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
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

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In This Issue

The October issue contains three articles and an *AHR* Forum, along with our usual extensive book review section. The articles take us first to the moon (in the company of seventeenth-century English writers), then to late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Africa, and finally to the Roman Empire. The Forum is on the timely subject of anti-Americanism.

Articles

In “Early Modern Space Travel and the English Man in the Moon,” **David Cressy** suggests that 1638 was England’s lunar moment. For it was about then that speculation about the plurality of worlds, the likelihood that the moon was inhabited, and the possibility of space travel bringing humans and lunar creatures into contact fostered a veritable lunar discourse among clerics and others in Stuart England, drawing upon ancient and medieval astronomical, theological, and literary traditions. Cressy demonstrates that lunar interest was hardly limited to astronomical or scientific circles. Indeed, a high proportion of those who wrote about the moon were churchmen who wondered how lunar inhabitants would fit into Christian history and whether they too were the seed of Adam. Cressy’s article shows that in a post-Copernican, post-Reformation, and post-Columbian Europe, the bounds of wonderment were virtually unlimited.

Derek Peterson’s “Morality Plays: Marriage, Church Courts, and Colonial Agency in Central Tanganyika, ca. 1876–1928” offers a corrective to conventional views of Africa’s legal history as defined in terms of a perpetual contest between modern governance and inflexible tradition. The essay focuses on the history of conjugal litigation in late-nineteenth-century Tanganyika. Anglican missionaries used record books and marriage certificates to define marriage as a contract authorized by God, thus allowing them to punish extramarital sex as adultery. Litigants, however, were hardly passive in the face of such efforts; they learned to use these bureaucratic modes of religious and social control to their own advantage. Husbands and wives entered into the legal process by articulating their own interests and complaints in a recognizable moral discourse that could draw judges’ attention and sympathy. In this way, they were able to pursue claims concerning such pertinent issues as wives’ deference, payment of bridewealth, or marital residence. By naming their spouses

as adulterers, litigants could co-opt judges, who were bound to punish wrongdoers, to rule in matters of fundamental importance to them. Peterson's article contributes to the growing literature on colonial agency in an African context.

"Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani: Concepts of Citizenship and Legal Identity of Barbarians in the Later Roman Empire" by **Ralph W. Mathisen** offers us an example of an expanding empire of many different peoples confronting the vexed question of inclusion through the granting of citizenship. In the Roman case, the question was merely opened, not decided, in 212 C.E., with the emperor Caracalla's issuance of the Antonine Constitution. Mathisen notes that, contrary to what is generally thought, this move did not put an end to distinctions created by different kinds of citizenship—civic, provincial, religious, and ethnic. Roman citizenship encompassed all of these, creating an assortment of personal and legal identities. And this very complexity defined how Romans dealt with barbarian settlers. Caracalla's grant was meant to be self-perpetuating, with Roman citizenship offered to "barbarian" foreigners who subsequently settled in the Empire. Barbarian settlers and their descendants had the opportunity to make use of Roman civil law in the same way it was used by other Roman citizens. Evolving concepts of citizenship thus facilitated the integration of foreign, barbarian populations into the western Roman world during the fifth and sixth centuries. Mathisen's article offers a distant model of how citizenship can be made inclusive.

AHR Forum


The *AHR* Forum, "Historical Perspectives on Anti-Americanism," looks at this phenomenon from four different parts of the world. **Greg Grandin's** "Your Americanism and Mine: Americanism and Anti-Americanism in the Americas" begins with the emergence of the concept itself, showing that it was first voiced in the nineteenth century as a charge against supporters of European tariffs placed on U.S. goods. In the early twentieth century, commentators broadened the definition of "anti-Americanism" to cover the growing popular opposition to American power. That Latin Americans, especially during the early Cold War years, challenged the U.S. largely from the standpoint of the liberal democratic ideals it claimed to espouse, created a serious crisis of legitimacy for Washington. In response, policy elites, scholars, and pundits marshaled the concept of "anti-Americanism," drawing on ideas associated with psychology and psychoanalysis—resentment, fear, and ambivalence—to argue that eruptions in Venezuela, Cuba, and elsewhere sprang not from legitimate grievances, but from dislocation and uncertainty caused by the transition to modernity. They forged "anti-Americanism" into a malleable interpretive concept that served to link Latin America's revolutionary nationalist movements to a general assumption that the "third world" was in revolt against modernity.

"Always Blame the Americans," **Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht's** contribution to the Forum, looks at debates about philo- and anti-Americanism in Eastern, Western, and Southern Europe from 1776 to September 11. She argues that European anti-

Americanism has had very little to do with the U.S. or its policies, and even less with transatlantic relations. European anti-Americanism is not monolithic or constant, but heterogeneous and episodic in its eruptions. Most important, she insists, anti-Americanism cannot be understood without its flip side, philo-Americanism. Indeed, the tension between the two embodies the very condition necessary for both: high expectations and bitter disillusionment are always conjoined. European anti-Americanism has always been fueled by defenders of European culture, conservatives, and a strain of elitism, while the fascination with Taylorism, Fordism, technology, and sports has consistently fostered its opposite, philo-Americanism.

As a region of enormous diversity of cultures and political systems, Asia's contacts with America are varied as well, making generalizations about Asian anti-Americanism difficult. Nevertheless, **Warren I. Cohen** and **Nancy Bernkopf Tucker**, in "America in Asian Eyes," see a pattern that spans this diversity over more than a hundred years. Asians find much in America to admire and emulate, but they are also troubled by the role the United States has played in the region and in the world at large. They lament the inability of the U.S. to act in accordance with its rhetorical commitment to its liberal values, especially democracy and self-determination. Thus Asians questioned American's anti-imperialism in the wake of U.S. actions in the Philippines and doubted the commitment to self-determination when, in the years after World War I, Wilson's inspirational words proved increasingly meaningless. The Cold War reinforced images of the United States as the land of opportunity and freedom, but Washington's support for regional dictators, the behavior of American troops in Asia, and the war in Vietnam only lent credence to communist anti-American propaganda. It is perhaps not surprising that anti-Americanism has soared in Asia's Muslim countries since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Less predictable has been the sharp decline in favorable views of the U.S. throughout the region, partly for local reasons, but largely because of the widespread perception of American arrogance.

Finally, **Juan Cole's** "Anti-Americanism: It's the Policies" comments on the Forum as a whole, offering a critique of some of the authors' interpretations as well as the underlying logic of their analyses. Drawing upon contemporary opinion polls and quantitative studies, he also is able to provide evidence on what is undoubtedly the region where contemporary anti-Americanism is both most pronounced and of greatest concern: the Middle East.



FRONTISPIECE: The early modern moon. From Johannes Hevelius, *Selenographia: Sive, Lunae descriptio; atque accurata . . . delineatio. In quâ simul cæterorum omnium planetarum nativæ facies, variæque observationes . . . figuris accuratissimè æri incisus, sub aspectum ponuntur* (Gdansk, 1647), fig. Q. Huntington Library rare book 487000:1040. Reproduced with permission.

Early Modern Space Travel and the English Man in the Moon

DAVID CRESSY

THE MOON, FOR EARLY MODERN ENGLISHMEN, was comfortingly familiar yet achingly distant. Countrymen looked to the moon, “the queen of heaven,” to understand “alterations and changes of humors, times, seasons,” and perturbations of “man’s body, the air, and all other things under her orb.” The moon and its phases helped regulate mundane activities, from the planting of crops to the letting of blood, as well as governed the washing of the tides.¹ Lunar light facilitated nighttime journeys. Lunar features stirred the imagination. From ancient times to the age of the telescope, sky-watchers speculated about the “face in the moon” or the “man in the moon,” and occasionally wondered whether lunar eyes were looking down on them.

The Roman Greek Plutarch (ca. 45–125) had written “of the face appearing in the roundel of the moon,” and his work was available in English by 1603. Plutarch’s moon was most likely inhabited either by creatures “light, active and nimble of body” or by “daemons” or departed souls.² The poet Edmund Spenser (1552–1599) wondered, “what if within the moon’s fair shining sphere, what if in every other star unseen, of other worlds he happily should hear?” Rhetorically, for Spenser, the moon was a bridge from the newfound lands of America to the undiscovered world of “faerie land.”³ The new global geography and the new astronomical science of late Renaissance Europe brought fresh attention to the lunar sphere. Churchmen, philosophers, and creative writers became fascinated with the properties of the populated moon. Their earnest inquiries were sometimes tinged with merriment and scorn, and jokes about “the man in the moon” became standard early modern fare.⁴

I am indebted to Mordechai Feingold, Matt Goldish, and Robert Westman, and to the *AHR*’s anonymous readers, for their comments on earlier versions of this essay.

¹ Edward Pond, *A President for Prognosticators: MDCIX* (London, 1609), sig. C4.

² Plutarch, *The Philosophie, Commonlie Called, the Morals . . . Translated out of Greeke into English, and Conferred with the Latine Translations and the French*, by Philemon Holland (London, 1603), 1159, 1179, 1184.

³ Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queen* [1590], ed. Thomas P. Roche, Jr. (New Haven, Conn., 1981), 204, Proem to book II.

⁴ See, for example, John Lyly, *Endymion*, ed. David Bevington (Manchester, 1996), 78; “The Man in the Moon’s Almanack,” Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ms. Rawlinson D. 398, fols. 237b–238; W. M., *The Man in the Moone, Telling Strange Fortunes* (London, 1609). “Selenicus,” the man in the moon, was equated with “Tom-a-Bedlam” in *Endymion* 1663; or, *The Man-in-the-Moon His Northern Weather-Glass* (London, 1663). *The Man in the Moon, Discovering a World of Knavery under the Sunne*, a scurrilous and subversive serial publication of 1649–1651, is discussed in David Underdown, *A Freeborn People: Politics and the Nation in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford, 1996), 95–99. Another Interregnum satire written “between jest and earnest” wondered “whether it be not expedient to employ an ambassador to the man in the moon, to procure habitations for our new courtiers,” and proposed that Dr. Wilkins, “in

English churchmen and virtuosi of the reign of Charles I (1625–1649) drew on ancient and medieval speculations about the plurality of worlds and toyed with the possibility of travel to the moon. With their continental counterparts, they explored notions of space travel and struggled to accommodate imagined extraterrestrial beings to Christian history. Rather than treating these musings in terms of the history of science, as is common among the few scholars who have noted them, my purpose is to locate these texts within the cultural and religious context of Stuart and Revolutionary England.⁵ While taking seriously the works of early modern lunar enthusiasts, I have tried to be attentive to their sometimes playful tone.

A series of publications in the late 1630s put the moon and its inhabitants, and the likelihood of traveling to meet them, into the national conversation. The key texts, which were available together at London bookstalls, were John Wilkins, *The Discovery of a World in the Moone; or, A Discourse Tending to Prove, That 'Tis Probable There May Be Another Habitable World in That Planet* (1638); Francis Godwin, *The Man in the Moone; or, A Discourse of a Voyage Thither, by Domingo Gonsales* (1638); and Wilkins's revised and expanded edition of *A Discourse Concerning a New World & Another Planet* (1640).⁶ All were published anonymously, though their authorship rapidly became known.

Wilkins argued that the moon was inhabited, but the nature of its inhabitants remained uncertain. Godwin gave an account of a Spanish adventurer who harnessed migrant birds to take him to the moon. There he found a kind of paradise with peace and plenty, and lunar creatures instinctively inclined toward Christianity. Wilkins's revised edition took note of Godwin and gave more attention to the possibilities and benefits of space travel.

These works, along with the literary, cosmological, and religious treatises that preceded them, and the disputations, entertainments, and translations that followed, were inspired both by the geographical discoveries of the age of Columbus and by the heliocentric discourse of the Copernican revolution. They were also energized by the soteriological concerns of Christianity, refracted and intensified by the Reformation. They raised important questions about humanity's location within the universe, and the interplay of science and the imagination with the truths of revealed religion. Had God in his plenitude created one world or many? Was humankind the unique focus of divine attention, or were there creatures on other planets enjoying

regard he hath the greatest knowledge in that new plantation," be engaged "to conduct them thither"; *Democritus Turned States-Man* (London, 1659), title page, sigs. A2–A2v. See also *A Tragi-Comedy, Called New-Market-Fayre* (London, 1649), purportedly written by "the man in the moon," and *The Man in the Moon Drinks Claret* (London, 1660?). For London taverns named for "The Man in the Moon," see John Taylor, *Taylor's Travels and Circular Perambulation* (London, 1636), sig. A3v, and Taylor, *A Preter-Plu-perfect Spick and Span* (Oxford, 1643), 12.

⁵ Pioneers of this subject include Marjorie Hope Nicolson, *Voyages to the Moon* (New York, 1948); Steven J. Dick, *Plurality of Worlds: The Origins of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate from Democritus to Kant* (Cambridge, 1982); and Scott L. Montgomery, *The Moon and the Western Imagination* (Tucson, Ariz., 1999). See also Karl S. Guthke, "Nightmare and Utopia: Extraterrestrial Worlds from Galileo to Goethe," *Early Science and Medicine* 8 (2003): 173–195.

⁶ [John Wilkins], *The Discovery of a World in the Moone; or, A Discourse Tending to Prove, That 'Tis Probable There May Be Another Habitable World in That Planet* (London, 1638), licensed by the bishop of London's chaplain, March 29, 1638, entered in the Stationers' register on March 30; [Francis Godwin], *The Man in the Moone; or, A Discourse of a Voyage Thither by Domingo Gonsales* (London, 1638), registered on August 1, 1638; [Wilkins], *A Discourse Concerning a New World & Another Planet* (London, 1640).

God's love and suffering his anger? If there were inhabitants on other worlds, were they, like us, the seed of Adam and participants in original sin, and did they benefit from Christ's atonement and enjoy the prospect of eternal life? Or did Christ die only for us, leaving any other creatures to a kind of limbo or perdition? Supposing the moon to be inhabited, among a plurality of populated worlds, what kind of society prevailed on that planet, and what could we on earth learn from it? Was there any means to resolve these questions by actually traveling there and back? These were ancient questions, revived in the Middle Ages, but they received new stimulus from the new astronomy, and from recent discoveries with the telescope and the compass.

To these contemporary questions we can add others that emerge from modern scholarship. What was the cultural and religious context of these seventeenth-century writings, and what did they owe to earlier discussions? In what manner or tone did the authors present their positions, and how did readers react to them? How did religious, scientific, and literary voices collide in the fractured worlds of post-Copernican, post-Reformation Europe, and in the contested cultures of early modern England? Who were the participants in these discourses, what other texts had they read, and who was saying what to whom?

THE CONVERSATION IN STUART ENGLAND about the inhabited moon was part of a larger European discussion about the mechanics and population of the universe that went back to ancient Greece. It was stimulated by Renaissance voyaging and geography, with frequent comparisons to America, which had been unknown before Columbus, and to the Antipodes, most of which remained undiscovered. It was propelled by the sixteenth-century configuration of the solar system, and by refinements and popularizations of the new astronomy. And it was further shaped by traditions of literary satire, from Lucian to Ariosto, by way of More's *Utopia*, that invented worlds or islands that reflected human frailties or follies.

The findings and theories of the new astronomy reinvigorated ancient and medieval notions of the plurality of worlds. Seventeenth-century theorists became increasingly willing to contemplate an infinite and populated universe, assuring their readers that this conjecture was compatible with revealed Christian religion. The acceptance of such beliefs involved rejection of the authority of Aristotle, and rejection, too, of a narrow literalist reading of Holy Scripture.

Pre-Socratic Pythagoreans had put forward the notion that the moon was "terrestrial," a kind of "celestial earth." Followers of Epicurus, Lucretius, and the ancient Greek atomists imagined the seeds of life spread through innumerable worlds.⁷ Despite having been denied by Aristotle and rejected by mainstream theologians, a Christianized variant of the belief in plural worlds reappeared in medieval Europe. The thirteenth-century St. Bonaventure believed that God *could* have created other

⁷ Many of these early theorists are cited in Walter Charleton, *Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletoniana; or, A Fabrick of Natural Science upon the Hypothesis of Atoms* (London, 1654), and Pierre Borel, *A New Treatise, Proving a Multiplicity of Worlds* (London, 1658). See also Grant McColley, "The Seventeenth-Century Doctrine of a Plurality of Worlds," *Annals of Science* 1 (1936): 385–387; Dick, *Plurality of Worlds*, 1–11; Milton K. Munitz, "One Universe or Many?" in Philip P. Wiener and Aaron Noland, eds., *Roots of Scientific Thought: A Cultural Perspective* (New York, 1957); Paolo Rossi, "Nobility of Man and Plurality of Worlds," in Allen G. Debus, ed., *Science, Medicine, and Society in the Renaissance*, 2 vols. (New York, 1972), 2: 131–162.

worlds, although there was no evidence or revelation that he did so. The doctrine of "the plenitude of God" encouraged fifteenth-century thinkers such as William of Vorilong and Nicholas of Cusa to conceive of life on other planets.⁸

William of Vorilong (1390–1463) imagined a plurality of worlds, all redeemed in principle by the sacrifice of Christ. "If it be inquired whether men exist on that [other] world, and whether they have sinned as Adam sinned, I answer no," he wrote, "for they would not exist in sin and did not spring from Adam . . . As to the question whether Christ by dying on this Earth could redeem the inhabitants of another world, I answer that he is able to do this even if the worlds were infinite, but it would not be fitting for him to go unto another world that he must die again."⁹

Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) likewise posited a boundless universe whose inhabitants owed their origin to God, "who is the centre and circumference of all stellar regions."¹⁰ John Wilkins read Cusanus as saying that lunar inhabitants, although not "infected with Adam's sin, yet perhaps they had some of their own, which make them liable to the same misery with us, out of which, perhaps, they were delivered by the same means as we, the death of Christ."¹¹

Post-Copernican advocates of divine plenitude and the plurality of worlds included the renegade Dominicans Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) and Tomasso Campanella (1568–1634) and, with some reservations, the astronomer Johannes Kepler (1571–1630). Bruno's work, including his account of an imaginary journey to the moon, was absorbed into the Englishman Nicholas Hill's *Philosophia Epicurea, Democritiana, Theophrastica* (1601).¹² French intellectuals in the 1630s hedged their bets by arguing that while God's omnipotence allowed him to create an infinite abundance of creatures, "his immense goodness seems to be restrained in the creation of but one world, and of but one kind." (In other words, he could have, but he didn't.) These ideas circulated as part of the international traffic in lunar and celestial cosmology that connected Paris and Padua to Oxford, Cambridge, and London. Belief in the plurality of worlds did not go against faith, these thinkers concluded, and was in "no way dangerous of itself, but only in the consequences the weakness of human wit would draw from it."¹³

⁸ Grant McColley and H. W. Miller, "Saint Bonaventure, Francis Mayron, William Vorilong, and the Doctrine of a Plurality of Worlds," *Speculum* 12 (1937): 386–389; Pierre Duhem, *Medieval Cosmology: Theories of Infinity, Place, Time, Void, and Plurality of Worlds* (Chicago, 1985), 431–510; Amos Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century* (Princeton, N.J., 1986), 141; Edward Grant, *Planets, Stars, and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos, 1200–1687* (Cambridge, 1994), 150–168.

⁹ William of Vorilong, *Quattuor librorum Sententiarum* (Basel, 1510), quoted in McColley, "Seventeenth-Century Doctrine," 402; McColley and Miller, "Saint Bonaventure," 388.

¹⁰ Nicholas of Cusa, *Idiota de sapientia, de mente, de staticis experimentis* [Of Learned Ignorance], quoted in Dick, *Plurality*, 41; McColley, "Seventeenth-Century Doctrine," 399, 402.

¹¹ Wilkins, *Discovery*, 189.

¹² Giordano Bruno, *De l'infinito universo et mundi* (London, 1584); Campanella, *Apologia pro Galileo* (Frankfurt, 1622); Nicolaus Hill, *Philosophia Epicurea, Democritiana, Theophrastica* (Paris, 1601, and Geneva, 1619). For Hill's influence, see Daniel Massa, "Giordano Bruno's Ideas in Seventeenth-Century England," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 38 (1977): 227–242.

¹³ Théophraste Renaudot, comp., "Recueil général des questions traitées es conférences du Bureau d'adresse," in George Havers, trans., *A General Collection of Discourses of the Virtuosi of France* (London, 1664), 537; Kathleen Wellman, *Making Science Social: The Conferences of Théophraste Renaudot, 1633–1642* (Norman, Okla., 2003), 125. Gabriel Naudé warned in 1640 of the dangerous heresies "that the astronomers want to introduce with their worlds, or rather lunar and celestial earths"; quoted in Rossi, "Nobility of Man," 131.

For most of Christian history, the idea of the plurality of worlds was regarded as mistaken, eccentric, or blasphemous. Saints Augustine and Aquinas had developed a localist terrestrial theology, and this was reiterated by the sixteenth-century Lutheran Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560): “God is a citizen of this world with us, custodian and server of this world, ruling the motion of the heavens, guiding the constellations, making this earth fruitful, and indeed watching over us; we do not contrive to have him in another world, and to watch over other men also . . . Our master Jesus Christ was born, died, and resurrected in this world. Nor does he manifest himself elsewhere, nor elsewhere has he died or resurrected. Therefore it must not be imagined that there are many worlds, because it must not be imagined that Christ died or was resurrected more often, nor must it be thought that in any other world without the knowledge of the son of God, that men would be restored to eternal life.”¹⁴

This was a European debate that cut across confessional divisions, and it did not depend on belief in a Copernican solar system. Protestant reformers were not necessarily enthusiasts for the new astronomy or for the plurality of worlds; nor were early modern Catholics necessarily against it. “Fie upon this infinity or multitude of worlds. There is one and no more,” insisted the French Calvinist theologian Lambert Daneau, whose work appeared in English in 1578 as *The Wonderfull Woorkmanship of the World*. Any talk of “many and sundry worlds” was at best “foolish and childish,” at worst “blasphemous,” Daneau insisted, for Scripture records “the special visible works of God” in “this one world only.”¹⁵ Aristotle’s position, “Non plures mundi sunt,” “There are no more worlds, nor more can be,” was endorsed by the early Stuart author Thomas Heywood: “Manifest it is, that there is but one world.” The idea of the solitary uniqueness of our world was linked to understandings of the immobility of the earth, and both were upheld by cosmological conservatives.¹⁶ The conviction that our world alone was inhabited still had many adherents, but by the middle of the seventeenth century they were generally in retreat.

SEVERAL CONVERGENT TRADITIONS GAVE SHAPE to Stuart English discussion of the populated moon and planets, only some of which have been noted in the specialist literature. The works of Godwin and Wilkins are well known in histories of science and astronomy, and they are sometimes mentioned in histories of travel.¹⁷ But the religious and ethnographic implications of space exploration are hardly ever mentioned. Although this was the aspect of the lunar encounter that most exercised contemporaries, the linkage of the plurality of worlds to questions of sin and salvation remains *terra incognita*. Just as religion in history may be too important to be

¹⁴ Phillip Melanchthon, *Initia Doctrina Physicae* (Wittenberg, 1550), quoted in Dick, *Plurality*, 89.

¹⁵ Lambert Daneau, *The Wonderfull Woorkmanship of the World* (London, 1578), 25–27.

¹⁶ Thomas Heywood, *The Hierarchie of the Blessed Angels* (London, 1635), 153–154. See also John Swan, *Speculum Mundi; or, A Glasse Representing the Face of the World* (Cambridge, 1635), 210–228; George Hakewill, *An Apologie of the Power and Providence of God in the Government of the World*, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1635); Andreas Tacquet, *Opera Mathematica* (Antwerp, 1669), section on astronomy.

¹⁷ Percy G. Adams, *Travel Literature and the Evolution of the Novel* (Lexington, Ky., 1983), 261, 275; A. G. H. Bachrach, “Lunar Mendax: Some Reflections on Moon-Voyages in Early Seventeenth-Century England,” in Dominic Baker-Smith and C. C. Barfoot, eds., *Between Dream and Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia* (Amsterdam, 1987), 70–90; Mary Baine Campbell, “Impossible Voyages: Seventeenth-Century Space Travel and the Impulse of Ethnology,” *Literature and History*, 3rd series 6 (1997): 1–17.

left to historians of the churches, so there may be more to say about the cultural history of the man in the moon than is claimed by historians of astronomy. The history of science was mostly a twentieth-century invention, whereas most of the writers discussed here regarded themselves as participants in the work of religion.¹⁸

The strand most often commented upon in modern scholarship locates these works from Caroline England within the European history of science, as part of the popularization of the heliocentric astronomical system.¹⁹ They are seen as part of the path to modernity, part of the Scientific Revolution. Early Stuart England, no less than the rest of late Renaissance Europe, took part in the processing, refining, and absorption of the observations and calculations of Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Galileo, and Kepler—the canonical figures of the new astronomy. The Roman Catholic condemnation of Copernicanism only drew more attention to its theories, and may have recommended them to Protestant Europe. Galileo's telescopic discoveries of 1609 had been made available internationally in the *Sidereus Nuncius* (1610), followed in 1632 by his *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*. Tomasso Campanella's *Apologia Pro Galileo* had been published in 1622. Kepler, the mathematician of planetary motion, had died in 1630, but his *Somnium* on lunar astronomy and lunar voyaging circulated in manuscript and was published in Frankfurt in 1634. The new experimental philosophy of Francis Bacon also made headway among English cognoscenti, with four editions of *Sylva Sylvarum* between 1627 and 1639, and *New Atlantis* republished in 1635. Those with a taste for French philosophical novelty could also turn to René Descartes, whose *Discourse on Method* appeared in 1637, the same year as Claude Mellan's engravings of Pierre Gassendi's maps of the moon. Seeking practical benefit as well as philosophical illumination, many Europeans at the time believed that lunar observations could unlock the mystery of longitude.²⁰

English readers of the 1630s could also turn to a variety of literary work that featured lunar adventures. They could draw on ancient and modern traditions, satires and speculations, available in recent editions. Francis Hicks's English translation of *Certaine Select Dialogues of Lucian Together with His True History*, originally in second-century Greek, was published at Oxford in 1634. It included two accounts of trips to the moon, one involving sailors beyond the Pillars of Hercules who were carried aloft by a whirlwind to the "shining island" of the moon, which they found "to be both inhabited and husbanded." Another relates the exploits of "the lofty traveler" Menippus, who outdid Icarus in equipping himself with wings and, leaping "directly towards heaven," was able to look back at the earth from the surface of the moon.²¹ Also appearing in 1634 was a new edition of Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*

¹⁸ The journal *Isis* was founded in 1912, the History of Science Society in 1924. In 1936, the first issue of *Annals of Science* ("an international review of the history of science and technology since the Renaissance") included Grant McColley, "The Second Edition of *The Discovery of a World in the Moone*," 330–334, and McColley, "The Seventeenth-Century Doctrine of a Plurality of Worlds," 385–430.

¹⁹ John L. Russell, "The Copernican System in Great Britain," in Jerzy Dobrzycki, ed., *The Reception of Copernicus' Heliocentric Theory* (Dordrecht, 1972), 189–239.

²⁰ Most of these works feature in standard histories of astronomy. The Englishman Thomas Harriot preceded Galileo's observations with the telescope by several months, but did not describe his discoveries in print. Ewen A. Whitaker, *Mapping and Naming the Moon: A History of Lunar Cartography and Nomenclature* (Cambridge, 1999), 25–32; Montgomery, *The Moon and the Western Imagination*, 29, 151–153, 165. See also Eileen Reeves, *Painting the Heavens: Art and Science in the Age of Galileo* (Princeton, N.J., 1997).

²¹ [Lucian], *Certaine Select Dialogues of Lucian, Together with His True History*, trans. Francis Hicks (Oxford, 1634), 109–111, 9–16.

(translated by Sir John Harington), in which the English knight Astolfo is transported to the moon in Elijah's fiery chariot, and finds there everything lost on earth, including the hero's wits. John Milton was sufficiently impressed by this passage to cite it in his 1641 pamphlet *Of Reformation*. A later-seventeenth-century reader would refer to this episode as "one of the most pleasant fooleries in all Ariosto."²² Adding to the mix in 1634 and 1635 were new editions of John Donne's *Ignatius His Conclave* (originally published in 1611), which imagined Lucifer and the Jesuits establishing "a church in the moon" to "reconcile the lunatic church" with the Church of Rome.²³ Christopher Grienberger (d. 1636), a Jesuit mathematician sympathetic to Galileo, had reportedly already "found out a way of flying," and an English follower, the instrument maker William Gascoigne, allegedly commenced aviation experiments in 1635.²⁴ Was it amusing or horrifying to imagine the Jesuits winning the space race?

By 1638, the year of publication of Wilkins and Godwin, a wide range of modern scientific treatises were available in English and in Latin, alongside satires and entertainments about the man in the moon. The same year saw the fifth edition of Robert Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (first published in 1621), in which the author, like Godwin and Wilkins a cleric of the Church of England, displayed his evolving currency with the new astronomical literature.²⁵ It was in that year, too, most likely, that the young John Milton, traveling in Italy, visited the aging Galileo and beheld the plains of night through the Tuscan astronomer's "optic glass."²⁶ The year 1638 could well be considered England's lunar moment. There was a quickening interest not just in the mechanics and mathematics of planetary motion, but also in what we might call the ethnography or cultural geography of outer space.

The twenty-four-year-old John Wilkins (1614–1672) burst onto the scene that year with a bombshell, arguing vigorously that the idea of a populated moon "doth not contradict any principle of reason or faith."²⁷ Wilkins was an Oxford-educated Puritan, a grandson and protégé of the godly John Dod, a young man at odds with the Laudian ascendancy. His publisher, Michael Sparke, was a religious radical who had been punished for his association with the Puritan controversialist William

²² Ludovico Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso in English Heroical Verse*, by Sr. Iohn Harington (London, 1634), book 34; John Milton, *Of Reformation* (London, 1641), 31; Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes* (Paris, 1686), trans. Aphra Behn as *A Discovery of New Worlds* (London, 1688), reprinted in Janet Todd, ed., *The Works of Aphra Behn*, 7 vols. (Columbus, Ohio, 1992–1996), 4: 118.

²³ John Donne, *Ignatius His Conclave; or, His Inthronisation in a Late Election in Hell* (London, 1611), 118. New editions appeared in 1626, 1634, and 1635. See also William Empson, "Donne the Space Man," *The Kenyon Review* 19 (1957): 337–399, for Donne's early interest in space travel.

²⁴ Pasquale M. D'Elia, *Galileo in China: Relations through the Roman College between Galileo and the Jesuit Scientist-Missionaries (1610–1640)* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 8; Oliver Lawson Dick, ed., *Aubrey's Brief Lives* (Harmondsworth, 1982), 280.

²⁵ Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, 5th ed. (Oxford, 1638), 254–255; Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling, and Rhonda L. Blair, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1989), 2: 53; Richard G. Barlow, "Infinite Worlds: Robert Burton's Cosmic Voyage," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 34 (1973): 291–302. Robert Burton (1577–1640) was a cleric at Christ Church, Oxford, with ecclesiastical livings in Oxfordshire, Lincolnshire, and Leicestershire.

²⁶ John Milton, *Areopagitica* (London, 1644), 24. Milton later wrote of "other worlds" and "imagined lands and regions in the moon"; *Paradise Lost*, book V, l. 263, book VIII, l. 175, in H. C. Beeching, ed., *The Poetical Works of John Milton* (Oxford, 1900), 278, 338. See also Derek N. C. Wood, "Milton and Galileo," *Milton Quarterly* 35 (2001): 50–52.

²⁷ Wilkins, *Discovery*, 24.

Prynne.²⁸ Recently ordained in 1638, Wilkins had found employment as private chaplain to Lord Saye and Sele, a Puritan nobleman with transatlantic as well as oppositional political interests. But Wilkins's Puritanism was determinedly moderate, a precursor of his famed latitudinarianism. He would go on to a spectacular career as a philosopher and preacher, thriving under changing regimes as warden of Wadham College, Oxford; master of Trinity College, Cambridge; brother-in-law of Oliver Cromwell; a founder of the Royal Society; and eventually bishop of Chester. Wilkins is a celebrity in the history of science, and his early views on the moon were never repudiated and were frequently republished.²⁹

Although it was introduced as a discourse for the reader's "leisure hours" and "the fruit of some lighter studies," Wilkins's *The Discovery of a World in the Moone* was a serious work, steeped in Renaissance astrophysics and Christian scholarship. The claim of slightness gave it cover in case anyone raised objections. Wilkins acknowledged that when he first began to think of the moon world, "it seemed such an uncouth opinion that I never durst discover it for fear of being counted singular and ridiculous. But afterwards, having read Plutarch, Galileo, Kepler, with some others, and finding so many of my own thoughts confirmed by such strong authority," he launched into his lunar propositions.³⁰

Just because it sounded strange was no reason for the idea of an inhabited moon to be rejected. After all, Wilkins reminded readers, Columbus's contemporaries had laughed "when he promised to discover another part of the earth." "Other truths have been formerly accounted as ridiculous as this," including the existence of the Antipodes, "which have been denied and laughed at by many wise and great scholars." (It was only a few years since enterprising English investors had petitioned Charles I to discover and colonize "the lands in the south part of the world called *Terra Australis incognita*.") Like the modernist Francis Bacon (whom he calls "judicious Verulam"), Wilkins was confident that "many secret truths which the ancients have passed over . . . are yet left to make some of our age famous for their discovery." If not us, then perhaps "our posterity" will discover "truths . . . which we now desire, but cannot know," including an invention "for a conveyance to the moon."³¹

The bulk of Wilkins's tract was a popularization of Copernican cosmology, explaining the motions of the planets. But its most arresting conjectures dealt with the "inhabitants in this other world," and the possibilities of lunar travel. The moon and other planets were populated, Wilkins argued, although "of what kind they are is uncertain." He named the moon-dwellers "Selenites" but refused to speculate about

²⁸ Dod (with Robert Cleaver) was the veteran nonconformist author of *A Plaine and Familiar Exposition of the Ten Commandments* (19th ed. by 1635). Sparke, the author of *Crumms of Comfort* (10th ed. by 1629), had been pilloried and fined for publishing Prynne's ill-fated *Histriomastix* (1633).

²⁹ Wilkins was at Magdalen Hall, Oxford, from 1627 to 1637. For his career, see *The Mathematical and Philosophical Works of the Right Reverend John Wilkins* (London, 1708); Barbara J. Shapiro, *John Wilkins, 1614–1672: An Intellectual Biography* (Berkeley, Calif., 1969); Allan Chapman, "'A World in the Moon': John Wilkins and His Lunar Voyage of 1640," *Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society* 32 (1991): 121–132. His work was in French by 1656 as *Le Monde dans la Lune . . . De la traduction du Sr de la Montagne* (Rouen, 1656). Fourth and fifth English editions appeared in 1684. See also John Wilkins, *Mathematical and Philosophical Works* (London, 1708).

³⁰ Wilkins, *Discovery*, A3, 22.

³¹ *Ibid.*, A4, 1, 3, 6, 208–209 misprinted as 107. For the enterprise of *Terra Australis* in 1625, see British National Archives, SP/16/14/33.

their characteristics. "Whether they are the seed of Adam, whether they are there in a blessed estate, or else what means there may be for their salvation" were "difficult questions" that could not be addressed at the time by an author who was studiously avoiding both fiction and theological controversy.³²

When Wilkins published his conjectures, he did not know that another English book on lunar exploration was almost simultaneously to appear in print. *The Man in the Moone; or, A Discourse of a Voyage Thither* reports the fanciful extraterrestrial adventure of Domingo Gonsales, a Spanish merchant who managed to harness large birds or "gansas" (Spanish for "geese") to fly him between islands, and ultimately to transport him to the moon. Published anonymously, it was immediately identified as the work of "a late reverend and learned bishop," Francis Godwin. Godwin (1562–1633) was the moderate Calvinist bishop of Hereford, a somewhat slack diocesan and an industrious if unoriginal ecclesiastical historian. There remains some controversy about when his moon voyage was written, but it seems to have been influenced by Kepler and Galileo, whose work circulated in England in the 1620s.³³

Like Wilkins, who deflected criticism from his essay by referring to it as "the fruit of some lighter studies," Godwin described his account as "an essay of fancy, where invention is showed with judgment." He too invoked Columbus's "espial of America," which brought "the then unknown" into knowledge, as an analogue for lunar discovery. "That there should be an Antipodes was once thought as great a paradox as now that the moon should be inhabitable," he continued, "but the knowledge of this may seem more properly reserved for this our discovering age." For Godwin as much as Wilkins, the "new discovery of a new world" was among the projects of modernity.³⁴

Unlike Wilkins, who lamented his ignorance of the lunar inhabitants and could not immediately imagine how anyone could go to meet them, Godwin plunges into a fanciful Utopian travel narrative. Observing the migration of swan-like birds in the South Atlantic, Godwin's hero Gonsales wonders where they go out of season and concludes that it must be to the moon. Devising a kind of armature or frame to distribute his weight, he rigs up a harness to twenty-five of these "gansas," who carry him aloft and away. A charming and much-reproduced illustration shows him airborne. Freed from the earth's gravitational pull, the journey to the moon takes eleven or twelve days.

Arrived on the lunar surface, Gonsales finds it vegetated with trees and shrubs, and populated with colorful long-lived giants in a commonwealth of order and beauty, peace and plenty. This is an extraterrestrial world of delight and wonder, not the menacing society of later science fiction. Its inhabitants he finds "most strange,

³² Wilkins, *Discovery*, 24, 185–186, 207. Kepler had named his moon island "Levania," from the Hebrew, but commented, "I could have called it Selenitis"; Kepler, *Kepler's Somnium: The Dream; or, Posthumous Work on Lunar Astronomy*, trans. Edward Rosen (Madison, Wis., 1967), 14—based on the 1634 Frankfurt edition. Cf. Thomas Blount, *Glossographia; or, A Dictionary Interpreting All Such Hard Words* (1656): "selenites . . . lunary men, or people that are held by some to inhabit the moon."

³³ Francis Godwin, *The Man in the Moone and Nuncius Inanimatus* (Northampton, Mass., 1937); H. W. Lawton, "Bishop Godwin's *Man in the Moone*," *The Review of English Studies* 7 (1931): 23–55. On the identification of the author, see Wilkins, *Discourse*, 240. Godwin may have attended Giordano Bruno's Oxford lectures on the infinity of worlds; Anna Marie E. Roos, *Luminaries in the Natural World: The Sun and the Moon in England, 1400–1720* (New York, 2001), 135.

³⁴ Godwin, *Man in the Moone*, 2.

both for their feature, demeanor and apparel." The "Lunars," as Godwin calls them, are apparently disciplined and devout in their religion, and intuitively receptive to Christianity. On first encountering the inhabitants, says Gonsales, "being stricken with a great amazement, I crossed myself, and cried out Jesus Maria. No sooner was the word Jesus out of my mouth, but young and old fell all down upon their knees . . . holding up both their hands on high, and repeating all certain words which I understood not." Later, at the lunar court, "hearing the name of our savior, they all . . . fell down upon their knees." Theirs is a fairly mechanical form of religion (as most of Godwin's Protestant contemporaries judged Roman Catholicism), but, like native inhabitants of the terrestrial new world, they would seem good candidates for missionary work, to be brought to knowledge of salvation. Their behavior also exemplified St. Paul's assertion to the Philippians "that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth." The work was a great success. It was translated into French, German, and Dutch, and appeared in more than a dozen editions.³⁵

Godwin's *The Man in the Moone* prompted Wilkins to revise and reissue his treatise. "Having thus finished this discourse," he wrote in 1640, "I chanced upon a late fancy to this purpose under the fained name of Domingo Gonsales, written by a late reverend and learned bishop: in which . . . there is delivered a very pleasant and well contrived fancy concerning a voyage to this other world." Wilkins's 1638 text offered to prove the probability of a habitable world in the moon, but now he added "a discourse concerning the possibility of a passage thither." A new conclusion expanded the proposition "that 'tis possible for some of our posterity, to find out a conveyance to this other world; and if there be inhabitants there, to have commerce with them." Providence, he was confident, would "lead us on by degrees, from the knowledge of one thing to another," even if it turned out to be something other than harnessed "gansas."³⁶

Godwin's "fancy" led Wilkins to more thoughtful conjectures about "what means there may be . . . for ascending beyond the sphere of the earth's magnetical vigor." In 1638 he had expressed the hope that such things might one day be possible, but two years later his speculation had more range and force. How to get to the moon? Perhaps with human-powered wings, perhaps with the assistance of giant birds. "Or if neither of these ways will serve, yet I do seriously and upon good grounds affirm it possible to make a flying chariot; in which a man may sit, and give such a motion unto it, as shall convey him through the air"; or perhaps some other mechanical "engine . . . contrived from the same principles by which Archytas made a wooden dove and Regiomontanus a wooden eagle." (Other mechanisms for lunar travel imagined in the seventeenth century included dream trance, wing power, explosives, supernatural escorts, and elevation with heaven-seeking dew.) Wilkins's revised treatise ends by considering "the great benefit and pleasure to be had by such a journey."

³⁵ Ibid., 18–28, 31. It was published in French in 1648 as *L'Homme dans las Lune*, and in German in 1659 as *Der Fliegende Wandersmann nach dem Mond*. With at least twelve Continental editions by 1718, the English authorship of *The Man in the Moone* was easily forgotten. The Flemish lunar cartographer Michiel van Langren indirectly honored Godwin in 1645 by naming one of the lunar features "gansii"; Whitaker, *Mapping and Naming*, 41, 196. For extraterrestrial bowing, see Philippians 2:10.

³⁶ Wilkins, *Discourse*, 240, 203. This expanded edition was printed by John Norton, who had earlier printed Godwin's *The Man in the Moone*.




FIGURE 1: [Francis Godwin], *The Man in the Moone; or, A Discourse of a Voyage Thither; by F.G. B. of H.; to which is added Nuncius inanimatus*, written in Latin by the same author, and now Englished by a person of worth (London, 1657), frontispiece and title page. Huntington Library rare book 145245. Reproduced with permission.

The “pleasure and profit” of encountering “the persons, language, arts, policy, religion of those inhabitants, together with the new traffic that might be brought thence,” thought Wilkins, are likely to go “inconceivably beyond” the “discoveries in America.”³⁷ Similar arguments are still heard today among enthusiasts for space exploration.³⁸

ACTUAL LUNAR OBSERVATIONS WERE ASSISTED by printed almanacs, which in 1638 predicted two lunar eclipses. The first, in June, “will not be seen here in England, because it happeneth in our day time; but in the parts lying westward from us it will

³⁷ Wilkins, *Discourse*, 237–239, 242. The reference to flying engines recurs in John Wilkins, *Mathematicall Magick; or, The Wonders That May Be Performed by Mechanicall Geometry* (London, 1648), book 2, chap. 6, “Of the volant automata”; chap. 7, “Concerning the art of flying”; and chap. 8, “The possibility of a flying chariot.” Wilkins’s reference to “the earth’s magnetical vigor” evokes the work of William Gilbert, *De Magnete* (London, 1600).

³⁸ See, for example, NASA’s “Vision for Space Exploration”; SETI, the search for extraterrestrial intelligence; interest in inhabitable planets; and the emerging field of astrobiology.

be seen either in part or wholly,” predicted the almanac-maker Arthur Sofford.³⁹ It was in fact seen at Plymouth Colony in New England, and is reckoned the first astronomical event to be recorded in English America. The second lunar eclipse, “a very great one,” was predicted for the night of December 10, 1638, promising a spectacular display “if the clouds shadow her not from our sight.”⁴⁰

Dr. William Gilbert (1597–1640), another astronomically adept clergyman, rector of Orsett, Essex, set out to observe this 1638 eclipse, but reported that it was obscured by bad weather. Undismayed, he launched into an astro-religious “meditation” on the Copernican and Galileian revolution, “that *Hysteron Proteron* of opinions in translating the sun into the center and making it stationary, in advancing the earth up into an orb and making it ambulatory.” Gilbert, like many educated churchmen, had no quarrel with the new mathematical astronomy, or “what the world (now come to spectacles) hath by her optic eyes of glass lately discovered.” The problem, or question, was what it meant for revealed religion, and for humankind’s special relationship with God.⁴¹

“What all these things may import, I spare to speak,” Gilbert wrote to Archbishop James Usher, “that this earth may enjoy her own opinion, to have been the only work of God in his creation in this kind; yet of Saturn and Jupiter and others of that kind, with that rich and fair furniture about them [the recently discovered rings and moons], I only say, as upon the discovery of some sumptuous richly hung house and all shining with lights and torches, surely that house was not so made and furnished for rats and mice to dwell in.” Could there be Saturnians and Jupiterrians (or Selenites or Lunars), amid an infinite number of stars and lights, all made by God? If so, where did that leave us? “What great share enjoy we of those fathomless fountains of heat and light, those many glorious suns send out? Yet we must be (by our own account) the only creatures of excellency, for whom all these things were made? So might the spider, nested in the roof of the Grand Seignior’s Seraglio, say of herself, all that magnificent and stately structure set out and embellished with all antiquity and mosaic work was only built for her to hang up her webs and toils to take flies. We the glorious ants of this earth magnify ourselves upon this molehill here, to be the great and sole end of the world’s workmanship, whilst we consider not how little and nothing we are of it.” Gilbert’s “meditation” came dangerously close to displacing humans from the center of God’s attention (as well as likening humankind to ants, rats, or spiders), but he told Usher that he found it strangely calming to be persuaded of “God’s omneity and his own nothing,” and “the almost infinity of these

³⁹ Arthur Sofford, *A New Almanacke and Prognostication, for the Yeere of Our Lord God, 1638* (London, 1638).

⁴⁰ Ibid.; John White, *A New Almanacke and Prognostication, for the Yeere of Our Lord God 1638* (London, 1638).

⁴¹ Dr. William Gilbert to Archbishop of Armagh James Usher, Dublin, December 11, 1638, in Richard Parr, ed., *The Life of the Most Reverend Father in God, James Usher . . . With a Collection of Three Hundred Letters* (London, 1686), 492. William Gilbert was educated at St. John’s College, Cambridge (B.A. 1617, M.A. 1620, B.D. 1627, and D.D. 1632). Step-nephew of William Gilbert of Colchester, the author of *De Magnete* (and possibly inheritor of his papers), he was rector of Orsett from 1626 until his death in December 1640. He dedicated his sole publication, *Architectonice Consolationis; or, The Art of Building Comfort* (London, 1640), to Viscount Edward Conway, Marshal of Ireland, thanking him for fourteen years of favor. Usher’s interest in cosmography extended back at least to 1610, when he corresponded with Henry Briggs about Kepler and astronomy; Feingold, *Mathematician’s Apprenticeship*, 138–139.

creations." He ended by assuring the archbishop, "you shall not further need to fear that I will find out new worlds where God hath made none."⁴²

These were extraordinary words from an otherwise obscure clergyman who was moved to meditate on the plurality of worlds. They reveal some of the circulation of Galilean science alongside ancient notions of the populated heavens. They were exactly contemporary with the similar but more succinct formulations of John Wilkins, and part of a long tradition. It is remarkable, and well worth remarking, that many of the participants in this discussion were Church of England ministers—Wilkins, Godwin, Burton, Gilbert, Alexander Ross, and others. Between them they represented much of the spectrum of devotional style and practice within the divided Caroline church. Their cosmological speculations proceeded from their churchmanship, divinity, and theology, and may best be understood by reference to the religious culture they inhabited. Those inclined toward Puritanism were more likely than Laudians to espouse the new astronomy, although there was no robust cosmological division between religious radicals and conservatives.⁴³

The Oxford cleric Robert Burton (1577–1640) shared this fascination with "infinite habitable worlds," but he recognized that we could do little more than "calculate their motions" or visit them "in a poetical fiction, or a dream." Burton worried that if Kepler and his contemporaries were right, "that the moon is inhabited . . . that the earth is a moon, then are we also giddy, vertiginous and lunatic within this sub-lunary world." If indeed the planets are inhabited, "what proportion bear we to them, and where's our glory?" which was exactly William Gilbert's problem. "Who shall dwell in these vast bodies, earths, worlds, if they be inhabited," Burton persisted, "rational creatures, as Kepler demands? Or have they souls to be saved? Or do they inhabit a better part of the world than do we? Are we or they lords of the world? And how are all things made for man? *Difficile est nodum hunc expedire*," these are hard questions to determine. Few propositions could be so worrisome, and so unfathomable. In 1621, Burton had been skeptical of the theory of infinite worlds, but by 1638 he had come to accept it.⁴⁴

Wilkins, the heir to this tradition, was at pains to point out that a belief in the plurality of worlds "doth not contradict any principle of reason or faith." But he offered no answer to the question "whether [the inhabitants] are the seed of Adam, whether they are in a blessed estate, or else what means there may be for their

⁴² Parr, *Life of the Most Reverend Father in God*, 492–494. Acknowledging that "we cannot know God's purpose," Descartes in 1641 similarly thought it "absurd to think He created the universe solely for the praising of men, or the sun simply to provide mankind with light"; René Descartes to Endergeest August, in Paolo Rossi, "Nobility of Man and Plurality of Worlds," in Debus, *Science, Medicine, and Society in the Renaissance*, 2: 152.

⁴³ Richard Westfall, *Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England* (New Haven, Conn., 1958), 17, noted that many of the scientific virtuosi were "deeply religious" clergymen. Evoking the debate on the relationship of Puritanism and science, Charles Webster, "Puritanism, Separatism, and Science," in David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers, eds., *God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between Christianity and Science* (Berkeley, Calif., 1986), 198, 213, noted that "a long line of leading figures in science were ordained clergymen," and concluded that "any truly historical account of the Scientific Revolution must pay due attention to the deep interpenetration of scientific and religious ideas." See also Adrian Johns, "Prudence and Pedantry in Early Modern Cosmology: The Trade of Al Ross," *History of Science* 35 (1997): 23–59; Mordechai Feingold, "Science as a Calling? The Early Modern Dilemma," *Science in Context* 15 (2002): 79–119.

⁴⁴ Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, 1: 66, 297; 2: 53; Barlow, "Infinite Worlds," 301.

salvation.”⁴⁵ Wilkins had cautiously limited his speculations. Indeed, as an author of the 1630s, familiar with the reins of censorship, he was skilled at proceeding by feints and hints.⁴⁶ Writing in 1638, Wilkins deemed it “probable there may be inhabitants in this other world, but of what kind they are is uncertain.” Broaching the topic of the social or spiritual condition of the moon-dwellers, he repeatedly used the word “perhaps.” For Wilkins, as we have seen, the matter of lunar soteriology remained a “difficult question,” not yet capable of resolution. Rather than recruiting his lunar inhabitants for Christ, or denying them the benefits of the Atonement, Wilkins opted out from these “uncertain enquiries, which I shall willingly omit, leaving it to their examination, who have more leisure and learning for the search of such particulars.”⁴⁷

Wilkins is artfully reticent here, not unlike Godwin, whose Domingo Gonsales seems to censor his report of flying machines and signaling systems: “I must be advised how I be over liberal in publishing these wonderful mysteries till the sages of our state have considered how far the use of these things may stand with the policy and good government of our country.”⁴⁸ How did lunar speculations sit with the “sages” of the early Stuart state? Perhaps it was significant that Godwin left his work unpublished.

When the young Puritan Wilkins turned away from “difficult questions” and left off “uncertain enquiries,” was he alluding to contemporary inhibitions on theological disputation? Should we be hearing a code word, or perhaps a hint of satire? James I’s “Directions for Preachers” (1622) had restrained discussion of “unprofitable, unsound, seditious and dangerous doctrines,” especially “the deep points of predestination, election [or] reprobation.” Archbishop Abbot’s accompanying letter warned ministers away from “points of divinity too deep for the capacity of the people,” and “idle fancies which . . . boil in the brains.”⁴⁹ Charles I similarly declared his distaste for “unnecessary disputes which may trouble the quiet of both church and state,” and attempted to cool down religious controversies caused by overly subtle “wits.”⁵⁰

Laudian divines in the 1630s preached against “perverse disputings,” “cobweb divinity,” and “the frothy agitations of unquiet heads” who would probe “the secrets and infinitude of God.” Even at Oxford there was disapproval of too much thinking.⁵¹

⁴⁵ Wilkins, *Discovery*, 24, 185–186.

⁴⁶ Annabel Patterson, *Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early Modern England* (Madison, Wis., 1984). See also A. B. Worden, “Literature and Political Censorship in Early Modern England,” in A. C. Duke and C. A. Tamse, eds., *Too Mighty to Be Free: Censorship and the Press in Britain and the Netherlands* (Zutphen, 1987), 45–62; Anthony Milton, “Licensing, Censorship, and Religious Orthodoxy in Early Stuart England,” *Historical Journal* 41 (1998): 625–652; Anthony Hadfield, “The Politics of Early Modern Censorship,” in Hadfield, ed., *Literature and Censorship in Renaissance England* (Basingstoke, 2001), 1–13; and David Cressy, “Book Burning in Tudor and Stuart England,” *Sixteenth Century Journal* 36 (2005): 359–374.

⁴⁷ Wilkins, *Discovery*, 185–186.

⁴⁸ Godwin, *Man in the Moone*, 6–7, where, besides the mysteries of flight, he offers to describe how “to send messages in an instant many miles off, and receive answer again immediately.”

⁴⁹ Neil Rhodes, Jennifer Richards, and Joseph Marshall, eds., *King James VI and I: Selected Writings* (Aldershot, 2003), 379–384; David Cressy and Lori Anne Ferrell, eds., *Religion and Society in Early Modern England*, 2nd ed. (London, 2005), 164–165.

⁵⁰ Larkin, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, 2: 218, 91–92.

⁵¹ Edward Boughen, *Two Sermons: The First Preached at Canterbury* (London, 1635), 15; Thomas Lawrence, *Two Sermons* (Oxford, 1635), 17, 18, 19, 23; Johns, “Prudence and Pedantry,” 32.

The sages warned clerics to avoid “scriptures that are obscure or dark, of ambiguous and doubtful meaning.”⁵² There was no profit to be had in striving “about abstruse mysteries,” for “God doth not bring men to heaven by difficult questions,” declared the Laudian apologist Christopher Dow in 1637.⁵³ “God leadeth not his people unto eternal life by knotty and inextricable questions,” preached Edward Reynolds in 1638, arguing that “weak Christians” should not be “perplexed with impertinent disputations.”⁵⁴ Absorbing these lessons, Wilkins may have recognized the soteriology of the man in the moon to be as problematic as predestination, another of the mysteries that were best regarded as unfathomable. Perhaps it was most safely wrapped up in the high-minded wit of “*convivium philosophicum*, or *convivium theologicum*,” as practiced by his nearby contemporaries in the Great Tew circle outside Oxford.⁵⁵ Wilkins may have thought it prudent to provide a ludic framing, although opponents would protest that he jested too much about serious matters.

Wilkins wrote initially to rebut the anti-Copernican minister Alexander Ross (1591–1654), whose defense of Aristotelian cosmology in 1634 was dedicated to Archbishop Laud.⁵⁶ In 1646, the year of Laud’s execution, Ross retaliated in *The New Planet No Planet; or, The Earth No Wandring Star: Except in the Wandring Heads of Galileans*. This was a lengthy, learned, and ultimately futile rant against the entire Copernican conspiracy, which particularly attacked Wilkins’s work on “the new found world of the moon.” Ross charged Wilkins with manufacturing ridiculous fictions. “Your world in the moon, your moving earth, your standing heavens, your figures and characters, what are they else but pleasant dreams and idle fancies? . . . You have found out that which God never made, to wit, a rolling earth, a standing heaven, and a world in the moon; which indeed are not the works of God, but of your own head.” The fundamental objection was not that these astronomical theories were observationally or mathematically flawed, but that they were “dangerous and pernicious to divinity.” Wilkins’s suggestions of a world in the moon went against “scripture, sense, reason, and the church’s authority,” Ross insisted. They were “both absurd and dangerous for men’s souls, and the peace of the church.”⁵⁷

Peter Heylyn (1599–1662), yet another English clergyman with astronomical enthusiasms, was circumspect about the possibility of “another world in the moon, inhabited as this is by persons of divers languages, customs, polities and religions.” Heylyn’s misfortunes in the English Revolution, when he lost his livings, his estates, and his library, persuaded him that “geography is better than divinity.” In his massive 1652 *Cosmographie* (a revision of his 1621 *Microcosmos*), he expressed “stronger

⁵² Nehemiah Rogers, *A Sermon Preached at the Second Triennial Visitation* (London, 1632), 10.

⁵³ Christopher Dow, *Innovations Unjustly Charged upon the Present Church and State* (London, 1637), 40–41.

⁵⁴ Edward Reynolds, *A Sermon Touching the Peace and Edification of the Church* (London, 1638), 2–3, 25, 26.

⁵⁵ Hugh Trevor-Roper, *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth Century Essays* (Chicago, 1988), 166–230.

⁵⁶ Alexander Ross, *Commentum de Terrae Motu Circulari* (London, 1634). For Ross’s career, see Johns, “Prudence and Pedantry,” 28–37, and David Allan, “Ross, Alexander (1591–1654),” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

⁵⁷ Alexander Ross, *The New Planet No Planet; or, The Earth No Wandring Star: Except in the Wandring Heads of Galileans . . . In Answer to a Discourse That the Earth May Be a Planet* (London, 1646), 13, 83, 105, 113, 118. Parts of this may have been written as early as 1641; Johns, “Prudence and Pedantry,” 45, 47, 58.

hopes of finding a new world" in Terra Australis than on another planet.⁵⁸ A generation later, the French savant Bernard de Fontenelle compared the population of the moon to "the inhabitants of that great land of Australia, which is still completely unknown to us," arguing yet again that the discovery of the Antipodes, "contrary to all expectation," allows us to believe that "we may come to know somewhat more of the moon."⁵⁹

BY THE MIDDLE AND LATER DECADES of the seventeenth century, the idea had become common among Christian rationalists that "the almighty and infinite power of the creator" had created an infinite plurality of worlds that were at least accessible to the imagination. The Platonist Henry More (1614–1687) and the dramatist Aphra Behn (1640–1689) shared a belief in an infinite number of worlds, made possible by the "inexhausted" goodness of God.⁶⁰ By 1650, the Elizabethan Oxford examination question "an sint plures mundi?" ("can these be many worlds?"—to which the correct Aristotelian answer was "no") had been replaced by the disputation thesis "quod Luna sit habitabilis" ("that the moon could be habitable"—which might be answered "probably" if not "yes").⁶¹ "The probability that there is a world in the moon" had been "most ingeniously discoursed by the late Reverend Dr. Wilkins," wrote the physician Robert Wittie in 1681, so "why . . . may not the other planets be worlds too, and have inhabitants to exalt the great name of their and our creator?" Astronomy and Christianity were not incompatible, he concluded, so when St. Paul wrote that "things in heaven, and things in earth" should bow at the name of Jesus, it could be taken to describe religious devotions on other planets.⁶² Savants of the Royal Society and their counterparts at Paris wondered whether sufficiently powerful telescopes could be constructed to see "the reputed citizens of the moon."⁶³

French treatises on this topic from Cyrano de Bergerac and Fontenelle led to further conversations on the world in the moon, including its implications for Christianity.⁶⁴ The rapid translation of these works testified to contemporary interest on both sides of the Channel. Pierre Borel wondered in the 1650s "whether those men in the stars are better than those that are in this world, whereof Satan is called the

⁵⁸ Peter Heylyn, *Cosmographie* (London, 1652), "to the reader," 196. Half a lifetime earlier, Heylyn had given a celebrated series of lectures on cosmography at Magdalen College, Oxford, where he was tutor and fellow from 1618 to 1629, overlapping with the young John Wilkins. See Heylyn, *Microcosmos: A Little Description of the Great World* (Oxford, 1621); Mordechai Feingold, *The Mathematician's Apprenticeship: Science, Universities and Society in England, 1560–1640* (Cambridge, 1984), 53, 63, 68.

⁵⁹ Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, *Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds* (Berkeley, Calif., 1990), 33; Behn, *A Discovery of New Worlds*, 124–125.

⁶⁰ Henry More, *Democritus Platonissans; or, An Essay upon the Infinity of Worlds out of Platonick Principles* (Cambridge, 1646), A2, stanzas 19, 26, 51; Behn, *A Discovery of New Worlds*, 77.

⁶¹ Russell, "Copernican System in Great Britain," 210, for the question of 1588; Christopher Potter, ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΑΣ ΜΕΤΕΜΨΥΧΟΣ, *sive Theses Quadregesimales In Scholis Oxon* (Oxford, 1650), title page.

⁶² Robert Wittie, *Ouranoskopia; or, A Survey of the Heavens* (London, 1681), 26–27.

⁶³ John Lowthorp, ed., *The Philosophical Transactions and Collections to the End of the Year MDCC*, 3 vols. (London, 1749), 1: 298–299, referring to discourses of 1665; *Le Iournal Des Scavans Du Lundi IV: Lanvier MDCLXVI* (Paris, 1666), 34.

⁶⁴ Cyrano de Bergerac, *Histoire Comique ou Voyage dans las Lune* (Paris, 1650), trans. Thomas St. Serf as *Selenarchia; or, The Government of the World in the Moon* (London, 1659); Fontenelle, *Entretiens* (Behn, *A Discovery of New Worlds*).

prince,” and therefore did not need the death of Christ to save them.⁶⁵ Behn, translating Fontenelle in the 1680s, recognized that “in regard of religion, there may be danger in placing inhabitants anywhere but on this earth . . . If you are a little of the theologian,” she continued, “you will then be presently full of difficulties.” It would be “a great perplexing point in theology” to imagine men on the moon who were not the sons of Adam, but the difficulty could be resolved, or at least alleviated, by claiming that the moon, although inhabited by rational beings, was not inhabited by humans. Fontenelle took the view that the moon-dwellers were not men but “some other odd sort of creatures,” presumably outside of Christian history.⁶⁶

By the end of the seventeenth century, it was widely believed by the likes of the philologist Richard Bentley (1662–1742) that “the infinite majesty and boundless beneficence of God” had populated a multitude of planets, and that such a belief involved no “quarrel with revealed religion.” Delivering the 1692 Boyle Lectures on the theme of “A Confutation of Atheism,” Bentley, like Wilkins before him, found nothing in Holy Scripture to “forbid him to suppose as great a multitude of systems, and as much inhabited, as he pleases.” Nor was there any need to worry “about the condition of those planetary people, nor raise frivolous disputes how they may participate in the miseries of Adam’s fall or in the benefits of Christ’s incarnation.” For although God, “by the inexhausted fecundity of his creative power, may have made innumerable orders and classes or rational minds” throughout the universe, the inhabitants of other planets lacked “human nature” and were therefore not “involved in the circumstances of this world.”⁶⁷ Christiaan Huygens’s *Kosmothereos*, published in English in 1698 as *The Celestial Worlds Discovered*, similarly imagined endless planets inhabited by rational but nonhuman “Planetarians.”⁶⁸ John Dunton’s *The Athenian Mercury*, a popular late Stuart “notes and queries,” deemed it probable that there were worlds beyond ours, but “as for sinning or not sinning in them, we need not enquire,” for that belonged to the unsearchable wisdom of God.⁶⁹

SOME OF THE FINEST MINDS of seventeenth-century Europe became exercised about “Selenites,” “Planetarians,” and the possibility of a plurality of worlds. Their work appeared in as many languages as genres, in astronomical and theological treatises, romances, travelogues, dialogues, poems, and plays. A question may arise about the manner and mode or tone of these writings on space travel. How seriously were they intended, and can we distinguish their important business from rhetorical *jeux d’esprit*? The man in the moon was a standard trope in early modern humor, a marker of preposterous absurdity, so any reference to the lunar encounter risks being quarantined with ridicule.

⁶⁵ Pierre Borel, *Discours Nouveau Prouvenant la Pluralité des Mondes* (Geneva, 1657), translated into English as *A New Treatise Proving a Multiplicity of Worlds* (London, 1658), 139.

⁶⁶ Behn, *A Discovery of New Worlds*, 90–91, 120. See also Fontenelle, *The Theory or System of Several New Inhabited Worlds . . . Made English by Mrs. Behn* (London, 1700).

⁶⁷ Richard Bentley, “A Confutation of Atheism,” in Alexander Dyce, ed., *The Works of Richard Bentley*, 3 vols. (London, 1838), 3: 175–176.

⁶⁸ Christiaan Huygens, *The Celestial World Discover’d; or, Conjectures Concerning the Inhabitants, Plants and Productions of the Worlds in the Planets* (London, 1698), 37, 66.

⁶⁹ John Dunton, *The Athenian Oracle: Being an Entire Collection of All the Valuable Questions and Answers in the Old Athenian Mercury*, 3 vols. (London, 1704), 3: 470–472.

Plutarch, with whom we began, acknowledged that “many things have been said as well merrily and by way of laughter, as seriously and in good earnest” about the population of the moon, and he applauded “the quick and pregnant wit” of those who advanced the discussion.⁷⁰ The second-century author Lucian, through his Caroline translator, claimed the poetic “liberty of lying” while relating lunar adventures. These were “matters which I neither saw nor suffered, nor heard by report from others,” he disarms the reader; “let no man therefore in any case give any credit to them.” Enlisting scholarly expertise, he speaks wryly of his consultation with philosophers: “I made my choice of the best among them . . . by the grimness of their countenances, the paleness of their complexion, and the profoundness of their beards; for such men, I was persuaded, could best speak deep points of learning.”⁷¹ The invitation, surely, is to be amused as much as to reflect.

John Donne labeled his early Stuart account of the lunatic church “a satire” so readers would know how to react.⁷² Ben Jonson also set out for laughs when he reported “news from the new world discovered in the moon” in his court masque of 1620. Audiences from Shakespeare to Behn understood that they were engaged with a comedy whenever there was mention of “the man in the moon.”⁷³

Robert Burton, adopting the voice of Democritus Junior in *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, invited the reader to “suppose the man in the moon or whom thy wilt to be the author.” Burton’s disquisition “of infinite worlds” would not be “a pasquil, a satire, some ridiculous treatise . . . or paradox,” he promised, but rather a serious treatment of an important topic. Like Kepler, who “in sober sadness” upheld “that the moon is inhabited,” Burton was intrigued by the possibility of infinite worlds, although he took Kepler to have written on this subject “betwixt jest and earnest.”⁷⁴

Godwin presented his tale of *The Man in the Moone* as “an essay of fancy, where invention is showed with judgment.” Godwin’s outlandish travel narrative, like Lucian’s, allowed the lunar encounter to be read as a fable. Wilkins, as one of Godwin’s first readers, commended it as “a very pleasant and well contrived fancy concerning a voyage to this other world.”⁷⁵ Many of Wilkins’s contemporaries regarded “fancy” as a dangerous mistress, the path “to unyoked passion,” but here the word was discharged of its disparaging connotations, in commendation of wit and imagination.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ Plutarch, *Philosophie*, 1159, 1177.

⁷¹ Lucian, *Certaine Select Dialogues*, 12, 107–108. Ladina Bezzola Lambert, *Imagining the Unimaginable: The Poetics of Early Modern Astronomy* (Amsterdam, 2002), 11, discusses “Lucian’s playful fantasies” and their seventeenth-century reception.

⁷² Donne, *Ignatius His Conclave*, title page. Satire, for Donne’s contemporaries, was “a sharp, biting kind of verse, wherein men’s vices were laid open”; John Bullokar, *An English Expositor* (London, 1616), sub “satyr.”

⁷³ Ben Jonson, “News from the New World Discovered in the Moon” [a court masque of 1620], in C. H. Herford and Percy and Evelyn Simpson, eds., *Ben Jonson*, 11 vols. (Oxford, 1925–1952), 7: 513–525. For Shakespearean examples, see *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, Act V, sc. 1; *The Tempest*, Act II, sc. 2. See also sources in n. 4, above.

⁷⁴ Burton, *Anatomy*, 1, 53, 66. On the playful seriousness of Kepler’s work, see Raz Chen-Morris, “Shadows of Instruction: Optics and Classical Authorities in Kepler’s *Somnium*,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 66 (2005): 223–243. Campanella referred to the “philosophical comedy” of Galileo’s 1632 *Dialogue*; Jean Dietz Moss, *Novelties in the Heavens: Rhetoric and Science in the Copernican Controversy* (Chicago, 1993), 301.

⁷⁵ Godwin, *Man in the Moone*, 2; Wilkins, *Discourse*, 240.

⁷⁶ Johns, “Prudence and Pedantry,” 31–34; William Strode, *The Floating Island: A Tragi-Comedy, Acted before His Majesty at Oxford, Aug. 29. 1636* (London, 1655), sig. B4. Wilkins may very well have

Fancy, to men of stern disposition, was the fruit of unbounded curiosity and undisciplined passions, but creative thinkers were now willing to credit fancy as a legitimate mode of speculation.

Wilkins acknowledged that his own *Discovery of a World in the Moone* might seem to some readers "ridiculous." He commended it as "the fruit of some lighter studies" intended for "thy leisure hours." Yet what could be more serious than the Copernican solar system and the likelihood of other inhabited planets? Wilkins acknowledged that his writings were "conjectural, and full of uncertainties," rather like the astronomer Huygens half a century later, who presented his work on "celestial worlds" as "probable and ingenious conjectures" rather than "true . . . mathematical demonstrations."⁷⁷

Anti-Copernican conservatives and critics of the plurality of worlds often derided their opponents as "foolish and childish" (Daneau, 1578), "childish and ridiculous" (Heywood, 1635), or given to "ridiculous suppositions" (Ross, 1646).⁷⁸ The notion of the plurality of worlds was based on neither "sense, nor solid reason, nor judicious authority," but rested instead on "the fragile reed of wild imagination," charged the royalist physician Walter Charleton in 1654. Such "extramundane curiosity" exhibited "a high degree of madness."⁷⁹ It became a standard tactic to laugh such ideas to scorn. "I perceive . . . that you are a merry gentleman, indeed you cannot answer for laughing," Ross charged Wilkins. Derisively associating him with Burton's *Anatomy*, Ross diagnosed Wilkins as "troubled with a hypochondriac melancholy, or with the spirit of blind Democritus, take heed of *risus sardonis*" [scornful laughter]. "Your whole book is nothing else but a heap of fictions," he charged, just "pleasant dreams and idle fancies."⁸⁰

A self-conscious lightness of tone often governed treatments of this topic in the later seventeenth century. The Cambridge Platonist Henry More confessed that his essay on "the infinity of worlds" was shaped by his "sportful fancy."⁸¹ When Margaret Cavendish, the Duchess of Newcastle, produced her *Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World* in the 1660s, she described it as "a work of fancy" joined to "my serious philosophical contemplations."⁸² The French libertine Cyrano de Bergerac's space adventure was billed as an "*histoire comique*"—a "comical history" of the world in the moon.⁸³ Fontenelle's "conversations on the plurality of worlds" aired more "fancies," provoking the marquise in the dialogue to protest against the "frivolous arguments" and "chimerical opinion" of the astronomical savant. It is

attended this university entertainment for the court, which dramatized the clash between fancy and prudence.

⁷⁷ Wilkins, *Discovery*, A3–A3v, 22; Wilkins, *Discourse*, 203; Huygens, *Celestial Worlds*, iv.

⁷⁸ Daneau, *Wonderfull Woorkmanship of the World*, f. 26v; Heywood, *The Hierarchie of the Blessed Angels*, 154; Ross, *New Planet No Planet*, 83.

⁷⁹ Charleton, *Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletoniana*, 13, 15.

⁸⁰ Ross, *New Planet No Planet*, 79, 105.

⁸¹ More, *Democritus Platonissans*, sig. A2.

⁸² Margaret Cavendish, "The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World," in Gregory Claes, ed., *Restoration and Augustan British Utopias* (Syracuse, N.Y., 2000), 55. The purpose of "fancy," Cavendish continued, was "to recreate the mind, and withdraw it from its more serious contemplations."

⁸³ Cyrano de Bergerac, *Histoire Comique (Selenarchia)*; Cyrano de Bergerac, *The Comical History of the States and Empires of the Worlds of the Moon and Sun*, trans. A. Lovell (London, 1687). Campbell, "Impossible Voyages," 8, describes this as a "libertine comedy . . . structured by paradox rather than plot."

clear, however, that the “philosophical entertainment” in which they were engaged was no joking matter. Behn offered her translation of Fontenelle as “but a trifle,” although also “something . . . out of the way of ordinary wit.” She too challenged her readers to distinguish “between what is truly solid (or at least probable) and what is trifling and airy.”⁸⁴

Taking the topic to the stage in her 1687 farce *The Emperor of the Moon*, Behn renders the principal character as “whimsical, romantic, Don-quick-sottish” or “rather mad” for his notion of the man on the moon. Poor Dr. Baliardo, who “discoursed gravely” on the moon’s “people . . . government, institutions, laws, manners, religion and constitution,” discovers that his discourse is “lunatic . . . the phantoms of mad brains to puzzle fools withal—the wise laugh at ’em.”⁸⁵ But laughter, Keith Thomas long ago assured us, is a mask for serious discussion.⁸⁶ As the early Stuart poet John Taylor insisted, “mirth and truth are good companions.”⁸⁷

IN CONCLUSION, TO BRING THIS DOWN TO EARTH, we need to reconsider the cultural context of the lunar conversation. Rather than tracing the history of moon travel forward into subsequent centuries, or associating it primarily with the advancement of science, let us re-root the subject in the early modern era, in what could be called England’s lunar moment. This was shaped by the convergence of three traditions or conversations: one about the cosmos, one about the planet, and one about the path to salvation.

The often-used argument that Columbus’s discovery of America, and the subsequent mapping of the Antipodes, betokened new discoveries in space may have appealed especially to readers of Renaissance voyaging. The European encounter with the Atlantic, the Americas, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific stimulated both the economy and the imagination. Early-seventeenth-century Europe saw the fruits of this exchange in a new cartography, new species, commodities, and peoples. English readers in 1625 were treated to the massive compilation of *Hakluytus Posthumus; or, Purchas His Pilgrimes*,⁸⁸ relating travels across a previously unimagined terrestrial world.

The near-simultaneity or overlap of this voyaging literature with the new discoveries of astronomy may also have quickened interest in the plurality of planetary worlds. For even without a telescope, the moon was more familiar than America or the Antipodes, although less accessible. The early-seventeenth-century work of Tho-

⁸⁴ Fontenelle, *Entretiens* (Behn, *A Discovery of New Worlds*, 72, 77, 124, 125). On Behn’s “double tone” using parody for serious matter, see Janet Todd, *The Secret Life of Aphra Behn* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1996), 398.

⁸⁵ Behn, “The Emperor of the Moon,” in Todd, *The Works of Aphra Behn*, 7: 163, 205. First published in London in 1687, this work is based on the farce by Nolant de Fatouville, *Arlequin, Empereur dans la lune* (Paris, 1684), although “much altered and adapted to our English theatre and genius,” according to Behn.

⁸⁶ Keith Thomas, “The Place of Laughter in Tudor and Stuart England,” *TLS* 21 (January 1977): 77–81.

⁸⁷ John Taylor, “The Praise of Hemp-Seed” [1620], in Bernard Capp, *The World of John Taylor the Water-Poet, 1578–1653* (Oxford, 1994), 79.

⁸⁸ Samuel Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus; or, Purchas His Pilgrimes*, 5 books in 4 vols. (London, 1625; repr., 20 vols., Glasgow, 1905–1907). Purchas (1577–1626) was yet another minister of the Church of England, with livings in Essex and London.

mas Harriot, Galileo, Campanella, and Gassendi literally put the moon on the map. Mapping the moon and naming its features was a means to domesticate the lunar sphere and to prepare it for appropriation.⁸⁹

Early modern Europe still had to cope with the religious problems posed by the discovery of people in the Americas. Whether they too were the seed of Adam, and whether they were covered by Christ's atonement, were initially difficult questions for Renaissance theology.⁹⁰ So too were the practical considerations of missionary activity, and the rivalries within and between Catholicism and Protestantism to harvest souls, after indigenous inhabitants were acknowledged to be human. The Jesuits were established from Japan to Canada, although not yet on the *Mare Tranquillitatis*, and it was no accident that Godwin's Domingo Gonsales ended up among Jesuits in China after his lunar adventures.⁹¹ Dozens of English ministers during the reign of Charles I subscribed to the missionary undertaking, "to make God known where he was never spoken nor thought of, to advance the scepter of God's kingdom" overseas. Petitioners to Parliament in 1641 promoted this enterprise to win the souls of "those silly seduced Americans."⁹² Behind this program lay the confessional divisions and competitive soteriological conflicts that followed the European Reformation.

Europe in the 1630s was racked by religious wars. By 1638, the combat had gone on for twenty years. England mostly stayed out of the Thirty Years War and congratulated herself on her peaceable condition, but religious friction with Scotland brought rebellion and the threat of war in 1638. Wilkins and his contemporaries that year would have been familiar with stresses within the Church of England, but they could not have known that they were in for a generation of civil war and revolution. Nonetheless, they might have concluded, to paraphrase Peter Heylyn, that "cosmography is safer than divinity."

One of the publishers of the 1650s explained, "I see the world so shuffled here below that I thought it safest to present the government of a world above," offering Cyrano de Bergerac's comical history of the moon as relief from the troubles of the English revolution.⁹³

Writing about the moon and its people may have been a deflection from some issues, but it involved a direct grappling with others. Like the Utopian tradition, to which it was related, the literature of lunar voyaging was part parodic but mostly sober, combining earnestness and jest. Imagining a world on the moon was perhaps a response to a shuffled world, a world turned upside down, in which systems of hierarchy, authority, religion, and gender, as well as planetary revolutions, were

⁸⁹ Whitaker, *Mapping and Naming the Moon*.

⁹⁰ Anthony Grafton, *New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 148–149, 153, 205–207; Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (Cambridge, 1986), 22–23; Pagden, *European Encounters with the New World from Renaissance to Romanticism* (New Haven, Conn., 1993), 11–12; Lewis Hanke, "The Theological Significance of the Discovery of America," in Fredi Chiappelli, ed., *First Images of America: The Impact of the New World on the Old*, 2 vols. (Berkeley, Calif., 1976), 1: 363–389.

⁹¹ Godwin, *Man in the Moone*, 44.

⁹² [William Castell], *A Petition of W. C . . . for the Propagation of the Gospel* (London, 1641), 6–7.

⁹³ Cyrano de Bergerac, *Selenarchia*, epistle to Lord George Douglas and General Andrew Rutherford. "The world i'th moon too lately is found out, It will with lunatics join, we need not doubt," rhymed the disaffected royalist John Collop in 1655; Conrad Hilberry, ed., *The Poems of John Collop* (Madison, Wis., 1962), 68–69.

called into question. As John Donne famously put it, reflecting on the consequences of Copernicus, "the new philosophy calls all in doubt."⁹⁴ This was the challenge for Godwin and Wilkins, and their French counterparts and contemporaries, whose speculations in the 1630s constituted Europe's first space program.

⁹⁴ John Donne, "The First Anniversary," in Sir Herbert Grierson, ed., *The Poems of John Donne* (Oxford, 1957), 213. On disruptions of the Caroline established order, see David Cressy, *England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640–1642* (Oxford, 2006).

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Morality Plays: Marriage, Church Courts, and Colonial Agency in Central Tanganyika, ca. 1876–1928

DEREK R. PETERSON

IN AUGUST 1923, DAVID NDAHANI, an Anglican pastor-in-training, came before the Kongwa church court in central Tanganyika to accuse his wife, Nenelwa, of adultery. They had been married in a Christian ceremony some years earlier, but Ndahani had never fully paid the bridewealth he owed to Nenelwa's relatives. Nenelwa, disgusted with her husband, had in early 1923 left her conjugal home to live with her parents. Before the church court that August day, David Ndahani said nothing about the unpaid bridewealth. He complained that Ezekiel, a church teacher, had cuckolded him. His accusation led the church court to dismiss Ezekiel from his duties; the errant wife, Nenelwa, was ordered to submit to Ndahani. But on Christmas Day 1923, David Ndahani himself confessed to an adulterous relationship with the communicant Elizabeti. Elizabeti had spent several nights outside Ndahani's door, loudly accusing him of sinning with her. Kongwa missionaries brokered a *détente* between Ndahani, Elizabeti, and her husband, Ishmael, committed their agreement to writing, and posted the notice on the church door. They hoped thereby to chasten the adulterous communicants. By 1929, however, Ndahani was in prison for thievery, and the missionaries were lamenting that "adultery was the norm rather than the exception."¹

In Tanganyika, churchmen gained control of converts' conduct by keeping records. Their bureaucracy was meant to formalize spousal relationships, making sexual behavior subject to outside authority. But lovers also represented themselves. Self-interested litigants such as David Ndahani sifted through their spouses' marital and social relationships, looking for evidence that could capture the church courts' attention. They actively recast conjugal arguments over bridewealth, residence, and other issues, using the language of the courts to make their marital debates look like simplified morality plays. In Vicente Rafael's nomenclature, litigants such as Ndahani and Elizabeti "contracted" administrative power, adopting some of its nomen-

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¹ Diocese of Central Tanganyika Archives, Dodoma, Tanzania (hereafter cited as DCT), Kongwa Station Log Book, entries for October 10, 1922; February 11 and December 25, 1923; January 4, 1929; and "Mafupizo ya minutes," January 1924.

clature while also shaping its hold over them.² They followed churchmen's script while also molding the courts' efforts to regulate their lives.

It is the theatrical work of agency that the scholarship on African legal history ignores. Legal history in Africa has too often been conceived as a clash between the textualized, bureaucratic practice of modern governance and the oral, flexible *mentalité*.³ Sean Hawkins's *Writing and Colonialism in Northern Ghana*, for example, studies the "encounter between the LoDagaa and 'the world on paper.'" ⁴ Before colonial conquest, says Hawkins, LoDagaa social order was flexible and negotiable: conjugal relationships and ethnic identity were crafted out of the back and forth of human interaction. Colonial rule worked to "subjugate and regulate [this] oral culture and force it within the conceptual framework of a literate society."⁵ In legal writs, in ethnographic writing, and through mapmaking, colonial officials used foreign categories to gain control over the changeable LoDagaa world. This "world on paper," Hawkins argues, was divorced from the real world; its simplified categories belonged to the British and their successors in government. Peter Pels follows a similar analytical line in his study of Catholic marital regulations in eastern Tanganyika. Where Luguru personhood was in reality built up through human relationships and ritual processes, Catholic missionaries sought to create individuals to convert and discipline. They fixed Luguru people's names on church registers, charted their life cycles, and plotted their biographies around a standard set of legal events. This individualized morality, writes Pels, was "untrue" and "in direct opposition to the context of reality."⁶ Like Hawkins, Pels argues that legal bureaucracy was a vehicle by which foreign modes of subjectivity were imposed on Africans.

The distinctions that scholars make between the real, oral world and the artificial, textualized practice of governance have shaped the discipline of African history more generally, not only in its analytical agenda but also in its methodology. The record books that church and government officials kept are catalogues of decisions made, sins disavowed, and judgments rendered. They make complicated human situations look deceptively simple. Scholars of legal history have therefore wondered about the extent to which court records can convey real insights into people's lived experiences. Legal historians of England lament that plaintiffs and witnesses couched their state-

² Vicente Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule* (Durham, N.C., 1993).

³ The scholarship I have in mind here includes Martin Chanock, "Making Customary Law: Men, Women, and Courts in Colonial Northern Rhodesia," in Margaret Hay and Marcia Wright, eds., *African Women and the Law: Historical Perspectives* (Boston, 1982), 53–67; Chanock, *Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1998); Marjorie Mbilinyi, "Runaway Wives in Colonial Tanganyika: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage in Rungwe District, 1919–1961," *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 16 (1988): 1–29; Margot Lovett, "'She Thinks She's Like a Man': Marriage and (De)Constructing Gender Identity in Colonial Buha, Western Tanzania, 1943–1960," in Dorothy Hodgson and Sheryl McCurdy, eds., *"Wicked" Women and the Reconfiguration of Gender in Africa* (Portsmouth, N.H., 2001), 47–66; Elizabeth Schmidt, *Peasants, Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870–1939* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1992); and Diana Jeater, *Marriage, Perversion, and Power: The Construction of Moral Discourse in Southern Rhodesia, 1894–1930* (Oxford, 1993).

⁴ Sean Hawkins, *Writing and Colonialism in Northern Ghana: The Encounter between the LoDagaa and "the World on Paper"* (Toronto, 2002).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁶ Peter Pels, *A Politics of Presence: Contacts between Missionaries and Waluguru in Late Colonial Tanganyika* (Amsterdam, 1999), 287–288, quoting Bronislaw Malinowski, *Coral Gardens and Their Magic: The Language of Magic and Gardening* (Bloomington, Ind., 1935), 239.

ments to correspond with the protocols that governed the court.⁷ Africa's scholars likewise worry that court transcripts are "but a shadow of a much more complex understanding of wrongs and the complex set of interactions that actually went on in court."⁸ The discipline of African history was, at its founding in the 1960s, conceived methodologically as a foray into oral research. Jan Vansina's 1965 book *Oral Tradition* argued that historians could, by excavating the original text from the accretions of later generations, engage directly with the precolonial African past through the spoken word.⁹ Vansina's book set out an agenda for Africa's scholars to pursue. Of the twenty-one articles printed in the first two volumes of the journal *History in Africa* (1974 and 1975), ten considered the methodology of oral history.¹⁰ By the 1980s, a new generation of Africanist scholars were problematizing the notion of oral tradition.¹¹ But the emphasis on African "voices" remained. In the 1980s and 1990s, a flurry of "life history" publications heralded the methodology of oral history as closer to real African experience than any text produced by European bureaucrats could be.¹²

By marking real life off from the written record, scholars have made it possible to identify an apparently authentic repository of African history. But the identification of African history with orality has made it hard to see how texts could shape Africans' relationships, form their imaginations, and lead them to act. The book-keepers of central Tanganyika were not standing back from real life. Nor were church archives located in a textualized otherworld. Record books reached outside the archives' walls, and reformed Africans' real-life relationships. British missionaries and church elders regularly called errant parishioners before the courts, asking them to live up to the promises they had made on paper. Using their lists of decisions made and loyalties declared, church officials invited adherents to conform their lives to the book, to orient their behavior to accord with the model portrayed in the record. As distilled, clarified models of conduct, missionaries' lists and record books gave Africans characters to play in the real world. And Africans played into Europeans'

⁷ See, for example, Martin Ingram, *Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England, 1570–1640* (Cambridge, 1987), 20.

⁸ Richard Roberts, *Litigants and Households: African Disputes and Colonial Courts in the French Soudan, 1895–1912* (Portsmouth, N.H., 2005), 238.

⁹ Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology*, trans. H. Wright (London, 1965).

¹⁰ *History in Africa* 1 and 2 (1974 and 1975). Texts on the methodology of oral history in Africa include David Henige, *The Chronology of Oral Tradition: Quest for a Chimera* (Oxford, 1974), and Joseph Miller, ed., *The African Past Speaks: Essays on Oral Traditions and History* (Folkestone, 1980); see also Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (Oxford, 1978).

¹¹ An early expression of doubt was T. O. Beidelman's "Myth, Legend, and Oral History," *Anthropos* 65 (1965): 74–97. See also C. A. Hamilton, "Ideology and Oral Traditions: Listening to the Voices 'from Below,'" *History in Africa* 14 (1987): 67–86; Karin Barber and P. F. de Moreas Farias, eds., *Discourse and Its Disguises: The Interpretation of African Oral Texts* (Birmingham, 1989); Leroy Vail and Landeg White, *Power and the Praise Poem: South African Voices in History* (Charlottesville, Va., 1991); Elizabeth Tonkin, *Narrating Our Pasts: The Social Construction of Oral History* (Cambridge, 1992); and most recently, Luise White, Stephan Miescher, and David William Cohen, eds., *African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History* (Bloomington, Ind., 2001).

¹² See Allen Isaacman, ed., *The Life History of Raul Honwana* (Boulder, Colo., 1988); Margaret Strobel and Sarah Mirza, *Three Swahili Women: Life Histories from Mombasa, Kenya* (Bloomington, Ind., 1980); Patricia Romero, ed., *Life Histories of African Women* (London, 1988); Susan Geiger, "Women's Life Histories: Method and Content," *Signs* 11 (1986): 334–351; Tim Keegan, *Facing the Storm: Portraits of Black Lives in Rural South Africa* (Athens, Ohio, 1988); Mary Smith, *Baba of Karo* (New Haven, Conn., 1981); and Jean Davison with the women of Mutira, *Voices from Mutira: Lives of Rural Gikuyu Women* (Boulder, Colo., 1989).

archetypes. They signed their names to missionaries' wedding registers and wrote notes confessing their sins. Some of them took missionaries' characters off the page, restaging textualized ideas, sentences, and plots for their own purposes. In front of church courts, husbands and wives reinterpreted nonmarital sexual relationships as adultery. Through their representational work, litigants roped missionaries into their private arguments over marital rights and obligations. As actors within missionaries' morality plays, Africans obligated churchmen themselves to play out a part.

It was not only Africans who recast their characters. Historians have shown that litigants in medieval and early modern England were similarly contracting with bureaucratic procedure. In the fourteenth-century Christianity of York, litigants Agnes Huntington and Simon Munkton bent the church courts toward their own ends.¹³ Against Agnes's wishes, Simon was planning to sell the land she had inherited from her father. Agnes knew that the church courts would annul marriages only in cases where a technical flaw could be shown to invalidate the original marriage vow. In court, therefore, she produced evidence to show that she had married another man before she pledged herself to Simon. For his part, Simon argued that Agnes's unwillingness to cohabit with him showed her to be an adulteress. He hoped that the court would confirm his marital rights. Both litigants used the framework of canon law to recast an argument that was really over the disposition of Agnes's property. With examples such as this one in view, historian Lawrence Stone has described the law of marriage and divorce in medieval and early modern England as a "fig leaf inadequately covering the very different reality of human behavior."¹⁴ Couples desiring a clandestine marriage in the early eighteenth century could obtain official-looking certificates from clergy jailed at the Fleet Prison in London. By 1740, at least half of Londoners were being married in a clandestine fashion.¹⁵ The Marriage Act of 1753 put the Fleet marrying shops out of business by nullifying any marriage not carried out by regular clergy, and by requiring couples to sign the parish register. Those who counterfeited marriage registers were liable for the death sentence. Even this reformed bureaucracy, however, could not squelch lovers' efforts to secure a respectable married life. After the Marriage Act, prospective brides and grooms arranged clandestine marriages by seeking out accommodating parsons in anonymous urban churches.

Litigants such as Agnes Huntington, David Ndahani, and the lovers of early modern London were practicing theater. They were reading the moral archetypes and the legal procedures outlined in church law as scripts, as directions on how best to play the courts. Litigants were not shuttling between a textualized, artificial legal process and a real oral world. The characters defined in church and government bureaucracy could be taken off the page and acted out, in a theater where church officials and litigants alike were bound to play a part. Litigants were representing themselves as wronged husbands or sinful penitents, and thereby generating social capital, making allies, and getting leverage over spouses and parents-in-law.

¹³ Frederik Pedersen, *Marriage Disputes in Medieval England* (London, 2000), chap. 2.

¹⁴ Lawrence Stone, *Road to Divorce: A History of the Making and Breaking of Marriage in England* (Oxford, 1995), 19. See also David Turner, *Fashioning Adultery: Gender, Sex and Civility in England, 1660–1740* (Cambridge, 2002), chap. 5.

¹⁵ R. B. Outhwaite, *Clandestine Marriage in England, 1500–1850* (London, 1995), 31; Stone, *Road to Divorce*, chap. 4.

Seeing marriage litigation as a theatrical performance helps us rethink the analytical category agency. Africa's scholars have very often equated agency with resistance. Inspired by E. P. Thompson and James Scott, social historians in the 1970s and 1980s set out to document "the ongoing, if prosaic, struggle between peasants and those who sought to extract from them their labor, rent, food, and taxes."¹⁶ Where an earlier generation of scholars had celebrated Africans' heroic wars of resistance against white conquerors, social historians looked for resistance in the mundane: in the quotidian negotiations between plantation workers and their overseers, in independent church members' subtle appropriations of missionaries' symbols, and in workmen's efforts to defend their own conceptions of time against white employers' clocks.¹⁷ This focus on the mundane was made possible by the use of oral interviews, which lent a first-person immediacy to the analysis of everyday resistance. Critics have noted that the sovereign, self-aware, speaking agent celebrated in social history was largely derived from liberal political theory.¹⁸ By focusing attention on the relationship between resisters and oppressors, the resistance paradigm made it hard to see that colonized people were themselves divided by generation, class, and political theory.¹⁹

Social history needs to inquire into the anthropology of colonial power as vigorously as it has analyzed human agency. Colonialism in Africa was not simply an invasive force, working to subordinate African subjects. Neither was colonial power very often resisted by heroic agents who were self-consciously defending their ways of life. Colonial government most often worked through routine, by patterning Africans' marital, religious, and political identities in predictable forms. With identity cards, passbooks, and marriage registers, officials stereotyped Africans' shifting ethnic, conjugal, and social identities, so as better to discipline them as members of tribes, as wives, or as sinners. For Africans, the bureaucratic form of power was at once a structure constraining the possible range of action and an opportunity for novel forms of discourse. Africans leveraged themselves into the characters that Europeans defined, playing the characters delineated in court records and government writs. Through their theatrical work, African agents laid out courses of action for missionaries and government officials to follow. Legal bureaucracy was an in-

¹⁶ James Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, Conn., 1985); E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963). The quotation comes from Allen Isaacman, "Peasants and Rural Social Protest in Africa," *African Studies Review* 33, no. 2 (1990): 31.

¹⁷ The literature referred to here includes Allen Isaacman, *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: The Zambezi Valley, 1850–1921* (Berkeley, Calif., 1976); Isaacman, *Cotton Is the Mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work, and Rural Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938–1961* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1996); Jean Comaroff, *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People* (Chicago, 1985); Karen Fields, *Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa* (Princeton, N.J., 1985); and Keletso Atkins, *The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Money! The Cultural Origins of an African Work Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843–1900* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1993).

¹⁸ Talal Asad, "Thinking about Agency and Pain," in Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, Calif., 2003); Timothy Mitchell, "Everyday Metaphors of Power," *Theory and Society* 19, no. 5 (1990): 545–577. See also Rosalind O'Hanlon's critique of the Subaltern Studies school in Indian historiography: "Recovering the Subject: *Subaltern Studies* and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia," *Modern Asian Studies* 22 (1988): 189–224.

¹⁹ Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking African Colonial History," *AHR* 99, no. 5 (December 1994): 1516–1545.

strument of colonial governmentality, but Africans could open up grooves of representation that shaped the courts' judgments.

English missionaries first settled in Ukaguru and Ugogo, in the protectorate of German East Africa (later the British protectorate of Tanganyika), in the late 1870s. From that time until the 1920s, when the postwar British administration inaugurated a system of African-run courts, missionaries exercised extensive legal powers over their converts' lives. The German colonial government was represented in central Tanganyika by a cadre of Swahili-speaking functionaries brought in from the Indian Ocean coast. They took little interest in Kaguru and Gogo people's marital disputes. Church courts were therefore virtually the only formal legal venue where antagonistic husbands and wives could redress their grievances. Confronted with converts' ceaseless marital arguments, church officials kept records on who had married whom, took notes on adultery cases, imposed fines, and suspended adulterers from communion. Their bureaucratic work solidified dynamic conjugal relationships, creating standards by which to judge deviant sexual conduct. But it was not only missionaries who were participating in the legal definition of adultery. African husbands and wives stereotyped their spouses' sexual and social relationships. They employed the legal categories authorized by missionary judges to reframe arguments about property, marital deference, or work. By accusing their spouses of moral indiscretions, litigants reconvened the church courts in their favor.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY CENTRAL TANGANYIKA was a place of uncertain environments and uneven opportunities. Its people were therefore entrepreneurial about their social relationships and ethnic identities.²⁰ The people who came to be called the "Gogo" lived in the dry plains of the Rift Valley. Rainfall there was erratic and unevenly distributed, and the Gogo suffered at least nine killing famines during the nineteenth century. Different regions suffered more than others. During an 1888 trip through the eastern plateau, the missionary John Price found that hunger was "dreadful" at Chilomwa, but at Nayu, only five miles away, "there was said to be plenty of food."²¹ The disparate ecology of their homeland invited Gogo people to defend their local interests. Clan leaders, called *watemi*, did not acknowledge a coordinating political authority. "Each town is entirely independent of its neighbor, and they frequently amuse themselves by running off with one another's cattle," wrote Dr. Baxter in 1881.²² Ecology and economics did not encourage the inhabitants of the central plains to think of themselves as members of an overarching ethnic community. One popular account has it that Swahili-speaking caravanners named

²⁰ The literature on nineteenth-century eastern Africa emphasizes the fluidity of ethnic categories. See, for example, Charles Ambler, *Kenyan Communities in the Age of Imperialism: The Central Region in the Late Nineteenth Century* (New Haven, Conn., 1988); Bill Bravman, *Making Ethnic Ways: Communities and Their Transformations in Taita, Kenya, 1800-1950* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1998); and Justin Willis, "The Makings of a Tribe: Bondei Identities and Histories," *Journal of African History* 33 (1992): 191-219.

²¹ For nineteenth-century famines, see Gregory Maddox, "'Leave, Wagogo, You Have No Food': Famine and Survival in Ugogo, Tanzania, 1916-1961" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1988), chap. 1; for Price's travels, see Church Missionary Society Archives, Birmingham (hereafter cited as CMS), G3/A5/O, Price to Lang, December 3, 1888.

²² CMS, G3/A5/O, Baxter to Hutchinson, March 18, 1881.

surveyor's artifice. In January 1912, the headman Kalage came to the Berega mission station, arguing that "his people were Wakaguru, and did not want to be taught by the Roman Catholics." The missionaries agreed with his petition, and German officials ruled that Kalage's people were really Kaguru.²⁵ The borders of the Kaguru homeland thereby seemed to be securely drawn. But even at the school in Itumba, in the mountainous heart of Kaguru country, missionaries found in 1911 that the people "laugh at the [Kaguru language] . . . and associate themselves with the Chigogo."²⁶ Kaguruland was hard to map out.

In this land of uneven opportunities, people were on the move. During times of famine, hungry people moved from place to place, searching for land to cultivate and on which to pasture cattle. During a famine in 1881, missionary observers reported that people fled from Mpwapwa, returning to rural areas in search of food. In 1894, a famine likewise emptied Mamboya of people. "All the people have gone or died," wrote the resident missionary.²⁷ Human communities clustered at places where food could be secured. Missionary travelers commented in 1879 on the great variety of languages spoken in the villages of the well-watered Itumba mountains.²⁸ People in Ukaguru and Ugogo had to be cultural entrepreneurs. Their political economy would not allow them to be dogmatic about their ethnicity. In 1889, the missionary Wood spent several days in the Kaguru village of Chief Sekwao. He was disconcerted to find that some of the girls there had recently been circumcised, because Kaguru did not normally cut their girls. "I asked Sekwao why he allowed them to follow the Gogo custom in this respect," wrote Wood. "He said it was because the women and young girls were so anxious for it."²⁹ Sekwao's daughter would not agree to play a pre-determined role. She and other women drew creatively on different traditions, looking for leverage and social advantage.

The body of anthropological scholarship about central Tanganyika frames Africans' social projects in the collective. In a series of prizewinning books and articles published over the past forty years, anthropologist T. O. Beidelman unpacked the structure of moral thought in Kaguru country.³⁰ Beidelman mined stories, songs, and initiation rituals for the insights they conveyed into Kaguru thinking about gender, age, and sexuality. Peter Rigby's classic work on Gogo society similarly focused on important rituals, highlighting how marriage and effective kin relations were constructed through the exchange of property. Rigby and Beidelman did not people their ethnographies with named individuals. Nor did they study how historical

in German East Africa," March 25, 1902. For missionaries' change of mind, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Usagara-Ugogo Mission Executive Committee meeting, August 26, 1911.

²⁵ DCT, Berega Log Book, entries for January 18, 1912, and October 17, 1914.

²⁶ DCT, Mamboya Log Book, Rees to Miss Spriggs, June 8, 1911.

²⁷ On Mpwapwa, see CMS, G3/A5/O, Baxter to Hutchinson, February 19, 1881; on Mamboya, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Rees, "History of the Church Missionary Society in German East Africa," March 25, 1902.

²⁸ CMS, C A6/O/14, Last to Wright, June 2, 1879.

²⁹ CMS, G3/A5/O, Wood, journal excerpts, 1889.

³⁰ Beidelman's most significant publications on Ukaguru include *The Matrilineal Peoples of Eastern Tanzania* (London, 1967); *Moral Imagination and Kaguru Modes of Thought* (Washington, D.C., 1993); and *The Cool Knife: Imagery of Gender, Sexuality, and Moral Education in Kaguru Initiation Ritual* (Washington, D.C., 1997). His *Colonial Evangelism: A Socio-Historical Study of an East African Mission at the Grassroots* (Bloomington, Ind., 1982) was the first scholarly book to inquire into the anthropology of Christian missionary work.

change shaped Africans' kin relations. For Rigby, doing research in the 1960s, the "traditional' Gogo social system has been, and still is in many ways, present below the surface of the broader changes and political institutions of modern Gogo society."³¹ Beidelman likewise cast his work in the ethnographic present tense.³² He was more sensitive than Rigby to the self-serving, partial, calculated choices that people make in dialogue with their community's expectations.³³ But like Rigby, Beidelman assumed that Africans' social practices could be inventoried apart from their uses in history.³⁴

Seeing Gogo and Kaguru people as tacticians changes our angle of vision. Instead of focusing on the collectivities that Beidelman and Rigby studied, we might better explore the structures of opportunity that women such as Sekwao's daughter faced.³⁵ The latitude with which entrepreneurial women could negotiate was probably greater in Ukaguru than in Ugogo, because in matrilineal Kaguru families, sisters could look to their brothers and parents for support in their marital arguments. Brothers hoped that their sisters' marriages would be weak, so that they could then exercise greater control over the women and their offspring. Wives' families diminished husbands' authority by encouraging women to set up autonomous homesteads.³⁶ The Kaguru woman Persisi, for example, repeatedly ran away from her husband, Ibrahimu, complaining about his drunkenness and abuse. When Ibrahimu died in 1912, Persisi refused her in-laws' demand that she shave her head in grief. She set up an independent household, and mothered orphaned children given to her by the missionaries at Mamboya. When in 1913 her parents-in-law attempted to coerce her to live with them, Persisi rebuffed their overture, arguing that she had a house and relatives of her own.³⁷ Kaguru women such as Persisi could marshal the material and social resources of their kin to get leverage over husbands and in-laws. In 1905, the Kaguru teacher Luka complained that the brother and sister of his wife, Mwendwa, were inducing her to divorce him. In 1910, Mwendwa took their three children to a *mganga*, a "witchdoctor," without Luka's consent. When missionaries berated her, she "got into a temper and left the [mission] village," bound for her brother's home.³⁸ Kaguru husbands always had to compete with their in-laws for control over their wives and children.

Wealthy Kaguru men enjoyed advantages in this contest over conjugal authority. Male entrepreneurs who invested in the nineteenth-century caravan trade were able to trump in-laws' claims, establishing virilocal, patrilineal homesteads. At Mamboya,

³¹ Rigby, *Cattle and Kinship*, 23–24.

³² As he notes in his preface to *The Cool Knife*, xiii.

³³ Beidelman writes that "much of Kaguru social life is a constant negotiation between self-serving, protective ambiguity and cooperative or exploitative explication of social rights and obligations." *Moral Imagination*, 8.

³⁴ The functionalist anthropology on central Tanganyika has been criticized in Robert Jackson and Gregory Maddox, "The Creation of Identity: Colonial Society in Bolivia and Tanzania," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35, no. 2 (1993): 263–284; and in Gregory Maddox, "Environment and Population Growth in Ugogo, Central Tanzania," in Maddox, James L. Giblin, and Isaria N. Kimambo, eds., *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania* (London, 1996), 43–65.

³⁵ See Steven Feierman, "African Histories and the Dissolution of World History," in Robert Bates et al., eds., *Africa and the Disciplines* (Chicago, 1993).

³⁶ Beidelman, *Moral Imagination*, 18.

³⁷ The sources for Persisi's biography are DCT, Mamboya Log Book, entries for June 19, 1903, May 25, 1912, and June 22, 1913; and CMS, G3/A8/O, Briggs to Baylis, May 1, 1902.

³⁸ DCT, Berega Log Book, entries for May 27, 1905, and August 28, 1910.



FIGURE 1: "Persisi and Ibrahimu with family, 1904." From Miss Spriggs's photo album, in CMS, Acc. 172 F3/18. Reproduced courtesy of the Church Mission Society.

the Kaguru entrepreneur Chimole accumulated slaves and dependents by trading in foodstuffs with Arab caravans. He took the Arabic title *Saidi* to facilitate this commerce.³⁹ When Chimole's father, the ruler of Mamboya, perished in the late 1870s, his sister's son should in Kaguru practice have inherited the position. But Chimole was able to best his aunt's son, claiming his father's post for himself. Chimole was the founder of his own patriline: his son, Saireni, was in 1897 named chief of Mamboya by the German colonial administration.⁴⁰ But even men such as Chimole had to compete with their wives and in-laws. Early in 1878, *Saidi* Chimole promised J. T. Last that he would send his son to be tutored at the newly established Anglican mission. More than a year later, the boy had not taken up his studies. On making inquiries, missionaries discovered that Chimole's wife had refused to allow her son to leave home.⁴¹ The most powerful of Kaguru fathers could not break a mother's hold over her children.

³⁹ DCT, Daudi Muhando, "Hadithi ya Kanisa, Usagara-Ukaguru," October 1951.

⁴⁰ RH, Micr. Af. 472, Reel 6, Kilosa District Book, "Notes on Wakaguru and Wasagara," n.d.; see also T. O. Beidelman, "Chiefship in Ukaguru: The Invention of Ethnicity and Tradition in Kaguru Colonial History," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 11, no. 2 (1978): 227–246.

⁴¹ CMS, C A6/O/14, Last to Wright, May 11, 1878; CMS, C A6/O/20, Price to Wright, October 28, 1879.



FIGURE 2: "Wamegi [Kaguru] women, Mamboya," n.d. (but mid-1890s). Like African men, missionaries were exercised about Kaguru women's sexuality. Here the photographer, Henry Cole, has carefully drawn a calico cover over the chest of the woman standing in the doorway. From CMS, Acc. 402 Z1/1. Reproduced courtesy of the Church Mission Society.

The strength of Kaguru mothers' hold over their offspring made husbands fret about their wives' sexual appetite. Regardless of their fathers' identity, Kaguru children could find a place in their mothers' family. Husbands' worries over their wives' promiscuity are evident in the songs that the anthropologist Beidelman recorded. A vagina was like a man-eater, went one Kaguru song. "Gaping, gaping the head of a leopard! It never fills up." Like the nose of a cow, a woman's vagina was always moist. It was a husband's burden to be an adequate sexual performer. Unfulfilled wives were liable to seek outsiders for sexual satisfaction. "That baobab tree is big for nothing because even a little one can climb it," went one song. Even a young man could seduce a much older woman. Lustful men were confident that they could find a lover in another man's wife. "I cut the tree to carry the nurturer, and if not that nurturer, then my neighbor's," went one song.⁴² Kaguru husbands knew their wives to be in-constant.

Conjugal unions were more permanent in patrilineal Gogo country than in matrilineal Kaguruland. "Petty quarrels do not cause husband and wife to separate," went one late-nineteenth-century proverb. "The relationship of brothers in law is sweet," went another. A contemporaneous folktale described how an unnamed husband, cuckolded by his wife, enlisted the aid of a hobgoblin, who chopped the errant

⁴² Songs analyzed in Beidelman, *The Cool Knife*, 200, 212, 215, 199.

woman to bits.⁴³ In 1930, Gogo elders were compelling men who committed adultery with a married woman to pay at least one head of cattle to the aggrieved husband.⁴⁴ By 1954, the ethnohistorian Mathias Mnyampala could look back on the precolonial nineteenth century as a time of sexual and social harmony. "There were no deceivers of the wives of other people; it was a very shameful matter to entice them away," he wrote. "Wives in the past were very trustworthy, because they did not covet wealth, as modern wives do."⁴⁵ The evidence is laden with nostalgia, but it shows that Gogo norms demanded disciplined fidelity of wives.

But the evidence also shows that in Ugogo, as in Ukaguru, husbands' mastery over their wives' sexual conduct depended largely on their wealth. In 1902, missionaries reported that men who could not pay the minimum bridewealth had to live like "slaves" in the homes of their wives' fathers. Some fathers-in-law were so strict that young men are said to have starved, denied the right to eat with their lovers' families.⁴⁶ By the 1930s, British officials could identify a scale of sexual and conjugal rights that men earned by offering livestock and labor to their fathers-in-law.⁴⁷ Poor men contracted *kupanga* marriages, paying one cow and one goat for sexual access to a prospective bride, then working for years on the father-in-law's land to marshal bridewealth.⁴⁸ Any children born to the couple belonged to the wife's family. Wealthy husbands went through an elaborate process of gift-giving in order to contract *kubanya* marriages. They paid dowry of up to twenty head of cattle and thirty goats, and thereby earned control over the women's labor and offspring. The solidity of wealthy Gogo husbands' rights made it unnecessary for them to monopolize their wives' sexual services. With her husband's encouragement, the wife of a wealthy polygamist could contract an *mbuya* relationship with a young male lover, inviting him into her room for sexual congress.⁴⁹ Even the nostalgic historian Mnyampala had to note that Gogo husbands "often exchanged wives with each other, because they were not very jealous."⁵⁰ British missionaries were appalled at the immorality they saw in Gogo married life, lamenting in 1909 that "there is much in [laws relating to matrimony and divorce] with which the teaching of the New Testament comes into desperate conflict."⁵¹ But Gogo husbands were not merely amoral gallants. A Gogo

⁴³ The proverbs and folktales come from missionary Henry Cole's ethnographic work, in CMS, Acc. 402 F5, Cole, "Chigogo Proverbs and Sayings," n.d.; and CMS, Acc. 402 F2, Cole, "Notes on Muyeye," n.d. Cole arrived at Mpwapwa in 1879, and worked in Kisokwe until 1905.

⁴⁴ RH, Micr. Af. 472, Reel 23, Manyoni District Book, vol. 1, "Wagogo History and Customs," March 17, 1930.

⁴⁵ Mnyampala, *The Gogo: History, Customs, and Traditions*, ed. and trans. Gregory Maddox (New York, 1995), 100.

⁴⁶ Henry Cole, "Notes on the Wagogo of German East Africa," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 32 (1902): 305–338; reproduced in Cole, "Children of the Dark Continent" (typescript, 1924), in CMS, Acc. 402 F3/1.

⁴⁷ RH, Micr. Af. 397, Dodoma District Book, A. Harries, "Wagogo Marriage Customs," April 13, 1932. Harries's typology is mirrored in Mnyampala's *The Gogo*, 106–109. See also Isaiah Chambala, "A Study of Marriage Customs amongst the Gogo People, with Particular Reference to the Area of the Chilonwa Parliamentary Constituency" (Dip. Theo., St. Philip's Kongwa, 1994).

⁴⁸ Mnyampala, *The Gogo*, 106.

⁴⁹ RH, Micr. Af. 472, Reel 23, Manyoni District Book, vol. 1, "Wagogo History and Customs," March 17, 1930; see also Rigby, *Cattle and Kinship*, 207.

⁵⁰ Mnyampala, *The Gogo*, 100.

⁵¹ Westgate, "The Home of the Wagogo," *Church Missionary Gleaner* 36 (1909).

child belonged to the patrician of the bridewealth-paying husband, even if he was not the child's father. Fertile, sexually active women enriched their husbands.

There was no incontrovertible third party that regulated conjugal conduct in Ugogo and Ukaguru. Wealthy, powerful men exercised more exclusive sexual rights over dependent women. They could afford to pay bridewealth and monopolize their wives' labor, sexual services, and progeny. Poor men, in contrast, had to compete with their wives' relatives and other paramours for the women's and children's loyalty. In both Ukaguru and Ugogo, they jostled with fathers-in-law, wives' brothers, and lovers. Entrepreneurial wives sought out brothers' and fathers' support against oppressive husbands. Wives and husbands did not enter into a permanent, inviolable contract, with fixed rights and expectations. They jockeyed for position, for greater freedom of action, and for greater control over their children's future.

MISSIONARIES SOUGHT TO TRANSFORM arguable conjugal unions into marriages validated under God's authority. With marriage registers and record books, they bound men and women together in an apparently unbreakable contract. Their family planning focused converts' sexual and social energies on a spouse, limiting fathers', mothers', lovers', and patrons' hold over their lives.

In the late nineteenth century, agents of the Church Missionary Society established stations along the routes that Arab and Swahili slave caravans traveled.⁵² Situated on the western edge of the Itumba mountains, Mpwapwa was a major entrepôt on the route leading inland from Bagamoyo and Zanzibar. Some 100,000 African porters, slaves, and traders annually passed through Mpwapwa.⁵³ The Anglicans built a station there in 1876, sheltering people who had escaped from slave caravans. In 1887, agents of the German East Africa Company built a fort at Mpwapwa. The fort and the mission house were destroyed in 1889, during a raid by the rebel Bushiri and two hundred of his men.⁵⁴ By October, the German Captain Wissman had arrived at Mpwapwa with a force of six hundred soldiers. Bushiri was captured and hanged, and on April 1, 1891, the region formerly controlled by the German trading company became part of the Imperial Protectorate of German East Africa.

Worried that the Germans' propensity for violence would give Christianity a bad name, English missionaries were eager to distinguish themselves in Africans' eyes. In 1888, shortly after the German fort at Mpwapwa was built, Price found it necessary to "explain to the Wagogo that [the Germans] were not in any way connected with us."⁵⁵ But Africans did not necessarily differentiate between pacific missionaries and German colonists. An 1886 dictionary testifies that Kaguru people knew a "missionary" to be a *mwejumbe*, the same word by which autocratic headmen were known.⁵⁶ The earliest missionaries used the threat of physical force to gain advan-

⁵² The history of the CMS mission in German East Africa is told in Beidelman's *Colonial Evangelism*.

⁵³ T. O. Beidelman, "A History of Ukaguru, 1857-1916," *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 58-59 (1962): 11-39.

⁵⁴ CMS, G3/A5/O, Price to Lang, July 25, 1889. The best account of the Bushiri uprising is Jonathon Glassman, *Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-1888* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1995).

⁵⁵ CMS, G3/A5/O, Price to Lang, January 2, 1888.

⁵⁶ J. T. Last, *Grammar of the Kaguru Language, Eastern Equatorial Africa* (London, 1886).

tages. While traveling through Gogo country in 1878, Dr. Baxter was asked by a local ruler for a length of cloth as tribute. Baxter took out his revolver, loaded it, and "told him I wanted to be friends." He was allowed to pass unhindered through the ruler's territory. By the 1900s, the German administration was actively backing missionaries' work. During an itinerating tour through the Itumba mountains in 1900, missionary Wood asked a chief for land on which to build a school. "How can I refuse?" the chief asked.⁵⁷ When in 1907 the Germans appointed five new para-chiefs to administer Mpwapwa District, three of the five appointments went to Anglican church members. By 1911, some government chiefs in Gogo country were imprisoning village headmen who refused to send their people to Sunday services.⁵⁸

Support from local government was of critical importance, because missionaries always found it hard to get a hearing. In 1881, Dr. Baxter at the Mpwapwa mission lamented that Gogo people's "houses are far apart, so that you can seldom get more [to preaching sessions] than six to a dozen at a one time."⁵⁹ Missionaries' first audience, therefore, was escaped slaves. "Cities of refuge" grew up on the boundaries of mission stations, where escaped slaves and others who sought the missionaries' patronage settled. At Kisokwe mission there lived a man, known to be a witch, whom missionaries had released on the way to his execution. Some forty former slaves populated the Mpwapwa mission in 1881.⁶⁰ Marginal, endangered people such as these became missionaries' default congregation. Only after the establishment of German colonial rule were preachers able to attract Gogo and Kaguru hearers en masse. Missionaries opened several new centers in the early 1900s.⁶¹ By 1903, there were 409 communicants at Anglican churches, while 3,060 people attended school. School attendance expanded dramatically when in 1910 the German government opened a railway line from Dar es Salaam through the central plains. By 1913 there were 1,295 Christians and 2,976 catechumens in Anglican mission stations, with 17,202 people attending school.⁶²

These statistics mask the controversies spurred by the expansion of mission churches. The earliest arguments were about where dependent women and men should properly live, because prosperous African men did not willingly relinquish their claims over the women and children who inhabited missionaries' "cities of ref-

⁵⁷ For Baxter's revolver, see CMS, C A6/O/5, Baxter to Wright, May 19, 1878; for the chief's question, see DCT, Itumba Log Book, North Wood, "Copy of Annual Letter Sent from Itumba CM Station to Salisbury Square," November 1900.

⁵⁸ For local administration, see Marcia Wright, *German Missions in Tanganyika, 1891-1941* (Oxford, 1971), 123, and Beidelman, *Colonial Evangelism*, 97; for headmen imprisoning non-churchgoers, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Westgate to Baylis, March 14, 1911.

⁵⁹ CMS, G3/A5/O, Baxter to Hutchinson, February 19, 1881.

⁶⁰ On Kisokwe's inhabitants, see CMS, G3/A5/O, Cole to Lang, July 18, 1888; on Mpwapwa's, see CMS, G3/A5/O, Price to Wigram, June 11, 1881. Uprooted people similarly populated stations run by German missionaries in nearby Iringa (Wright, *German Missions*, 86-88). British missionaries in the 1870s and 1880s had no legal authority with which to liberate slaves on the African mainland. They could only take down the slave dealers' names and forward the list to the British consul at Zanzibar.

⁶¹ The new stations were Berega, Nyangala, and Itumba in Ukaguru, and Kongwa and Mvumi in Ugogo. CMS, G3/A8/O, Rees, "History of the Church Missionary Society in German East Africa," March 25, 1902.

⁶² On the railway, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Rees and Baxter, General Report for Ussagara-Ugogo Mission, 1910; on school statistics, see CMS, G3/A8/O, "A Few Facts about the Work of the CMS in German East Africa," 1914.



FIGURE 3: "Boys and girls of our village: 1. Mazangu—donkey boy. 2. Loi—freed slave girl. 3. Terekani—water boy. 4. Ndodola—cast-off wife. 5. Kanye—runaway slave. 6. Vigoha—servant. 7. Mygoha—cook, an enquirer. 8. N'gonda—servant, an enquirer. 9. Nasibu—rescued slave boy. 10. Chigaye—working for her keep. 11. Munjala—ditto as no. 10—Miss Colsey's monkey on shoulder, 1898." From CMS, Acc. 172 F1/1. Reproduced courtesy of the Church Mission Society.

uge." In 1900, for example, a girl named Chausiku watched her mother die.⁶³ She was taken into the home of Chogamawano, a senior man. Chausiku found Chogamawano a harsh taskmaster: when he discovered that she had been attending church at Mamboya, he "held my hand and heavily slapped my face and held my throat while threatening to strangle me." He had plans, she learned, to marry her to his own son. When in May 1902 Maria Ackerman asked her if she wished to live at the mission, Chausiku unhesitatingly replied, "Yes, mom." Ackerman overrode Chogamawano's protests: "I'm taking her because you're mistreating her," she said. After a year spent as a servant in Ackerman's home, Chausiku married a mission teacher in a church wedding.

There was more at stake here than slavery and freedom. Missionaries' debates with wealthy men such as Chogamawano were structured by their contending theories of kinship. By manufacturing kin connections with female dependents, wealthy men could multiply their clients and found a patriline. In 1887, Dr. Pruen at Mpwapwa interviewed two children who had run away from a small caravan.⁶⁴ They had been enslaved in Gogo country, they said, sold for a piece of cloth. An older man came to claim them, arguing that they were his brother and sister. In conversation, Pruen discovered that the children spoke the Gogo language, while the man spoke

⁶³ The sources on Chausiku's childhood are DCT, Mariamu Chausiku, "Habari za Maisha Yangu," September 29, 1948; and DCT, Mamboya Log Book, entry for May 16, 1902.

⁶⁴ CMS, G3/A5/O, Dr. Pruen to Lang, July 4, 1887.

Kisagara. On the basis of this evidence, he concluded that the children were the older man's slaves, not his kin. But Gogo and Kaguru rights holders did not make such distinctions. They integrated pawns or dependents into their homesteads, building a family with fictive kin ties. For their part, socially marginal girls such as Chausiku sought to create bonds of kinship with powerful patrons. Some of them found missionaries to be willing parents. In the early 1890s, Miss Spriggs and Maria Ackerman adopted the girl Nyamiti, a former slave who had escaped to the mission at Mpwapwa. When Nyamiti married a teacher in 1898, Spriggs acted as her mother, oiling her body and conveying her to the church for the ceremony. By turning African girls into kin, missionaries claimed from senior men the right to negotiate marriages and profit from the girls' labor. At Mamboya, Miss Colsey adopted a baby girl named Hefsi in 1898. Hefsi had been given to the missionaries by her uncle after she cut her top teeth first, which made her inauspicious in Kaguru people's eyes. When Hefsi married a church student in 1912, the groom paid bridewealth to Miss Colsey. In 1898, Miss Pickthall adopted an infant she named Hephzibah. When the girl married a teacher in 1912, Pickthall organized a church wedding and taught local villagers to sing "a very pretty Welsh tune . . . [which is] to take the place of every objectionable song that they have hitherto sung in their own villages on such occasions."⁶⁵

The marriages that missionaries sponsored were generally virilocal. They could not be otherwise, for the majority of Christian men worked part-time as church teachers or evangelists. Teachers' wives had to live with their husbands at a location that suited the missionaries' needs. Wives' relatives had the most to lose in this arrangement. Particularly in matrilineal Ukaguru, they competed with missionaries and husbands for young women's loyalty. In 1897, the Anglican church court at Mvumi spent an entire day interviewing the Kaguru teacher Danyeli, whose sick son had been taken to a "heathen" witchdoctor. His wife, when called before the court, admitted to doctoring the child on her own initiative.⁶⁶ Kaguru mothers and their relatives worked to keep control over their own children, even against missionaries' intervention. In 1907, Miss Pickthall "rescued" the young girl Mashaka from her mother, Paulina. Paulina, though, refused to relinquish her daughter: even four years later, missionaries reported that she was "making a fuss" about Mashaka. When a church teacher married Mashaka, the missionaries collected five goats in bride-wealth. By 1914, Paulina had been excommunicated for living an "immoral life" with a Muslim in Dodoma town.⁶⁷

Missionaries invited the men and women settled at mission stations to form monogamous marriages. They defended Christian husbands' rights over their wives, limiting the role that wives' relatives and other rights holders could play. In 1905, the chief at Mamboya laid claim to the wife and children of church teacher Johana Maganga. They were, he said, his slaves. Missionaries wrote a letter to the German

⁶⁵ Nyamiti's and Hefsi's stories are in CMS, Acc. 172 F1, Extracts from Miss Spriggs's Letters, December 1898; the quotation is from CMS, G3/A8/O, Pickthall, Annual Letter, November 12, 1912. See also DCT, Mamboya Log Book, entry for September 12, 1912.

⁶⁶ DCT, Chama cha CMS Mvumi, entry for October 18, 1897. A few months later, the Mvumi court heard another teacher, Yeremiya, complain that his wife and her kin had given his daughter heathen medicine without his knowledge; *ibid.*, entry for February 27, 1898.

⁶⁷ Mashaka's story is in DCT, Mamboya Log Book, entries for October 8, 1907, September 18, 1911, and April 4, 1914; and DCT, Berega Log Book, entry for December 2, 1911.



FIGURE 4: "Miss Colsey and self with little Theo, 1898." This photo, from Miss Spriggs's photo album, pictures the bush where missionaries had found Theo abandoned a few months before. From CMS, Acc. 172 F1/1. Reproduced courtesy of the Church Mission Society.



FIGURE 5: "Native Agent, Beraga (Yusufu Msagala) with wife, mother in law, four children and niece, 1904." Missionary photographs very often featured monogamous couples, carefully posed with their children. But mothers-in-law would not stay out of the frame. In 1910, Miss Spriggs found that Yusufu's children were sleeping in their grandmother's home. When she remonstrated with Yusufu, he complained that he could not get the children back unless the missionaries came personally to extract them from his in-laws' home. For Yusufu's frustration, see DCT, Beraga Log Book, entry for July 14, 1910. The photograph is from CMS, Acc. 172 F3/46. Reproduced courtesy of the Church Mission Society.

government arguing Maganga's case, and within a month, the German administrator had declared Maganga's children and wife to be legally free.⁶⁸ Missionaries believed that the bond between husband and wife took precedence over all other relationships. They ruled that no polygamist could be admitted to the catechumenate unless he separated from all of his wives except the one he had married first.⁶⁹ Many people found this paring down of their human relationships to be dangerously antisocial. When in 1902 the polygamist Kayanka sought to be baptized in the Anglican church at Mamboya, he had to renounce several women with whom he had conjugal relationships. As a village headman, Kayanka had used his wealth to recruit women and dependents: he possessed as many as thirty slaves. It is not surprising that he hesitated before pledging for baptism, complaining that "all manner of unkind things will be said if he drives [his wives] away now." Even his Christian wife thought it discreditable when, after he had resolved his doubts, Kayanka renounced his claims

⁶⁸ DCT, Kongwa Log Book, entries for May 31 and June 27, 1905. German officials could emancipate slaves where they found slave trading to be taking place or where slaves had been abused. For the law, see Thaddeus Sunseri, "Slave Ransoming in German East Africa, 1885–1922," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 26, no. 3 (1993): 481–511.

⁶⁹ CMS, G3/A8/O, Executive Committee Meeting at Mamboya, April 6, 1900.

over wives and slaves alike. A scant few months after his baptism, she committed adultery with a church teacher.⁷⁰

Missionaries worked to refabricate Africans' social relationships, stitching monogamous marriages out of the variegated economic, social, and sexual fabric that connected Kaguru and Gogo people. Kaguru and Gogo people had acknowledged a variety of different conjugal or sexual relationships. A Kaguru man, for example, could pay *mafu*, a fee for sexual rights, to a woman who lived with her natal kin.⁷¹ A Gogo woman could likewise create an *mbuya* relationship with an unmarried man. Missionaries regarded *mbuya* and other relationships like it as illicit, adulterous affairs. When in 1917 the wife of the government administrator Petro was found to have repeatedly had sexual congress with two men, she was excommunicated. Husbands were expected to have exclusive sexual access to their wives. Wives, conversely, were expected to hold their husbands to account. Missionaries at Berega were appalled when, in 1903, the communicant Zakariya was found to have repeatedly committed adultery. His wife was found to have been complicit in his liaisons. Missionaries suspended all three offenders from communion, and sent them away from the mission station.⁷²

The practice of bookkeeping was one means by which Anglican missionaries obligated African converts to practice sexually exclusive monogamy. In medieval England, couples could, through a ritual called "handfasting," form a binding union simply by exchanging a verbal pledge. Oliver Cromwell's radical Protestants sought to regularize popular marital practices by requiring couples to submit their names to their parish registrar twenty-one days in advance of their wedding. One hundred years later, the Marriage Act of 1753 ruled that a marriage was null unless a record was made in the parish register, signed by the bride and groom, two witnesses, and the officiating clergy.⁷³ In German East Africa, missionaries were from 1901 empowered to administer both civil and Christian marriages. They kept careful records on who married whom, and presented the books yearly for review by German government officers.⁷⁴ These records transformed personal choices into a publicly verifiable pledge. In 1901, the catechumen Mulosa married Aksa at the church in Berega. Theirs was the first Christian marriage celebrated at Berega; the couple's names, and the names of two witnesses, headed the list of marriages in the mission's log book. But in 1903, Mulosa was found to have committed adultery. He wrote a letter of confession to the missionaries at Berega, vowing that "from this time forward my name is being removed from the book of the pleasures of this world." The missionaries carefully pasted Mulosa's note in the church log book, and made notes

⁷⁰ For Kayanka's quandary, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Peel, "Usagara and Ugogo Revisited," 1902–1903; Rees to Baylis, August 2, 1905; and DCT, Chama cha CMS Mvumi Log Book, entry for November 5, 1898. For Kayanka's wife, see CMS, G3/A5/O, *Usagara-Ugogo Notes*, vol. 2 (December 1903).

⁷¹ Beidelman, *The Matrilineal Peoples of Eastern Tanzania*, 45.

⁷² For Petro's wife, see DCT, Kongwa Log Book, entry for February 27, 1917; for Zakariya, see DCT, Berega Log Book, entry for July 25, 1903.

⁷³ For handfasting, see Martin Ingram, *Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England, 1570–1640* (Cambridge, 1987), 190; for Cromwell, see Outhwaite, *Clandestine Marriage*, 12. See also Stone, *Road to Divorce*, 124.

⁷⁴ CMS, G3/A8/O, Executive Committee Meeting at Mpwapwa, June 6–7, 1901.

on its import.⁷⁵ By keeping records, missionaries crafted measures with which to evaluate converts' conduct.⁷⁶

Husbands and wives were liable to be punished when they did not abide by the letter of the law. In 1911, a conference of missionaries and African Christians ruled that a Christian man who committed adultery was to pay his lover's aggrieved spouse or father two head of cattle: one heifer and one steer. A Christian woman who committed adultery was obliged to pay the church the sum of ten rupees.⁷⁷ Adultery fines were not a novelty in patrilineal Ugogo, where cuckolded husbands customarily demanded compensation from their wives' lovers. What was new about the church's adultery fines was the breadth of their reach and the precision of their application. Adulterous Gogo wives had never before been fined for their transgressions, and in matrilineal Kaguru territory, adultery fines were uncommon. Missionaries insisted that adultery fines should be collected even when the aggrieved parties declined to demand compensation. In 1925, Banks found that Nyendera, an unmarried catechumen at Kilimatinde, had given birth to a child. Nyendera's father refused to demand an adultery fine from his daughter's lover, and Banks was disconcerted to find that "both parties profess to be penitent, but do not see their way to marry."⁷⁸ Banks required both offenders to pay a fine to the church, and lobbied Nyendera's father to demand compensation from his daughter's lover.

Missionaries granted divorces when husbands and wives could show their partners to be habitual adulterers. Under the civil code in England, adultery was from 1857 until 1937 the sole grounds on which the courts would allow couples to divorce.⁷⁹ The executive committee of the German East Africa Mission ruled in 1900 that the innocent party in an adultery case could be allowed to divorce. Divorce was also allowed in the case of desertion, if the husband or wife had not been heard from for four years. In 1919, the Kongwa church court found that the married communicant Elisha had a longstanding conjugal relationship with another woman. Moreover, Jemima, Elisha's proper wife, complained that he and his father treated her badly, punishing her "for not following certain Gogo customs." Missionaries excommunicated Elisha. Jemima was granted a divorce and given custody of their son.⁸⁰

Anglican church courts were not the only legal venue open to Kaguru and Gogo litigants, but their options were limited. The German military administered central Tanganyika virtually until the onset of World War I.⁸¹ With German civil officers thin

⁷⁵ The sources on Mulosa's marriage with Aksa are DCT, Berega Log Book, entries for February 4, 1901, and August 13, 1903; Mulosa to Bibi Akaman, n.d.; and Mulosa to Deekes at Nyangala, n.d.

⁷⁶ Political entrepreneurs in central Kenya likewise sought to discipline their constituents through recordkeeping. See Derek R. Peterson, *Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and the Work of Imagination in Colonial Kenya* (Portsmouth, N.H., 2004).

⁷⁷ CMS, G3/A8/O, Ussagara-Ugogo Mission Executive Committee, August 26, 1911.

⁷⁸ DCT, Kilimatinde Log Book, entry for January 11, 1924.

⁷⁹ Bruce Bennett, "The Church of England and the Law of Divorce since 1857: Marriage Discipline, Ecclesiastical Law and the Establishment," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 45, no. 4 (1994): 625–641; and Gail Savage, "Divorce and the Law in England and France Prior to the First World War," *Journal of Social History* 21 (1988): 499–513.

⁸⁰ For the law, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Executive Committee Meeting at Mamboya, April 6, 1900; for Elisha and Jemima, see DCT, Kongwa Log Book, entries for October 17, 1919, and February 27, 1920.

⁸¹ Military officers administered the German station at Mpwapwa until 1906. Kondoia, in Gogo country, was not handed over to civilian administration until 1912. See RH, Micr. Af. 472, Reel 5, Kondoia District Book, vol. 1, "Historical Note," n.d.; and Juhani Koponen, *Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884–1914* (Helsinki, 1994), 115–116.

on the ground, Swahili-speaking agents from the Indian Ocean coast performed the daily work of government. Neither German officers nor their subordinates were willing to intervene in Kaguru and Gogo people's intimate disputes. When in 1903 the teacher Andreyka Kayanka petitioned the German Captain Fonck to punish the man who had cuckolded him, Fonck refused.⁸² It was not until 1928, under the new British mandate, that a system of local courts run by Kaguru and Gogo judges was established.⁸³ In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, therefore, litigants seeking alternatives to missionary justice had to turn to Islam. Islam had long been practiced in East Africa's trading centers. In the 1910s it enjoyed a surge in popularity, as the railway brought Muslim traders and evangelists to central Tanganyika. Some Africans shuttled between religions, capitalizing on Islam's tolerance for polygamy. Samson Tofiki, an ex-houseboy for the missionary Cole, became a Muslim in the 1890s when he married a second wife. On becoming mortally ill in 1909, he sent word to Dr. Baxter, promising to renounce Islam and re-convert to Christianity. Men such as Tofiki were "venue-shopping," mining the resources of Christianity and Islam.⁸⁴

But there were good reasons to abide by missionaries' rules. In 1906, teachers in mission employ were paid ten rupees a month, considerably more than manual workers earned. Teachers and other church workers were also given land to cultivate, and building materials for their homes. Excommunicated church people were obliged to move at least a quarter-mile away from the mission station, abandoning the homes they had built. They were also obliged to drop their Christian names, and were cut off from any social interaction with the church community. Africans who enjoyed missionaries' favor were protected from the labor recruiters who impressed people for work on German-run plantations or on the railway. Old men who regularly attended church were likewise exempt from forced labor. For people invested in the Anglican mission, excommunication was a financial and social disaster.⁸⁵

Anglican missionaries used social, material, and legal sanctions to restructure Africans' social relationships. They protected runaway slave girls against senior male "owners," and married their charges to church teachers. They disciplined polygamous men, insisting that they disassociate themselves from all their wives save one. And they kept records, creating textual proof with which to hold husbands and wives accountable. Through their social and bureaucratic work, missionaries limited the role that mothers, uncles, fathers, brothers, patrons, or lovers could play in husbands'

⁸² CMS, G3/A8/O, *Usagara-Ugogo Notes*, vol. 2 (December 1903).

⁸³ RH, Micr. Af. 472, Reel 6, Mpwapwa District Book, vol. 2, "Resume of Native Authorities in the Mpwapwa District," 1931.

⁸⁴ For Islam's railway-born popularity, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Forsythe, Annual Letter, November 28, 1910; for Tofiki, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Dr. Baxter, Annual Letter, December 13, 1909. The term "venue-shopping" comes from Richard Roberts, *Litigants and Households: African Disputes and Colonial Courts in the French Soudan, 1895-1912* (Portsmouth, N.H., 2005).

⁸⁵ On wage levels, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Executive Committee Meeting, February 9, 1906; on the rule that excommunicated church members had to move their homes, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Executive Committee minutes, February 28, 1912, and Beidelman, *Colonial Evangelism*, 148. On names and excommunication, see DCT, Central Church Council of the Tanganyika Mission, meeting on February 27 and March 1, 1926. On converts and forced labor, see DCT, Nyangala Log Book, entry for July 12, 1911. The labor history of late-nineteenth-century central Tanganyika is recounted in Thaddeus Sunseri, *Vilimani: Labor Migration and Rural Change in Early Colonial Tanzania* (Portsmouth, N.H., 2002), chap. 6. On the consequences of excommunication in medieval England, see Ingram, *Church Courts, Sex and Marriage*, chap. 1.

and wives' lives. They worked for the reorientation of African social life, for the preeminence of wedlock over other human relationships.

AFRICANS WERE ALSO LIVING UP to the letter of the law. Missionaries' archives, stuffed with record books and lists, were by no means a foreign world to African litigants. Kaguru and Gogo people had long concretized contestable decisions by keeping records. In 1899, the missionary Wood found that Kaguru elders recorded dates and facts by tying knots in a piece of string. One elder possessed a stick on which were recorded the results of three lawsuits: big notches stood for cows he had been awarded, little notches for goats. The elder told Wood, "this is our *kitabu* [book]."⁸⁶ Sticks were like books because they permanently recorded human decisions. Litigants such as the unnamed Kaguru elder created records in order to render controversial judgments above dispute. Many people found missionaries' records to be helpful in resolving divisive social problems. During a tour through Ugogo in 1888, the missionary Pruen reported that petitioners "often ask me to look in my book and see if they have not been bewitched." Everyone knew it to be difficult to properly identify malevolent witches. Kaguru and Gogo people tested suspects by compelling them to undergo dangerous ordeals.⁸⁷ Pruen's petitioners sought a surer solution. They looked in missionaries' books for concrete, uncontested evidence of wrongdoing.

For Gogo and Kaguru litigants, missionaries' practice of bookkeeping was useful in resolving their own arguments. Records were helpful because they interposed a third element—the archive—between human co-participants in an argument. In 1913 Nellie, a student at Mamboya, agreed to marry the teacher Andrea Uhimbo. Uhimbo had lived on the Indian Ocean coast for more than thirteen years. Before Nellie would marry him, she first insisted that he sign a letter "testifying to his intention to live in their own country of Ukaguru."⁸⁸ Her fiancé's promissory note gave her the prospect of living in close proximity to her natal kin. Records such as Uhimbo's note clarified changeable decisions. Aggrieved lovers, husbands, and wives used records as evidence in church courts. In 1905, the church teacher Maryamu accused a male teacher of asking her for sex. He wrote five letters to persuade her.⁸⁹ She kept the letters, and presented them to missionaries at Mamboya as evidence of his wrongdoing. Love letters were concrete proof of evil intentions. In 1904, the teacher Gideon Terekani was accused of wrongdoing with the inquirer Visimba. When Mamboya missionaries investigated, they found that Gideon had written love notes both to Visimba and to another teacher's wife. Presented with the evidence, Gideon confessed to his wrongdoing. "I have been deceitful before you and before God," he wrote in a letter to the missionaries.⁹⁰ By keeping notes and making records, aggrieved men and women made wrongdoers answerable to a higher power.

Recordkeeping was useful for litigants because it brought missionaries' authority

⁸⁶ A. North Wood, "Mamboia," *Church Missionary Gleaner* 26 (1899).

⁸⁷ For Pruen's petitioners, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Pruen to Lang, June 18, 1888; for witchcraft ordeals, see CMS, G3/A5/O, Price to Hutchinson, July 16, 1881, and Beidelman, *Moral Imagination*, 144–145.

⁸⁸ DCT, Mamboya Log Book, entry for August 12, 1913.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, entry for June 5, 1905.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, entries for March 27 and 28, 1904; and Gideon Terekani to David Rees, August 31, 1904.

to bear. Missionaries were obligated to punish adulterers and others who broke church laws. For African litigants, the church's regulations on marriage opened up grooves of representation that they could follow. Husbands and wives reinterpreted earlier sexual liaisons, recasting what were originally consensual relationships into violations of marital trust. In July 1894, the inquirer Sara quarreled with her husband, the Mamboya mission cook Yohana. The next day, Sara told missionaries that Yohana had committed adultery with the woman Magauge.⁹¹ When confronted with his wife's accusation, Yohana in turn accused his wife of committing adultery with a communicant at Mamboya. Sara's sin had occurred in 1891 or 1892, several years before Yohana reported it to the missionaries. Yohana and Magauge had likewise had congress, said Sara, "a long time back." Husband and wife had found it possible to live in harmony for several years after both had liaised with other people. Only when they sought to involve missionaries in their private quarrel did their earlier liaisons become "adultery," an infraction deserving punishment. By reinterpreting nonmarital sexual relationships as adultery, Sara and Yohana both sought to leverage the missionaries onto their own side in a private marital debate.

Making the accusation of adultery was a legal strategy for warring husbands and wives. It gripped missionaries' attention, and set a disciplinary process into motion. In 1922, Ainea Sembuli appeared before Mamboya missionaries to complain about the behavior of his wife, Loi. He reported that she "had a sharp temper, used insulting language, was often the worse for drink, and on one occasion boxed his ears several times." Loi was one of Miss Spriggs's earliest adoptees. Formerly a slave, she had married Ainea in 1898 at a ceremony that Spriggs had organized. Ainea found her to be a formidable spouse. Testifying before the church court, he refused to live with her. Loi, when called to testify, admitted to some of Ainea's charges, and agreed to pay the fine of a chicken as compensation for her wrongdoing. But, she added, "she had grave suspicions about her husband regarding his conduct with another woman." She had no proof, but her accusation against Ainea transformed what had been a disciplinary action directed against her into an inquiry about his conduct. After a long conversation that the missionaries refereed, Loi and Ainea agreed to live together once again.⁹²

By accusing their spouses of adultery or other moral infractions, husbands and wives invited missionaries to sit in judgment on their private disputes. Litigants cast about for means to shock or appall church courts, hoping to spur them into action. In October 1925, the Kilimatinde church council convened to hear teacher Meshak Mang'wela's complaint against the relatives of his wife, Damarsis. Meshak accused his in-laws of undermining his marriage: his wife's mother, he reported, wanted to see the couple separated. When called before the council, Damarsis widened the court's scope of inquiry, accusing Meshak of "being drunk, and neglecting his work as a teacher and ill treating her." Further questioning proved fruitless, the court's secretary reported, because "each time the parties were brought before [the council] they made different statements contradicting what had been said previously." Two

⁹¹ CMS, G3/A5/O, Wood to Baylis, August 21, 1894.

⁹² For Loi's biography, see CMS, Acc. 172 F1, Extracts from Miss Spriggs's Letters, 1898; for Ainea and Loi's arguments, see DCT, Mamboya Log Book, entry for December 15, 1922; for Kaguru wives' decorum, see Beidelman, *The Cool Knife*, 79–81. By 1938, Ainea had been excommunicated from the Anglican church. DCT, Berega Log Book, "Tangazo," September 11, 1938.

weeks after the hearing was adjourned, Meshak complained that his mother-in-law was still refusing to allow his wife to live with him.⁹³ The records do not tell us whether Meshak and Damarsis were Gogo or Kaguru, whether they really belonged to patrilocal or matrilineal families. Their argument was in any case about precisely this question. Damarsis's blood relatives kept her at her natal home, asserting their control over her fertility and labor. Meshak, in contrast, insisted that his wife should properly live at his residence. In this argument over Damarsis's future, husband and wife each got traction in the church court by impugning the other's conduct. They made moral accusations strategically, in order to convince the missionaries to act in their favor.

African husbands and wives transposed arguments over bridewealth, residence, and marital obligations into a framework that attracted missionaries' attention. In June 1925, the Kilimatinde teacher Yohana Ndahani complained that his wife, Aksa, had been taken from him by her brother. One of the animals that Yohana had paid as bridewealth had been taken back by its original owner. His brother-in-law had therefore reclaimed Aksa until Yohana could replace the cow with another. Three months after Yohana made his complaint, missionaries convened the church council to discuss the case. When called to testify, Aksa did not complain about the bride-wealth that Yohana had failed to pay. She accused him of "ill-treatment, drunkenness, and unfaithfulness with a woman." She called no witnesses to prove her accusation. When questioned, Yohana strenuously denied committing adultery. In the absence of evidence, the missionaries determined to keep a close watch on Yohana's behavior. Almost a year later, Aksa was still living at her natal home.⁹⁴

It is impossible to know whether Yohana Ndahani really committed adultery, or whether he was a drunkard or an abusive lout. Such questions were the church court's to answer. For historians, this and other cases illuminate how the accusation of adultery performed social and legal work for disputatious husbands and wives. Yohana and Aksa's argument was about the allocation of bridewealth. Damarsis and Meshak Mang'wela disagreed about the proper location for their marital home. Ainea and Loi argued over her lack of deference. But in court, husbands and wives recast their arguments to suit missionaries' framework. They strategically adopted a contractual definition of marriage, and reinterpreted their spouses' extramarital relationships as adulterous. By this representation, arguing husbands and wives laid out a path of legal and social action for missionary judges to follow.

Some couples did indisputably have sex outside marriage. For young men and women eager to be married, having sex was a means of forcing churchmen to endorse their plans. This strategy was by no means new. When a young Kaguru man could not persuade his maternal relatives to pay bridewealth to his lover's relations, he might elope with his intended, in an act called *kugalula*. Frustrated Gogo men could similarly elope with their paramours, following a ritualized process called *kupula*.⁹⁵ Young lovers could thereby force their elders' hand, speeding bridewealth negotiations along. Missionaries frowned on men and women who eloped, but they were

⁹³ DCT, Kilimatinde Log Book, entries for October 17 and October 28, 1925.

⁹⁴ Ibid., entries for June 11 and August 26, 1925, and April 19, 1926.

⁹⁵ For *kugalula*, see Beidelman, *Matrilineal Peoples of Eastern Africa*, 45; for *kupula*, see Mnyampala, *The Gogo*, 108–109, and Rigby, *Cattle and Kinship*, 212.

inclined to marry young lovers who presented them with a *fait accompli*. In 1898, a woman named Kanyi, an ex-slave who had been adopted by missionaries, was found to have repeatedly spent the night at the house of Maganga, an inquirer at the church at Mvumi.⁹⁶ The missionaries at Mvumi ordered the couple to be married as soon as possible. By committing fornication, young lovers could obligate missionaries to broker marriages on their behalf.

This strategy of marriage formation was especially widely practiced in the years immediately following World War I. The war years were a time of tremendous social upheaval in central Tanganyika. Some 35,000 Gogo men were conscripted into German military service. British missionaries were interned, while African church teachers were arrested en masse. In the wake of the war, famine and disease unsettled human communities. Some 30,000 people perished in Ugogo.⁹⁷ But even in these desperate circumstances, Gogo and Kaguru converts were burnishing their Anglicanism. The church teacher Mikaeli conducted weekly services at Berega throughout the war years, save for the two Sundays when Germans occupied the church building. When the missionary Daulton returned to Kisokwe in 1918, converts lined the road, singing hymns of praise to God.⁹⁸ African Christians were actively drawing Anglican missionaries into their postwar building projects. The population in Ugogo expanded at an annual rate of 4.3 percent during the early 1920s, mostly through immigration.⁹⁹ Some of the newcomers allied with Gogo patrons. During the postwar famine, the unmarried woman Isanza binti Kinda in Muhalala grew cassava and distributed it to her dependents. She declared herself sultan, and by 1923 was governing some two hundred people.¹⁰⁰ Other people identified with Anglican missionaries. In 1920 there were 6,354 students attending school in and around Mvumi, compared with 4,096 in 1913.¹⁰¹ In 1922, Ralph Banks was collared by an elderly rainmaker, who asked that the missionaries educate his young son. "He said he wished him to learn everything we English knew," reported Banks.¹⁰² Entrepreneurs such as the rainmaker were tapping into the moral and material resources that missionary patrons offered.

In married life, too, Kaguru and Gogo people made claims on missionaries, seeking to transform dalliances formed during the war into socially recognizable marriages. At Kongwa, David Rees reported in 1920 that "a number of the Christians had fallen into a state of pitiable moral laxity, due in part to the absence of the administration of the marriage rite."¹⁰³ He noted, however, that his interviews with sinful fornicators were often rewarded with expressions of repentance. "When I rec-

⁹⁶ DCT, Chama cha CMS Mvumi, entry for September 13, 1898.

⁹⁷ The economic and demographic history is told in Gregory Maddox, "Mtunya: Famine in Central Tanzania, 1917–20," *Journal of African History* 31 (1990): 181–197, and Rigby, *Cattle and Kinship*, 21–22. The church history is in CMS, G3/A8/O, Simeoni Mtupula to Miss Jackson, June 29, 1916; Daulton to Manley, September 19, 1916.

⁹⁸ For Berega's service schedule, see DCT, Berega Service Book, entries for July 30, 1916, and August 13, 1916, and Knox, *Signal on the Mountain*, 206; for Daulton's return to Kisokwe, see CMS, G3/A8/O, Daulton to Manley, March 21, 1918.

⁹⁹ Gregory Maddox, "Environment and Population Growth in Ugogo, Central Tanzania," in Maddox, James Giblin, and Isaria Kimambo, eds., *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania* (London, 1996), 43–65.

¹⁰⁰ RH, Micr. Af. 472, Reel 23, Manyoni District Book, vol. 1, entry titled "Muhalala," n.d.

¹⁰¹ Attendance at Buigiri likewise grew from 2,808 pupils to 3,588. The statistics are from *Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society*, 1914 and 1921.

¹⁰² CMS, Banks, Annual Letter, November 6, 1922.

¹⁰³ CMS, Rees, Annual Letter, November 20, 1920.

ollect my sin I am angry with myself," said Rees's prototypical penitent. By admitting guilt, penitents obligated missionaries to act in their favor. In 1918, missionaries at Kongwa discovered that during the tumult of war, the communicant Emi had taken up residence with Semango, who had fathered three children with her.¹⁰⁴ The missionaries had little choice in the matter: Rees insisted that Semango should pay a nominal bridewealth to Emi's relatives, reasoning that doing so would "make it a proper marriage at least from the Gogo point of view." In 1921, missionaries at Kongwa found that Timoteyo and Mwendwa, both communicants, had repeatedly had sex during the war. The church court ordered their fathers to arrange a proper marriage for the lovers. However, Timoteyo's father steadfastly refused to pay bride-wealth. When later that year it became evident that Mwendwa was pregnant, the missionaries determinedly lectured Timoteyo's parents that "only if Timoteyo marries Mwendwa can they in any way claim the child." Within a week, Timoteyo's father reported that bridewealth negotiations had been concluded. A month later, the couple were married.¹⁰⁵

Young men and women such as Timoteyo and Mwendwa used missionaries' sanction against extramarital sex to trump stingy relatives, and to transform impermanent liaisons into valid marriages. At church court proceedings, lovers offered evidence of their conjugal relationships, then asked missionaries for support in transforming these dalliances into marriages. Through their sexual liaisons, young lovers made missionaries into wedding planners.

IN THE 1920s, THE NEW BRITISH ADMINISTRATION curtailed church courts' authority over married life. The 1921 Marriage Ordinance established a procedure by which Christian Africans could obtain governmental recognition for their marriages. In 1928, a formal system of native courts was established in central Tanganyika. Run by chiefs and headmen, the tribunals judged marriage and other family cases in accordance with what the British euphemistically called "customary law."¹⁰⁶ The prerogatives of church courts were thereby curtailed: missionaries and African priests could marry church adherents and excommunicate adulterers, but by the late 1920s, legal authority over marriage and divorce was vested with the civil authorities.

Nevertheless, African husbands and wives continued to use church courts to argue about their marriages. In 1945, the missionary Mrs. Bakewell was posted to Kaguru country. By that time, her missionary colleagues had been working in the region for fully seventy years. Commenting on church business, she complained that "each year a group of church elders are elected for the church council . . . and they

¹⁰⁴ DCT, Kongwa Log Book, entry for November 2, 1918.

¹⁰⁵ DCT, Kongwa Log Book, entries for December 21, 1921, and February 8, June 3, June 4, June 17, and July 15, 1922.

¹⁰⁶ For ordinances pertaining to marriage, see Tanganyika Territory, *Ordinances under the Tanganyika Order in Council, 1920* (London, 1923), no. 12; Tanganyika Territory, *Ordinances Enacted during the Year 1923* (Dar es Salaam, 1924), no. 17; for local government courts, see RH, Micr. Af. 472, Reel 6, Mpwapwa District Book, vol. 2, "Resume of Native Authorities in the Mpwapwa District," 1931; and Tanganyika Territory, "Supplement to the Gazette, vol. IX, 1928" (Dar es Salaam, 1928). These legal reforms were an aspect of the larger institutionalization of "indirect rule" in Tanganyika Territory. See Mahmood Mamdani's illuminating *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, N.J., 1996).

spend their year of office listening to extremely petty and sometimes unpleasantly gross quarrels between so-called Christian husbands and wives.”¹⁰⁷ Mrs. Bakewell thought that church elders’ attention to spouses’ quarrels manifested the triviality of Kaguru people’s Christianity. In fact, the courts’ focus on marriage illuminates husbands’ and wives’ agency. Precolonial Kaguru and Gogo conjugal practices did not invite husbands or wives to think of themselves as bound in an exclusive sexual relationship. Sexual conduct was a matter for them to negotiate over. Men with material and social resources got leverage over their wives’ sexual services; poor men, by contrast, had to compete with their wives’ brothers and other paramours for the women’s loyalty. Entrepreneurial women could marshal support from kin, lovers, and patrons in order to abridge husbands’ control. In the late nineteenth century, Anglican missionaries sought to interpose a third party between negotiating husbands and wives. In record books and on marriage certificates, they made marriage look like a contract authorized by God. Church courts could therefore condemn extramarital sexual activity as “adultery.” But it was not only missionaries who were reformulating marital relationships. In front of church courts, African husbands and wives sorted through their spouses’ social lives, looking for evidence that could usefully draw missionary judges’ attention. They used a moral grammar to reframe arguments over wives’ deference, over bridewealth improperly paid, and over the location of marital residence. Litigants thereby laid out avenues of analysis and action for church courts to follow. Kaguru and Gogo litigants interpellated missionary judges, obligating them to play a part.¹⁰⁸

This mode of agency did not work against power. Kaguru and Gogo litigants contracted with colonialism. Political power in colonial Africa was enacted in bureaucracy: in the public meetings where district commissioners castigated wrongdoers and passed down rulings, in the issuing of identity cards, and in the instructive judgments of church and government courts.¹⁰⁹ The exercise of bureaucratic discipline made it possible for colonial functionaries to typecast Africans as tribesmen, as husbands and wives, or as sinners. The textual detritus of their reformist agenda has come down to us in government and church archives. It is with this archival evidence in view that one legal historian has argued that empire was an effort to “appropriate people through the medium of writing, to colonize them through the power of writing, and to regulate their lives through the order of writing.”¹¹⁰ The *raison d’être* of Africanist legal history has been to illuminate the gulf between colonial officials’ stereotyped definitions of behavior and Africans’ more flexible understandings.

But in contrasting the textual world of governance with real African life, scholars have too often ignored Africans’ own work of representation. For colonial subjects, the stereotypes defined in government bureaucracy opened up lines of action and

¹⁰⁷ CMS, Mrs. Bakewell, Annual Letter, August 23, 1945.

¹⁰⁸ Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, 2001), 116–118.

¹⁰⁹ Jan-Georg Deutsch, “Celebrating Power in Everyday Life: The Administration of Law and the Public Sphere in Colonial Tanzania, 1890–1914,” *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 15 (2002): 93–104; Angelique Haugerud, *The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya* (Cambridge, 1997); Peterson, *Creative Writing*, chap. 6.

¹¹⁰ Hawkins, *Writing and Colonialism in Northern Ghana*, 3.

imagination. Africans could take the simplified characters that officials sketched and play with them. In central Tanganyika, litigants before Anglican courts represented themselves as loyal wives or wronged husbands, and named their spouses as sinners. Through this typecasting they leveraged themselves into the moral framework that missionaries authorized. Their representational work invited missionaries themselves to adopt a role, as judges bound to punish wrongdoers. Legal bureaucracy was by no means a foreign world for African litigants, because textualized archetypes would not stay in the archives.

Historians' task is to give archives a broader reading, to explore how the prototypical characters sketched in record books came to inhabit the political and social world. We should, that is, think of archives as more than source material, more than a record of past events. In writing down husbands' and wives' names, in recording their sexual and moral failings, missionaries were gaining control over Africans' conduct. And in living up to the law, in representing themselves as wronged wives or as penitent sinners, Africans were exerting pressure on missionaries. Archives inspired action, oriented behavior, and opened up channels for claim-making. Our task is to reconstruct this theater.

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Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani: Concepts of Citizenship and the Legal Identity of Barbarians in the Later Roman Empire

RALPH W. MATHISEN

IN RECENT YEARS, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, increasing attention has been paid to changing concepts of citizenship in the context of the globalization of the economy, politics, and society.¹ The interrelationships among citizenship, nationality, ethnicity, and identity have evolved as a consequence of factors such as a renewed role for religious identity and mass migrations that have altered the ethnic composition and influenced the cultural norms of the society of nearly every modern nation.² Traditionally, in order to become a citizen of an established nation-state, a foreigner has been expected to profess the acceptance of certain moral, cultural, and political views.³ At a 2005 press conference, for example, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated, "People who want to be British citizens should share our values and our way of life."⁴ In this model, citizens receive certain privileges and are liable to certain obligations.⁵

A model of citizenship based on geographically delimited nation-states now is sometimes considered to be unsuited to modern multiethnic, multiracial, and supranational societies.⁶ Rather than a formal juridical status based on fixed principles, citizenship also can be viewed as a process of negotiation between established values and the values of newcomers into a society.⁷ Increasing attention likewise has been

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¹ E.g., Ellie Vasta, ed., *Citizenship, Community, and Democracy* (Basingstoke, 2000), vii: "The notion of citizenship is currently under scrutiny both in terms of its theoretical significance as well as its practical application."

² Paul J. Weithman, *Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship* (Cambridge, 2002); Vasta, *Citizenship, Community, and Democracy*, vii; Martha Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 9, no. 1 (1997): 1–25.

³ Riva Kastoryano, *Negotiating Identities* (Princeton, N.J., 2002); Alastair Davidson, "Fractured Identities: Citizenship in a Global World," in Vasta, *Citizenship, Community, and Democracy*, 3–21, 8.

⁴ <http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page8041.asp> (accessed August 5, 2005).

⁵ Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," 6.

⁶ Vasta, *Citizenship, Community, and Democracy*, vii; David Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity* (Cambridge, 2000), 1; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices* (Washington, D.C., 2001), vii; Peter Herrmann, ed., *Citizenship Revisited: Threats or Opportunities of Shifting Boundaries* (New York, 2004).

⁷ Vassoodeven Vuddamalai, "Research on Immigration, Islam and Citizenship in Western Europe," in Rémy Leveau, Khadija Mohsen-Finan, and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, eds., *New European Identity and Citizenship* (Aldershot, 2002), 1–35; Aleinikoff, *Citizenship Today*, vii.

given to metaphorical or philosophical forms of citizenship, and to the “relationship between . . . citizenship and moral and intellectual integrity.”⁸ Thus, one can be a citizen not only of a nation, but also of more diffuse and inclusive bodies, such as the European community or even the world. Cosmopolitanism, it has been suggested, now denotes a “world community . . . where relations between individuals transcend state boundaries” and a belief in “basic human rights that all individuals should enjoy.”⁹ As noted by April Carter, “The idea of world citizenship is fashionable again.”¹⁰ All of these manifestations of citizenship can supply unifying elements that are otherwise lacking in diverse societies, where citizenship “fosters social cooperation and identification that avoid the divisiveness of racial, religious, and ethnic affiliations.”¹¹ Citizenship thus can provide forms of personal identity that are defined either narrowly, by how the population of a nation is defined and treated under the law, or broadly, by the acceptance of a set of philosophical and moral concepts.

Similar ideas were discussed or even implemented in antiquity in ways that have much to teach us. Although one must take care not to press apparent parallels too far, the ancient world, and in particular the later Roman Empire, can provide us with a laboratory for investigating what does and does not work in dealing with the interlocking issues of citizenship, ethnicity, and identity. It permits us to inform our understanding of emotionally charged phenomena from a more distanced and objective perspective. The concepts of cosmopolitanism and world citizenship go back at least to Hellenistic philosophies of the fourth and third centuries B.C.E. The Cynic Diogenes, for example, stated that he was “a cosmopolite”: “a citizen of the world.”¹² The Stoics believed that the whole world constituted the only true city, whose citizens were of necessity “good” people.¹³ In the Roman Empire, in the early second century C.E., the Stoic philosopher Epictetus likewise spoke of being a “citizen of the world.”¹⁴ Even the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius (161–180) called himself a “citizen of the world-city,” opining that “under its laws equal treatment is meted out to all.”¹⁵

In general, however, universal citizenship that transcends traditional legal, social, or national boundaries, that presupposes that all citizens are “good people,” or that does not distinguish between citizens and noncitizens (or between “haves” and “have-nots”) exists only in the mind and spirit, not as a formal juridical status.¹⁶ Not

⁸ Dana Villa, *Socratic Citizenship* (Princeton, N.J., 2001), ix.

⁹ Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism,” 2, 11.

¹⁰ April Carter, *The Political Theory of Global Citizenship* (London, 2001), 1; also Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, “European Citizenship and Migration,” in Leveau, Mohsen-Finan, and de Wenden, *New European Identity*, 79–89; Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford, 1995).

¹¹ Aleinikoff, *Citizenship Today*, vii.

¹² Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 6.63; see Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought* (Basingstoke, 1996).

¹³ Diog. Laer. *Vit. phil.* 7; see Malcolm Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge, 1991), 24; Anthony Pagden, *Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism* (London, 2000); Clifford Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* (Berkeley, Calif., 2000), 341; Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism.”

¹⁴ Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.10.1, cf. 1.9.20.

¹⁵ Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 12.36, trans. Charles R. Haines (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 341; also Greg R. Stanton, “The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius,” *Phronesis* 13 (1968): 83–95.

¹⁶ See Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism,” 5–7: “the term is at best metaphorical . . .

even Marcus Aurelius, fortified with the authority of a Roman emperor, manifested his concept of world citizenship in Roman legislation. And in the modern day, the recent problems with the passage of a European constitution, which states that "every citizen of a Member State is a citizen of the Union and enjoys dual citizenship, national citizenship, and European citizenship,"¹⁷ provide just one example of the practical difficulties inherent in creating forms of citizenship that transcend the borders of traditional nation-states.

It may be, in fact, that the closest the world ever came to implementing a form of world citizenship was during the later Roman Empire. Beginning in the early third century, the Roman government worked to maximize the number of persons to whom Roman *ius civile*, the law of Roman citizens, applied. Emperors and jurists created a practical manifestation of universal citizenship that was rather different from the views of the philosophers.¹⁸ In the process, a number of problems with a curiously modern feel had to be confronted, including how to create a form of citizenship that was not predicated on an antithesis between "citizens" and "noncitizens," how to deal with new concepts of Christian religious identity, and how to integrate multitudes of foreign immigrants (otherwise known as "barbarians") with different cultural values who created a more ethnically diverse society.

In the world of Roman officialdom during the Roman Republic (509–27 B.C.E.) and the first few centuries of the Roman Empire, citizenship denoted an elite legal status to which certain rights, privileges, and obligations accrued under the law.¹⁹ For example, in private life, citizens could marry, make wills, and carry on business under the protection of Roman law. Noncitizens, or *peregrini* ("foreigners"), generally remained subject to whatever legal system was in effect when their provincial communities were annexed by Rome. Beginning with the reign of the emperor Augustus (27 B.C.E.–14 C.E.), institutionalized practices permitted provincials to become citizens, generally by serving either in the Roman army or on a city council. And because citizen rights were inherited, the number of Roman citizens quickly increased.

The extension of Roman citizenship to noncitizens was an unqualified success. As the Greek orator Aristides proclaimed in the mid-second century, "Neither sea nor intervening continent are bars to citizenship. No one worthy of rule or trust remains an alien, but a civil community of the World has been established as a Free Republic."²⁰ Aristides, of course, was telling the emperor Hadrian (117–138) just what he wanted to hear, but a wealth of other evidence makes it clear that a multitude

global citizenship is an oxymoron"; also David Miller, "Bounded Citizenship," in Kimberly Hutchings and Roland Dannreuther, eds., *Cosmopolitan Citizenship* (New York, 1999), 60.

¹⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2371715.stm> (accessed August 5, 2005).

¹⁸ For a counterproposal, see Tony Honoré, *Ulpian: Pioneer of Human Rights*, 2nd ed. (London, 2002), ix, 80; on which see review by Ralph Mathisen, *Journal of Roman Studies* 94 (2004): 279–280.

¹⁹ For Roman citizenship, see Adrian N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1979); Claude Nicolet, *The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome*, trans. Paul S. Falla (London, 1980); Nicolet, *Le métier de citoyen dans la Rome républicaine*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1989); Paulo Donati Giacomini and Gabrielle Poma, eds., *Cittadini e non cittadini nel Mondo Romano: Guida ai testi e ai documenti* (Bologna, 1996); Jane F. Gardner, *Being a Roman Citizen* (London, 1993); David Noy, *Foreigners at Rome: Citizens and Strangers* (London, 2000); Geoffrey E. M. de Ste-Croix, *Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1981), 453–461; Max Kaser, *Das römische Privatrecht: Erster Abschnitt: Das altrömische, das vorklassische, und klassische Recht*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Munich, 1971), 1: 279–282.

²⁰ Aelius Aristides, "To Rome" 59–60; translation based on J. H. Oliver, *The Ruling Power* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1953), 901.

of provincials profited from the legal benefits and career prospects provided by Roman citizenship.²¹

As the centuries wore on, the Roman citizen body continued to expand.²² Roman citizenship, and access to Roman *ius civile*, became less a special status and more a lowest common denominator. This process culminated in the issuance in 212 C.E. of the Antonine Constitution, in which the emperor Caracalla (211–217) granted citizenship to nearly all of the remaining free *peregrini* in the Roman Empire.²³ The only surviving copy of Caracalla's law, a papyrus Greek translation of the Latin original, is very fragmentary, but the crucial words are clear: "I grant to all those in the Roman world the citizenship of the Romans."²⁴ All that can be said with any certainty about the rest of the text is that people known as *dediticii* were excluded from citizenship.²⁵

Modern writers often have downplayed the significance of Caracalla's grant and suggested that Roman citizenship had little value thereafter.²⁶ Peter Brown, for example, suggested that "The brittle privileges and self-respect once associated with the notion of citizenship slipped away."²⁷ According to Peter Garnsey, "For some modern observers, it was all over for Roman citizenship after Caracalla's edict . . . citizenship had lost whatever residual value it formerly possessed."²⁸ Systematic studies of what it meant to be a "citizen" in the Roman world almost invariably stop at this point, on the assumption that once everyone who was eligible had Roman citizenship, citizen status ceased to be a meaningful component of personal or legal identity in the Roman world.²⁹ Even though the literature is replete with discussions of "identity" in the late and post-Roman worlds, with abundant attention devoted

²¹ See Peter Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law in the Later Empire," in Simon Swain and Mark Edwards, eds., *Approaching Late Antiquity: The Transformation from Early to Later Empire* (Oxford, 2004), 133–155, 137: "the spread of citizenship held the key to the prodigious success of Rome"; also Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 222–223; and Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty*.

²² See Arnold H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire, 284–602: A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey* (Oxford, 1964; repr., Baltimore, Md., 1986), 16; Fergus Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World (31 BC–AD 337)* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), 481; and John P. V. D. Balsdon, *Romans and Aliens* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979), 95.

²³ See Christoph Sasse, *Die Constitutio Antoniniana: Eine Untersuchung über den Umfang der Bürgerrechtsverleihung auf Grund von Papyrus Gissensis 40 I* (Wiesbaden, 1958); Adam Lukaszewicz, "Zum Papyrus Gissensis 40 I 9 ('Constitutio Antoniniana')." *The Journal of Juristic Papyrology* 20 (1990): 93–101; and Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," an expanded version of a section on "Citizens and Aliens," in Peter Garnsey and Caroline Humfress, eds., *The Evolution of the Late Antique World* (Cambridge, 2001), 88–91.

²⁴ "ἔδωκεν τοῖς ἅπασιν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαϊκὴν οἰκουμένην π[ολι]τείαν Ῥωμαίων . . ."; for the text, see Salvatore Riccobono, ed., *Fontes Iuris Romani Antejustiniani*, vol. 1: *Leges* (Florence, 1968), no. 88, 445–449; and Fritz M. Heichelheim, "The Text of the *Constitutio Antoniniana*," *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 26 (1940): 10–22.

²⁵ "χωρ[is] τῶν [δε]δευτικῶν . . ."; the *dediticii* are discussed below.

²⁶ Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 444: it "introduced no material alteration"; Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," dismisses it as "an accident of history" (133), a "whim" that "came out of the blue" (135, 137); W. Williams, "Caracalla and the Authorship of Imperial Edicts," *Latomus* 38 (1979): 67–89, 69–72, deems it an "impulsive measure."

²⁷ Peter Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire* (Madison, Wis., 1992), 154. Note also, e.g., Wolfgang Kunkel, *An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History*, trans. J. M. Kelley, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1973), 79ff.; Alfred Sollner, *Einführung in die römische Rechtsgeschichte* (Munich, 1980), 97; Giacomini and Poma, *Cittadini e non cittadini*, 165; Gardner, *Being a Roman Citizen*, 187; and Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 445.

²⁸ Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 140 (reprising Garnsey, "Citizens and Aliens," 88).

²⁹ E.g., Giacomini and Poma, *Cittadini e non cittadini*, 165.

to gender, religious, cultural, and, in particular, ethnic identity,³⁰ a continued sense of personal identity based on citizenship status (Roman or otherwise) and the legal rights associated with it is not thought to have persisted.

A close examination of the evidence, however, challenges the prevailing opinion and suggests that concepts of citizenship, from the personal, legal, and metaphorical perspectives, continued to play a vital role in defining personal and legal identity after 212 C.E. In particular, Roman citizenship continued not only to be a factor in how people perceived themselves, but also to entail legal rights that were available only to persons who were identified as "Roman citizens." The issuance of the Antonine Constitution did not put an end to distinctions created either by differences in citizenship status or by degrees of difference within a particular citizenship status.³¹ It rather encompassed various manifestations of citizenship—civic, provincial, religious, and ethnic—that could create different kinds of personal and legal identities and interact in different ways. In addition, evolving concepts of citizenship facilitated the integration of foreign, barbarian, populations into the western Roman world during the fifth and sixth centuries.

FROM SOME PERSPECTIVES, one is justified in suggesting that the Antonine Constitution had little impact. Although the number of citizens was increased, perhaps by quite a bit, the new citizens did not acquire as many benefits as they would have in the past.³² On the one hand, now that nearly everyone had it, Roman citizenship no longer conveyed higher social status vis-à-vis most other persons. And the differential treatments in criminal law that once had favored Roman citizens now were based on the distinction between *honestiores* (more distinguished people) and *humiliores* (more humble people), which was determined empirically on the basis of social and official position.³³ The extension of citizenship did, however, permit the new citizens to use Roman *ius civile*, a not inconsequential benefit. It no longer was as necessary for lawyers to navigate the differentiations between citizens and many categories of provincial noncitizens that before 212 C.E. had made lawsuits, inheritances, property transfers, and contracts a nightmare.³⁴ Having access to Roman *ius*

³⁰ See, e.g., Walter Pohl and Helmut Reimitz, eds., *Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of Ethnic Communities, 300–800* (Leiden, 1998); Stephen Mitchell and Geoffrey Greatrex, eds., *Ethnicity and Culture in Late Antiquity* (London, 2000); Patrick Amory, *People and Identity in Ostrogothic Italy, 489–554* (Cambridge, 1997); and Antti J. Arjava, *Women and Law in Late Antiquity* (Oxford, 1996).

³¹ Pace Wolf Liebeschuetz, "Citizen Status and Law in the Roman Empire and the Visigothic Kingdom," in Pohl and Reimitz, *Strategies of Distinction*, 131–152, 134–137.

³² New citizens and their descendants can be identified by their *nomen* (family name) "Aurelius" (from Caracalla's official name, "Aurelius Antoninus"): Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 56; Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World*, 481; Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 143; and Arnold H. M. Jones, John R. Martindale, and John Morris, eds., *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, 3 vols., *Volume 1: AD 260–395* (Cambridge, 1971), 130–138.

³³ See Jones, *The Later Roman Empire*, 17; Rolf Rilinger, *Humiliores-Honestiores: Zu einer sozialen Dichotomie im Strafrecht der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Munich, 1988); and Peter Garnsey, *Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1970), 118.

³⁴ See Jean-Michel Carrié, "Developments in Provincial and Local Administrations," in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd ed., 20 vols., vol. 12: *The Crisis of Empire, AD 193–337* (Cambridge, 2005), 274; the grant entailed "a compulsory adaptation of local laws to Roman juridical principles"; also Henriette Pavis d'Ecurac, "Affranchis et citoyeneté: Les effets juridiques de l'affranchissement sous le Haut-Empire," *Ktema* 6 (1981): 181–192. For administrative streamlining, see Millar, *The Emperor*

civile became a default status that applied not only to *cives Romani* (full citizens), but also to legally disadvantaged persons,³⁵ including *servi* (slaves) and three classes of *liberti* (freed slaves): full citizens, Junian Latins (who could not make wills), and *dediticii* (stigmatized freedmen).³⁶

It took a while for Caracalla's edict to be fully implemented,³⁷ but once it had been, it incorporated other kinds of citizenship and legal identity.³⁸ In particular, there continued to be a parallel concept of municipal citizenship.³⁹ The territory of the Roman Empire was subdivided into a multitude of municipalities, county-sized territories under the jurisdiction of *civitates* (cities), which were responsible for overseeing much of Roman administration at the local level. Nominally, every Roman citizen also was a citizen of a city and, if sufficiently well-to-do, liable for the performance of *munera* (services) on its behalf.⁴⁰ After Roman citizenship became essentially universal, people generally no longer identified themselves as "Roman citizens" but as citizens of cities.⁴¹ In the late fourth century, for example, the poet Ausonius could write, "I love Bordeaux, I esteem Rome: I am a citizen of the one, a consul in both."⁴² The late-fourth-century historian Ammianus Marcellinus even used the term *cives Romani* to refer to citizens of the city of Rome as opposed to the Roman Empire.⁴³ Nor did municipal citizenship provide the only kind of local identity that could be cited in conjunction with Roman citizenship. Even Rhine frontier villagers in 230 C.E. could call themselves "Roman citizens and inhabitants of Taunus by paternal descent."⁴⁴ In a similar manner, mid-third-century Thracians could identify themselves ethnically as "Roman citizens and Bessi."⁴⁵

One also could be a "citizen" of a province, a status that has received virtually no attention in the scholarship. During the later empire, people increasingly iden-

in the Roman World, 481; and for the legal "simplification that common citizenship would bring," see Honoré, *Ulpian*, 85.

³⁵ As seen throughout Justinian's *Digest*; contrary to the assumption that *ius civile* applied only to "free peoples" (Honoré, *Ulpian*, 80).

³⁶ Ulpian, *Regulae* 1.5; see Andrew T. Fear, "Cives Latini, servi publici and the *lex Irnitana*," *Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité* 37 (1990): 149–166; Paul Weaver, "Where Have All the Junian Latins Gone? Nomenclature and Status in the Roman Empire," *Chiron* 20 (1990): 275–305. The *dediticii* are discussed below.

³⁷ See Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 143, for "geographically, ethnically, and culturally marginal people allowed to slip through the net."

³⁸ See Govaert C. J. J. van den Bergh, "Legal Pluralism in Roman Law," in Csaba Varga, ed., *Comparative Legal Cultures* (New York, 1992), 338–350.

³⁹ Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 137: "local citizenships were tolerated." See also Mostafa A. H. El-Abbadi, "The Alexandrian Citizenship," *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 49 (1962): 106–123.

⁴⁰ See Arnold H. M. Jones "The *dediticii* and the *Constitutio Antoniniana*," in Jones, ed., *Studies in Roman Government and Law* (Oxford, 1968), 129–140, 136.

⁴¹ For *cives* of cities, see the Theodosian Code [hereafter *CTh*]: Teodor Mommsen, Paul M. Meyer, and Paul Krüger, eds., *Theodosiani libri XVI* (Berlin, 1902), 1.10.4 (391), 11.16.6 (346), 12.1.17 (329), 12.1.53 (362), 15.5.3 (409), 15.5.4 (424); and Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res gestae* 19.2.14, 27.3.

⁴² Ausonius, *Carmina* 11.20.40–41: "Diligo Burdigalam, Romam colo; civis in hac sum / consul in ambabus."

⁴³ Amm. Marc. *Res gestae* 27.9.9; also *Novella Valentiniani* 5 (440).

⁴⁴ Alexander Riese, ed., *Das rheinische Germanien in den antiken Inschriften* (Berlin, 1914), 3.1176 132; see Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 388.

⁴⁵ *Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum* [hereafter *CIL*] 3.3505, 7533, 14214; *Année épigraphique* (1924), nos. 142–148 (pp. 237–246); see Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 56, 210, 269, 387, 269.

tified themselves as inhabitants of provinces.⁴⁶ Justinian's sixth-century *Digest* cites earlier examples of Campanian and Pontic legal identity.⁴⁷ Roman law even refers to "citizens" of a province, a usage also found in popular parlance, with references to citizens of Africa, Gaul, or Spain.⁴⁸ But just what it meant to be a citizen of a province is not clear. It seems to have been based upon residence and obligation. The legal term *provinciales* ("provincials") usually referred generically to all non-servile inhabitants of one or more provinces, and many late imperial enactments were addressed simply "To the provincials."⁴⁹ Selected provincials had a collective identity as members of a provincial council.⁵⁰ Provincials had an identity separate from citizens of cities with regard to *vectigales* (tax imposts), military requisitions, *munera* (such as maintaining the imperial post system), the assignment of *tabularii* (imperial accountants), making public benefactions, pursuing lawsuits, sending embassies to court, and obtaining favors from imperial administrators.⁵¹ Responsibilities incumbent upon provincials included keeping tabs on provincial governors, sending petitions to the emperor, promulgating imperial initiatives, and renewing their loyalty oaths to the emperor at the annual provincial council meetings.⁵²

The adoption of Christianity as a state religion during the fourth century brought additional ways of defining citizen status. As Christian clerics, administrators, and emperors became increasingly intolerant of anyone who was not an orthodox Christian, the possession of full citizenship came to be based on Christian confessional status. Pagans, Jews, and heretics suffered a diminution of their citizenship rights and their ability to avail themselves of Roman civil law: they could "pursue the decisions of no judge in private business."⁵³ And in a metaphorical sense, the Christian concept of being a citizen of some supernal community, such as heaven or the "City of God," was similar to, and even replaced, the classical philosophical sense of being a citizen of the cosmopolis: Christians were "citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem."⁵⁴

Persons who were Roman citizens thus also could be identified by their municipal,

⁴⁶ See Charlotte Roueché, "Asia Minor and Cyprus," in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 14: *Late Antiquity: Empire and Successors, AD 425–600* (Cambridge, 2001), 572: "Many people chose to describe themselves as inhabitants of their province . . . rather than as citizens of particular towns."

⁴⁷ Just. *Digest* 50.1.1.2.

⁴⁸ *CTh* 1.34.1 (400): "cives . . . provinciae." Popular usage: Gregory of Tours, *Gloria confessorum* 69.1; Hydatius, *Chronicon* 217, s.a. 462; and *Vita Eugendi* 2: F. Martine, ed., *Vie des pères du Jura* (Paris, 1968), 364–435.

⁴⁹ For example, *CTh* 1.5.1, 1.16.6–7, 2.26.3, 2.30.1, 7.4.26, 7.9.1, 7.13.7–8, 7.13.16, 7.20.8, and throughout; also 8.10.2, 11.8.3.1.

⁵⁰ *CTh* 1.16.2 (317), 12.12.12.1 (392), 11.20.4.3 (392), 12.12.13 (392), 12.12.14 (408); see Jakob A.O. Larsen, "The Position of Provincial Assemblies in the Government and Society of the Late Roman Empire," *Classical Philology* 29 (1934): 209–220. Multi-provincial diocesan councils also existed: *CTh* 12.12.9; Larsen, "The Position of Provincial Assemblies," 213; and Joseph Zeller, "Das Concilium der Septem Provinciae in Arelate," *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kunst* 24 (1905): 1–19.

⁵¹ *CTh* 4.13.5 (358), 3.1.8 (399), 7.4.26 (401), 7.4.1 (325), 3.1.8 (399), 6.29.5 (359), 8.2.5 (401), 8.12.3 (316), 8.12.8 (415), 11.30.63 (405), 12.12.11 (386), 1.16.2 (317).

⁵² Larsen, "The Position of Provincial Assemblies"; Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty*, 359–361.

⁵³ E.g., *Novella Theodosii* 3.7 (438); see Carolina Lo Nero, "Christiana dignitas: New Christian Criteria for Citizenship in the Later Roman Empire," *Medieval Encounters* 7 (2001): 146–164; and Noel Q. King, *The Emperor Theodosius and the Establishment of Christianity* (London, 1961), 95.

⁵⁴ Aurelius Augustinus, *De civitate dei* 22.17; also Paul, Ephesians 2.19: "citizens of sainthood and domestics of God." See Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 150–155; and Michel Clévenot, "La double citoyenneté: Situation des chrétiens dans l'empire romain," in Marie-Madeleine Mactoux and Geny Évelyne, eds., *Mélanges Pierre Lévêque*, vol. 1: *Religion* (Paris, 1988), 107–115.

provincial, ethnic, or religious citizenship or status. This created multiple legal identities related to the legal jurisdiction under which different categories of citizens fell. Even though all Roman citizens could use *ius civile*, not all of them did so. Parallel legal systems, variously referred to as provincial, vulgar, civic, or common law, continued to be valid alongside Roman civil law.⁵⁵ In addition, the official recognition of the Christian church brought with it an acknowledgment of Christian legal jurisdiction in cases involving the maintenance of proper Christian belief and behavior. The result was a growing body of canon law that sometimes competed with or contradicted Roman civil and criminal law.⁵⁶

CARACALLA'S GRANT WAS APPLIED to all those living in the Roman Empire at the time it was made. But the population of the Roman world was not static. Many immigrants arrived after 212. Did they then constitute a new class of noncitizens, or were they permitted to become citizens by some formal or informal process, or at least to be absorbed into the population that was covered under *ius civile*? This question has been rarely asked and never answered. To begin to deal with this question, it might be noted that one characteristic that nearly all manifestations of real citizenship share is that citizens are juxtaposed, explicitly or implicitly, with noncitizens (in this case foreign *peregrini*) who supposedly do not share the benefits, duties, status, and sense of identity that accrue to the citizen body.⁵⁷ Post-Caracallan Roman citizenship, however, did not follow this model. Even in the legal sphere, the status of *peregrinus*—several manifestations of which continued to exist—did not disqualify a person from many of the opportunities or obligations that putatively were available only to members of a particular citizen group. For example, a ruling of 364 declared, "Knights of Rome shall be chosen from native Romans and citizens (*ex indigenis Romanis et civibus*), or from those *peregrini* (noncitizens of the city) whom it is not proper to attach to the guilds";⁵⁸ and according to a law of 400, judges could have on their council either "citizens of the province" or *peregrini* (that is, nonprovincials).⁵⁹ In a like vein, Jews and Samaritans, even if prohibited from holding other kinds of dignities, were nevertheless compelled by the emperors to fulfill any municipal offices and obligations to which they were liable, "lest We seem to have granted the benefit of immunity upon these execrable persons."⁶⁰ Such legislation

⁵⁵ For law other than *ius civile* after 212, see Ernst Levy, "The Vulgarization of Roman Law in the Early Middle Ages," *Mediaevalia et Humanistica* 1 (1943): 14–40, and Levy, *Weströmisches Vulgarrecht: Das Obligationenrecht* (Weimar, 1956); Gudrun Stühff, *Vulgarrecht im Kaiserrecht* (Weimar, 1966); A. J. Boudewijn Sirks, "Shifting Frontiers in the Law: Romans, Provincials, and Barbarians," in Ralph Mathisen and Hagith Sivan, eds., *Shifting Frontiers in Late Antiquity* (Aldershot, 1996), 146–157, 150 ("Roman and indigenous law still coexisted"); Carrié, "Developments in Provincial and Local Administrations," 274 ("Roman power preserved for local laws the same place that they occupied . . . within provincial law"); Kunkel, *An Introduction*, 79; Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 138–141, 146. For a dissenting opinion, see Honoré, *Ulpian*, 80: after 212, "the contrast between the civil law and common custom was now of purely historical interest."

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Jean Gaudemet, *Les sources du droit de l'église en occident du IIe au VIe siècle* (Paris, 1985).

⁵⁷ E.g., Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 136–137.

⁵⁸ *CTh* 6.37.1 (364).

⁵⁹ *CTh* 1.34.1 (400).

⁶⁰ *Nov.Theod.* 3.6 (438).

demonstrates that, in order to maximize the numbers of those eligible for the performance of public services, the Roman government instituted flexible eligibility requirements, including putting in abeyance restrictions that otherwise would have kept noncitizens, however defined, from participating.

One also might ask whether there continued to be any procedures for granting Roman citizenship after 212. Once again, this is a question that rarely has been raised in the scholarship, on the assumption that in 212 nearly everyone already had been made a citizen. Yet one discovers that even after Caracalla's grant, there still are many references to the means by which one could "become" a citizen. Several late Roman laws discuss how *liberti*, or even *servi*, became full *cives Romani*.⁶¹ A law of 349, for example, decreed that manumitted mothers, "for whom, of course, the rights of Roman citizenship had been obtained," could have their cases heard in court, as could any freed sons and daughters who had become "Roman citizens in a similar manner."⁶² In 447, a *novella* (new law) of the emperor Valentinian III (425–455) spoke of the testamentary rights of "a *libertus*, who will have obtained the privilege of Roman citizenship."⁶³ In exceptional cases, slaves could become citizens directly, without any intermediate process.⁶⁴ Indeed, nearly all, if not all, of the acquisitions of citizenship attested after 212 resulted from promotions from servile to free status. This is what really was at issue; citizenship was merely the legal vehicle used to enable these changes.

Nor were all changes of citizenship status a one-way street, from lesser to greater legal privilege. Citizens also could be reduced in status, or they could lose their citizenship altogether and thus become part of a legally underprivileged class.⁶⁵ Indigent guardians who had abused their authority were "punished with a diminution of status and ceased to be Roman citizens," the same penalty that befell jurisconsults who failed to participate in ecclesiastical hearings.⁶⁶ Loss of citizenship rights, in total or in part, often accompanied the penalty known as *infamia* (infamy).⁶⁷ High-ranking Romans who attempted to legitimate lowborn offspring were sentenced "to suffer the stain of *infamia* and to be made *peregrini* (alien) from Roman laws."⁶⁸ Some of the penalties associated with *infamia* were specified in a law of 381 regarding Manichaeans: "We remove from them, under a perpetual note of branded infamy, all opportunity of giving testimony and living under Roman law, nor do we allow them to have the power to bequeath or receive any inheritance."⁶⁹ In addition, anyone "who has lost the dignity of Roman citizenship and has been made a [Junian] Latin" forfeited his testamentary rights.⁷⁰ A ruling of 333 was especially Draconian: procurators who stole from the imperial weaving factories were summarily "removed

⁶¹ A point missed, e.g., by Liebeschuetz, "Citizen Status and Law," 135.

⁶² *CTh* 8.13.1 (349).

⁶³ *Nov.Val.* 25 (447).

⁶⁴ E.g., *CTh* 9.21.2.1 (321), 4.7.1 (321).

⁶⁵ See Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 144–145.

⁶⁶ *CTh* 3.30.4 (331); *Nov.Val.* 35.2 (452).

⁶⁷ See *CTh* 2.9.3, 3.18.2, 9.10.4, 9.14.3, 9.39.2, 14.9.3, 15.14.11; *Nov.Val.* 23.4; *infamia* did not necessarily entail complete loss of citizenship (pace Garnsey, "Citizens and Aliens," 89, and "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 144–145; see Gardner, *Being a Roman Citizen*, 110–154).

⁶⁸ *CTh* 4.6.3 (336); also *CTh* 16.5.36 (399).

⁶⁹ *CTh* 16.5.7 (381).

⁷⁰ *CTh* 2.22.1 (326); for Junian Latins, see n. 36 above.

from the number of Roman citizens" by being "smitten by the sword."⁷¹ Furthermore, those who fell into enemy hands and had been removed from Roman territory also lost their citizenship, with the proviso that they could regain it, and their property, by the *ius postliminii* ("right of return from beyond the frontiers") should they be able to get back home.⁷² There also were regulations permitting freed slaves who had lost their citizenship to regain it upon their demonstration of the proper penitence.⁷³

These examples show that there were different ways in which *servi*, *liberti*, and *cives Romani* could change their citizenship status and either use or lose some or all of the components of *ius civile*. Roman citizenship was not a package deal. Rather, different elements of citizenship status could be granted or revoked depending on a person's degree of legal privilege or disadvantage. For many, therefore, the gain or loss of Roman citizenship and the extent to which they could exercise it still meant a great deal after 212.

That leaves the *peregrini*. Even if *liberti* and *servi* were able to "become" Roman citizens, this says nothing about the opportunity of *peregrini*, however defined, to do the same. One class of *peregrini*, the *peregrini dediticii*, was specifically forbidden from gaining citizenship.⁷⁴ During the Roman Republic, *peregrini dediticii*, a term meaning "surrendered foreigners," were foreign peoples who had surrendered to Rome.⁷⁵ But by the third century, the legal definition of *dediticii* had changed. *Peregrini dediticii* now were stigmatized freedmen who had been branded or tortured, or who had fought in the arena.⁷⁶ They remained forever excluded from citizenship. But there were other *peregrini*—not provincial natives, for they had been made citizens, but foreign *peregrini* who had settled on Roman territory.⁷⁷ Surely there were many of them, yet there is no clear exposition of their status in the thousands upon thousands of surviving laws. This must mean one of two things: either they remained in some kind of legal limbo or we have simply been mistaken regarding what kinds of legislation we would "expect" to find dealing with them. Given the Roman penchant for legal precision, the former seems unlikely. The following model will therefore be based on the premise that after 212, Roman law did have a place for foreigners who settled in the Roman Empire.

Contrary to some scholarly assertions,⁷⁸ the meaning of *peregrinus* as "noncitizen" in a legal sense was alive and well in the later empire.⁷⁹ Just as there were different

⁷¹ *CTh* 1.32.1 (333).

⁷² Just. *Digest* 50.7.18, 49.15, 32.1.2; *CTh*, Title 5.7; also Maria Virginia Sanna, *Nuove ricerche in tema di postliminium e redemptio ab hostibus* (Cagliari, 2001).

⁷³ *Codex Justinianus* [hereafter *CJ*] 6.7.2.1 (326).

⁷⁴ Jones, "The *dediticii* and the *Constitutio Antoniniana*"; Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 380–398.

⁷⁵ See Thomas Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians, 100 B.C.–A.D. 400* (Baltimore, Md., 2003), 246–247; Sasse, *Die Constitutio Antoniniana*, 70–104, 111–119; Heichelheim, "The Text," 16; and Kaser, *Das römische Privatrecht*, 1: 282.

⁷⁶ Gaius, *Institutionum* 1.13–14; see Sasse, *Die Constitutio Antoniniana*, 104–110.

⁷⁷ Pace Jones, "The *dediticii* and the *Constitutio Antoniniana*," 135, that after 212, "no distinction between *peregrini* and *dediticii* . . . was . . . made."

⁷⁸ E.g., Ste-Croix, *Class Struggle*, 455: the distinction between *cives* and *peregrini* became "unnecessary and irrelevant"; Jean Gaudemet, "L'étranger au bas-empire," in *L'étranger, I, Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin* 9 (Brussels, 1958): 209–235, 211: the term *peregrinus* is seen "perdre toute signification juridique précise"; also Jones, *The Later Roman Empire*, 16.

⁷⁹ Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 143–145 (cf. "Citizens and Aliens," 89).

categories of *cives*, there also were different categories of *peregrini*. Many were “foreign” with respect to provincial or municipal citizenship or residence.⁸⁰ But with regard to Roman citizenship, an insight into the distinction between Roman citizens and foreigners comes from Sidonius Apollinaris, who in the late fifth century said about Rome, “In this state (*civitas*) alone of the entire world only barbarians and slaves are *peregrini*.”⁸¹ Now, *servi* (not to mention *liberti*) were “foreign” to Roman citizenship in a sense for which there always had been remedies in *ius civile*. That leaves foreign barbarians as the only *peregrini* who were not part of the Roman *civitas*, a point also made in the mid-sixth century by the poet Corippus, who contrasted the *cives Romani* of the Roman army to the barbarian *gentes* of North Africa whom they were fighting.⁸² And this is exactly what we would expect: after 212, those who were *peregrini* with respect to Roman citizenship were foreigners from beyond the frontiers, the peoples known collectively as “barbarians.”

WE THEREFORE NOW CAN CONCENTRATE on clarifying the legal status of barbarians who had settled in the Roman Empire. During the Principate, there had been established procedures whereby provincial *peregrini* living in the empire could become Roman citizens.⁸³ Were there similar procedures after 212 for foreign, barbarian, *peregrini* to become citizens, and in this way (or in some other manner) to be covered by Roman *ius civile*? Whereas current scholarship has given great consideration to barbarian cultural identity, to Roman and barbarian legal administration and practice, to Roman attitudes toward barbarians, and to Roman-barbarian interactions in general,⁸⁴ discussion of the legal status of late Roman barbarians has been very sparse.⁸⁵ So a thorough look at the legal status of barbarians in the late Roman world seems called for if we are to understand any effect that it may have had on the ability of barbarians to be integrated into Roman society.

Barbarians resident outside the Roman world were identified as belonging to a barbarian *gens* (people, family), *natio* (nation), or *populus* (people). This is consistent with Roman thought and terminology, which recognized not only citizenship (*civitas*) but also ethnicity (*gens*, *natio*, *populus*) as a basis for establishing identity.⁸⁶ The

⁸⁰ Provincial: *CTh* 1.34.1 (400), 8.1.9 (365), 12.1.161 (399); municipal: *CTh* 6.37.1 (361), 13.11.13 (412); also, Noy, *Foreigners at Rome*, 25; and Liebeschuetz, “Citizen Status and Law,” 138.

⁸¹ Sidonius Apollinaris, *Epistulae* 1.6.3, cf. 2.1.2.; see Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 387; Otto Karlowa, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1885–1901), 1: 929–930.

⁸² Corippus, *Iohannide* 4.1213–1215, cf. 4.439–442, 6.624–625, 7.497–499.

⁸³ Gaius, *Institutionum* 1.93; see Fernand de Visscher, “La condition des pérégrins à Rome jusqu’à la Constitution Antonine de l’an 212,” in *L’étranger*, I, 195–208; also Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 310: “barbarian peasantry secured [citizenship] by long service in the provincial militia.”

⁸⁴ In addition to bibliography cited herein, note Gerhart B. Ladner, “On Roman Attitudes toward Barbarians in Late Antiquity,” *Viator* 7 (1976): 1–25; Yves A. Dauge, *Le barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation* (Brussels, 1981); and Dennis B. Saddington, “Roman Attitudes to the *externae gentes* of the North,” *Acta classica* 4 (1961): 90–102.

⁸⁵ Note, in particular, Emilienne Demougeot, “Restrictions à l’expansion du droit de cité dans la seconde moitié du IV^e siècle,” *Ktema* 6 (1981): 381–393, and Demougeot, “Le ‘conubium’ et la citoyenneté conféré aux soldats barbares du Bas-Empire,” in *Sodalitas: Scritti in onore di Antonio Guarino*, 5 vols. (Naples, 1984), 4: 1633–1643, 1638ff.; Liebeschuetz, “Citizen Status and Law”; and Garnsey, “Citizens and Aliens” and “Roman Citizenship and Roman Law.”

⁸⁶ Even Romans belonged to a *gens*: e.g., *CJ* 4.42.2 (457/465); *CTh* 7.16.3 = *CJ* 12.44.1 (420); *CTh* 8.5.57 = *CJ* 12.50.16 (397); *CTh* 5.6.3 (409); *CJ* 4.41.2 (455/7), 1.17.2 (533).

greatest modern attention has been given to the legal status of barbarians who served in the Roman army. As of the fourth century, barbarians appear throughout the Roman military.⁸⁷ Barbarians rose to hold high Roman offices, including not only military offices, such as *Comes rei militaris* (Count of Military Matters) and *Magister militum* (Master of Soldiers), but even the consulate.⁸⁸ Many barbarian soldiers remained inside the empire after their military service.⁸⁹ What was the legal status of barbarian soldiers and settlers? Did they have access to Roman *ius civile*? Were they able to cross the divide from *peregrinus* to *civis Romanus*?

It sometimes has been assumed that by an unspecified process, some barbarians, perhaps only military officers, became Roman citizens.⁹⁰ Emilienne Demougeot, for example, conjectured that barbarians who became members of the field army, held Roman military or civilian office, or married Romans must have become citizens.⁹¹ She also argued that the honorific title "Flavius," borne by many barbarians, indicated a grant of Roman citizenship, a suggestion that was seconded by Garnsey.⁹² But there is nothing to prove that the title "Flavius"—an inherited title held not just by barbarians but by a multitude of imperial officials—carried citizen status.⁹³ Demougeot also suggested that barbarians held some kind of special *civitas sine conubium* ("citizenship without the right of marriage").⁹⁴ But this kind of halfway house is both unprecedented and undocumented in Roman law. Demougeot even estimated that about seventy high-ranking barbarians had Roman citizenship.⁹⁵ Peter Heather suggests, without citing any evidence, that late Roman "citizenship was limited only to the most important Goths."⁹⁶ And Garnsey repeats Demougeot's estimate of seventy barbarian citizens and asserts—without giving any examples—that "a few individual Goths were honoured with Roman citizenship."⁹⁷ Indeed, no one provides a single example of a barbarian who was expressly granted Roman

⁸⁷ E.g., Julian, *Oratio* 5.11, where an officer "exhorted his troops, both peregrines and citizens"; see Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 144.

⁸⁸ See Martin Bang, *Die Germanen im römischen Dienst bis zum Regierungsantritt Constantins I.* (Berlin, 1906); Manfred Waas, *Germanen im römischen Dienst in 4. Jahrhundert nach Christus* (Bonn, 1971); and Klaus-Peter Johné, "Germanen im römischen Dienst," *Das Altertum* 34 (1988): 5–13.

⁸⁹ E.g., Dietrich Hoffmann, "Die spätrömischen Soldatengrabschriften von Concordia," *Museum Helveticum* 20 (1963): 22–57, for twenty-seven epitaphs from a military cemetery near Aquileia, with barbarian names such as Fl. Fandigildis and Fl. Sindila.

⁹⁰ E.g., Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 380ff.; Rosario Soraci, *Ricerche sui conubia tra Romani e Germani nei secoli I–VI* (Catania, 1965; rev. ed. 1974); Roger C. Blockley, "Roman-Barbarian Marriages in the Later Empire," *Florilegium* 4 (1982): 63–79; Demougeot, "Restrictions," 387; Peter Heather, *Goths and Romans, 332–489* (Oxford, 1991), 164–165; and Liebeschuetz, "Citizen Status and Law," 138. But Sirks, "Shifting Frontiers," 149, states simply, "they did not become Roman citizens."

⁹¹ Arguing by assertion, with much use of "assurément," "implicitement," "indéniable," "vraisemblablement," and "sans doute": Demougeot, "Restrictions," 384–387.

⁹² Demougeot, "Restrictions," 383, and "Le 'conubium,'" 1637; Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 144; also Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World*, 481.

⁹³ See András Mocsy, "Der Name Flavius als Rangbezeichnung in der Spätantike," in *Akte des IV. internationalen Kongresses für griechisches und lateinisches Epigraphie* (Vienna, 1964), 257–263; also James G. Keenan, "The Names Flavius and Aurelius as Status Designations in Later Roman Egypt," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 11 (1973): 33–63 and 12 (1974): 283–304. For its later use by barbarian kings, see Herwig Wolfram, *Intitulatio*, vol. 1: *Lateinische Königs- und Fürstentitel bis zum Ende des 8. Jahrhunderts* (Graz, 1967), 56–76.

⁹⁴ Demougeot, "Le 'conubium,'" 1637–1641; also "Restrictions," 384.

⁹⁵ Demougeot, "Restrictions," 388.

⁹⁶ Heather, *Goths and Romans*, 164–165, citing David Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King: The Character of Client Kingship* (London, 1984), 39.

⁹⁷ Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law," 144.

citizenship, and this in spite of a wealth of available legal and prosopographical material (the purported seventy barbarian citizens seem to have come from counting Flavii who had barbarian-sounding names).⁹⁸

A diligent search of the sources turns up only a handful of references to barbarians described as Romans or Roman citizens. In 383, the orator Themistius opined that Goths were “no longer called barbarians but Romans,” a sentiment seconded by Pacatus, who stated in 389 that Theodosius I (379–395) had ordered defeated barbarian soldiers to “become Roman.”⁹⁹ It is difficult to see how “becoming Roman” would not entail having some degree of Roman citizenship. Citizenship specifically is mentioned by Claudian, who, in his panegyric to Stilicho in 400, observed of Rome, “She calls together as citizens those whom she has conquered.”¹⁰⁰ This view survived in the mid-sixth century, when Corippus could say, in a North African context, “Whatever *gentes* the Roman Empire sees being faithful and subject, it considers them to be Latin citizens.”¹⁰¹ More specifically, the rhetor Synesius stated that Theodosius I “considered the Goths worthy of citizenship.”¹⁰² The only person of barbarian ancestry specifically called a Roman citizen is the Master of Soldiers Stilicho, the son of a Roman mother and a Vandal father, of whom Claudian said, “Rome rejoiced that she deserved to have you as a citizen.”¹⁰³ But how Stilicho gained this status—whether through his mother, through some action of his own, or by default—we are not told. We still, therefore, have no examples of barbarians actually being “made” citizens; nor do we know what kind of reality lies behind the rhetoric. How was the “citizenship” described here obtained, and what form did it take? What did it mean in the real world of Roman law?

THIS RAISES SOME ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS. During the later empire, were foreign *peregrini* who resided or settled in the Roman Empire—nearly all of whom would have been barbarians—able to make use of Roman *ius civile*? And if so, to what extent could they do so, and did they need to be Roman citizens? These questions can be approached by looking for examples of barbarians’ actual use of various elements of Roman law. One very widespread way in which barbarians participated in Roman legal procedures was related to landholding and the tax liabilities on property. Beginning in the early Principate, large numbers of barbarians were resettled on Roman territory in order to bring unoccupied lands under cultivation and to provide taxes and military recruits.¹⁰⁴ Augustus reportedly settled 50,000 Getae on the Danube;

⁹⁸ Catalogued in Jones, Martindale, and Morris, *The Prosopography*, 1: 350–361, and J. R. Martindale, *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, Volume 2: AD 395–527* (Cambridge, 1980), 474–476. See Garnsey, “Roman Citizenship and Roman Law,” 144.

⁹⁹ Themistius, *Orationes* 167.211–212; Pacatus, *Pan.Lat.* 2/12.36.4, “iussisti esse Romanam.”

¹⁰⁰ Claudian, *De consulatu Stilichonis* 3.152–153: “civesque vocavit / quos domuit.”

¹⁰¹ Corip. *Iohannide* 8.461–462: “cives putat esse latinos.”

¹⁰² “πολιτείας ἤξιον”: Synesius, *De regno* 21/25C: 50, 13–14; Nicola Terzaghi, ed., *Synesii Cyrenensis opuscula* (Rome, 1944), 50, ll. 13–14. Liebeschuetz, “Citizen Status and Law,” 135, suggests that here “politeia” “has acquired a new meaning,” being applied to “non-naturalized barbarians who had acquired the right to live within the empire.” The normal meaning of “citizenship,” however, fits the context perfectly well.

¹⁰³ Claud. *De cons.Stil.* 3.180–181: “Roma . . . gaudebat . . . / quod te . . . meruisset . . . civem.” Stilicho’s ancestry: *ibid.* 1.35–39; Orosius, *Historia adversus paganos* 7.38.1; Johannes Antiochenus, fr. 187; Jerome, *Epistulae* 123.16; Jones, Martindale, and Morris, *The Prosopography*, 1: 853.

¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., Evangelos Chrysos, “Legal Concepts and Patterns for the Barbarian’s Settlement on

Tiberius (14–37) “transferred forty thousand captives from Germany and settled them on the banks of the Rhine in Gaul”; and Nero (54–68) granted land in the Balkans to more than 100,000 Transdanubians “for the purpose of providing tribute.”¹⁰⁵ A century later, Marcus Aurelius (161–180) settled numbers of Quadi, Vandals, Iazyges, Naristae, and Marcomanni.¹⁰⁶ The descendants of these barbarians would have become citizens in 212. Subsequently, barbarian settlers continued to pour into the empire. The *Augustan History* claims that after Claudius II’s defeat of the Goths ca. 270, “the provinces were filled with Gothic farmers; the Goth became a *colonus* (tenant farmer).”¹⁰⁷ In 297/298, a panegyrist of the emperor Constantius Chlorus (293–306) reported that “captive processions of barbarians” were “distributed to the provincials and conducted to the cultivation of deserted lands assigned to them,” where they attended markets, paid taxes, and were liable to military service.¹⁰⁸ A lead proof of a non-extant gold medallion showing barbarian families entering the Roman Empire at Mainz is thought to depict this very event.¹⁰⁹ (See Figure 2.)

Many such settlements were established in the fourth century. In 310, a panegyrist congratulated Constantine I (306–337) because “Frankish nations have been settled in deserted areas of Gaul and sustain the peace of the Roman Empire by their cultivation and its military by their levies.”¹¹⁰ Constantine also settled more than 300,000 Sarmatians “throughout Thrace, Scythia, Macedonia, and Italy”; in 359, a group of Sarmatians promised to “undertake the name and burden of tributaries (*tributariorum*)” if they were allowed to settle on Roman territory; and Ausonius in 368 spoke of “fields recently harvested by Sarmatian *coloni*.”¹¹¹ Ammianus reports that in the 360s and 370s, Alamanni were relocated to Gaul, where they became “subject to taxes and a source of income,” and to Italy, “where, having received fertile fields, they now cultivate the Po as taxpayers”; and that in 377, defeated Goths and Taifals “were settled around the towns of Mutina, Rhegium, and Parma in Italy as cultivators of the fields.”¹¹² In 386, “the nation of the Greuthingi was brought as

Roman Soil,” in Chrysos and Andreas Schwarcz, eds., *Das Reich und die Barbaren* (Vienna, 1989), 13–23; Dietrich Claude, “Zur Ansiedlung barbarischer Föderaten in der ersten Hälfte des 5. Jahrhunderts,” in Herwig Wolfram and Andreas Schwarcz, eds., *Anerkennung und Integration: Zu den wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen der Völkerverwanderungszeit 400–600* (Vienna, 1988), 13–16; Ramsay MacMullen, “Barbarian Enclaves in the Northern Roman Empire,” *Antiquité classique* 32 (1963): 552–561; Lawrence Okamura, “Roman Withdrawals from Three Transfluvial Frontiers,” in Mathisen and Sivan, *Shifting Frontiers*, 11–19; and, with a comprehensive list, Ste-Croix, *Class Struggle*, 245–249, 509–518.

¹⁰⁵ Strabo 7.303; Eutropius, *Breviarium* 7.9; Hermann Dessau, ed., *Inscriptiones Latinae selectae*, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Berlin, 1954–1955), 1: no. 986.

¹⁰⁶ Dio Cassius, *Historiae* 71.11.4–5, 71.12.1–3, 71.16.2, 71.31; *Historia Augusta* [hereafter *HA*] *Marcus Aurelius*, *Meditations* 22.2, 24.3.

¹⁰⁷ *HA Claudius* 9.4; also *HA Aurelian* 48.2 for the settlement of “captive families” in northern Italy for the creation of a viticulture industry.

¹⁰⁸ Pacat. *Pan.Lat.* 8/5.9.3; Charles E. V. Nixon and Barbara Saylor Rodgers, eds., *In Praise of Later Roman Emperors* (Berkeley, Calif., 1994), 121–122.

¹⁰⁹ Pierre Bastien, *Le médaillon de plomb de Lyon*, appended to Bastien, Michel Amandry, and Georges Gautier, eds., *Le monnayage de l’atelier de Lyon (274–413)*, *Supplément* (Wetteren, 1989); Ste-Croix, *Class Struggle*, 513. The possibility that this scene represents repatriated Roman captives is belied by the depiction of barbarian *editio* (surrender). (See Figure 1.)

¹¹⁰ Pacat. *Pan.Lat.* 7/6.6.

¹¹¹ *Anonymus Valesianus* 32; Amm.Marc. *Res gestae* 19.11.6: *tributarius* was another name for *colonus*: CTh 5.11.9 (364/5), 10.12.2 (368/373), 11.7.2 (319), 12.6.21 (368); Ausonius, *Mosella* 9.

¹¹² Amm.Marc. *Res gestae* 20.4.1, 28.5.15, 31.9.4.



FIGURE 1: The “plomb de Lyon.” Defeated barbarians beg for mercy from the emperors Maximianus and Constantius I ca. 297 and are magnanimously assembled for resettlement. The legend reads “Saeculi felicitas” (“Felicity of the age”). From W. Froehner, *Les médaillons de l’Empire romain: Depuis le règne d’Auguste jusqu’à Priscus Attale* (Paris, 1878), 259.

captives onto Roman soil.”¹¹³ Barbarian immigration also is attested in the legal sources. A ruling of 409 noted that groups of Scirians were settled as *coloni* in the eastern empire; they were granted special protection from enslavement and from being put to work on city public works projects.¹¹⁴

The legal or citizenship status of these barbarian settlers and landowners never has been convincingly elucidated.¹¹⁵ Yet, they farmed land either as tenant farmers or as landowners in their own right, statuses that certainly were covered under *ius civile*.¹¹⁶ By the third century, some of them and their descendants had the status of *laeti*, individual barbarians who were allowed to settle on land within the empire in exchange for the payment of taxes and as-needed military service.¹¹⁷ *Laeti* soon gained legal rights that approximated those of Roman citizens, for the aforementioned panegyric to Constantius of 297/298 also spoke of “the *laetus*, who has been restored by *postliminium*.”¹¹⁸ The right of *postliminium* allowed Roman citizens to

¹¹³ *Consularia Constantinopolitana* s.a. 386: *Monumenta Germaniae historica* [hereafter *MGH*], *Auctores antiquissimi* 9.214.

¹¹⁴ *CTh* 5.6.3 (409): “They have been received by no other right than that of the colonate.”

¹¹⁵ E.g., Heather, *Goths and Romans*, 113, suggests that groups from beyond the frontier submitted “not as full citizens but as dependent subjects.”

¹¹⁶ For *coloni* as Roman citizens, see Liebeschuetz, “Citizen Status and Law,” 136.

¹¹⁷ For *laeti*, see *CIL* 13.6592; *Pacat. Pan. Lat.* 8/5.21.1; *Amm. Marc. Res gestae* 20.4.1, 20.8.13, 24.1.15; *CTh* 7.20.10 (369), 7.20.12 (400), 13.11.10 (399); *Novella Severi* 2.1 (465); also Emilienne Demougeot, “A propos des lètes gaulois du IV^e siècle,” in *Festschrift für Franz Altheim* (Berlin, 1970), 101–113; C. J. Simpson, “*Laeti* in the *Notitia Dignitatum*: Regular Soldiers vs. Soldier Farmers,” *Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire* 66 (1988): 80–85.

¹¹⁸ *Pacat. Pan. Lat.* 8/5.21.1; Nixon-Rodgers, *In Praise of Later Roman Emperors*, 105.



FIGURE 2: Plomb de Lyon. Barbarian families cross the Rhine ("FL[uvius] RENVVS") from Kastel ("CASTEL" = Castellum Mattiacorum) to Mainz ("MOGONTIACVM") on their way to resettlement on land within the Roman Empire, ca. 297. From W. Froehner, *Les médailles de l'Empire romain: Depuis le règne d'Auguste jusqu'à Priscus Attale* (Paris, 1878), 259.

recover property that had been lost, either because they had been forced into exile or because their property had been seized by foreign invaders.¹¹⁹ For *laeti* to have had this right, they must have been covered by Roman law. And a law of 409 mentioned North African *gentiles* (barbarian auxiliaries), in a status similar to the *laeti*, who had been "granted extents of lands on account of their guarding and fortification of the frontier."¹²⁰ Barbarian generals in Roman service also are attested as owning land, without, however, any indication of how they obtained it.¹²¹ In general, then, after settling in the Roman Empire as farmers or soldiers, barbarians were certainly assimilated into the Roman legal system, at least as regards land tenure and tax-paying.¹²²

Barbarian soldiers also were eligible for veterans' benefits. The law codes record several instances of land grants and tax breaks being awarded to army veterans.¹²³ Although ethnicity is mentioned in only a few cases, they show barbarians being treated the same way as citizens. One regulation stated that "any Alamannic *laetus* or unattached Sarmatian or son of a veteran" who was liable to the draft and falsely claimed veterans' benefits was to be enrolled in the military¹²⁴—a necessary corollary to which would seem to be that any Alamanni, Sarmatians, and sons of Roman vet-

¹¹⁹ See Demougeot, "Lètes," 104; Nixon-Rodgers, *In Praise of Later Roman Emperors*, 143 n. 76.

¹²⁰ *CTh* 7.15.1 (409). Similarities to *laeti*: *Notitia dignitatum occidentaliū* 42.

¹²¹ Such as Ellebichus, Master of Soldiers 383–388: Libanius, *Epistulae* 898; Areobindus, Master of Soldiers 434–449; Theodoret, *Epistulae* 18.23; and Fl. Valila *qui et* Theodobius (discussed below). See Blockley, "Roman-Barbarian Marriages."

¹²² For barbarian taxpayers, see also Themist. *Orat.* 167.211–212.

¹²³ E.g., *CTh* 7.20.3 (320), 7.20.4 (325), 7.20.8 (364), 7.20.11 (373).

¹²⁴ *CTh* 7.20.12 (400).




FIGURE 3: The emperor Trajan (98–117) graciously receives Dacian women and children ca. 107. Trajan's Column, Rome: Karl Lehmann-Hartleben, *Die Trajanssäule: Ein römisches Kunstwerk zu Beginn der Spätantike* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1926), pl. 17.

erans who had legitimate claims could be the legal recipients of these benefits. In a like manner, a fragmentary ruling granted something unspecified to “retired veterans and *gentiles*.”¹²⁵

These settlements of barbarians on Roman territory also reveal an aspect of Roman policy vis-à-vis barbarians that has rarely been appreciated. There has been a growing understanding of the role of “bad barbarians” in imperial propaganda. Simply put, the empire needed its violent, threatening barbarians to justify massive expenditures on the Roman military and to provide emperors with a validation of their very existence. The continued presence of dangerous barbarians, punctuated by reports of barbarian attacks followed by the *de rigueur* imperial victories, played a large part in imperial ideologies.¹²⁶ But there is another, usually unacknowledged, side of the barbarian propaganda coin. Just as the empire needed its warlike barbarians, it also needed its peaceful ones. The emperors advertised their ability to turn bad barbarians into good ones by magnanimously introducing them to life as peaceful farmers and taxpayers on Roman soil. This policy was manifested iconographically

¹²⁵ *CTh* 5.11.7 (365). Because the following four constitutions dealt with deserted land, this one probably also did.

¹²⁶ See Ralph W. Mathisen, “Violent Behavior and the Construction of Barbarian Identity in Late Antiquity,” in Harold Drake, ed., *Violence in Late Antiquity* (Aldershot, 2006), 27–35.



FIGURE 4: Dacians being led off for resettlement in 102. Trajan's Column, Rome: Karl Lehmann-Hartleben, *Die Trajanssäule: Ein römisches Kunstwerk zu Beginn der Spätantike* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1926), pl. 36.

not only by scenes of gracious receptions and barbarian families being relocated into the Roman Empire, but also by coins depicting a Roman soldier, now the barbarians' friend, leading a barbarian from his hut, no doubt to enjoy the benefits of life under Roman authority, including, at least as regards land tenure, access to Roman civil law. (See Figures 1–5.) Indeed, a law of 399 demonstrates the emperor's personal role in granting lands to *laeti* newly welcomed into the Roman fold: "Because those seeking Roman felicity from among many barbarian peoples betake themselves to our Empire, on whose behalf the laetic lands must be administered, no one should merit any of these fields unless through Our personal dispensation."¹²⁷ In this way, potentially hostile barbarians were co-opted into the Roman system. The descendants of some of these settlers did very well for themselves. For example, Magnentius, a descendant of *laeti*, rose to high command in the Roman army and was proclaimed emperor at Autun in 350.¹²⁸ (See Figure 6.)

The legal distinction between barbarians and Romans often is thought to have meant something in the case of marriages. A law of the 370s addressed to the Master of Soldiers Theodosius decreed, "For none of the provincials (*provincialium*) may

¹²⁷ *CTh* 13.11.10 (399). See Ralph Mathisen, "Adnotatio and petitio: The Emperor's Favor and Special Exceptions in Early Byzantine Law," in Denis Feissel, ed., *La pétition à Byzance* (Paris, 2004), 23–32.

¹²⁸ Zosimus, *Historia nova* 2.54; Aurelius Victor, *Caesares* 41.25; see Jones, Martindale, and Morris, *The Prosopography*, 1: 532.



FIGURE 5: A Roman soldier, with his spear pointing downward to indicate a lack of hostile intent, leads a barbarian from a hut under a tree for resettlement on Roman territory. The legend reads "Fel(iciu)m temp(orum) reparatio" ("Happy times are here again"). Centenionalis of Constans I (337–350). Mint of Rome. Mathisen Collection.

there be a marriage with a barbarian wife (*barbara uxore*), nor may any provincial (*provincialis*) woman marry any of the *gentiles*."¹²⁹ The law is very anomalous. Not only does no other Roman legislation even hint at any such prohibition, but many marriages between Romans and barbarians also are attested without any indication

¹²⁹ *CTh* 3.14.1 (365/373); see Hagith S. Sivan, "Why Not Marry a Barbarian? Marital Frontiers in Late Antiquity (The Example of *CTh* 3.14.1)," in Mathisen and Sivan, *Shifting Frontiers*, 136–145; also Alexander Demandt, "The Osmosis of Late Roman and Germanic Aristocracies," in Chrysos and Schwarcz, *Das Reich und die Barbaren*, 75–86; Blockley, "Roman-Barbarian Marriages," 53ff.; and Soraci, *Ricerche sui conubia*, 81–108 (for earlier bibliography).




FIGURE 6: Centenionalis of the emperor Magnentius (350–353), a descendant of a barbarian *laetus*. He usurped the throne in Gaul in 350 C.E. The reverse (*facing page*) depicts Magnentius on horseback threatening a cringing barbarian. Mathisen Collection.

of legal complications.¹³⁰ So what to do with the law? One might note that it does not distinguish between *Romani* and *barbari*, but between people classified more specifically as *provinciales* and *barbari* who are further described as *gentiles*.¹³¹ Indeed, the title of the section in the Theodosian Code for which this is the only entry, “On the Marriages of *Gentiles*,” indicates that the law is not about barbarians in general but about barbarians who also were *gentiles*, a specialized term referring to barbarian army units.¹³² This is consistent with the law being addressed to an army general: it must have had something to do with soldiers.

¹³⁰ See Demandt, “Osmosis”; Soraci, *Ricerche sui conubia*; Blockley, “Roman-Barbarian Marriages”; and Maria Bianchini, “Ancora in tema di unioni fra barbari e Romani,” *Atti dell’ Accademia romanistica constantiana* 7 (1988): 225–249.

¹³¹ For a similar distinction, compare *CTh* 3.4.1 (374), “non solum in barbaris, sed etiam in provincialibus servis.”

¹³² Military *gentiles* are attested in Africa in legal sources (*CTh* 7.15.1 [409], 12.12.5 [364], 11.30.62 [405]), and in Italy and Gaul in *Not.dig.occ.* 42.



Rather than being a blanket ban on Roman-barbarian marriages,¹³³ this law is probably but one more example of the Roman fondness for prohibiting or regulating marriages between persons from different social, legal, or even religious backgrounds. As a general policy, marriages were to be “between persons equal in status, with no law impeding them.”¹³⁴ Roman law forbade marriages, for example, between certain family members, between Christians and Jews or pagans, between slave and free, and so on.¹³⁵ In the case of the law in question, some inconsistency involving the status and obligations of *provinciales* and *gentiles* may have arisen in the area where the law was directed.¹³⁶ *Gentiles* had special duties relating to their military service, and, as seen above, provincials were liable to other kinds of obligations.

¹³³ As assumed, e.g., by Gaudemet, “L'étranger,” 223; Demougeot, “Le ‘conubium’”; Bianchini, “Ancora in tema di unioni,” 225, 249.

¹³⁴ *CTh* 3.7.3 (428).

¹³⁵ E.g., *CTh* 3.7.2 = 9.7.5, 3.12.1 (342), 3.12.3 (422); see Judith Evans-Grubbs, *Law and Family in Late Antiquity: The Emperor Constantine's Marriage Legislation* (Oxford, 1995).

¹³⁶ Sivan, “Why Not Marry a Barbarian?” connects the law to North Africa; Soraci, *Ricerche sui conubia*, and Bianchini, “Ancora in tema di unioni,” to Gaul.

Gentiles who married *provinciales* perhaps could claim that they, or their offspring, were not liable for military service, and *provinciales* who married *gentiles* might claim that they were no longer liable to provincial *munera*. All kinds of problems could arise.¹³⁷ Marital restrictions had been imposed on soldiers in the Roman past; this could be a late imperial manifestation.¹³⁸ If this interpretation is correct, then this law provides an example of one category of barbarian soldiers being integrated into the Roman legal system in a manner similar to how other legally restricted groups—slaves, freedmen, women, and Jews—were incorporated. An unappreciated legal parallel is provided by a western law of 465 dealing with *laeti* who had illegally married *coloni*.¹³⁹ The illegality, however, had to do not with ethnicity but with legal status: *coloni* were bound to the land that they worked, but *laeti* were not, and they were claiming that the children of these marriages did not have tenant farmer status. The law grandfathered in existing children but stated that any future offspring of such marriages would be under the authority of the owner of the tenant farmer's land. In this case, then, barbarian *laeti* not only had recognized legal status, but even ranked above *coloni* on the Roman social and legal scale.

With regard to intermarriage, then, the empirical evidence is correct. Barbarians and Romans were perfectly free to marry each other so long as the marriages were “between persons equal in status, with no law impeding them.” This notion of marital non-exclusivity was current in other spheres of contemporary Roman thought. The late-fourth-century Spanish poet Prudentius, for example, stated: “A common law makes us equal . . . the native city embraces in its unifying walls fellow citizens (*cives congenitos*) . . . Foreign peoples now congregate with the right of marriage (*ius conubii*): for with mixed blood, one family is created from different peoples.”¹⁴⁰ Even though Prudentius was speaking metaphorically about the city of God, his words, which described people as far away as India, seem uncannily applicable to the world of late Roman multiethnic marriage.

BARBARIANS ALSO RECEIVED other kinds of acknowledgment in Roman law. Three laws indicate that slaves described as “barbarians,” on the one hand, and “provincials,” on the other, received essentially the same treatment.¹⁴¹ A law of 405, regarding barbarian soldiers involved in legal cases and addressed to the Proconsul of Africa, stated, “In cases that come on appeal, we desire the ancient custom to be upheld, making this addition (*illud addentes*), that, if ever an appeal is introduced by *gentiles* or by their prefects, let a sacred examination of a proconsular hearing be awaited.”¹⁴² The phrase *illud addentes* suggests that an exception was being made to

¹³⁷ The barbarian general Fravitta needed special permission from the emperor to marry a Roman ca. 400 (Eunapius, fr. 59) probably not because of his barbarian ethnicity but because he was a pagan (see n. 144 below).

¹³⁸ See Sara Elise Phang, *The Marriage of Roman Soldiers (13 B.C.—A.D. 235): Law and Family in the Imperial Army* (Leiden, 2001).

¹³⁹ Nov. Sev. 2 (465).

¹⁴⁰ *Contra Symmachum* 2.598–614.

¹⁴¹ *CTh* 3.4.1 = *CJ* 4.58.5 (386); *CTh* 13.4.4 (374); *CJ* 4.42.2 (457/465).

¹⁴² *CTh* 11.30.62 (405). Pace Sirks, “Shifting Frontiers,” 149, “Barbarians were not subjected to Roman courts.”

accommodate barbarian soldiers.¹⁴³ Even high-ranking barbarians recognized that they were liable to Roman law. When asked ca. 400 what reward he would desire after winning a victory, the barbarian general Fravitta requested, and received, the liberty to practice his pagan beliefs.¹⁴⁴ And in 408, after the emperor Honorius (393–423) enacted a law forbidding pagans from holding high office, the barbarian general Generidus resigned his post in protest.¹⁴⁵ Honorius eventually relented and annulled the objectionable law.¹⁴⁶

The customary Roman imperial attitude that barbarians could be included under Roman law also is seen in the panegyric to Constantius, which spoke of “the Frank, who has been received into the laws (*receptus in leges*),”¹⁴⁷ a statement that can mean only that Frankish immigrants were covered by Roman law. This attitude also was reflected in a fictitious prophecy of the 390s suggesting that the emperor “would place the Franks and Alamanni under Roman law,”¹⁴⁸ and in Zosimus’s report about barbarian soldiers of Theodosius I who had robbed the provincials: “This was not the behavior of men who were ready to live according to the laws of the Romans.”¹⁴⁹ The idea that barbarians who acknowledged Roman suzerainty should be sheltered under Roman law also is suggested by a *novella* of Theodosius II (402–450), issued in 439, which began, “Thus, it is advantageous that barbarian peoples be taken possession of (*mancipari*) by the empire of Our Godliness, thus our victories will seem most fruitful for those who are obedient (*oboedientibus*) if the advantages of peace are regulated by the rule of law. Therefore . . . we considered it fitting . . . that each one may make a testament according to his own wishes.”¹⁵⁰ The law then went on to provide a summary of Roman testamentary practices. If, as seems likely, the word *oboedientibus* refers to the aforementioned barbarians, the mention of barbarians might be more than just a manifestation of traditional Roman victory ideology. It also could reflect a desire to incorporate newly settled barbarians under the umbrella of Roman *ius civile*.

Nor is it mere speculation to suggest that barbarians were interested in making wills under the protection of Roman law. A law of Leo I of 468 stated, “But if a testator of a barbarian nation leaves a bequest or trust of this sort without a person having been designated, and if some ambiguity appears regarding his *patria* (home), the bishop of his city, in which the testator died, likewise shall oversee the petition of the bequest or trust, in order to fulfill in all ways the resolution of the deceased.”¹⁵¹ Here, Roman *ius civile* is made available to someone of a *barbara natio*, a term that, as seen above, was the legal designation of a barbarian foreigner. And one notes that the issue under consideration was not whether the barbarian had the right to des-

¹⁴³ Yves Modéran, *Les Maures et l’Afrique romaine* (Rome, 2003), 500 (cf. 348, 510), however, suggests that these *gentiles* already were citizens; contra: Ste-Croix, *Class Struggle*, 515.

¹⁴⁴ Eunapius, fr. 82; Jones, Martindale, and Morris, *The Prosopography*, 1: 372–373.

¹⁴⁵ *CTh* 16.5.42 (408); Zos. *Hist.nov.* 5.46; James J. Buchanan and Harold T. Davis, trans., *Zosimus: Historia nova—The Decline of Rome* (San Antonio, Tex., 1967), 243–244.

¹⁴⁶ Zos. *Hist.nov.* 5.46.2–4; Martindale, *The Prosopography*, 2: 500–501.

¹⁴⁷ Pacat. *Pan.Lat.* 8/5.21.1; Nixon-Rodgers, *In Praise of Later Roman Emperors*, 105.

¹⁴⁸ *HA Tacitus* 15.2: “sub Romanis legibus.”

¹⁴⁹ Zos. *Hist.nov.* 3.30.4; discussed by Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty*, 341; cf. Sidonius Apollinaris, *Carmina* 7.495–496, 510–511.

¹⁵⁰ *Nov.Theod.* 16 (439).

¹⁵¹ *CJ* 1.3.28.3 (468). Significantly, this law was included in two barbarian law codes, the Visigothic *Breviarium* and the “Roman Law of the Burgundians” (45.2).

ignate an executor or trustee under *ius civile*—that was taken for granted—but what to do if he failed to do so. The question of the barbarian's *patria* suggests another way in which barbarians might have been legally integrated into the Roman world. In Roman legal terminology, *patria* usually referred to one's native city, occasionally to the Roman Empire, but never to a foreign land.¹⁵² So how could the aforementioned barbarian have a Roman *patria*? A tantalizing law of 364, addressed "To all the provincials," suggests one way that this could have happened, stating, "We grant to all well-deserving veterans the *patria* that they wish."¹⁵³ The opportunity to choose one's own *patria* would have been most applicable to those who did not already have one, a criterion that would have fit barbarian veterans. Citizens of a municipality were ipso facto Roman citizens. In addition, if one was sufficiently well-to-do, becoming a citizen of a municipality also could make one liable to municipal *munera*. Retired soldiers, however, were hardly ever in that category, so we would not expect to find these barbarians on city councils.

We do, however, have evidence that high-ranking barbarians participated in traditional Roman civic activities. Most of the evidence for barbarians on city councils comes from Constantinople. In the late fourth century, Synesius lampooned barbarian generals who exchanged their sheepskins for togas when they attended meetings of the Senate at Constantinople.¹⁵⁴ Zosimus was more sympathetic, and spoke of the Gothic general Gaïnas responsibly attending Senate meetings.¹⁵⁵ The barbarian general Aspar even rose to hold the position of *princeps senatus* ("first man in the Senate").¹⁵⁶ But not until the Ostrogothic occupation of Italy after 493 are barbarians clearly attested as members of the Senate in Rome.¹⁵⁷ Barbarians also participated in traditional senatorial euergeticism. In the east, during the 460s, the aforementioned Aspar provided Constantinople with a new cistern.¹⁵⁸ And in Italy at about the same time, the barbarian patrician Ricimer decorated the Arian church of St. Agatha in Rome with mosaics.¹⁵⁹ In 471, the barbarian Master of Soldiers Fl. Valila *qui et* Theodobius dictated, proofread, and subscribed to an extant *donatio* (deed of gift) that established a church at Tivoli.¹⁶⁰ Wealthy barbarians also disposed of their property using Roman testamentary law. Aspar named another barbarian, the Ostrogoth Theoderic Strabo, as one of his heirs.¹⁶¹ The emperor Leo, however, refused to allow Strabo to claim his inheritance, perhaps because of the strained political relations between the two, or perhaps because Strabo was not covered by *ius civile*. And Valila bequeathed to the church a house on the Esquiline Hill in

¹⁵² Municipality: *CTh* 6.4.21.4, 8.12.3, 12.1.98, 12.1.119, 12.1.146, 12.18.2, 14.9.1, 15.1.42; Empire: *CTh* 9.37.2, 10.10.25.

¹⁵³ *CTh* 7.20.8: "quam volunt patriam damus."

¹⁵⁴ *De regno* 19/23C.

¹⁵⁵ Zos. *Hist. nov.* 5.13.1.

¹⁵⁶ John Malalas, *Chronicon* 371; *Chronicon paschale* s.a. 467.

¹⁵⁷ U. di Gianlorenzo, "I barbari nel senato romano al sesto secolo," *Studi e documenti di storia e diritto* 20 (1899): 127–191.

¹⁵⁸ *Chronicon paschale* s.a. 459. My thanks to one of the referees for this example.

¹⁵⁹ Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae selectae*, no. 1294.

¹⁶⁰ *Carta Cornutiana*: Louis Duchesne, ed., *Liber pontificalis*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1886–1892), 1: lcxlvii. See Martindale, *The Prosopography*, 2: 1147; and Helmut Castritius, "Zur Sozialgeschichte der Heermeister des Westreichs nach der Mitte des 5. Jh.: Flavius Valila qui et Theodovius," *Ancient Society* 3 (1972): 233–243.

¹⁶¹ Malchus, fr. 2: Lia Raffaella Cresci, ed., *Malco di Filadelfia: Frammenti* (Naples, 1982).

Rome.¹⁶² In this way, very important barbarians, who often had a family history of imperial service,¹⁶³ fulfilled the traditional civic roles expected of wealthy and influential Roman citizens. And their ability to make property transfers and testamentary bequests demonstrates that they had full access to Roman *ius civile*.

Barbarians who lived under the Roman legal umbrella, moreover, did not necessarily give up their barbarian identity. Although multitudes of barbarian settlers no doubt were absorbed into Roman society and retained at most sentimental attachments to the old country, other barbarians who served in the Roman Empire had dual residences, living part-time in the empire but also returning home.¹⁶⁴ Barbarians thus were able to maintain dual citizenship, just as one could hold Roman citizenship along with municipal or provincial citizenship without any contradictions. A ruling of 398 specifically permitted Jews to choose their legal identity. In civil cases, they could use their own laws within their own religious communities or when both parties agreed, but if they were “living by Roman common law” (*Romano et communi iure viventes*), they were expected to “initiate and conclude all legal actions according to Roman law.”¹⁶⁵ Nor is there any indication that the Jews who chose to live by Roman law did so in any other manner than by simply doing so. Even prior to the Antonine Constitution, the opportunity to hold dual citizenship was formally extended to barbarians. During the 160s, Roman citizenship was granted to North African *gentiles salvo iure gentis*, that is, “with the law of their people preserved.”¹⁶⁶ These barbarians retained whatever legal obligations or benefits accrued from their belonging to a barbarian people at the same time that Roman *ius civile* became available to them.¹⁶⁷ They, like the Jews, could use their own law when they identified themselves as *gentiles*, or Roman law when they identified themselves as *cives Romani*. Nor did this kind of dual citizenship create any problems of political allegiance, for by the later Roman Empire, being a Roman citizen had become purely a statement of legal status and coverage. It no longer had anything to do with politics. There were other institutions—military oaths for soldiers and provincial council meetings for civilians—that dealt with declaring oneself a loyal subject of the emperor.¹⁶⁸

Indeed, in late Roman popular usage, barbarians were recognized as bearing a form of ethnic citizenship. A Roman of Florence, for example, described his deceased wife as a *civis Alamanna* (“citizen of the Alamanni”).¹⁶⁹ The Arian Modaharius, who debated Bishop Basilius of Aix in the 470s, was depicted as a *civis Gothus*

¹⁶² *Liber pontificalis* 49: Duchesne 250.

¹⁶³ Note, e.g., the families of Arbogast and Richomer, Stilicho, Aspar, and Ricimer (Jones, Martindale, and Morris, *The Prosopography*, 1: 95–97, 765–766, 853–858; Martindale, *The Prosopography*, 2: 1310, 1312).

¹⁶⁴ E.g., Amm. Marc. *Res gestae* 21.4.3, 29.6.5, 18.2.17; see A. D. Lee, *Information and Frontiers: Roman Foreign Relations in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1993), 71.

¹⁶⁵ *CTh* 2.1.10 (398).

¹⁶⁶ “non cunctamur . . . ciuitatem Romanam salvo iure gentis dare”: *Tabula Banasitana* (ca. 161/169): Nadine Labory, ed., *Inscriptions antiques du Maroc II: Inscriptions latines* (Paris, 1982), n. 94, 76–91. See A. N. Sherwin-White, “The *Tabula* of Banasa and the *Constitutio Antoniniana*,” *Journal of Roman Studies* 63 (1973): 86–98. For dual citizenship: Honoré, *Ulpian*, 24; and Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King*, 39ff.: “Gothic leaders easily could have held dual citizenship.”

¹⁶⁷ For the laws of barbarian *gentes*, see Sirks, “Shifting Frontiers,” 153–155.

¹⁶⁸ Military: Vegetius 2.5; provinces: n. 53 above.

¹⁶⁹ *CIL* 11.1731 (423).

("Gothic citizen").¹⁷⁰ And a soldier buried near Budapest said on his epitaph, "I am a *civis Francus* [Frankish citizen] and a Roman soldier in arms."¹⁷¹ But this usage never appears in any extant Roman legal sources, and it is unclear what being a barbarian *civis* meant. It may have been the functional or metaphorical equivalent of Roman civic or provincial citizenship. It also may have had as much, if not more, to do with ethnic identity as with legal status. One's personal identification with a city, a province, a religion, or a barbarian people could be expressed in terms of "citizenship" that in no way conflicted with holding Roman citizenship.

SO WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE barbarians who settled on Roman territory and were assimilated under the umbrella of Roman law? Can they be deemed "Roman citizens"? There is no evidence of any *peregrinus* being formally granted Roman citizenship after 212.¹⁷² If this ever did happen, it is fair to expect that we would continue to find evidence for it. Given the great number of references to such awards during the Principate, the lack of them during the later empire has to be significant, and cannot be dismissed as an argument from silence. After 212, the only formal grants of Roman citizenship were to freedmen and slaves, who thus experienced not so much a change from "noncitizen" to "citizen" as a transfer to a greater measure of legal freedom under *ius civile*. It was a difference of degree rather than of kind. But *peregrini* no longer received grants of citizenship. Thus, when considering the question of whether barbarians were considered to be Roman citizens, one must not assume that this happened as a consequence of some legal act. If it happened, it must have been in some other manner.

And happen it surely did, for, as just seen, we have plenty of evidence for barbarians behaving as if they were Roman citizens. They held office,¹⁷³ owned and transferred property, made wills, went to Roman courts, and generally made use of *ius civile*, all without formally receiving citizenship. The most reasonable explanation for this is that the Antonine Constitution was meant to be self-perpetuating. All free foreign *peregrini* who settled in the Roman Empire and took up the obligations and identity of *cives* of a municipality or a province were potential Roman citizens. Being a foreign barbarian did not exclude one from access to some if not all elements of Roman *ius civile* and from other citizen privileges. What counted was not ethnicity but distinctions among slaves, freedmen, and full citizens, who had different levels of access to *ius civile*. Indeed, the primary distinction in Roman law now was not even between citizen and noncitizen, but between free and degrees of legal disability, as denoted by being, for example, a slave, a freedman, a *colonus*, a *dediticius*, or a person under a sentence of *infamia*. Free status conveyed full access to *ius civile*, whereas nonfree status, as always, brought noncitizen status in the sense of incomplete access to *ius civile*. Conversely, non-full-citizen status necessarily implied legal disability. It therefore was a contradiction to suggest that a free person could be a noncitizen. This

¹⁷⁰ Sid. Apoll. *Epist.* 7.6.2–3.

¹⁷¹ *CIL* 11.3576 (Aquincum, near Budapest).

¹⁷² Except for a few early examples of bureaucratic inertia; see Herodian, *History* 8.4.2, and Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 388.

¹⁷³ And to hold the office of Consul certainly implied that one had the *ius honorum*, the right of Roman citizens to hold office.

would explain why there are no cases during the later empire of anyone being denied access to *ius civile* on the basis of ethnic, or any other nonservile, status, a stark contrast to the Principate, when accusations that noncitizens were passing themselves off as citizens were rampant.¹⁷⁴

It thus is no surprise that free barbarian *peregrini* had access to *ius civile*. But this does not mean that all barbarians automatically were considered citizens. It was making use of the “law of Roman citizens” that made someone both *de facto* and *de iure* a citizen. Citizenship was a matter of participation and self-identification:¹⁷⁵ one could just as easily identify oneself as a *civis Francus* as a *civis Romanus*. Indeed, given the concept of dual identity, one could do both. There was no process by which a foreigner became a Roman citizen except by functioning as one. Caracalla’s edict truly intended that *ius civile* would apply to everyone, and that included new residents. Roman law united everyone in the world. As expressed by the third-century jurist Modestinus in his work “On Manumissions,” “Roma communis nostra patria est” (“Rome is our shared homeland”).¹⁷⁶ The same ideology lay behind the *Augustan History*’s proud observation, in the late fourth century, about the emperor Probus: “Did he not defeat all of the barbarian nations and make almost the entire world Roman? There is peace everywhere, Roman laws are everywhere, our judges are everywhere.”¹⁷⁷ Rhetoric, yes, but a rhetoric based on imperial ideology. By making their law available to all, the Romans manifested their claim to rule all that mattered of the whole world and established the closest thing ever known to a “citizenship of the world.”¹⁷⁸

DURING THE FIFTH CENTURY, the carefully crafted unity of the Roman world disintegrated. The western half of the empire gave way to several barbarian successor states, which assimilated many Roman concepts of law, citizenship, and legal identity.¹⁷⁹ For more than four hundred years, the Roman Empire had been the only Mediterranean or European government that offered the benefits of a system of law. The barbarian states now issued laws and law codes in their own names that applied to all the residents of their kingdoms.¹⁸⁰ But they also continued to recognize laws

¹⁷⁴ E.g., Epict. *Disc.* 3.41: “those who falsely claim Roman citizenship are severely punished”; see Meyer Reinhold, “Usurpation of Status and Status Symbols in the Roman Empire,” *Historia* 20 (1971): 275–302.

¹⁷⁵ A point made by Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty*, 352, for the pre-212 period.

¹⁷⁶ Just. *Digest* 50.1.33. For this concept, see Yan Thomas, *L’origine de la commune patrie: Etude de droit public romain* (89 av. J.-C.—212 ap. J.-C.) (Paris, 1996).

¹⁷⁷ *HA Probus* 18.4–5.

¹⁷⁸ For Roman rule of the “*orbis terrarum*” (“circle of the lands”), see Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty*, 278.

¹⁷⁹ E.g., Cassiodorus, *Variorum* 1.1, to the Byzantine emperor Anastasius, “Regnum nostrum imitatio vestra est.”

¹⁸⁰ For the Ostrogothic “Edict of Theoderic,” see Sirks, “Shifting Frontiers,” 153; and G. Vismara, *Edictum Theodorici* (Milan, 1967). For the Visigothic “Code of Euric,” see Mommsen, Meyer, and Krüger, *Theodosiani libri XVI*, 1: cccvii–cccxxi; for Visigothic use of Roman law, see John Matthews, “Roman Law and Barbarian Identity in the Late Roman West,” in Mitchell and Greatrex, *Ethnicity and Culture*, 31–44. For the Burgundian laws, see Katherine Fischer Drew, trans., *The Burgundian Code Book of Constitutions or Law of Gundobad: Additional Enactments* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1949). And for the Franks, see Drew, *The Laws of the Salian Franks* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1991). Applicability: Liebeschuetz, “Citizen Status and Law,” 142–147.

associated with other kinds of legal identity. In the words of the Ostrogothic king Theoderic (493–526), “For each his own laws are preserved and under a diversity of judges a single justice embraces everyone.”¹⁸¹ The introduction of barbarian legal systems thus put one more selection in the legal smorgasbord. Someone identified as a Roman could continue to use Roman *ius civile* while at the same time functioning under the jurisdiction of barbarian law. Things could get complicated. For example, the Visigothic *Breviarium* (“Summary”) of 506 preserved, and commented upon, the Jewish access to Jewish law that had been available in the Roman Empire: “All Jews who acknowledge that they are Romans may pursue in the presence of the elders of their religion . . . the statutes that are in the Hebrew laws. Other matters, which are contained in our laws and relate to the courts, they shall pursue in the presence of the governor of the province where all do so.”¹⁸² In this case, a Jew enjoyed triple legal identity: as a Jew, as a Roman, and as a subject of the Gothic kingdom.

Barbarian kingdoms also preserved concepts of citizenship that sometimes, but not always, were related to legal jurisdiction. They gave particular attention to safeguarding the rights of those identified as Roman citizens. Both the Visigoths and the Burgundians preserved a law of Constantine dealing with slaves who were made “Roman citizens.”¹⁸³ Regarding inheritances, the Visigothic interpretation of a law of Valentinian III referred to “the succession rights of *liberti* who are Roman citizens.”¹⁸⁴ And the “Burgundian Law of the Romans” included regulations dealing with witnessing procedures and the wills of Roman citizens.¹⁸⁵ In late-sixth-century Italy and seventh-century Spain, slaves still were being formally manumitted and granted “Roman citizenship.”¹⁸⁶ And well into the ninth century, legal forms in the Frankish kingdom continued to convey “Roman citizenship,” which “included the right to make a will, to give testimony, to buy, to sell, to endow, and to commute,” just as in the Roman period.¹⁸⁷ Usually, however, in the post-Roman world, as during the later Roman Empire, generic references to “citizens” meant citizens of cities.¹⁸⁸ But there also was a more generalized usage, referring to citizens of “the Republic,” that is, Romans (and perhaps Ostrogoths as well) now subject to the Ostrogothic monarchy.¹⁸⁹ And the Visigothic kingdom of the seventh century issued laws “for the utility of all citizens.”¹⁹⁰

So just what was a “citizen” of a barbarian kingdom? The best hint at a direct answer comes from the 470s. After the Gallo-Roman Lampridius had his property restored by the Visigothic king Euric, Sidonius Apollinaris wrote to him, “I, until now

¹⁸¹ Cass. Var. 7.3.1.

¹⁸² CTh 2.1.10 = *Breviarium Alarici* 2.1.10 (506).

¹⁸³ Visigoths: CTh 4.7.1 = *Brev. Alar.* 4.7.1 (506). Burgundians: *Lex Romana Burgundionum* 3.

¹⁸⁴ *Nov. Val.* 25, *interpretatio* (506).

¹⁸⁵ *Lex Romana Burgundionum* 45.2 (derived from *Nov. Theod.* 16, also included in the Visigothic *Breviarium*), 45.4.

¹⁸⁶ Gregory the Great, *Regularum* 6.12 (595): “vos . . . liberos . . . civesque romanos efficimus”; *Lex Visigothorum* 12.2.13–14.

¹⁸⁷ *Formulae Arvernenses* 27: *MGH, Formulae* 30, cf. 141, 172, 182, 246, 257–258, 311–313, 518, and throughout.

¹⁸⁸ For Gaul, see Gregory of Tours, *Historiae* 7.31, 8.20, 10.31, 9.6, 2.11, 4.16, 9.13, 6.13; CTh 1.29.6 = *Brev. Alar.* 1.10.1 *interpretatio*; for Italy, see, e.g., Cass. Var. 1.21.1, 2.37.1, 3.44.1, 6.23, 7.8, 7.11–12, 7.29, 7.44, 8.30.3, 8.31, 9.2.4–6, 9.5.1, 9.14.2, 11.12, 12.13.1, 12.15.6; special attention was given to the citizens and Senate of Rome: e.g., Cass. Var. 1.41, 2.32, 3.10, 9.17, 10.13.

¹⁸⁹ Cass. Var. 6.11.1, 7.37.1; cf. 4.16.1, 6.1.1–4, 11.13.3, 11.5.4.

¹⁹⁰ *Lex Visigothorum* (= *Liber iudiciorum*) 1.3.

(*adhuc*), act as an exile; you yourself now act as a citizen."¹⁹¹ In whatever sense that it entailed, Lampridius had become a citizen of the Visigothic kingdom, and the word *adhuc* suggests that Sidonius hoped to do the same. There is no indication of any formal process for becoming a citizen of a barbarian kingdom. It is likely that, just as in the Roman Empire, one did so by a process of residence, participation, and self-identification. Romans now had the opportunity to exercise a dual citizenship of their own. Just as it had been possible during the Roman Empire to be both a *gentilis* and a *civis Romanus*, in barbarian kingdoms one could retain Roman citizenship while at the same time identifying oneself as a citizen of a barbarian kingdom.

The permeability of various forms of citizenship status in the barbarian kingdoms helps to explain why the transition from Roman to barbarian administrations just before and after the year 500 was not nearly as disruptive as it might have been. Roman administrative systems were preserved,¹⁹² as were institutions relating to personal legal status and procedures for all citizens of a kingdom. An additional consideration is that being identified as a Roman citizen was simply a statement of coverage under Roman *ius civile*. It did not carry any sense of political loyalty to the Byzantine emperor or the old Roman Empire.

Over the longer term, however, the Roman concept of universal citizenship was lost. After all, barbarian kingdoms had none of the ideological or conceptual underpinnings that had led to Roman ideas of inclusive citizenship. In particular, they had no claim to universal political hegemony. Quite the contrary. Each was confronted by a welter of other kingdoms, not to mention a resurgent Roman Empire in the east, with which they usually competed. Exclusivity rather than inclusivity was their watchword. As the Roman afterglow petered out, Roman concepts of citizenship, whether of a world, a nation, a province, or a city, did likewise, to be replaced in the Middle Ages by models of subjugation to bishops and kings.¹⁹³ Any idea of universal citizenship now was transferred from the cosmopolitan city of the secular world to the heavenly city of God, more meaningful in the context of the world to come than in the here and now. Not until the later Middle Ages did ancient-appearing forms of citizenship based on city centers begin to reemerge.¹⁹⁴ And it was only in the Renaissance that Roman concepts of individual citizen liberty, not to mention ideas of world citizenship, reappeared.¹⁹⁵

In sum, during the later Roman Empire, the Roman government, in the belief

¹⁹¹ Sid. Apoll. *Epist.* 8.9.3.

¹⁹² See Paul S. Barnwell, *Emperors, Prefects and Kings: The Roman West, 395–565* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992).

¹⁹³ See William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1765–1769), 1: 354: "The first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural-born subjects." Note also Gaines Post, "Philosophy and Citizenship in the Thirteenth Century: Laicisation, the Two Laws, and Aristotle," in William C. Jordan, Bruce McNab, and Teofilo R. Ruiz, eds., *Order and Innovation in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honor of Joseph R. Strayer* (Princeton, N.J., 1976), 401–408. Most discussions of Roman law in the Middle Ages do not even mention citizenship; e.g., Paul Vinogradoff, *Roman Law in Medieval Europe* (Oxford, 1929).

¹⁹⁴ See Martha C. Howell, "Citizenship and Gender: Women's Political Status in Northern Medieval Cities," in Mary Erler and Maryanne Kowaleski, eds., *Women and Power in the Middle Ages* (Athens, Ga., 1988), 37–60.

¹⁹⁵ See Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," 9; and Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague, 1974), 4.

that it ruled as much of the *orbis terrarum* ("circle of the lands") as was worth ruling, created a functional equivalent of universal citizenship. This was done largely for purposes of administrative streamlining, but even the streamlining could not have happened if there had not been a pervasive belief in the world of Roman officialdom that people living under Roman authority ought to have access to Roman law. In the conceptual framework of Roman claims to political jurisdiction beyond whatever the effective extent of Roman political control happened to be, there was nothing inconsistent in permitting immigrating foreigners from beyond the frontiers to live under the umbrella of Roman *ius civile*. As a result, a Frank or Visigoth could become just as much a Roman citizen as a Numidian, Sardinian, or Egyptian. Since the fall of the western Roman Empire, no nation has been so grand that it could claim to encompass the whole world or attempt to create a form of universal citizenship that was open to all comers. But now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there is again much discussion of the different forms that universal citizenship could take. In spite of, or perhaps because of, the chronological gap between the ancient and modern phenomena of world citizenship, it may be that the Roman model for dealing with issues of ethnicity, identity, and religion in the context of legal definitions of citizenship has much to teach us.¹⁹⁶ In particular, the time may have come once again for a form of citizenship unburdened by the baggage of nationalism or political allegiances.

¹⁹⁶ In general, Bertrand Lançon, "La modernité du bas empire romain," in Roger-Pol Droit, ed., *Les Grecs, Les Romains et nous: L'Antiquité est-elle moderne?* (Le Mans, 1991), 332–345; Christian Bruschi, "Le droit de cité dans l'Antiquité: Un questionnement pour la citoyenneté d'aujourd'hui," in C. Wihtol de Wenden, ed., *La citoyenneté et les changements de structures sociale et nationale dans la population française* (Paris, 1988), 126–153; and C. Nicolet, "Citoyenneté française et citoyenneté romaine: Essai de mise en perspective," in *La nozione di "romano" tra cittadinanza e universalità* (Rome, 1984), 145–173.

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AHR Forum

Historical Perspectives on Anti-Americanism

It is clear from many different sources that anti-Americanism around the world is at an all-time high. It is also clear, as the essays in this AHR Forum demonstrate, that anti-Americanism is hardly new. Nor is it simple. It is our hope that placing this phenomenon in a historical perspective might help us better understand its contemporary manifestations.

Academic historians are usually careful to qualify claims about the relevance of history with warnings about the fundamental remoteness of the past and the irreducible specificity of historical experiences. Their warnings are well-placed, for the call to make history relevant has often led to the misuse of the past and its exploitation for dubious ends. But in a sense, every historian who reads the morning paper "makes history relevant," insofar as he or she cannot resist wondering about the historical antecedents or analogies of the day's events. And when it comes to everyday assertions about the supposed intractability, changelessness, or utter novelty of contemporary affairs, the historian can provide a crucial public service by reminding us how wrong and misleading, in the light of history, these assertions are.

That is indeed the purpose of this AHR Forum. The three articles and comment show that anti-Americanism has a long and complex history, which belies any attempt to frame it as monolithic, ideologically determined in one direction, or historically constant. "Your Americanism and Mine: Americanism and Anti-Americanism in the Americas," by Greg Grandin, reminds us, as do the other contributions, that foreign perceptions of the United States were hardly of a piece. Grandin offers a complex analysis of both contrasting Latin American attitudes to the U.S. and the different faces America presented to its neighbors in the South. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht's contribution, "Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century," adds to this complex, nuanced view of the sentiment, laying particular stress on the difference between cultural and political anti-Americanism. In "America in Asian Eyes," Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, focusing mostly on East Asia, demonstrate, among other things, the large role played by U.S. racial and colonial policies in fashioning Asian perceptions. Finally, in his comment, "Anti-Americanism: It's the Policies," Juan Cole offers both a critique of these three articles and his own view of the phenomenon from the vantage point of a Middle Eastern specialist. Together these articles add an element of historicity to a contemporary issue and contribute to a transnational understanding of American history as well.

AHR Forum
Your Americanism and Mine:
Americanism and Anti-Americanism in the Americas

GREG GRANDIN

The historical evolution of the proper adjective American has made it, without arrogation, synonymous, at least in the English-speaking world, with the less euphonious adjective United States.

Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (1943)

The adjective ["American"] must not be taken as the expression of a distinct law, but as the expression of a particular application of general and universal public international law.

Carlos Sánchez i Sánchez, *Curso de derecho internacional público americano* (1943)

IF ANYONE HAD GOOD REASON to be "anti-American," it was the Guatemalan political activist and poet Huberto Alvarado Arellano. He was seventeen years old in 1944 when he joined an uprising led by students, middle-class professionals, and urban workers that overthrew a thirteen-year dictatorship, helping to usher in what was perhaps the most ambitious social democratic experiment in post-World War II Latin America. The revolution led to two elected governments that over the course of a decade consolidated constitutional rule, extended the franchise to women, the poor, and Mayans, established state-run social security and health care, enacted a labor code, ended forced labor on coffee plantations, and implemented far-reaching agrarian reform. As part of a young generation of cultural and political modernists, Alvarado helped found both a small but influential communist party, called the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, and Saker-Ti, a group of artists, novelists, and poets dedicated to creating a democratic political culture—no mean task in a society as hierarchal and exclusionary as was Guatemala at that time.

In 1954, however, Guatemala's "civilized decade," as Alvarado later described the period, came to an abrupt end when the CIA ousted Jacobo Arbenz, the revolution's second elected president, in its first Cold War Latin American intervention.¹ Alvarado fled to Mexico, along with thousands of others, many of whom looked to Marxist critiques of imperialism to make sense of their recent experience. One

¹ The 1954 intervention is discussed in Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton, N.J., 1991); Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954* (Stanford, Calif., 1999); and Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago, 2004).

deposed Arbenz official, himself not a communist, sketched out an influential analysis of “monopoly imperialism,” arguing that an alliance of interests between the U.S. Department of State, local economic elites, and foreign corporations, most notably the United Fruit Company, would never allow reforms such as those advanced by the Guatemalan Revolution to mature.²

But Alvarado did not pick up Lenin’s *Imperialism* or Mao’s *Imperialism and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers*, even though a Spanish version of the Chinese text had begun to circulate in Latin America a few months after the coup.³ Instead, he turned to Walt Whitman’s *Leaves of Grass*. In an essay published in Ecuador in 1955, Alvarado applauded Whitman’s commitment to “democratic and progressive ideas” even as he condemned Washington’s “empire of intimidation.” He cautioned against letting the Cold War and the nuclear arms race generate too much pessimism: “During this shadowy and shining moment, when there are new roads to destruction and death, there is also a bright horizon; it is imperative that we go back to lessons provided by the great North American poet and remember his prediction that the ‘sweetest songs remain yet to be sung.’”⁴

Alvarado’s embrace of Whitman at such a low moment was not a flight into romanticism, a solace sought by many a frustrated activist during moments of political reaction since at least the French Revolution. The coup did not diminish the Guatemalan refugee’s concern for the political world. Alvarado deepened his commitment to communist politics, becoming general secretary of the party in exile. His appeal to the values celebrated by Whitman reveals the suppleness of the idea “America,” just at a moment when heightened imperial conflict was reinforcing its equally pliable opposite: “anti-Americanism.”

Since the early nineteenth century, Latin American elites had shared with their North American counterparts the idea that “America” represented a renovating world force distinct from archaic Europe. Thomas Jefferson’s faith that the U.S. represented an “empire for liberty” resonated, however suspiciously, with Latin America’s independence leaders, who were among the first to celebrate the dynamic moderation of the United States’ revolutionary break from Great Britain against the excesses of the French and Haitian revolutions.⁵ Among the most confident, “America” referred to the possibility of a larger, hemisphere-wide democratic imaginary. Such enthusiasm waned fast throughout the nineteenth century, overcome by Washington’s militarism and Wall Street’s increasing dominance of Latin American economies. Nationalists began to develop a vision of “two Americas,” a “Latin” America that for them was more faithful to the original vision of New World sovereignty and democracy than that advanced by the United States. For a brief but consequential moment in the 1930s and 1940s, American reformers, from both the U.S. and Latin America, redeemed the promise of “pan-Americanism” in the name of social de-

² Alfonso Bauer Paiz, *Como opera el capital yanqui en Centroamérica (El caso de Guatemala)* (Mexico, 1956).

³ William E. Ratliff, “Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy toward Latin America, 1949–1960,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 49, no. 1 (February 1969): 53–79, 69.

⁴ Huberto Alvarado Arellano, “Walt Whitman: Poeta Nacional, Democrático, y Realista,” *Cuadernos del Guayas* (Ecuador) 6 (1955): 20. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

⁵ Charles A. Hale, “Political Ideas and Ideologies in Latin America, 1870–1930,” in Leslie Bethell, ed., *Ideas and Ideologies in Twentieth Century Latin America* (Cambridge, 1996), 135–138.

mocracy.⁶ But this redemption was short-lived. After the CIA's 1954 coup, the Cold War once again drove a wedge between the two Americas. For the next four decades, despite nominal support for the continent's "democratic left," the U.S. would align with the most illiberal and revanchist forces in the hemisphere. In fact, the most passionate defenders of liberalization and democracy were likely to be found in the ranks of Washington's opponents—and to be singled out for elimination by Washington's allies. In order to check the power of an increasingly militant nationalism, the U.S., following the costly Korean War, funded and trained domestic intelligence agencies throughout the continent, which, over the course of three decades, executed hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans—including Alvarado, who, having covertly returned to Guatemala, was murdered by security forces in 1971—tortured untold thousands more, and drove millions into exile.⁷

In turning to *Leaves of Grass* to make sense of the coup, Alvarado followed earlier writers who, since the Cuban revolutionary José Martí introduced Whitman to Latin American readers in 1887, had invoked the poet to highlight Washington's hypocrisy and rhetorically temper its aggression. "The voice that would reach you, Hunter," Nicaragua's Ruben Darío wrote to Theodore Roosevelt in 1905, "must speak in Biblical tones, or in the poetry of Walt Whitman."⁸ For many Latin American nationalists, Whitman embodied an alternative "America," and they sensed in him, even before Spanish translations of his poetry were widely available, the possibility of, as Alvarado put it, a "democratic and progressive" America, one in which the nation's universal promise was not shackled to Washington's ambitions. After attending one of Whitman's last public appearances in New York in 1887, Martí, himself an anti-imperialist, lauded the North American's ability to join "reason to grace," pronouncing him an "heir to the world" who wore his legacy lightly. Whitman's promiscuous use of Spanish words such as *libertad*, *americanos*, and *camarada*, Martí felt, suggested an inclusive and diverse Americanism. The Cuban also identified with Whitman's prose rebellion against "coy lyrics" that whispered of courtly love, believing that it captured the energy of a "new humanity congregated on a fertile continent . . . the renewal of mankind."⁹ More than sixty years later, in 1948, the Bra-

⁶ I use "pan-Americanism" here in its broad, idealistic sense to cover the common liberal ground that existed between competing definitions of the idea of America, yet Latin Americans have often associated the term with Washington's efforts to exert administrative control over the hemisphere: the Mexican writer and pedagogue José Vasconcelos distinguished between Bolivarism ("the Hispanic-American ideal of creating a federation with all the nations of Spanish culture") and Monroeism (the "Anglo-Saxon ideal of incorporating the . . . Hispanic nations to the Northern empire by means of the politics of Pan-Americanism"); Vasconcelos, "Hispano-Americanism and Pan-Americanism," in F. Toscano and James Hiestler, eds., *Anti-Yankee Feelings in Latin America: An Anthology of Latin American Writings from Colonial to Modern Times in Their Historical Perspective* (Washington, D.C., 1982), 85–92, quotes from 85.

⁷ The literature on the responsibility of the U.S. in Latin American political repression is vast and growing. For an overview, see Americas Watch, *With Friends Like These: The Americas Watch Report on Human Rights and U.S. Policy in Latin America* (New York, 1985); for Brazil, see Martha Huggins, *Political Policing: The United States and Latin America* (Durham, N.C., 1998); for El Salvador, see National Security Archive, *El Salvador: The Making of US Policy, 1977–1984* (Alexandria, Va., 1989), and Mark Danner, *The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War* (New York, 1994); for Operation Condor, see John Dinges, *The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents* (New York, 2004).

⁸ Ruben Darío, "To Roosevelt," in Toscano and Hiestler, *Anti-Yankee Feelings in Latin America*, 49–50, quote from 49.

⁹ For Martí's "The Poet Walt Whitman," see Gay Wilson Allen, ed., *Walt Whitman Abroad: Critical*

zilian scholar Gilberto Freyre made much the same point: "Whitman's Americanism always aimed at universal man . . . he obviously could not conceive of 'universal man' reduced to a caricature of American man."¹⁰

Yet 1948 was the last year that such an argument could be made.¹¹ Even before the CIA's 1954 Guatemalan coup, the increasingly heavy hand of the United States in hemispheric and world affairs reawakened anti-imperialist resentment that had lain dormant during the Good Neighbor Policy and the wartime popular front. Whitman once again became a voice of disillusionment. In 1952, the Dominican Pedro Mir lamented the conscription of the poet's radical exuberance into a resurgent militarism: "The ones who defiled his luminous beard and put a gun on his shoulders . . . Those of you who do not want Walt Whitman, the democrat, but another Whitman, atomic and savage."¹² Two years after the overthrow of Arbenz, Mexico's Octavio Paz went further, declaring that it was not universalism that had nourished Whitman's democratic vision but a singular exclusionary belief that the United States, and by extension the idea of America, stood outside of history:

America was—if it was anything—geography, pure space, open to human action . . . And where there was an historical obstacle—for example, the indigenous societies—it was erased from history, reduced to a mere natural fact and dealt with accordingly . . . Everything that in some way is irreducible or inassimilable is not American. In other places the future is one of man's attributes: because we are men, we have a future; in the Saxon America of the last century, the process is reversed and the future determines the man: we are men because we are the future. Anyone who has no future is not a man. This kind of reality offers no room for contradiction, ambiguity, or conflict . . . America dreams itself in Whitman because America itself is a dream, pure creation. Before and after Whitman we have had other poetic dreams. All of them—be the dreamer named Poe or Darío, Melville or Dickinson—are really attempts to escape from the American nightmare.¹³

Nearly all who write on "anti-Americanism" confess to finding it difficult to come up with a proper definition of the term. Yet Paz's formulation—anything "irreducible or inassimilable" to American universalism—is better than most.¹⁴ As it was

Essays from Germany, France, Scandinavia, Russia, Italy, Spain and Latin America, Israel, Japan, and India (Syracuse, N.Y., 1955), 201–213, quotes from 205, 206, 211.

¹⁰ Gilberto Freyre, "Camerado Whitman," in Allen, *Walt Whitman Abroad*, 223–234, quote from 231.

¹¹ The Whitman cult in Latin America deepened through the Good Neighbor Policy and popular front period of the 1930s, until the years immediately following World War II. His influence on poets such as Pablo Neruda and Gabriela Mistral is apparent. See Luis Franco, *Walt Whitman: El mayor demócrata que el mundo ha visto* (Buenos Aires, 1940), and José Gabriel, *Walt Whitman: La Voz Democrática de América* (Montevideo, 1944).

¹² Pedro Mir, *Countersong to Walt Whitman and other Poems*, trans. Jonathan Cohen and Donald D. Walsh (Washington, D.C., 1993), 97; a decade later, Mir's poetics proved prophetic when Walt Whitman Rostow, an advocate of military escalation in Vietnam, became a key advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

¹³ Octavio Paz, *El arco y la lira: El poema; la revelación poética; poesía e historia* (Mexico City, 1956), 299–300. Ten years later, another Mexican writer, Mauricio González de la Garza, was more blunt, focusing on Whitman's earlier jingoistic writings, in *Walt Whitman: Racista, imperialista, antimexicano* (Mexico, 1971; adapted from his 1966 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México thesis). In 1973, Neruda's *Incitación al Nixonicidio, y alabanza de la revolución chilena* (Santiago, 1973) returned to Darío's strategy of using Whitman to rebuke U.S. aggression: "I call on you, necessary brother, old Walt Whitman . . ."

¹⁴ For example, Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith, "Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a Phe-

leveled during the Cold War and is being used again today in its current post-9/11 revival, the charge “anti-American” often assumes a harmonization of the society, polity, and culture of the United States with capitalist modernity. Anti-Americanism is nothing less than the “rejection of Western society itself and its values,” or so said U.S. Ambassador to West Germany Arthur Burns in 1984.¹⁵ In 2003, the French writer Jean-François Revel expressed his belief that the “principal function of anti-Americanism has always been, and still is, to discredit liberalism by discrediting its supreme incarnation.”¹⁶ Identifying the United States as the apex of liberalism, or the “true end product of the liberal grand design,” as Stephen Haseler does in his *The Varieties of Anti-Americanism*, makes it easy to dispatch any criticisms of Washington’s policies as a “repudiation of liberal democratic capitalism and its attendant values.”¹⁷ “Anti-American” becomes an omnibus accusation, as capacious as the term “American” and used to describe diverse oppositional sentiments and actions as pathological reactions to the modern world. Even attempts to come to terms with “anti-Americanism” that are critical of U.S. policies often tend to leave such conceits unexamined and to ignore the production of the category itself.¹⁸

In his essay on Whitman, Alvarado wrote that “to be universal, one has to be from somewhere.”¹⁹ The same can be said about the indictment “anti-American.” Before the adjective was applied globally, it was worked out locally, largely through the long course of inter-American relations.²⁰ Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the concept “anti-American” generally served as the claim of imperial rivalry and high politics.²¹ The press infrequently deployed the term, using it almost exclusively

nomenon,” in Rubinstein and Smith, eds., *Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 1985), 1–30; Thomas Perry Thornton, “Preface,” in Thornton, ed., *Anti-Americanism: Origins and Context*, special edition, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (May 1988): 9–19; Alan McPherson, *Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), 4.

¹⁵ Arthur Burns, “This Anti-Americanism Is Firstly Anti-Western,” *International Herald Tribune*, January 2, 1984.

¹⁶ Jean-François Revel, *Anti-Americanism*, trans. Diarmid Cammell (San Francisco, 2003), 12.

¹⁷ Stephen Haseler, *The Varieties of Anti-Americanism: Reflex and Response* (Washington, D.C., 1985), 19–20.

¹⁸ For example, George W. Grayson, “Anti-Americanism in Mexico,” in Rubinstein and Smith, *Anti-Americanism in the Third World*, 31–48.

¹⁹ Alvarado, “Walt Whitman,” 5.

²⁰ Starting in the 1920s, scholarly and popular journals began to address the question of Latin American “Yankee-phobia”: Edward Perry, “Anti-American Propaganda in Hispanic America,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 3, no. 1 (1920): 17–40; Anna Powell, “Relations between the United States and Nicaragua, 1898–1916,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 8, no. 1 (1928): 43–64; J. Fred Rippy, “Literary Yankee-Phobia in Latin America,” *Journal of International Relations* 12 (January 1922): 350–371; “Latin America’s Distrust of Uncle Sam,” *Literary Digest* 79, no. 1 (October 6, 1923): 23–24; and “As Latin America Sees US,” *American Mercury* 3 (December 1924): 465–471. See also Tancredo Pinochet, *The Gulf of Misunderstanding (or North and South as Seen by Each Other)* (New York, 1920).

²¹ There are few references in the early to mid-nineteenth century to “anti-Americanism” as a noun, used in the sense of opposition to a set of values represented by the idea of “America.” President Andrew Johnson used the adjective “anti-American” in relation to the French occupation of Mexico, concerned that France would “raise up in Mexico an anti-republican or anti-American” government; “Message of President Transmitting Report on Evacuation of Mexico by French,” April 23, 1866, 36, available online at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/> (accessed August 3, 2004). As the United States began to displace British, French, and German economic interests in Latin America, the U.S. press occasionally complained of “anti-American propaganda” on the part of European influence in the hemisphere; see “Foreign Feeling in Brazil,” *New York Times*, February 4, 1894, 20, and “Warned of the United States,” *New York Times*, August 13, 1899, 7. Interestingly, government agents occasionally used the charge of

as a descriptive category to refer to European tariffs placed on U.S. agricultural and manufacturing products. Throughout the early twentieth century, commentators broadened the definition of “anti-American” to cover the escalating opposition to American power, opposition that increasingly took the form either of insurgents fighting U.S. occupying forces—in the Philippines, Haiti, and Nicaragua, for instance—or of violence, vandalism, and labor militancy targeted against U.S. economic interests, in places such as Mexico, Colombia, and Bolivia.²² As Washington justified its growing global ambitions in ever more idealist, even pious, terms, the phrase began to take on normative meaning, signaling not just resistance to the expanding military and economic reach of the United States but hostility to the values that sanctioned that expansion. After World War II, this reorientation of the phrase both repeated and accelerated.

During the early Cold War years, policy analysts used “anti-Americanism” to refer to either official Soviet propaganda or perceived elite European contempt. Yet as superpower conflict overlapped with decolonization movements, commentators once again refurbished the concept to explain grassroots opposition to specific U.S. policies and to the country’s growing power more generally. The first serious manifestations of challenges to the United States’ postwar authority—Vice-President Richard Nixon’s disastrous 1958 visit to Venezuela, where he was spit on, stoned, and nearly killed, and the 1959 Cuban Revolution—were explicitly directed at Washington’s support for long-standing dictatorships in those countries. That Latin American critics, especially during the early Cold War, were not repudiating liberal democracy and its attendant values but rather were mobilizing in their defense, challenging the U.S. largely from the standpoint of the ideals that it claimed to defend, created a serious crisis of legitimacy for Washington’s authority. In response, policy elites, scholars, and pundits began to marshal the concept of “anti-Americanism,” drawing on ideas associated with psychology and psychoanalysis—resentment, fear, and ambivalence—to argue that eruptions in Venezuela, Cuba, and elsewhere sprang from the dislocation and uncertainty caused by the transition to modernity, from the move from ordered, patriarchal societies to plural, economically open polities. They forged “anti-Americanism” into a malleable interpretive lens, using the concept as an organizing device that linked Latin America’s revolutionary nationalist movements to a general perception that the “third world” was in revolt.²³

WHAT IS OFTEN TAKEN FOR ANTI-AMERICANISM in Latin America is, in fact, a competing variation of Americanism. During the first century of independence from Spain, Latin American intellectuals and politicians developed a nationalism that was at

“anti-American” against Anglo settlers in western North America who did not recognize the authority of the federal government. The commander of Fort Pickett on San Juan Island in Washington Territory, for instance, applied the term to settlers who were abusing Native Americans against the orders of territorial officials; “Indian Depredations in Oregon and Washington . . .,” January 11, 1861, 24, available online at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/> (accessed August 3, 2004).

²² For example, “Anti-American Manifesto,” *New York Times*, February 20, 1899, 1, and “Filipinos Unfit to Rule Themselves,” *New York Times*, November 3, 1899, 6.

²³ McPherson’s *Yankee No!* discusses “anti-Americanism” during the Nixon trip, the Panama Canal riots, and the Cuban Revolution.

once particular—acutely attached to a specific national and regional place—and universal—a belief that the Americas represented an exceptional opportunity to fulfill the promise of the modern world. That modern world was inescapably defined in relation to the rise of U.S. power in all of its expressions, leading nationalists to adopt a defensive posture. But even when disapproval of Washington was expressed in a cultural idiom, opposition to the U.S. rarely, if ever, yielded to the politics of reaction and tradition: it was, after all, the anti-imperialist Darío who had both coined the phrase and helped pioneer the literary form “modernismo” in the 1890s to declare independence from baroque Spanish constraints.²⁴ Dissidents rarely defined themselves as “anti-American”; they tended to use the terms “anti-interventionist,” “anti-Yankee,” and, increasingly after 1898, “anti-imperialist.”²⁵ “Yankee” embodied both the antithesis and the betrayal of the universal American: “They would concentrate the universe in themselves,” complained the Chilean writer Francisco Bilbao in 1856, in the wake of the Mexican-American War and William Walker’s invasion of Nicaragua. The birth of the United States “caused rejoicing on the part of sorrowing humanity . . . and provided a field of utopia . . . free lands for free souls”; yet within a generation, Bilbao said regretfully, the “Yankee has replace[d] the American; Roman patriotism, philosophy; . . . and self-interest, justice.”²⁶

Through the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century, literary nationalists from every Latin American country produced an impassioned, lyrical body of work that censured Washington for not matching its actions to its ideals. Writers such as Brazil’s Eduardo Prado, Mexico’s Isidro Fabela, Venezuela’s Rufino Blanco-Fombona, Bolivia’s Franz Tamayo, Cuba’s José María Céspedes, Guatemala’s Máximo Soto Hall, and Colombia’s José María Vargas Vila freely blended the Rousseauian tradition of Enlightenment liberalism with a diffuse Spanish Catholic antipathy toward Anglo-Protestant “individualism.” They contrasted what they imagined to be the utilitarian, alienated, sterile, cunning, instrumental United States, driven by brute political and economic power, with the more authentic, humanist, aesthetic, and spiritual republics of Latin America. “And though,” wrote Darío to Theodore Roosevelt, “you have everything, you are lacking one thing: God.”²⁷ In 1900, Uruguay’s José Enrique Rodó captured this critique in arresting imagery in *Ariel*, a book that cast the U.S. as the grubbing Caliban and Latin America as the sublime Ariel.²⁸

A color line increasingly marked the border between the two Americas: in the

²⁴ Perry Anderson, *The Origins of Postmodernity* (London, 1998), 3.

²⁵ Between 1900 and 1899, approximately 1,000 titles were published in Latin America containing the word “imperialism.” The Cuban nationalist weekly *Patria* used the term in 1898 (October 15); in Peru, Luis de las Casas wrote a doctoral thesis titled “Imperialismo” (Lima, 1901). Other examples include Enrique José Varona’s “Imperialismo a la luz de la sociología” (1905), in Pedro Pablo Rodríguez and Josefina Meza, eds., *Política y sociedad* (Havana, 1999), 221–235; Carlos Pereyra, *La doctrina Monroe: El destino manifesto y el imperialismo* (Mexico, 1908); Salvador Turcios, *Al margen del imperialismo yanqui* (San Salvador, 1915); and Francisco Caraballo Sotolongo, *El imperialismo norteamericano* (Havana, 1914).

²⁶ Francisco Bilbao, *América en peligro* (1856), excerpted in Benjamin Keen, *Latin American Civilization: History and Society, 1492 to the Present*, 7th ed. (Boulder, Colo., 2000), 477–482, quotes from 479.

²⁷ Darío, “To Roosevelt,” 50.

²⁸ José Enrique Rodó, *Ariel* (Montevideo, 1900). Cuban Roberto Fernández Retamar, foreshadowing similar postcolonial appropriations, claimed both Caliban and Ariel as symbols of colonial subjugation and assigned to the United States the role of Prospero, the “foreign magician”; Fernández Retamar, *Calibán: Apuntes sobre la cultura en nuestra América* (Mexico, 1971).

nineteenth century, the endurance of slavery in the U.S. well past the time when most Latin American countries had abolished forced labor and introduced universal suffrage, followed by the institutionalization of Jim Crow, further discredited Washington in the eyes of many Latin American liberals and nationalists.²⁹ The growing presence of Anglo settlers and troops in the North American Southwest, the Caribbean, and Central America, many of whom brought with them racist institutions and attitudes, further highlighted the breach between ideal and practice.³⁰ In the twentieth century, anti-imperialist activists such as Nicaragua's Augusto Sandino and Peru's Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre democratized and racialized the antimony developed by Rodó and others, arguing that Latin America constituted a unique "Indo-American race" distinct from Anglo-Saxon America: they offered a popular patriotism that Latin America's majority poor could sympathize with, one that superseded elite nationalism by valorizing the dark-skinned, impoverished peasant culture that prevailed throughout Mesoamerica and much of South America.³¹ Every new confirmation of Anglo aggression—the Texas secession, the Mexican-American War, Walker's invasion of Nicaragua, the Spanish-American War, the annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the 1902 creation of Panama, the Platt Amendment, Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, brief occupations of Mexico and Cuba followed by longer stays in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic—provoked a new Latin American reprimand.³²

In the early twentieth century, criticism of the United States, sharpened through Marxist theory, gained political momentum with the growth of communist, socialist, and nationalist political parties, and connected both with domestic guerrilla insurgencies and internationalist movements.³³ As corporations and banks steadily replaced gunboats as the main agent and symbol of U.S. power (although Marines continued to be a provocative presence in the Caribbean and Central America through the 1930s), the florid allegorical opposition to the United States of the pre-

²⁹ Unlike most Latin American critics, Martí gained his insights through extended firsthand observation of U.S. society, offering trenchant commentary on the gap that existed in the United States between the promise of liberal political equality and the reality of racial subordination; see his essays in José Martí, ed., *En los Estados Unidos* (Madrid, 1968).

³⁰ Aims McGuinness, "Searching for 'Latin America': Race and Sovereignty in the Americas in the 1850s," in Nancy Appelbaum, Anne Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Roseblatt, eds., *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2003), 97–102, writes that the first uses of "América Latina" and "dos Américas" were in an 1856 poem by José María Torres Caicedo titled "Las dos Américas," protesting Walker's invasion of Nicaragua. The poem was published in Paris, highlighting how European, particularly French, influence reinvigorated Spanish Catholic antipathy toward Anglo-Saxonism. In the 1950s, U.S. observers often complained that Latin American elites learned their "anti-Americanism" in French schools; see McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 26.

³¹ Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, *¿A dónde va Indoamérica?* (Santiago, 1936); Michael J. Schroeder, "The Sandino Rebellion Revisited: Civil War, Imperialism, Popular Nationalism, and State Formation Muddled Up Together in the Segovias of Nicaragua, 1926–1934," in Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Durham, N.C., 1998), 208–268; see also Franz Tamayo, "Mensaje a la juventud libre de Indoamérica," *Repertorio Americano* 16, no. 12 (1928).

³² Linda B. Klein, "The Rhetorics of Yankeeophobia: Anti-U.S. Sentiment in Spanish American Literature" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1971).

³³ Frederick Pike, "Visions of Rebirth: The Spiritualist Facet of Peru's Haya de la Torre," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63, no. 3 (August 1983): 479–516, describes how the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, founded in 1924 in Peru, followed by franchises in nearly every Latin American country, melded the eclectic, often incongruous strands that constituted early-twentieth-century internationalism, including socialism, occult humanism, anti-imperialism, and nationalism.

vious century was supplemented by two new forms: First, Latin American critics began to focus on the economic dimensions of U.S. power. "Modern conquests," the Argentine Manuel Ugarte wrote in 1920, "differ from earlier ones in that they are achieved through political means, without the use of arms. Material usurpation results from a long period of infiltration or hegemony that slowly wears down national defenses . . . In considering the Yankee threat, we shouldn't see a brutal aggression but the slow work of subterranean invasions and gradual conquests."³⁴ Ugarte was from Argentina, a country that into the twentieth century had found itself fettered to London's financial houses, which perhaps accounts for his focus on the informality of empire. Closer north, Central American and Caribbean writers provided more animated exposés of imperialism, combining economic analyses with graphic descriptions of military conquest and brutal forms of capital accumulation. "Where does Wall Street begin and where does it end?" asked former Guatemalan president Juan José Arévalo after the CIA's 1954 operation, capturing the omnipresent nature of U.S. financial power; the question, though, appears in a book whose title leaves little to the imagination about the brute force that makes such elusive ubiquity possible: *The Shark and the Sardines*.³⁵ Second, Latin American writers began to chronicle the indignities and violence (especially repression directed at labor movements) of everyday life under the growing influence of U.S. corporations, as it was experienced in mining or agricultural company towns, in the shadow of U.S. consumer culture, or in cities where electricity, transportation, and finance were controlled from abroad. In Chile in 1904, Baldomero Lillo, the son of a mine foreman, published a volume of short stories that captured the miseries of miners, including their abuses at the hands of one "Mister Davis," the first of many unsympathetic "misters" who would populate twentieth-century social and magical realist prose. (When Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez taunted George W. Bush at the 2005 Summit of the Americas by repeatedly referring to him as "Mister Danger," he was referencing a character from *Doña Bárbara*, a 1929 novel by the Venezuelan writer and politician Rómulo Gallegos: a blue-eyed, pink-faced, land-grabbing, "scornful foreigner.")³⁶

By the late 1920s, mounting opposition had made U.S. policy in Latin America untenable, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America. Throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, there was an increase in peasant and working-class

³⁴ Manuel Ugarte, *El porvenir de la América Española: La raza, la integridad territorial y moral, la organización interior* (Valencia, 1920), 197.

³⁵ Lenin's analysis of the determining causes of imperialism had been available in Latin America since 1917 (published by Talleres Nueva América in Santiago, Chile, as *El imperialismo, fase superior del capitalismo*). Yet most Latin Americans focused not on what drove U.S. imperialism but on its effects and violence. Francisco García Calderón, "El imperialismo yanquí en la América Central," *Cuba Contemporánea* 1 (1914): 14–27, identified the Panama Canal as a line marking two forms of U.S. imperialism: to the south, informal "financial, industrial, and commercial penetration" reigned; to the north, "absolute and indisputable political hegemony" (16). Juan José Arévalo, *The Shark and the Sardines*, trans. of *Fábula del tiburón y las sardinas* by June Cobb and Raul Osegueda (New York, 1961), quote from 243.

³⁶ Baldomero Lillo, *Sub Terra: Cuadros Mineros* (Santiago, 1973); cf. Catherine James Hampares, "The Image of the Yankee: The North American Businessman in the Contemporary Novel of Spanish America" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1968). Two famous examples of this genre are Guatemala's Miguel Ángel Asturias's "Banana Trilogy" (*Los ojos de los enterrados*; *El papa verde*; and *Viento fuerte*, published in the 1950s) and Colombia's Gabriel García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, whose town of Macondo serves as a literary illustration to dependency theory. Rómulo Gallegos, *Doña Bárbara* (Caracas, 1985), 97.

violence directed at U.S.-owned plantations, factories, and mines, particularly in Colombia, Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.³⁷ As part of the "Republican Restoration," the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations tried to shift foreign policy away from the "protective imperialism," as Samuel Flagg Bemis put it, of their predecessors, but they inherited violent occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic and found themselves informally administering Cuba under the auspices of the Platt Amendment.³⁸ In Nicaragua, a protracted guerrilla war waged by Augusto Sandino against U.S. Marines concentrated scattered opposition to Washington into a focused movement, one with widespread intellectual and political support, both in the Americas and beyond.³⁹

The most vocal criticism of the United States came from nongovernmental intellectuals and activists, yet Sandino's war roused official efforts to obtain from the U.S. a commitment of nonintervention in Latin America's domestic politics. Just prior to the Sixth Pan-American Conference, held in Havana in early 1928, Sandino scored a series of impressive military victories against the U.S., and Latin American delegates took the opportunity to launch a barrage of criticism. The gallery audience applauded each recounting of old and new grievances and hissed at the attempts by U.S. envoy Charles E. Hughes, former secretary of state, to defend Washington's policy.⁴⁰ Sandino was not directly mentioned, yet Latin American newspapers nonetheless reported the diplomacy in light of the fighting in Nicaragua. "The high-sounding declarations heard in Havana do not serve to erase the inexcusable acts committed in Central America, which still weigh overwhelmingly and paralyze real pan-Americanism," wrote the Buenos Aires *La Nación*; "as long as intervention is an accomplished fact in Nicaragua, the policies of the United States will seem ambiguous and detrimental to its international good name." Another Argentine newspaper declared that "United States intervention in Nicaragua was far worse and more unjust than was Belgium's invasion by Germany in 1914," while a Uruguayan daily warned that the "Nicaraguan muddle is really the death-knell of the pan-American ideal."⁴¹

The Havana conference, in fact, did signal the beginning of a reorientation of

³⁷ Thomas O'Brien, *The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900–1945* (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), and John Mason Hart, *Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002).

³⁸ Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation* (New York, 1943), 202–226.

³⁹ "Pro-Nicaraguan Committees" sprang up throughout Latin America. *El Repertorio Americano*, based in Costa Rica because of that country's relative political openness, and which enjoyed a readership throughout Latin America and Europe, published regular articles on the Nicaraguan crisis. U.S. ambassadors to Latin America conveyed to Washington their concern with the growing opposition, as U.S. policy was denounced in manifestos, at grassroots meetings, in condemnatory editorials, and at ever larger street protests (in order to bypass government prohibitions against anti-U.S. policy demonstrations, protesters often claimed to be organizing pro-Mexican rallies). In the United States, Sandino's war resuscitated the moribund Anti-Imperialist League, first formed in response to the Spanish-American war three decades earlier. And while Europe's anti-imperialist movement focused mostly on colonialism in Asia and Africa, Sandino's struggle nonetheless stirred sympathy: for example, at the International Congress against Colonialism and Imperialism, held in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1929, a Mexican delegate displayed a tattered U.S. flag captured by Sandino's troops, drawing cheers and applause; Richard V. Salisbury, *Anti-Imperialism and International Competition in Central America, 1920–1929* (Wilmington, Del., 1989), 131–156.

⁴⁰ Salisbury, *Anti-Imperialism*, 115.

⁴¹ Newspapers cited in John Edwin Fagg, *Pan Americanism* (Malabar, Fla., 1982), 161–162.

U.S. policy toward Latin America, which would come full circle following Franklin D. Roosevelt's election.⁴² Owing in no small part to the anger that Sandino's insurgency provoked throughout the Americas, there emerged a new thinking among foreign policy and business leaders that Washington could no longer afford to play catch-up diplomacy and waste its time responding to one emergency after another either caused or inflamed by direct military interventions.⁴³ Adolf Berle, a prominent member of FDR's brain trust, understood this new dispensation as imperialism—he had no problem with the word “empire,” believing that “neither great nor small powers have free choice in the matter.”⁴⁴ Corporate reformers likewise counseled change. After witnessing firsthand widespread poverty and labor unrest in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Mexico during a 1937 tour of Latin America, Nelson Rockefeller lectured his peers that “we must recognize the social responsibilities of corporations and the corporation must use its ownership of assets to reflect the best interest of the people.” “If we don't,” warned Rockefeller, who would go on to play a central role in shaping Washington's postwar Latin American policy, “they will take away our ownership.”⁴⁵ Throughout the 1930s, the U.S. withdrew troops from Nicaragua and Haiti, abrogated the Platt Amendment in Cuba's constitution, abandoned a series of treaties that gave it special rights in a host of Central American countries, allowed Haiti to retake control of its national bank, occasionally backed Latin American nationalists in the struggle with U.S. corporations, and eventually committed to a precedent-setting policy of absolute nonintervention.

Roosevelt's acceptance of hemispheric pluralism—“your Americanism and mine,” as he put it in his address to the Pan-American Union a few months after taking office—allowed Latin American politicians to once again embrace New World purpose: “America . . . for humanity,” proclaimed Panamanian president Juan Demóstenes Arosemena in 1939 in his speech to a gathering of American foreign ministers called to declare a united policy of neutrality (the first step in cutting Nazi Germany off from Latin America) at the start of World War II.⁴⁶

FDR's GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY, while initially designed to douse the fires sparked by decades of U.S. militarism and corporate rapaciousness, was also influenced by an often unacknowledged source: Latin America's evolving tradition of social democracy and liberal internationalism. The roots of this tradition are deep, stretching

⁴² Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States*, 202–255, describes steps taken by Republican administrations prefiguring Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy.

⁴³ For policy intellectuals' criticism of U.S. policy toward Latin America in the second half of the Hoover administration, see the essays under the heading “Our Future Relations with Latin America,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 156 (July 1931): 110–136; see also Thomas J. McCormick, “Walking the Tightrope: Adolf A. Berle and America's Journey from Social to Global Capitalism, 1933–1945,” in Thomas J. McCormick and Walter LaFeber, eds., *Behind the Throne: Servants of Power to Imperial Presidents, 1898–1968* (Madison, Wis., 1993).

⁴⁴ Cited in McCormick, “Walking the Tightrope,” 138.

⁴⁵ Gerard Colby with Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon—Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil* (New York, 1995), 82.

⁴⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 2: *The Years of Crisis, 1933* (New York 1938); Juan Demóstenes Arosemena, *Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente de la República de Panamá: En la sesión inaugural de la reunión consultiva de los Ministros de relaciones exteriores de las repúblicas Americanas* (Panama, 1939), 4.

back to a late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century rights tradition that synthesized Anglo and French Enlightenment thought to exalt both individual freedom and a virtuous society.⁴⁷ Likewise, Catholic humanism, influenced by the Thomist school of rational natural law, injected into Latin American political liberalism a commitment to social solidarity and conscientiousness.⁴⁸ This humane intellectual current, though, developed in the teeth of severe exploitation, hierarchy, and exclusion, and it took a series of violent social revolutions, most notably in nineteenth-century Cuba and early-twentieth-century Mexico, before it was reflected in legal doctrine. Mexico's 1917 constitution, for example, adopted after seven years of nearly continuous warfare, became the model for subsequent Latin American charters and prefigured similar social democratic constitutions put into place decades later in India and Europe. It affirmed personal liberties common to the Anglo-American legal tradition, while guaranteeing a wide array of social and economic rights, including the right to education. The constitution laid out a progressive labor code that regulated working conditions, prohibited child labor, granted the right to form unions and conduct strikes, and mandated worker health care, pensions, and unemployment and accident insurance. Understanding that these protections could not be achieved without some social control over the economy, the charter allowed for the expropriation of industries and large estates, which, when implemented in the 1930s, became the basis for an extensive agrarian reform and industrialization.

The 1920s and 1930s, though, were an inauspicious period for implementing democratic ideas in Latin America. Reformers had little room to maneuver, as post-World War I liberalization gave way to a series of authoritarian regimes. So political liberals focused outward, on reforming the interstate system. What became the backbone of the Good Neighbor Policy—the policy and principle of nonintervention in both the domestic and foreign affairs of sovereign nations—was much more than a sudden reflex on the part of Washington in response to a constricted global economy and political pressure from Latin American nationalists. It represented the central plank in a long-evolving effort by Latin American jurists to remake the philosophical foundations of international law.

As the center of continental political and economic gravity, rivaling Washington's hemispheric leadership while at the same time trying to shake free of London's financial shackles, Argentina took the lead in this effort. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its jurists advanced legal precedents that restricted the right of European nations to collect debts through military means.⁴⁹ Washington tentatively supported these moves, viewing them as useful in rolling back Great Britain's influence. But the United States refused to give up the right, which it claimed under universal international law, to intervene militarily when it deemed that its

⁴⁷ One of the first instances of a concern on the part of Latin America that U.S. materialism could undermine the promise of republicanism can be found in the late-eighteenth-century diary of Francisco de Miranda, who would go on to be one of Venezuela's independence leaders. During his visit to New England, Miranda inquired of Samuel Adams about the dangers of founding a democracy such as the United States on "property" rather than on "virtue"; William Spence Robertson, ed., *The Diary of Francisco de Miranda: Tour of the United States, 1783–1784* (New York, 1928), 118.

⁴⁸ Paulo G. Carozza, "From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 25 (2003): 281–313.

⁴⁹ Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States*, 230, 147, describes the 1868 "Calvo Doctrine," named after Carlos Calvo, and the 1902 "Drago Doctrine," named after Luis Drago.

nationals were unduly denied justice or when a state acted irresponsibly. "Let us face the facts," said Secretary of State Hughes at the 1928 Havana conference; "the difficulty . . . in any one of the American Republics, is not of any external aggression. It is an internal difficulty . . . What are we going to do when government breaks down and American citizens are in danger of their lives? . . . Now it is a principle of international law that in such a case a government is fully justified in taking action."⁵⁰

In response, Latin American legal theorists, in communication with liberal internationalists in the United States, began well before the establishment of the League of Nations or the codification of much international law to challenge the very principles that underwrote Great Power diplomacy. The most famous of those jurists, the Chilean Alejandro Alvarez, began to advocate for what he called "American International Law." In place of the excessive "individualism" implied in the notion of state sovereignty, Alvarez and others began to insist that nations recognize the importance and legitimacy of values such as interdependence, cooperation, and solidarity in international relations. Alvarez was a firm believer in American exceptionalism, arguing that the common experience of the Americas—constitutional, republican, liberal, democratic, egalitarian, founded on the ideal of popular suffrage—provided a unique opportunity to forge a new system of hemispheric governance, one built on multilateral cooperation and mutual dependence.⁵¹ Of course, the ideal of absolute nonintervention, based as it was on the principle of sovereignty, contradicted the notion of interdependence. Latin American jurists resolved this contradiction by proposing the establishment of pan-American institutions that could mediate conflicts among American nations, as opposed to mandated arbitration at the Hague, which, they argued, was biased toward European and U.S. interests. With the financial support of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Alvarez founded the American Institute of International Law in 1911, establishing franchises in each of America's twenty-one republics. The institute, along with a series of ad hoc pan-American committees, advocated not just for the codification of international law but for "judicial progress," that is, for the creation of new precedents that would legitimate the principles of "American International Law."⁵²

Washington largely opposed these efforts. Not wanting to give up the right to intervention or to be tied down by Lilliputian regional restraints, its representatives objected to legal innovation as well as the notion of American exceptionalism: "There can no more be an American international law," argued William Henry Trescott, the U.S. representative to the 1889 Pan-American Conference, "than there can be an English, a German, or a Prussian international law. International law has an old and settled meaning. It is the common law of the civilized world, and was in active

⁵⁰ Ibid., 252.

⁵¹ Alvarez elaborated these ideas over the course of an extraordinarily long and productive career; see, for example, "Latin America and International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 3 (April 1909): 269–353; "New Conception and New Bases of Legal Philosophy," *Illinois Law Review* 13 (1918–1919): 25–41; "The Necessity for the Reconstruction of International Law—Its Aim," in *Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of Teachers of International Law and Related Subjects* (Washington, D.C., 1930); and *The Monroe Doctrine: Its Importance in the International Life of the States of the New World* (New York, 1924).

⁵² Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States*, 236; James Brown Scott, "The Gradual and Progressive Codification of International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 21, no. 3 (July 1927): 417–450.

recognized and continuous force long before any of the now established American nations had an independent existence.”⁵³

Alvarez equivocated on whether American law was distinct from international law. But his peer diplomats had more than hemispheric ambitions: in September 1932, Foreign Minister Carlos Saavedra Lamas of Argentina invited the nations of the world to sign an “Anti-War Treaty on Non-Aggression and Conciliation,” which, Saavedra Lamas believed, would “doubtless mark a new step in the juridical evolution of the world.”⁵⁴ Building on the momentum generated by other recently signed international peace and arbitration agreements—the League of Nations Covenant, the Hague Conventions, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact—the Argentine treaty crystallized many of the doctrines long advocated by Latin American jurists, particularly the absolute prohibition of “intervention either diplomatic or armed.” By presenting it to the world for ratification (the official version of the treaty omitted the prefix “South American,” with a footnote explaining that the phrase was meant to express only the “source” of the treaty’s “inspiration,” and not to imply any regional specificity), the Argentine minister did an end run around Washington’s insistence that the right to unilateral intervention was enshrined in international law. By the start of the Seventh Pan-American Conference, which took place in Montevideo in October 1933, Saavedra Lamas had obtained the signatures of six Latin American countries on the treaty, thus presenting the convention not as an agenda item but as a *fait accompli*. In Montevideo, Washington not only signed Saavedra Lamas’s non-intervention convention but conceded a raft of other long-sought demands, thus institutionalizing FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy. However instrumental and, at times, nominal Washington’s about-face was, it did open the way for a decade of unparalleled hemispheric cooperation, binding the Americas together with a series of political, economic, military, and cultural treaties and the creation of an assortment of inter-American institutions, organizations, bodies of arbitration, and mechanisms for consultation and joint action in the case of an extra-hemispheric threat.⁵⁵

Refracted through their firsthand experience of U.S. expansion, the destruction that took place during the two world wars confirmed the belief of Latin American jurists that the international order needed to be remade. “Public opinion to-day demands that after the war there be a reconstruction, on new and more solid foundations, of political life, of economic life, and especially of international life,” said Alvarez during a 1916 lecture tour of U.S. universities, a sentiment that would be echoed in arguments he made in 1942.⁵⁶ His hope was premature in the first instance,

⁵³ Cited in Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States*, 233.

⁵⁴ Competition with the U.S. over who would negotiate a peace between Paraguay and Bolivia in the 1928–1935 Chaco War spurred Saavedra Lamas to draft the treaty. Philip Jessup, “The Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Draft Treaty,” *American Journal of International Law* 27, no. 1 (January 1933): 109–114. The treaty is found in *Supplement to the American Journal of International Law: Official Documents* 28, no. 3 (July 1934): 79–84.

⁵⁵ Carlton Beals, Bryce Oliver, Herschel Brickell, and Samuel Guy Inman, *What the South Americans Think of Us: A Symposium* (New York, 1945), provides a balanced survey of Latin American opinion of the United States during the Good Neighbor Policy. Close to nine hundred texts critical of the U.S. were published in Latin America between 1933 and 1959, suggesting that the Soviet Union’s popular front directive to tone down anti-imperialist criticism had limited effect in Latin America; William S. Stokes, “Cultural Anti-Americanism in Latin America,” in George Anderson, ed., *Issues and Conflicts: Studies in Twentieth-Century American Diplomacy* (Lawrence, Kans., 1959), 315–338.

⁵⁶ Alejandro Alvarez, *International Law and Related Subjects from the Point of View of the American*

but after World War II, Latin American diplomats and legal theorists did play an influential role in the construction of the postwar order. Dropping the adjective “American,” they produced a large body of work that advanced the reorientation of international law away from power politics toward the recognition of multilateral “interdependence” in pursuit of social welfare and peace.⁵⁷ “All that harmonizes with human solidarity is just, all that contradicts it is unjust,” wrote Colombia’s Edgardo Manotas Wilches in 1948.⁵⁸ Brazil’s Jorge Americano argued that the purpose of international law should be to guarantee the rights elaborated by FDR in his “Four Freedoms” speech, finding the foundation of an international social democratic order in its “freedom from want” plank.⁵⁹

Having brought with them their long experience of pan-American diplomacy and encouraged by their experience of wartime cooperation with the U.S., a number of these diplomats conveyed in their memoirs an unbridled confidence in their ability to create a new global community of peaceful, stable nations.⁶⁰ The majority of Latin America’s twenty-one representatives who gathered in San Francisco in 1945 to found the United Nations—nearly half the total delegates, and the largest single regional caucus—willingly allowed themselves to be organized into a voting bloc by Nelson Rockefeller, then the assistant secretary of state for Latin America, providing key support to Washington’s vision for the structure and purpose of the new body.⁶¹ But they also pressed their own concerns, forcing the UN to confront directly the issue of colonial racism and to adopt a human rights policy. Chile and Panama supplied draft charters on which the new institution modeled its Universal Declaration of Human Rights, while Latin American representatives successfully pushed for the charter to include social and economic rights—to social security, to work, to an adequate standard of living, to participation in trade unions, to rest and leisure time, to food, clothing, housing, and health care, and to free education—as well as for a provision treating men and women as equals.

For his part, Roosevelt, as the world war wound down, held up the “illustration of the Republics of this continent” as a model for postwar reconstruction. “In 1933 there were many times twenty-one different kinds of hate,” he wrote, taking credit

Continent: A Report on Lectures in the Universities of the United States, 1916–1918 (Washington, D.C., 1922), 14; Alvarez, *Después de la Guerra: La vida internacional, social e intelectual* (Buenos Aires, 1942).

⁵⁷ The Brazilian Ilmar Penna Marinho wrote in 1947: “In a word: the new juridical order is to be based fundamentally on the policy of absolute interdependence and strict international collaboration”; Marinho, *Características essenciais do novo direito internacional* (Rio de Janeiro, 1947), 21.

⁵⁸ Edgardo Manotas Wilches, *Le nouveau droit des gens* (Paris, 1948), 59.

⁵⁹ Jorge Americano, *The New Foundation of International Law* (New York, 1947), 5. See also Pedro Batista Martins, *Da unidade do direito e da supremacia do direito internacional* (Rio de Janeiro, 1942); Levi Carneiro, *O Direito internacional e a democracia* (Rio de Janeiro, 1945); José María Velasco Ibarra, *Derecho internacional del futuro* (Buenos Aires, 1943).

⁶⁰ For Latin America’s role in building the postwar order, and especially the Universal Declaration, see Carozza, “From Conquest to Constitutions”; Susan Waltz, “Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 23 (2001): 44–72; John Humphrey, *Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1984); Johannes Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1999); and Hernán Santa Cruz, *Cooperar o perecer: El dilema de la comunidad mundial*, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1984).

⁶¹ Colby, *Thy Will be Done*, 173–175, provides an account of how Rockefeller “became the United States’ parliamentary whip over Latin America” at the founding of the UN.

for selling Latin Americans on the “idea of peace without hate.”⁶² Yet more than just providing a “showcase” for peaceful diplomacy, as the U.S. ambassador to Germany described American affairs, the consolidation of cooperative relations in the Western Hemisphere allowed Washington to project New World power back to the Old.⁶³

First, a formal renunciation of the right to intervention allowed Washington to formalize its hemispheric authority without the burden of militarism or direct colonial administration, binding the Americas together in a series of political, economic, military, and cultural treaties and the creation of an assortment of multilateral institutions, bodies of arbitration, and mechanisms for consultation and joint action in the case of an extra-hemispheric threat. Second, the withdrawal of troops from the Caribbean, the renegotiation of treaties, and the increased tolerance of economic nationalism gave Roosevelt a better claim to legitimacy as he advocated for an end to colonialism and militarism elsewhere. Bemis writes that it “seems most plausible” that Roosevelt’s precocious appeal in May 1933 for the nations of the world to enter into a nonaggression pact was an attempt to steal Saavedra Lamas’s “thunder and roll it around the globe in Rooseveltian reverberations,” since the “immediate effect of his appeal was to place the United States and its President, rather than Argentina and her Foreign Minister, before the people of both hemispheres as the champion of Nonintervention.”⁶⁴ Roosevelt’s popularity in Latin America—especially following his 1936 visit to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo, where he was greeted by audiences of hundreds of thousands of cheering admirers, with the usually skeptical Argentine press heralding him as a “shepherd of democracy”—stealed his aspirations to world leadership.⁶⁵

Third, improved relations with Latin America likewise helped the United States recover from the contractions of the Great Depression. With Asia increasingly off limits and Europe headed for war, Washington looked to the south for economic relief, both as a market for manufactured goods and as a source of raw material. Empowered by the 1934 Trade Agreement Act, which gave FDR fast-track authority to lower targeted tariffs by as much as 50 percent, Washington negotiated trade treaties with fifteen Latin American countries between 1934 and 1942.⁶⁶ The U.S. trade deficit with Latin America as a whole fell from \$142 million in 1931 to just over \$13 million in 1939; it soon after entered into the black, where it remains to this day.

Finally, the inter-American alliance system allowed Washington to undercut the authority of the new United Nations, helping to create what one historian has described as a “closed hemisphere” in an ever more “Open World.”⁶⁷ Even as Harry Truman’s envoys were working with delegates from around the world to create the structure and define the purpose of the UN, the United States was negotiating a

⁶² Franklin D. Roosevelt, *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters*, ed. Elliott Roosevelt, vol. 2: 1928–1945 (New York, 1950), 1445–1447.

⁶³ Frederick Marks, *Wind over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt* (Athens, Ga., 1990), 217.

⁶⁴ Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States*, 270.

⁶⁵ Fredrick B. Pike, *FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos* (Austin, Tex., 1995), 220; Marks, *Wind over Sand*, 218.

⁶⁶ Frank Niess, *A Hemisphere to Itself: A History of US-Latin American Relations* (London, 1990), 115–123.

⁶⁷ David Green, *Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Chicago, 1971).

mutual defense treaty with Latin America, empowering signatory nations to act collectively against outside aggression. Critics charged that the new military pact, formalized in Rio de Janeiro in 1947, served as a thin veil for the resurrection of the Monroe Doctrine and would once again open the door to U.S. military intervention. Furthermore, by providing a precedent for the creation of a regional organization bound by its own set of rules and procedures outside of UN oversight, the Rio Pact, as the treaty was called, paved the way for both sides in the emerging Cold War to formalize their respective spheres of influence. NATO, for example, was modeled directly on the Rio Pact, as was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

The irony is obvious: it took decades of “anti-Americanism” to force Washington to accept a framework of international relations that it then used in the second half of the century to attain unprecedented global power; in the exercise of that power, the U.S. came to rely on the kind of “American exceptionalism” advocated by Latin American jurists—which Washington had long rejected for fear of having to limit its actions—to consolidate spheres of influence in an increasingly open and interdependent world.⁶⁸

After World War II, Washington extended the ideas and institutions it had adopted in the Western Hemisphere elsewhere, to Europe and East Asia, allowing the U.S. to accumulate considerable “soft power,” to solidify its authority and establish its leadership in the emerging Cold War, and to become an “empire by invitation.”⁶⁹ Back in Latin America, however, it quickly moved toward rehabilitating militarism. Leaving behind the gunboats and Marine occupations that had marked the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, though, Washington now was able to use the close ties to the region’s security forces that it had established during the war to cloak its “hard power” behind allied dictators, military regimes, and, beginning in the mid-1960s, death squads.

Nearly as soon as World War II ended, the State Department had begun to signal that its support for democracy, which after the Allied defeat of fascism had taken fragile hold throughout the continent, was contingent on political stability. In 1945, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Adolf Berle had already moved against President Getúlio Vargas, facilitating his overthrow. In 1948, the U.S. tacitly backed the ousting of Venezuelan president Rómulo Gallegos, the novelist who created the character of Mister Danger; elected the previous year in the country’s first truly free elections, Gallegos had promised to implement a program of social democratic reforms. Support for dictators—such as Marcos Pérez Jiménez, who ruled Venezuela for ten years after overthrowing Gallegos, or Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza, who executed Sandino and seized power after the Marines withdrew—was no longer understood as the

⁶⁸ By 1936, the opinion of some Latin American nations had shifted away from the goal of creating uniquely “American” institutions; they had come to believe that international organizations would best temper U.S. power. Argentina, for example, resisted U.S. efforts to establish official channels for consultation and action in the face of an outside threat, considering that such mechanisms would create an “American League of Nations” working at odds with Geneva; Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States*, 286–287. Such a fear became a reality during the Cold War. In 1954, for example, the Eisenhower administration used the Organization of American States to isolate Guatemala by arguing that supposed Soviet influence on its government represented a threat to the Americas, thus legitimating the 1954 coup; recounted in Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*.

⁶⁹ Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (September 1986): 263–277.

unwanted consequence of the principle of nonintervention. As a backstop against subversion, such support was now understood to be the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Latin America: because of a “growing awareness of Soviet Russia’s aggressive policy,” wrote the State Department’s Division of the American Republics, the United States has now “swung back toward a policy of general cooperation [with dictators] that gives only secondary importance to the degree of democracy manifested by [Latin America’s] respective governments.”⁷⁰ By the early 1950s, however, Washington found it increasingly difficult merely to support strongmen from the sidelines. The frustration of postwar democracy combined with stepped-up political repression led not to stability but rather to a climate of crisis in one country after another. The U.S., wrote Thomas Mann, Eisenhower’s assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, in 1952, would need to take the lead in efforts to “arrest the development of irresponsibility and extreme nationalism.”⁷¹ The first “arrest,” as it were, carried out directly by the U.S. came two years later, with the CIA’s Guatemalan coup. It was an event that polarized continental politics even further, producing a generation of political activists who identified the United States not as a model but as an obstacle to reform. America, as Octavio Paz would point out two years later, could no longer find itself in the idylls of Whitman; it was now in the fever dreams of Poe and Melville.

IT WAS IN THIS CAULDRON of continental American politics, with the definition of democracy up for grabs, that the concept “anti-Americanism” began to take on the explanatory weight it carries to this day. In September 1954, the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences published a symposium, *America through Foreign Eyes*, presenting research mostly conducted under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council and the Rockefeller and Ford foundations.⁷² The struggle between liberal democracy and Soviet communism had long been understood to be one of ideas, yet the spread of post-World War II mass movements pursuing, separately or in concert, decolonization and economic justice made popular opinion an increasingly urgent foreign policy concern.⁷³ The volume gave considerable attention to the outlook of students and common folk in Mexico, a country deemed to be “mid-passage” on the road to modernization, and India, a nation still “apprehensive of final commitment in the East-West struggle.”⁷⁴ Applying methodology drawn from social psychology research into how individuals develop negative racial and ethnic stereotypes, the symposium’s introduction analyzed data culled from UNESCO’s pioneering 1948 word-list foreign survey to craft an interpretive framework that would become commonplace in subsequent attempts to assess foreign attitudes:

⁷⁰ David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999), 145.

⁷¹ Walter LaFeber, “Thomas C. Mann and the Devolution of Latin American Policy: From the Good Neighbor to Military Intervention,” in McCormick and LaFeber, *Behind the Throne*, 174.

⁷² Richard D. Lambert, ed., *America through Foreign Eyes*, special edition, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 295 (September 1954). See also Franz Joseph, ed., *As Others See Us: The United States through Foreign Eyes* (Princeton, N.J., 1959).

⁷³ McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 21–26.

⁷⁴ Richard Lambert, “Foreword,” in *America through Foreign Eyes*, vii–viii, viii.

"From Shylock to Stepin Fetchit . . . stereotyped national, racial, and class types have drawn such ready applause that we must conclude that stereotyping meets a psychological need, probably that of ego inflation." Stereotypes, the volume argued, comprise two components: the first is "preconception," which is formed in a child's psyche from scattered cultural referents; the second is "perception," or the meaning and purpose given to one's attempts to use those referents to organize "the incomprehensible, unpredictable behavior of foreigners—particularly those actions which he thinks may affect him personally—into a comprehensible whole." To bridge the gap between perception and reality, the introduction counseled that the U.S. should be more sensitive to foreign beliefs, and should not be quick to "leap to the conclusion that all images of Americans held abroad are foolish, fanciful, and unjustified." It also advocated for maintaining clear channels of communication and conducting diplomacy as "straightforwardly as possible so that our policies, even when they must be unpalatable abroad, could at least be consistent and predictable."⁷⁵

Just a few months prior to the symposium, though, the CIA's nearly year-long operation against Arbenz represented a different yet no less psychologically driven approach to dealing with foreign opinion. It was the agency's most ambitious action to date, far more comprehensive than anything it had done in the six weeks it took to topple Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran the year earlier. The CIA mobilized not just political, economic, and military power, but innovative techniques borrowed from Madison Avenue, Hollywood, and new behavioral social sciences to manipulate public opinion. Operatives mined pop sociologies such as Robert Maurer's *The Big Con* (1940) and Paul Linebarger's *Psychological Warfare* (1948), and worked closely with Edward Bernays, a pioneer in public propaganda (and Sigmund Freud's nephew!), to develop disinformation tactics.⁷⁶ They planted stories in the Guatemalan and U.S. press, transmitted radio shows into the country to make it seem that a widespread underground resistance movement was gaining strength, spread rumors, engineered death threats, and conducted sabotage—all designed to erode revolutionary solidarity and generate opposition. Yet for all the expressed concern at the time with providing an ideological alternative to communism, the CIA rejected the advice of its Guatemalan allies that it include in the campaign a positive educational component, instead insisting on pursuing a strategy to inspire fear more than virtue.

Propaganda designed to "attack the theoretical foundations of the enemy" was misplaced; the point, the head of operations wrote in March 1954, was "to (1) intensify anti-Communist, anti-government sentiment and create a disposition to act; and (2) create dissension, confusion, and FEAR in the enemy camp." Psychological efforts should be directed at the "heart, the stomach and the liver (fear)."⁷⁷ "We are not running a popularity contest but an uprising," rejoined one agent to Guatemalan

⁷⁵ William Buchanan, "How Others See Us," *ibid.*, 1–11, quotes from 6, 7, 11. For early efforts to use social psychology to explain "national character," see Milton D. Graham, "An Experiment in International Attitudes Research," *International Social Science Bulletin* 3, no. 3 (Fall 1951): 525–539; Ralph Linton, "The Concept of National Character," in A. H. Stanton and S. E. Perry, eds., *Personality and Political Crisis* (Glencoe, Ill., 1951), 133–150; William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other* (Urbana, Ill., 1953).

⁷⁶ For Bernays's role, see his *Biography of an Idea* (New York, 1965) and the BBC documentary *Century of the Self*, episode 2, "The Engineering of Consent," 2002.

⁷⁷ Cullather, *Secret History*, 66.

concerns that the campaign was too negative. U.S. planes flew low over the capital, dropping propaganda material, which for a region that had not seen aerial warfare since the Marine campaign against Sandino sent a message beyond what was printed on the flyers. "I suppose it doesn't really matter what the leaflets say," said Tracy Barnes, the CIA operative who led the operation.⁷⁸ The "most effective leaflet drops," concluded an agency postmortem of the coup, "were those followed by a successful military blow."⁷⁹ Such blows were delivered by CIA assets in-country, who bombed roads, bridges, military installations, and property owned by government supporters. The agency distributed sabotage manuals that provided illustrated, step-by-step instructions on how to make pipe bombs, time bombs, remote fuses, chemical, nitroglycerine, and dynamite bombs, even explosives hidden in pens, books, and rocks. The how-to guide exhorted Guatemalans to take up violence in the name of liberty, noting that "sabotage, like all things in life, is good or bad depending on whether its objective is good or bad."⁸⁰ Such terror worked. Arbenz fell not because psych ops had won the "hearts and minds" of the population but because the military refused to defend him, fearing Washington's wrath if it repelled the mercenaries.

In the ensuing decades, the tension that existed between the symposium's contemplative, even solicitous, interpretation of foreign opinion and the CIA's resolved, action-oriented crusade would give the accusation "anti-Americanism" its operative valence. While at first glance these two approaches would appear to represent opposite poles, they shared common motivating assumptions.

In the first instance, historical grievances and contemporary conflicts of interest are reduced to either the raw material that makes up an individual's psyche (or a nation's culture), misunderstandings, or misperceptions that could be remedied by better communication. As the Cold War shifted away from Europe toward the third world, social scientists, particularly those tied to the national security apparatus, furthered the translation of the concept "anti-American" into a psychological interpretive framework. Scholars associated with the new postwar behaviorist paradigm began to elaborate unified theories of human behavior, including behavior understood as hostile to the U.S., discounting the influence of ideas, ideology, values, and history, not to mention actual conflicting interests, as factors motivating dissent. In what amounted to a "shrinking agenda of complexity," as historian Ron Robin put it in his 2001 survey of Cold War social science, they explained oppositional sentiment and action in terms of repression or trauma. Belief systems were interpreted not as cognitive frameworks but as rationalizations of behavioral routines. The more foreign and "inscrutable" the object of analysis, the more "intimate" and knowable it appeared, as "distinct people and events were translated into measurable ideal types," with their behavior reduced to a common set of psychological tropes.⁸¹ In the 1950s, both foreign policy officials and the press picked up on and amplified

⁷⁸ Ibid., 83.

⁷⁹ "Memorandum from William Robertson of Operation PBSUCCESS to the Chief of the Project," available online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ike/guat/20181.htm>, "Foreign Relations, Guatemala 1952–1954," doc. 274 (accessed February 3, 2005).

⁸⁰ See the discussion of this manual in Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre*, 238.

⁸¹ Ron Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex* (Princeton, N.J., 2001), 7. Robin identifies the research associated with the publication of Samuel A. Stouffer's *The American Soldier* (2 vols., Princeton, N.J., 1949), as well as the work of Daniel Lerner, Bernard Berelson, James Charlesworth, David McClelland, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Harold Lass-

this inclination to understand dissent in terms of resentment. In 1952, for example, the *New York Times* described Mexican “anti-Americanism” in terms of “fear,” “envy,” and “pride.”⁸² An essayist in the academy’s 1954 symposium wrote that Mexican intellectuals “resent” and “are jealous” of U.S. technological superiority.⁸³

Economists and political scientists added to insights drawn from psychology by reporting that nations and social groups suffering the dislocation caused by modernization tend to criticize the United States as the agent of class and gender liberalization.⁸⁴ Nixon’s 1958 experience in Caracas, where he was greeted at the airport with a rain of spit, with his motorcade later surrounded by an angry crowd and stoned (Venezuela had just emerged from a ten-year, U.S.-backed Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, with Washington granting some of its worst torturers political asylum), hastened this propensity to pathologize politics: “this nationalism is anti-American for various reasons,” wrote one State Department official following the assault on Nixon, “most of them irrational and unjustified. The problem it poses is primarily a psychological one, not to be measured in financial terms nor answered in dollars.”⁸⁵ It also provoked soul-searching: George Allen, director of the United States Information Agency (USIA), urged the U.S. to “grow up psychologically” and to stop its “boast[ing] about our richness, our bigness, and our strength,” while Eisenhower urged U.S. commentators to be more attentive to the “injured feelings” of “other American Republics.”⁸⁶ In other words, against a global field of increasingly militant nationalist challenges, charges of “anti-Americanism” served both to deny historical and cultural diversity and to dismiss varied expressions of dissent as atavistic reactions to the contemporary world, thus affirming the U.S. as both the embodiment and the defender of a universal model of modernity: “Criticisms of or complaints about America,” wrote the *Saturday Review* in 1951, “are criticisms of the modern world.”⁸⁷

In the second instance, the CIA’s use of fear as the exclusive basis of its campaign to overthrow Arbenz signaled another current of Cold War social science, one that would not become fully operational until the 1960s: the influence of rational choice and systems theory in counterinsurgent doctrine and practice. Rand Corporation analysts in internal war and insurgencies grew disillusioned with the prospects of defeating insurgencies through “constructive counterinsurgency,” that is, by transforming the psychological or cultural patterns associated with traditional societies and by winning hearts and minds through reforms designed to elevate living standards, as had been the received wisdom in the early years of the Vietnam War.⁸⁸ By

well, as emblematic of “behavioralist” approaches that downplayed ideology, politics, and history as motivating factors of human action.

⁸² For example, Flora Lewis, “Why There Is Anti-Americanism in Mexico,” *New York Times Magazine*, July 6, 1952, 10, 30–31.

⁸³ Norman D. Humphrey, “The Mexican Image of Americans,” in Lambert, *America through Foreign Eyes*, 116–125, 119.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 34.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 33, 35.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁸⁸ In the early 1960s, counterinsurgent doctrine tended to emphasize either poverty and inequality or the cultural and social affinity established between an insurgency’s leaders and its base as the cause of rebellion. For the former approach, see Walt Whitman Rostow, “Countering Guerrilla Attack,” in

the mid-1960s, experts such as Charles Wolf and Nathan Leites counseled against worrying too much about either the cultural “sympathies or preferences” of the insurgents or the root economic causes of rebellion. To do so would, at best, lead to despair in the face of the enormity of the task or, at worst, add fuel to the crisis. Instead, their advice was to treat insurgencies like an economic system and to work on increasing the costs of supporting political movements through “coercive counterinsurgency.”⁸⁹ Such inflation could be brought about by inflicting “pain and shock, loss and grief, privation and horror,” as Harvard economist Thomas Schelling put it in his 1966 *Arms and Influence*.⁹⁰ Supporters of insurgencies, this new approach argued, were basically rational actors, no matter the stage of their society’s development or the codes that structured their culture, and the struggle between authority and rebellion was in effect a “contest in the effective management of coercion.”⁹¹

The containment of revolutionary nationalism in Latin America depended on a blending of similar soft and hard approaches. As the hemisphere’s unrivaled military power, principal source of capital, dominant supplier of manufactured goods, and primary importer of raw material, U.S. private interests and government institutions exercised considerable persuasion in setting the permissible limits of political and cultural debate. During the Cold War, Washington-funded efforts to disseminate U.S. influence worked through USIA programs, Point Four and Agency for International Development assistance, and the activities of private organizations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation. Yet following the 1959 Cuban Revolution, foreign policy officials elevated “anti-Americanism” to an analytical category to interpret and respond to foreign threats throughout Latin America and the third world.⁹² The Kennedy administration responded with a two-pronged approach.⁹³ On the one hand, it launched the Alliance for Progress, which aimed to promote economic modernization and closer cultural relations. On the other hand, it set out to invigorate Latin American militaries and centralized intelligence agencies. Unable to contain mass mobilizations through constitutional means, fortified security forces unleashed

Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., *Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961* (New York, 1962), 464–471; for the latter, see the discussion in Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy*, 189–191.

⁸⁹ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago, 1970), 42; Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy*, 189–199, analyzes the transition from “constructive” to “coercive” counterinsurgency.

⁹⁰ Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn., 1966), 2.

⁹¹ Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 155.

⁹² Following the Cuban Revolution, Kennedy’s “Cuban Study Group”—headed by Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy, and Allen Dulles—deemed that Castro’s “anti-Americanism” constituted a “real menace” to U.S. interests in the hemisphere, and they counseled taking “active measures” to remove the threat; “Recommendations of the Cuban Study Group,” June 13, 1961, Folder: Cuba—Bay of Pigs, Box 2, John F. Kennedy Library, available online at <http://cisweb.lexis-nexis.com/histuniv/> (accessed March 5, 2004). Likewise, a National Security Council memo identified the threat posed by Castro as residing in the appeal of “anti-Americanism” for other Latin American nations as they undergo the disruptions of modernization; National Security Council, “Draft of U.S. Policy toward Cuba,” May 4, 1961, available online at <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS> (accessed July 29, 2004). Between 1945 and 1957, 354 foreign policy documents addressed “anti-Americanism,” according to the Declassified Document Reference System electronic database; between 1959 and 1971, the number doubled to 877, with nearly half related to Cuba.

⁹³ For the social science origins of Kennedy’s foreign policy, both its hard and soft components, see Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000).

a hemisphere-wide, coordinated reign of terror.⁹⁴ In one country after another, dictatorships and paramilitaries allied with the United States, or, in the case of Nicaragua in the 1980s, counterinsurgents created and maintained by Washington, inflicted “pain and shock” to successful effect, as any number of truth commissions and books detailing the psychological effects of fear demonstrate.⁹⁵

Repressive rational choice theory either contradicted or found useless many of the assumptions of previous psychological interpretations of human behavior that went into “hearts-and-minds” counterinsurgent doctrine—namely the belief that support for oppositional movements identified as “anti-American” was rooted in cultural or psychological pathways of tradition (indeed, starting in the mid-1960s, counterinsurgent strategy increasingly understood traditional culture to be an important bulwark against revolution).⁹⁶ Yet both models operated on, and reinforced, a shared univocalism.

Behavioralist approaches developed in the 1950s for analyzing foreign popular opinion reduced the complexity of political commitment and action into easily classifiable and treatable symptoms. By borrowing from approaches first employed to evaluate racial and ethnic stereotypes, social scientists explicitly equated antagonistic sentiments and actions toward the United States with racism, with the implication being that both would dissipate as the world moved toward a more tolerant liberal pluralism. This notion that the U.S. represented the “true end product of the liberal grand design” was reinforced by the proliferation of foreign opinion polling by UNESCO and USIA. One survey after another confirmed that U.S. values and lifestyles held great appeal for much of the world’s population, with commentators making much of the discrepancy between popular and working-class goodwill and elite hostility.⁹⁷ The gap between polling data and increasing displays of hostility created a dissonance that observers repeatedly reconciled with recourse to the most overworked concept used to explain opposition to the United States: “ambivalence.” “Latin American attitudes toward the US” were “ambivalent,” reported the 1958 National Intelligence Estimate: they expressed “envy by disparaging US materialism” yet wanted our consumer goods and capital; they espoused pan-Americanism but engaged in petty nationalism; they chafed at our military power but wanted our protection.⁹⁸ Such affirmations of national self-esteem folded nicely with subsequent rational choice doctrine: an overwhelming preponderance of power, often in the form of terror, would separate the common man and woman from their resentful

⁹⁴ John Dinges, *The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents* (New York, 2003), and J. Patrice McSherry, *Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America* (Lanham, Md., 2005).

⁹⁵ Juan E. Corradi, Patricia Weiss Fagen, and Manuel Antonio Garretón, eds., *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America* (Berkeley, Calif., 1992); Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, *Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación*, 3 vols. (Santiago, 1991); Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desaparición de Personas, *Nunca más: Informe de la Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desaparición de Personas* (Buenos Aires, 1984); and Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, *Guatemala: Memoria del silencio*, 12 vols. (Guatemala City, 1999).

⁹⁶ For culture as bulwark, see Samuel Huntington, “The Bases of Accommodation,” *Foreign Affairs* 46 (July 1968): 642–656, 646.

⁹⁷ McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 23. See also Alan Girard and Raul Samuel, *Situación y perspectivas de Chile en septiembre de 1957* (Santiago, 1958), which confirmed that the U.S. enjoyed more support among the working class than did the USSR.

⁹⁸ McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 33. See also comments John F. Kennedy made in Puerto Rico following Nixon’s ill-fated Latin American tour, *ibid.*, 72.

leadership, erode irrational revolutionary nationalism, and force an acceptance of the modern world as defined and policed by the U.S.

"COME . . . I WILL MAKE DIVINE MAGNETIC LANDS," Whitman summoned, and many Latin Americans answered with an ideal of America no less purposeful than that advanced by Washington. Over the course of two centuries, it has not been clashing universalisms that served as the primary fault line between the two Americas, but how the expansion of the United States' political and economic power fractured a shared sense of exceptionalism. It was the immanence of the critique of U.S. power—the fact that it appealed to shared values—that allowed the brief period of hemispheric cooperation during the mid-twentieth century to be so consequential. Latin American jurists argued that with the loss of Europe and Asia to totalitarianism, the Americas represented a bastion from which "democracy could be renovated and acquire an expansive force," but only if democracy itself was socialized and the interdependency of individual states recognized.⁹⁹ Increasingly, though, after the war, such a vision once again created a "dilemma," as Alan McPherson put it in his survey of Latin American anti-Americanism, one that pitted the "universalism of democracy against the exceptionalism of superpowerdom."¹⁰⁰ What Louis Pérez argues for Cuba is true for much of Latin America during the Cold War: pushed to their "logical conclusion," the democratic values both embodied and opposed by the United States created a crisis situation in nearly every country across the continent.¹⁰¹

Some now contend that today's antagonism toward the United States represents not an immanent criticism but a clash between opposing values, a "conflict of visions," as George W. Bush has described it.¹⁰² That argument is debatable. But what is clear is that many of the same assumptions that defined the concept of Cold War "anti-Americanism" continue to frame the way enmity to the U.S. is interpreted. Rather than a response to any specific policy, "anti-Americanism," believes sociologist Paul Hollander, represents a psychological "need to find some clear-cut and morally satisfying explanation for a wide range of unwelcome circumstances associated with either actual states or feelings of backwardness, inferiority, weakness, diminished competitiveness or a loss of coherence and stability in the life of a nation, a group or individual."¹⁰³ Yet in Latin America, what made "anti-Americanism" so effective an organizing concept was the real concessions that Washington was at times forced to make to political and economic nationalists. Now, though, the charge seems to be drained of content, representing little but the more coercive face of U.S. power. Counterinsurgent theorists have recycled repressive rational choice doctrine

⁹⁹ Alvarez, *Después de la guerra*, 74.

¹⁰⁰ McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 24.

¹⁰¹ Louis Pérez, *On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999), 487.

¹⁰² "President Bush Discusses Importance of Democracy in Middle East," Remarks by the President on Winston Churchill and the War on Terror, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., February 4, 2004, available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040204-4.html> (accessed August 15, 2004).

¹⁰³ Hollander made his remarks after attending a State Department conference on the topic of "Anti-Americanism"; Ron Brunton, "Last Refuge of the Anti-American," *Brisbane Courier Mail*, September 7, 2002. See also Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990* (New York, 1992).

to fight the war on terrorism, with their assumptions backed up by scholars who argue that Arabs are culturally predisposed to respond to a strong hand.¹⁰⁴ Princeton's Bernard Lewis—mentor to many of the Bush administration's Middle East counselors—briefed the White House foreign policy staff immediately after 9/11, brushing aside concerns that too harsh a retaliation would provoke the Arab street: "In that part of the world," he said, "nothing matters more than resolute will and force."¹⁰⁵ *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman, bringing together the hard and soft components of U.S. power, advises that we "need to go into the heart of [the Arab] world and beat their brains out, frankly," and then "partner with them" to "build a decent and different Iraq."¹⁰⁶ Considering Washington's strife-ridden record in Latin America, though, where it had the benefit of sharing with its critics a belief, however contested, in Americanism, the prospect of success for such a partnership seems dim.

¹⁰⁴ Nicholas Lemann, "What Terrorists Want," *The New Yorker*, October 29, 2001, 36–41.

¹⁰⁵ Nicholas Lemann, "The Next World Order," *The New Yorker*, April 1, 2002, 42–48.

¹⁰⁶ *Tim Russert Show*, CNBC, September 13, 2003.

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Always Blame the Americans:
Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century

JESSICA C. E. GIENOW-HECHT

LET THERE BE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT: if one can believe the press and the public on both sides of the Atlantic, the United States has a serious public relations problem. The proportion of the public expressing pro-U.S. sympathies declined in France from 62 percent in 1999/2000 to 43 percent in June 2003, in Germany from 78 to 45 percent, and in Spain from 50 to 38 percent, with no improvement in sight.¹ The Internet is flooded with published and unpublished essays pertaining in a more or less serious fashion to anti-Americanism in Europe,² while supposedly "best-selling" books with sexy titles such as *Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World* and *Why Do People Hate America?* jam the shelves of bookstore chains like Waterstone's, Hugendubel, FNAC, and Barnes and Noble.³ Authors juggle the names of contemporary leaders such as German ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder, French president Jacques Chirac, and Javier Solana of Spain, the current High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Community, all of whom made a career sailing on the waves of anti-Americanism. Scholarly conferences and editions on the subject abound, while esteemed scholars such as Robert Kagan and Timothy Garton Ash present powerful arguments about the history and future of European-American antipathies.⁴

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¹ Russell Berman, *Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem* (Stanford, Calif., 2004).

² Eric Krebbers, "The Conservative Roots of Anti-Americanism," *De Fabel van de Illegaal* 58 (May/June 2003), <http://www.gebladerte.nl/30048v01.htm> (accessed August 5, 2004); James Ceaser, "A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism," *The Public Interest*, Summer 2003, http://www.travelbrochuregraphics.com/extra/a_genealogy_of_antiamericanism.htm (accessed August 5, 2004); Jean-François Revel, "Introduction," in Revel, *Anti-Americanism*, trans. Diarmid Cammell (San Francisco, 2003); Hugh Brogan, "Foreign Views of America," in "The Reader's Companion to American History," http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/rcah/html/ah_032300_foreignviews.htm (accessed August 5, 2004); Richard Bernstein, "Does Europe Need to Get a Life?" *New York Times*, August 8, 2004.

³ Mark Hertsgaard, *The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World* (New York, 2002); Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, *Why Do People Hate America?* (Cambridge, 2004); Richard Herzinger and Hannes Stein, *Endzeit-Propheten oder Die Offensiver der Antiwestler* (Hamburg, 1995).

⁴ Alexander Stephan, ed., *Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945* (New York, 2005); Stephan, *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Di-*

The bottom line is typically the same: in the twentieth century, a nation rose—Rome-like—to the heights of a superpower that now attracts more hatred than any other country in the world. When commentators ask “Who Is Afraid of America?”, depict “the tragedy of American democracy” and the fate of “the parochial superpower,” or diagnose “American Hamburgers and other viruses,” their conclusions fall into two categories. Advising that people should transcend their hatred and acknowledge their blindness, conservative critics scold Europeans for their ignorance of America and the problems of U.S. foreign policy.⁵ Flabbergasted at how little the United States knows about Europe and the world at large, including its allies and its enemies, anti-American critics draw the image of an apocalypse, or at least a sort of decline—again reminiscent of Rome—in which the nation will outspend, outline, and outkill itself before fading into oblivion. “Always blame the Americans,” concludes a character in Costa-Gavra’s political 1969 film *Z*. “Even when you’re wrong, you’re right.”⁶

Since 9/11, there has been a notable abundance of discussions about anti-Americanism in academia and beyond. Some effort has been made to look at the contemporary manifestations of anti-Americanism within a historical context. Fifteen years after the Cold War and five years after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it seems appropriate to reexamine some of the historiographical and historical conclusions and ask how, in effect, they might explain the current situation. There is a tendency among scholars of twentieth-century history to subdivide this period into three blocs: pre-1945, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era. However, the course of anti-Americanism did and does not necessarily follow this timeline.

Over the decades, there have been a number of books on the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, some of which have become or deserve to become standard reading in upper-division classes, including the works of British historian Richard Crockatt and French critic Philippe Roger.⁷ There are two main currents in the debate: one focuses on discourse (at home or abroad), the other on power (notably U.S. power). In order to conduct a succinct and up-to-date analysis, we need to look at both in tandem, examining discourses of anti-Americanism in the twentieth century from a European—and historical—perspective while at the same time integrating aspects of U.S. hegemony.

Anti-Americanism is a curious phenomenon, and one that seems to be unique

plomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945 (New York, 2006); Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West* (New York, 2004); Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York, 2003). For a European reply, see Rudolf von Thadden and Alexandre Escudier, *Amerika und Europa—Mars und Venus: Das Bild Amerikas in Europa* (Göttingen, 2004).

⁵ Thus, Jean-François Revel, a firm advocate of American policies in Europe, believes that European hostility toward the United States makes it impossible for the U.S. administration in power to distinguish between enemies and friends, and has therefore pushed the U.S. into an unalterable course of unilateralism. Revel, *Anti-Americanism*, 171, 176; Dan Diner, *Feindbild Amerika: Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments* (Berlin, 2002), 206.

⁶ Cited in J. L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americans* (Toronto, 1996), 7.

⁷ Richard Crockatt, *America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism and the Global Order* (London, 2003); Philippe Roger, *L'ennemi américain: Généalogie de l'antiamericanisme française* (Paris, 2002).

to the United States. There does not seem to be such a thing as anti-Europeanism, at least not to the same extent. Of course, this does not mean that nations have never been systematically hated before. Indeed, most empires have been systematically despised. Even among them, Europeans, Asians, and Middle Easterners have often reached a degree of mutual antagonism that comes close to verbal warfare. But there is no other convenient catch phrase that covers such a broad variety of complaints as “anti-Americanism,” not even “Anglophobia” or “Japan-bashing.” “Anti-Slavism” and “Sinophobia,” although they are powerful concepts, never achieved the popularity of the term “anti-Americanism.”

For this reason, most critics worry about “Why America?”⁸ But the question, it seems to me, is not why there is anti-Americanism, but why anti-Americanism has been around for so long a time and across the political spectrum. Why are these “pictures in our mind” so enduring? And to what extent do these images affect current assessments of an anti-Americanism spreading across Europe in the twenty-first century?

European anti-Americanism has very little to do with America or politics, and even less with transatlantic relations. In many ways, it is not even a useful term, because unlike other “isms” it is not supported by a movement, it lacks the vision of a future, and it defines itself by opposition rather than through a proper point of view. In a sense, there is no one European anti-Americanism, but rather a variety of heterogeneous expressions of this phenomenon, conditioned by geographical concerns and historical cycles. The shape and content of the phenomenon differ in accordance not only with dimensions of space, but also with dimensions of time: each epoch has its own forms of anti-Americanism, and it is misleading to assume, as Dan Diner does for Germany, that one and the same anti-Americanism has simply assumed different forms at different times.

Anti-Americanism in Europe is a habitus, a syndrome, an ideological *Versatzstück* the profile of which is dependent on the local political and cultural context as well as regional economic interests. There is, of course, a cultural, a political, and an economic anti-Americanism, but these accentuations typically merge within the same reference group or even one and the same person. In other words, there is no “European” anti-Americanism proper, but only many different varieties of the phenomenon. At best, anti-Americanism manifests a century-long frustration over the loss of a vision that once proved so powerful before it literally turned sour, in the form of the American Century. Popular belief often has it that since the nineteenth century, anti-Americanism has been a left-wing phenomenon: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels projected many of their criticisms on the United States, as did twentieth-century socialists and liberals who devised their own rather fractured image of the country. But historically, anti-Americanism has been at least as strong on the right, where the U.S. is demonized for inflicting mass man and mass culture on the world. The meaning of the discourse, then, derives less from the object (the United States) than from the subject (the critics).

European anti-Americanism is a cultural phenomenon; however, it occasionally hides behind a political mask, such as during the height of the Cold War or since

⁸ Crockatt, *America Embattled*, 46.

9/11. Since the 1950s, the relationship between cultural images and U.S. foreign policy has become increasingly complicated; but even then, anti-Americanism always followed the same structural course: politics served as a trigger but never as a cause. Indeed, for many years politics played no role in Europe's perception of the United States. That is to say, anti-Americanism was and remains at core a cultural mindset, one that usurps and manipulates the political context without being dependent on it. For this reason, governments and official receptions have not had a major part to play in the development and persistence of anti-Americanism. Instead, over the decades, conservatives, progressives, and the left have consistently agreed on their common rejection of the American model.

Most important, anti-Americanism is unthinkable without its flip side, philo-Americanism, and the tension between the two constitutes the very condition necessary to support the existence of both: high expectations and bitter disillusion are always joined at the hip. Or, to put it in terms of Hegelian dialecticism, the European debate on the U.S. has always employed a system of reasoning that seeks to arrive at a conclusion ("the truth") through the exchange of logical and conflicting arguments, by mounting two opposite warring forces. Anti-Americanism and philo-Americanism not only coexist in juxtaposition; they are structurally linked with one another, related to each other in the sense that anti-American statements frequently respond to philo-American perspectives.

Philo-Americanism is at least as old as anti-Americanism. It originally combined condescension with a vision of the U.S. as the laboratory of Europe's future. European liberals fell in love with America as a utopian vision before the rise of industrial capitalism and modernity. Then they began to think that the United States had walked out on them.⁹ That was the hour an anti-American discourse framed by philo-American tendencies was born.

IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, media experts, popular entertainers, political observers, and scholars have produced a plethora of definitions and theories to characterize anti-Americanism, revealing a stunning extent of emotional involvement.¹⁰ "You want to know what anti-Americanism is for most people?" asked online political analyst David Kaspar in 2003. "It's a German schoolteacher who vacations in America, who watches American movies, who was defended from the Soviets by America and then later met an Eastern German cousin she never knew because Reagan won the Cold War, who sneers at America in front of the kids she teaches every day."¹¹ Charles

⁹ Guy Sorman, "United States: Model or Bête Noire?" in Denis Lacorne and Jacques Rupnik, eds., *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception*, trans. Gerald Turner (Houndmills, 1990), 213–218, quotes 215–216.

¹⁰ Marie-France Toinet notes that before 1984, the term did not even appear in French or American dictionaries; however, they did include "Americanism," a term popularized by Theodore Roosevelt's Americanization campaign in the early 1900s as well as by a generation of America critics thereafter. Toinet, "Does Anti-Americanism Exist?" in Lacorne and Rupnik, *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism*, 219–235, definition 219.

¹¹ The image of the German teacher is far from the only one cited by Kaspar. Indeed, it is coupled with images of a Saudi oil entrepreneur and a Liberian businessman. But the vision of a German schoolteacher indoctrinating thousands of innocent schoolchildren with heavy doses of anti-American statements remains striking—and not only because it refers to stereotypes of both the past (Germany as the

H. Price, U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom between 1983 and 1989, concluded: "For my part I approach [anti-Americanism] as one of our Supreme Court justices approached pornography; I can't define it but I sure can recognize it when I see it."¹² And to John Gibson, host of the Fox News Channel's *The Big Story*, anti-Americanism—or "Hating America"—has simply become "the new world sport," and one that serves to delight many nations in many ways: since September 11, the French—grateful for the opportunity and mindful of their own interests in the Middle East—have started a "War on America" and almost co-opted the "Arabs' mindless hatred for America." The British continue to pursue an "annoying tendency to hate themselves for not hating America quite viciously enough"; the Germans are simply delighted that "at last someone else is Hitler"; and Belgium, South Korea, and Canada have conspired to form "the axis of envy." All agree that they despise George W. Bush, and Gibson's only (and conclusive) piece of advice to the world is, "They're Wrong. We're Right. Get Used to It."¹³

Supposedly scholarly assessments offer a similar brand of emotion and ahistorical thinking. Russell Berman, Hoover fellow at Stanford University, sees contemporary anti-Americanism both as related to the U.S. retreat from Europe (protection no longer needed) and as a functional attitude that is helping to strengthen a new European identity: particularly for the Germans, "becoming more European is a way to become less German."¹⁴ In the words of French philosopher Jean-François Revel, anti-Americanism represents an almost totalitarian vision, according to which "Americans can do nothing but speak idiocies, make blunders and commit crimes; and they are answerable for all the setbacks, all the injustices and all the sufferings of the rest of humanity."¹⁵

One of the most prolific writers on anti-Americanism, conservative scholar Paul Hollander, points out that anti-Americanism has sprung up both at home and abroad, and in either case originates in an almost unlimited set of complaints, encompassing nationalism, anti-Western sentiments, a disdain for capitalism, "the rejection of science, technology, and urban life, fear of nuclear war, general disgust with modernity, the defense of traditional ways of life, and the cultural condescension of established elites."¹⁶ And to British political scientist Stephen Haseler, anti-Americanism is a "straightforward opposition, ranging from distaste to animus, to the cultural and political values of the United States," one that is often emotional

land of knowledge and education) and the present (today's teachers' lack of political sensibility and abuse of influence). David Kaspar, "A Wonderful Definition of Anti-Americanism / Eine wundervolle Definition von Anti-Amerikanismus," *Davids Medienkritik: Politisch unkorrekte Betrachtungen zur Berichterstattung in deutschen Medien*, http://medienkritik.typepad.com/blog/2003/11/a_wonderful_def.html (accessed July 23, 2006).

¹² Cited in David Ellwood, *Anti-Americanism in Western Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, Occasional Paper Series, European Studies Seminar Series, no. 3 (Bologna, 1999), 47. The remark was made in 1987.

¹³ John Gibson, *Hating America: The New World Sport* (New York, 2004).

¹⁴ Berman, *Anti-Americanism in Europe*, xii, xv, 4, 10, 39–52.

¹⁵ Revel, *Anti-Americanism*, 143.

¹⁶ Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1995), 384, lxviii.

in its origins and centers on the envy of U.S. political power, economic success, and idealism.¹⁷

In Europe, a number of scholars have explored further the idea that anti-Americanism often lacks a clear focus. To Herbert J. Spiro, professor of politics at the John F. Kennedy-Institut at the Freie Universität Berlin, anti-Americanism “consists not of opposition to particular policies but of ‘persistent patterns of gross criticism of the main values of the U.S. Constitution.’”¹⁸ In the Netherlands, Rob Kroes believes that “‘America’ [is] a construct of the mind, a composite image based on the perception of dismal trends which are then linked to America.”¹⁹ To cultural historian Pascal Ory, anti-Americanism entails “an aristocratic *lost paradise* of the ‘lord of the manor,’” on the one hand, and “the plebian ‘singing tomorrows’ of the liberal or democratic variety,”²⁰ on the other.

Much of this polemical and sometimes even melodramatic blame on the part of anti-Americanists abroad originates—consciously or not—in the false assumption that things were not always that way. It is true that Europeans developed a tremendous amount of admiration for the American way of life during the decades following the American Revolution. Because the French Revolution had failed, by the early nineteenth century the United States constituted the sole example of a country guided by Enlightenment principles. Hence it became the only target for those attracted to and repulsed by the ideals of a modern democratic society. The failed revolutions of 1848 further sealed the fate of liberal thought, which began to turn increasingly into a European enigma with no real focus other than the New World.²¹ Liberals, in turn, quickly came to the defense of the world’s first modern democratic—and supposedly fruitful—experiment.²²

Portrayals of U.S. society remained favorable throughout the nineteenth century and up until World War I, whether out of idealism or personal interest. Besides political charges, a literary canon bolstered by writers such as Friedrich Gerstäcker, Karl May, and numerous others drew the image of a romantic West where human values were still intact, though constantly under attack by European corruption and greed. While European elites remained distrustful of the American experiment and

¹⁷ Stephen Haseler, *The Varieties of Anti-Americanism: Reflex and Response* (Washington, D.C., 1985), 6. See also Uwe Srp, *Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Theoretische und empirische Analyse basierend auf dem Irakkrieg 2003* (Hamburg, 2005).

¹⁸ Herbert J. Spiro, “Anti-Americanism in Western Europe,” in Thomas Perry Thornton, ed., *Anti-Americanism: Origins and Context*, special issue, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (May 1988): 120–132, quote 120. See also André Kaspi, “By Way of Conclusion,” in Lacorne and Rupnik, *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism*, 236–243.

¹⁹ Rob Kroes, “The Great Satan versus the Evil Empire: Anti-Americanism in the Netherlands,” in Kroes and Maarten van Rossem, eds., *Anti-Americanism in Europe* (Amsterdam, 1986), 1, 12, 37. See also August J. Fry, “Undergoing Anti-Americanism: A Personal Statement,” *ibid.*, 137–147.

²⁰ Pascal Ory, “From Baudelaire to Duhamel: An Unlikely Antipathy,” in Lacorne and Rupnik, *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism*, 42–54, quotes 42, 52. See also Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald B. Smith, “Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a Phenomenon,” in Rubinstein and Smith, eds., *Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 1985), 1–30; Sigrid Faath, ed., *Antiamerikanismus in Nordafrika, Nah- und Mittelost: Formen, Dimensionen und Folgen für Deutschland* (Hamburg, 2003).

²¹ James Ceaser, “The Philosophical Origins of Anti-Americanism in Europe,” in Paul Hollander, ed., *Understanding Anti-Americanism* (Chicago, 2004), 45–64; Michael Freund, “A Historical Sketch of German Attitudes,” *ibid.*, 105–123.

²² J. W. Schulte Nordholt, “Anti-Americanism in European Culture: Its Early Manifestations,” in Kroes and Rossem, *Anti-Americanism in Europe*, 7–19.

while art critic John Ruskin refused an invitation to visit the U.S. because he could not, as he stated, reside in a country with no castles, not even for a couple of months, others saw precisely those medieval relics as a burden on the European mind. “America, thy happy lot,” rhymed Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in 1827, “Abode old Europe’s I exalt: / Thou hast no castle ruin hoar / No giant columns of basalt. / Thy soul is not troubled. / In living light of day / By useless traditions, / Vain strife and array.”²³

Yet in tandem with philo-Americanism, anti-Americanism began shortly after the American Revolution, expanded in the nineteenth century as a criticism of culture and modernity, and remained that way throughout the early twentieth century, until shortly after World War I. Dutch traders watched the outcome of the revolution anxiously because they feared that the interests of the new nation might thwart their own mercenary designs. As a result, one of the earliest stereotypes was that money determines everything in the United States. In the Romantic era, skeptical observers extended such charges to embrace complaints about the United States’ “abstract liberty” and “abstract principles.”

This contrast between Europe’s decay and wisdom and America’s lack of history and vigor would be, and has continued to be, endlessly repeated in the media on both sides of the ocean. As Volker Depkat has shown, the myth of the dishwasher who grew up to be a millionaire in America, the obsession to exclude everything “American” from contemporary values and terminology, and the inability to see the United States on its own terms rather than as a shrill deviation from the European norm can all be traced back to the eighteenth century. Two hundred years ago, these accusations developed in the context of Europe’s social and political change from a feudal to a bourgeois society.²⁴

One of the most noteworthy examples of this mutual—and increasingly idiosyncratic—dependence between philo- and anti-Americanism was British author W. T. Stead’s *The Americanization of the World; or, The Trend of the Twentieth Century*. Initially published in 1901, the book went into numerous editions and has been reviewed countless times since its first appearance. To Stead, America’s rising impact on the rest of the world in the realm of politics, finance, industrial production, consumer culture, and even the arts was a given. The question was merely how individual people and nations would deal with this fact. Stead meant his account to be benevolent. It was intended to set the record straight: from the Ottoman Empire to Asia, most people who abhorred the U.S. did so even though they personally had “things American” in their lives. The Royal Munich Academy had given awards to prestigious American artists, American singers were staffing opera ensembles all over Europe, and U.S. scientific progress was soon to outdo European achieve-

²³ “Amerika, du hast es besser / Als unser Kontinent, der alte, / Hast keine verfallenen Schlösser / Und keine Basalte. / Dich stört nicht im Innern / Zu lebendiger Zeit / Unnützes Erinnern / Und vergeblicher Streit.” Cited in *ibid.*, 12, 18.

²⁴ Volker Depkat, *Amerikabilder in politischen Diskursen: Deutsche Zeitschriften von 1789 bis 1830* (Stuttgart, 1998); Schulte Nordholt, “Anti-Americanism in European Culture,” 16. Mid-century novels such as F. R. Eylert’s *Rückblicke auf Amerika* (Reflections on America, 1841), Elisabeth Wetherell’s *The Wide, Wide World* (1851), Talvj’s *Die Auswanderer* (The Exiles, 1852), or Ferdinand Kürnberger’s *Der Amerikamüde* (Disenchanted with America, 1855), along with a host of lesser-known oeuvres condemning migration, country society, and life in the big city, typically portrayed violence, swindling, theft, and fraud, and some were explicitly composed to stop emigration. G. T. Hollyday, *Anti-Americanism in the German Novel, 1841–1862* (Berne, 1977).

ment.²⁵ Yet curiously, *The Americanization of the World* became a standard dictionary for anti-American complaints because it could not make a case for the United States without elaborating on—and thereby giving voice to—all the fears that have since become so commonplace around the world: fears that America's culture, standards, and way of life would overrun everyone else's; that U.S. consumer products would extinguish other countries' economies; and that a monster USA would simply devour European identities.²⁶

Before World War I, anti-Americanism was typically a concern of conservative elites who focused their criticism on the threat of modernity incarnated by things American. Yet in the twentieth century, entire generations of intellectuals and cultivated minds, from Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger to Herbert Marcuse and Emmanuel Todd, portrayed the United States as the site of a gigantic human catastrophe.²⁷ In other words, anti-Americanism originated in the nineteenth century, but it became a common habit of the mind only after World War I.

Take, for example, the case of Russia. Russian nativist critique of the United States had been widespread before World War I.²⁸ The Slavophile idea of a "Holy Russia" contrasted markedly with the vision of a dying West subdued by secularism and class struggle. It opposed industrial modernity and acquisitive individualism. Instead, Slavophiles underlined religious, communal, and irrational values. In their view of a romantic and organic nation, the United States was really no nation at all. Indeed, to the writer Fedor Dostoevsky, America constituted a geographical outlaw, a place where his fictional protagonists fled never to return. Russian Slavophiles thus confirmed what historians have called the historical friendship between Russia and the United States, based on political calculations (notably a common opposition to England) while each nation loathed the political principles of the other. In doing so,

²⁵ W. T. Stead, *The Americanization of the World; or, The Trend of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1901). To Stead, American influence should be embraced because Europe could benefit from it and because it is unavoidable. At the same time, Stead cautions Europeans, and notably the British, to convert to the "rush and bustle of modern life" (442). Stead lists all the "Americanizing forces" that Europeans criticized when viewing the United States: the ramifications of the Monroe Doctrine, a flood of supposedly superficial literature, the state of the arts, the emancipation of American women, mass production, overly competitive sports, the invasion of American consumer products, and the unrestrained capitalism of railways, shipping, and trusts. On American artists in Germany, see also Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, "Trumpeting Down the Walls of Jericho: The Politics of Art, Music and Emotion in German-American Relations, 1870–1920," *Journal of Social History* 36, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 585–613.

²⁶ Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, "Shame on US? Cultural Transfer, Academics, and the Cold War—A Critical Review," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Summer 2000): 466–479; D. H. Lawrence, *Studies in Classic American Literature* (1923; repr., New York, 1950), 9–21; Adolf Halfeld, *Amerika und der Amerikanismus: Kritische Betrachtungen eines Deutschen und Europäers* (Jena, 1927); Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York, 1994), 26, 113–114; Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), 19ff., 167–183, 264ff.; Alexander Schmidt, *Reisen in die Moderne: Der Amerika-Diskurs des deutschen Bürgertums vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg im europäischen Vergleich* (Berlin, 1997), 163–169.

²⁷ In 1927, Richard Müller Freienfels, one of the leading psychologists of his time, published *Geheimnisse der Seele* (Mysteries of the Soul; Munich, 1927), in which he developed an overview of human psychological development. Freienfels believed that Americanism constituted an abstract concept that determined the face and soul of the twentieth century all across the globe. Resulting from the modernization, mechanization, and mathematization of life, the rule of mass and quantity over quality and uniqueness, it encompassed an increasing shallowness of the soul, a "psychological wilderness."

²⁸ Abbott Gleason, "Republic of Humbug: The Russian Nativist Critique of the United States, 1830–1930," *American Quarterly* 44, no. 1 (March 1992): 1–23.

the Slavophiles developed an argument that Soviet communists would later recite ad nauseam to discredit the United States, and which resurfaces later in the writings of Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others.²⁹

After World War I, the debate about America—and with it manifestations of philo- and anti-Americanism—spread like wildfire through books, cartoons, fashion, music, advertising, and movies.³⁰ Henry Ford and his vision for transforming the U.S. from an agricultural to an industrial, mass-production, mass-consumption economy had a huge impact on the immediate post-World War I era in Europe. It inspired Aldous Huxley's insidious satirical novel *Brave New World* and José Ortega y Gasset's influential work on social theory *La rebellion de las masas*, as well as Robert Arnaud and André Dandieu's *Le cancer américain* less than a decade later.³¹

Another important trigger for anti-Americanism in the 1930s was the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuing Depression. Until the late 1920s, anti-Americanism fed off fears of the U.S. as a monster that threatened Europe's future. Instead of diminishing this fear, the crash aggravated the dread of cultural critics such as Huxley, Ortega y Gasset, Arnaud, and Dandieu. To many other European observers, the crash exposed the corruption and failure of American capitalism. The ensuing New Deal seemed to constitute a new approach to the European way, including a state-centered domestic policy and social welfare. The United States became so important in the popular European perception because images of America served to cement national positions in the discourse on modernity.³² America thus mutated into a "cipher" for modernity, as Detlev Peukert has argued, while the discourse on America became a debate on the challenges of modernity to European culture.³³

Germany was arguably the most American of the European countries long before the Cold War. Germany saw several waves of philo-Americanism, including during the Weimar Republic, when the country moved closer to the United States in terms of its culture and industrialization.³⁴ Many political and intellectual observers supported an affinity with the U.S. And like many other Europeans, Germans developed

²⁹ Ibid., 3–9, 12.

³⁰ Looking at German images from the nineteenth century to the present, Mary Nolan has shown how German analyses of North America shifted focus during the 1920s, from illusory images of the West to the United States as the incarnation of modernity. Nolan, "American in the German Imagination," in Heidi Fehrenbach and Uta Poiger, eds., *Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations: American Culture in Western Europe and Japan* (Providence, R.I., 2000), 3–25.

³¹ Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (London, 1932); José Ortega y Gasset, *La rebellion de las masas* (The Revolt of the Masses; Madrid, 1930); Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, *Le cancer américain* (The American Cancer; Paris, 1931).

³² Philipp Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung, 1933–1945* (Stuttgart, 1997), 12–13.

³³ Detlev Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), 178–179; Alf Luedtke, Inge Marssolek, and Adelheid von Saldern, *Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 1996). Twentieth-century European literature reveals many of these ciphers: you're on your own; the land of unlimited opportunities; money makes the world go around; acquisitive greed; faceless society; robber barons and self-made men; violence and crime; short-term orientation and quick profit; poverty in the United States; corruption, lobbying, industry, and war; the military-industrial complex; and so on. European novels typically presented such assessments in a highly critical manner, designed to evoke images of a societal monster that brought the country to the brink of ruin. Iris Sommer and Karsten Hellmann, *The American Economic System as Depicted in the Critical Literature of the 20th Century* (Frankfurt am Main, 1994).

³⁴ Adelheid von Saldern, *The Challenge of Modernity: German Social and Cultural Studies, 1890–1960* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2002), 93–298.

a profound admiration for American sports, as was visible at the Olympics of 1936 in Berlin, when the African American athlete Jesse Owens became “the hero of the Games and the darling of the Berlin crowds.”³⁵

At the same time, the Weimar years bred a heavy dose of anti-Americanism, triggered, but not caused, by reparations, Woodrow Wilson’s “14 Points,” and the fact that American passivity had confirmed the Versailles Treaty and the Dawes Plan. Intellectuals, critics, popular writers, and playwrights from Egon Erwin Kisch to Bertolt Brecht used America to portray either the evils of capitalism or the vision of a superficial, childish, and soulless society, even if, as in Alfred Kerr’s 1925 novel *Yankeeland*, anti-Americanism was not an issue.³⁶ With Adolf Halfeld, Germany produced its foremost (but far from its only) prolific critic of the United States. Having spent several years in the U.S., where he had devoured the new critical literature of the 1920s such as H. L. Mencken and Sinclair Lewis, Halfeld disdained the way that America’s “planned culture” and “dying landscape” were determined by American business, the almighty obsession with success that drove both urban and rural inhabitants, and the “fetters of the spirit,” notably what he called the “cultural feminism” that reigned among both American thinkers and the general public.³⁷

Popular culture echoed the tension between admiration and rejection. The antagonism to Hollywood movies may have featured most strongly as a component in anti-Americanism after the 1920s, and German movies often picked up on the American debate. Films with regional backgrounds such as *The Prodigal Son* (1934), starring Luis Trenker, portrayed America as ridden by economic depression, a land of seduction, and, as Eric Rentschler puts it, “a dangerous object of desire” shaking from the contractions of economic cycles. Retracing the fate of a young German in New York, Tonio Feuersinger, who ends up in the gutter before returning to his home village in the Dolomites, *The Prodigal Son* contrasts American modernity with alpine homegrown happiness.³⁸ At the same time, for every Luis Trenker movie, there was another film that admired American modernity and liberty. Fritz Lang’s classic *Metropolis* showed philo-American tendencies in German society. Lang’s movie demonstrated the longing for a resolution of the discrepancy between labor and capital, modernity and tradition, men and women, set in an American environment.³⁹

Such paradoxes continued during the Third Reich. Adolf Hitler himself both loathed and liked the United States. In typical Weimarian fashion, he and his entourage despised the country as weak and unmilitary, a nation driven by Jews, African Americans, and the almighty dollar.⁴⁰ At the same time, the Nazis were keenly

³⁵ Barbara Keys, “Spreading Peace, Democracy, and Coca-Cola: Sport and American Cultural Expansion in the 1930s,” *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 2 (April 2004): 165–196, quote 192.

³⁶ Alfred Kerr, *Yankeeland: Eine Reise von Alfred Kerr* (Berlin, 1925); Dan Diner, *Verkehrte Welten: Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), 37, 86.

³⁷ Halfeld, *Amerika und der Amerikanismus*, 191.

³⁸ Eric Rentschler, “There’s No Place Like Home: Luis Trenker’s *The Prodigal Son* (1934),” *New German Critique* 60 (Fall 1993): 33–56, special issue on German film history.

³⁹ German audiences welcomed Hollywood films, hundreds of which were shown in cinemas throughout the Reich between 1933 and 1940. Disney cartoon characters such as Mickey Mouse were tremendously popular in the Third Reich, particularly when several cartoons were combined into feature-film length shows. Joan Crawford, Greta Garbo, and Marlene Dietrich were among the most popular Hollywood stars. Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich*, 164–165.

⁴⁰ In *Die Stunden der Entscheidung: Kampf um Europa* (Munich, 1943), dedicated to Reichsminister

interested in the United States' technological development, Taylorism, modernization, rationalization, and mass production, notably in the area of consumer products such as cars.⁴¹ American films, jazz, and swing, although officially forbidden by the Reichsleitung, remained in vogue until the end of the war, and not only in dance halls but even, in fact especially, in the frontline trenches of the Wehrmacht. The Nazis never resolved their inconsequential position: on the one hand, they admired Fordism and economic Americanization; on the other, they rejected the mass society produced by American culture, a position that Jeffrey Herf has labeled "reactionary modernism."⁴²

European fascists saw no contradiction in the juxtaposition of philo- and anti-Americanism, but their motivations differed in accordance with national and regional concerns. The Italian press, for example, displayed a profound antipathy against the United States in the 1920s, although the U.S. government contributed substantially to the rise of Benito Mussolini until 1935.⁴³ Mussolini himself remained completely ambivalent toward the United States. As an anti-Bolshevik and an advocate of modernization, Mussolini maintained friendly relations with Roosevelt and congratulated Herbert Hoover on his political achievements. He admired Charles Lindbergh and even produced a film designed to explain fascism to American audiences. He was an advocate of American tourism, American investment, and American joint ventures in the film industry, allowing Hollywood movies in Italy until 1938.⁴⁴ Yet Italian fascists rejected liberalism and "the dictatorship of businessmen," particularly when the Depression hit harder in the United States than in Italy.⁴⁵

To Italian fascists, moralism and the reconfiguration of the family constituted a pillar of the making of the "new Italian," while American snobbery, the crisis of the family, feminism, capitalist greed, and individualism posed as its counterpoint.⁴⁶ Anti-Americanism in Italy remained linked to a complete abhorrence of modernity, but such aversion constituted only one side of Italian fascists' perception of the United States. Like the Nazis, Italian fascists did not regard the arrival of technology or mass industry as a threat. In contrast, many believed that the New Deal was America's acknowledgment of the superiority of fascist solutions, notably the domination of the individual's will over the rhythm of history and a balance between man and machines. "Containing and domesticating the American challenge, in all its ever-changing variety of forms," writes David Ellwood, "was probably an experience

und Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday, A. Sanders contrasted a struggle between continental Europe and Anglo-Americans for world domination. To Sanders, the Puritans, the Freemasons, and the Jews dominated the Anglo-American world and threatened to overpower the European continent, the European economy, and the European way of life. The challenge for Europe, then, was to defend its borders, defeat the Anglo-Americans, reorganize Europe politically, and thereby inaugurate a "welthistorische Wende."

⁴¹ Diner, *Verkehrte Welten*, 92–94.

⁴² Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge, 1984).

⁴³ Stefano Luconi, "Anti-Americanism in the Italian-Language Press in the United States in the Interwar Years," in Groupe de Recherche et d'Etudes Nord-Américaines, *L'Antiaméricanisme: Anti-Americanism at Home and Abroad* (Aix-en-Provence, 2000), 33.

⁴⁴ I am indebted to David Ellwood for this point.

⁴⁵ Luconi, "Anti-Americanism in the Italian-Language Press," 35, 36, 45, 47.

⁴⁶ Emilio Gentile, "Impending Modernity: Fascism and the Ambivalent Image of the United States," *Journal of Contemporary History* 28 (1993): 7–29, magazine count 7.

which helped to unite Italians more than it divided them." Catholicism, fascism, communism, and the U.S. occupation all were and are bound up with the question of what it meant to be an Italian as opposed to an American.⁴⁷

If European fascists were divided over their reasons for rejecting America, so were European democracies. For example, French feelings toward the new republic had been ambivalent throughout the nineteenth century, swinging from Tocquevillian admiration to utter hostility at the end of the July Monarchy in 1848. Robert Young has shown that despite the antipathy on the part of French elites, the French government made a forceful effort to win U.S. sympathies between 1900 and 1940. While privately opposing American "best-in-the-world" claims, French leaders understood that France had more control of its identity than of the productive resources necessary to become a major modern power. Therefore, they often complemented popular anti-Americanism with a heavy dose of Franco-American friendship and admiration.⁴⁸ In 1931, French author Edmond Demolins argued in *A quoi tient la Supériorité des Anglo-Saxons* that the Anglo-Saxons had managed to liberate themselves from the pastoral, proletarian, and more sedentary Celtic race, which typically "fill the ranks of the lower proletariat, or higher in the social scale—the liberal and political professions." Anglo-Saxons had likewise liberated themselves from the fetters of Norman influences, whose "spirit of snobbery" tended to weaken the upper classes.⁴⁹

As a result, feelings in France moved continuously up and down during World War I and the interwar period. The nation moved from gratitude for American military intervention to outspoken reproach when the U.S. government refused to allow the French to ally their repayments to German reparations. The French consequently regarded their country as the new pauper of Europe, if not of the community of capitalist nations, while the United States seemed to enjoy the comforts of unlimited wealth.

Yet for all its political patina, in the interwar period French anti-Americanism remained a fundamentally cultural phenomenon, which originated among that group of French critics most familiar with U.S. society, including intellectuals such as André Tardieu, Georges Duhamel, and Paul Morand. Some focused their criticism on American diplomatic power, while others worried about the ramifications of a mass society. But all continuously looked back to the prewar world, mourning the decline

⁴⁷ David Ellwood, "Italy: Containing Modernity, Domesticating America," in Alexander Stephan, ed., *Dynamics of Cultural Blending: Americanization and Anti-Americanism in Europe* (New York, forthcoming).

⁴⁸ Robert Young, *Marketing Marianne: French Propaganda in America, 1900–1940* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2004), quote 18. See also André Béziat, "Le Général de Gaulle était-il antiaméricain pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale?" in Groupe de Recherche Nord-Américaines, *Antiaméricanisme*, 65–82.

⁴⁹ Demolins drew a concise picture that consistently underlined the cause of Anglo-Saxon superiority. The mode of education in France, he claimed, had reduced the country's birth rate and compromised its financial situation, while Anglo-Saxon education prepared children for the struggle for existence, physical fitness, gender equality, independence, and the future. Political actors in France and Germany were more receptive to socialism than were Anglo-Saxons, which led both countries into moral decay and social degeneration. Anglo-Saxons nurtured a different idea of the fatherland than did their French and German neighbors, one that emphasized business, expansion, and the future. Edmond Demolins, *Anglo-Saxon Superiority: To What It Is Due*, trans. Louis Bert. Lavigne (New York, 1931), vi.

of France and the modernization of French society.⁵⁰ In the 1930s, French intellectuals refocused their critique on the American empire, notably its demand for raw materials, its expansion and domination of Europe, the threat of American capital to Europe, and distaste for American culture.⁵¹

Neither prewar Catholics nor the Uriage group—designed to train young leaders for Vichy youth movements—nor leaders such as François Mitterand could avoid this position: they all were convinced that in order to make France more French, to avoid Americanization, and to distill “la France profonde” from the sway of minority groups, they needed to support Pétain and the Vichy regime even if that included discriminating against Jews and compromising the Resistance.⁵² As Robert Paxton has shown, the Vichy regime was the first to actively bar U.S. culture in France. Subsequent leaders preferred an America that was generous but distant, and they sought to avoid armed liberation in favor of a revival from within.⁵³

As a result, the Vichy regime gave way to Gaullist nationalism, a pro-Soviet attitude, and two powerful myths: first, that France had liberated itself; second, that the Soviets and the Americans had divided Europe between themselves at Yalta—at the expense of France. Such political anti-Americanism went hand in hand with a resurgence of cultural criticisms focusing on everything from individual rights to the menace of Coca-Cola and the Americanization of the French language (even though less than 2 percent of the words added to the French vocabulary are of Anglo-Saxon origin).⁵⁴ Just as in the case of Italy and Germany, the French discourse on the United States concerned less American society than French interests, methods, and social life. In the words of Marie-France Toinet, “The French hold up the United States as a mirror to look, in fact, at themselves.”⁵⁵

Thus, interwar perceptions of the U.S. in Europe were mixed, regardless of a country’s political system and ideology. Beyond a general admiration for Fordism and the New Deal, there was a general fascination—almost scientific—with understanding the American system as an original phenomenon. Simultaneously, cultural anti-Americanism remained a feature of conservative and fascist circles, all of which

⁵⁰ David Strauss, *Menace in the West: The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times* (Westport, Conn., 1978), 65–77.

⁵¹ Ibid., 97, 103. See also Donald Roy Allen, *French Views of America in the 1930s* (New York, 1979), 64; Seth D. Armus, “The Eternal Enemy: Emmanuel Mounier’s Esprit and French Anti-Americanism,” *French Historical Studies* 24, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 271–304.

⁵² John Hellman, “Wounding Memories: Mitterand, Moulin, Touver, and the Divine Half-Lie of Resistance,” *French Historical Studies* 19, no. 2 (Autumn 1995): 461–486.

⁵³ Vichy leaders’ campaign focused on antimodernism, patriotism, and religious values along with education. They sought to moralize French youth and the educational hierarchy, barring jazz and American films. Since the Resistance focused on the defense of the French way of life, leaders rejected much of the U.S. example in the realm of politics and culture, since Americans were seen as a bunch of big children, naïve, rootless, and materialist. Robert O. Paxton, “Anti-Americanism in the Years of Collaboration and Resistance,” in Lacorne and Rupnik, *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism*, 55–66; Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* (New York, 1972), 165.

⁵⁴ Denis Lacorne and Jacques Rupnik, “France Bewitched by America,” in Lacorne and Rupnik, *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism*, 1–34.

⁵⁵ Marie-France Toinet, “French Pique and Picques Françaises,” in Thornton, *Anti-Americanism*, 137; Ellwood, *Anti-Americanism in Western Europe*. The best survey on postwar France so far remains Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, Calif., 1993).

viewed the United States as an attack against tradition, national essence, and Europe's internal reinvention in the 1930s.⁵⁶

During the Cold War, the anti-American debate took a decisively political turn. While Europeans had always voiced political criticism, notably after the ratification of the Versailles Treaty, it was only during the era of McCarthyism that observers abroad formulated a criticism of the United States that extended the cultural critique to include political ideology.⁵⁷ In line with the dialectical approach of the prewar decades, culture and philo-Americanism continued to shape any criticism of the United States, and for every manifestation of rejection there was another one of appropriation. Both philo- and anti-Americanism became part of everyday life.⁵⁸ Europeans selectively appropriated certain commodities, ideas, and images by carefully tailoring those to their own needs. Moreover, instead of a one-way street of ideas flowing west to east across the Atlantic, there was a constant flux of communication from both sides throughout the Cold War.⁵⁹

Take, for example, French intellectuals and their admiration of jazz music. After jazz hit France in the interwar years, French avant-garde musicians "intellectualized" this music genre, collectively forming a genuine French jazz "milieu" after World War II. They successfully dissociated jazz from its origins, using it instead to underline the superiority of European culture. Ludovic Tournès calls this process "counter-Americanization," as an American cultural product mutated into a powerful instrument of criticism against U.S. culture.⁶⁰

This process continued throughout the Cold War. Despite all the political cooperation, European anti-Americanism ballooned nearly everywhere during this time, seamlessly merging cultural and political concerns. French anti-Americanism, for example, was very much conditioned by the rift between communism and so-

⁵⁶ On inter-European NGO efforts to redesign an occidental European unity between the wars (occidental culture), see Guido Müller, "France and Germany after the Great War: Businessmen, Intellectuals and Artists in Non-Governmental European Networks," in Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., *Culture and International History* (Oxford, 2003), 97–114; Guido Müller, *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Das Deutsch-Französische Studienkomitee und der Europäische Kulturbund* (Munich, 2005).

⁵⁷ In a sweeping essay on anti-Americanism in Western Europe, David Ellwood contends that only after World War II did European perceptions shift to a rejection of American diplomacy, military power, and ideology—and the country at large—thus inaugurating a distinctive anti-Americanism. Reactions to America—however diverse—assumed a different meaning and a different level of force once the United States began to project its power abroad, during and even more so after World War II. It was at this point, Ellwood argues, that nineteenth-century distaste and early-twentieth-century fears of modernity combined to form a new antagonism to U.S. power. And it was at this point, too, that the U.S. government first began to worry about the image of America in the world. David Ellwood, "Comparative Anti-Americanism in Western Europe," in Fehrenbach and Poiger, *Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations*, 26–44; Gienow-Hecht, "Shame on US?" 466–469.

⁵⁸ Nolan's conclusion that America would lose its central position in the German imagination after the Cold War has proven futile. Mary Nolan, "America in the German Imagination," in Fehrenbach and Poiger, *Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations*, 3–25.

⁵⁹ Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, La., 1999); Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York, 1997); Heide Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995); Mary Nolan, "Consuming America, Producing Gender," in Maurizio Vaudagna, ed., *The American Century* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003), 243–261; Kuisel, *Seducing the French*.

⁶⁰ Ludovic Tournès, "La réinterprétation du jazz: Un phénomène de contre-américanisation dans la France d'après-guerre (1945–1960)," in Groupe de Recherche Nord-Américaines, *Antiaméricanisme*, 167–183.

cialism articulated at the Communist Congress in Strasbourg in 1947. Public debates denounced American expansionism, NATO, and the corruptive influence of American art, horrifying French elites but not the mass of voters. Instead, the American way of life fascinated a generation of young French enamored with consumerism, better living standards, and economic growth.⁶¹ For many French, America represented more of a “counter-myth” designed to refute the anticulturalists than a concern based on the reality of international relations.⁶²

Nowhere were these internal cultural concerns more visible than in the field of modern art. In the 1950s, French art administrators had serious concerns about their nation’s standing in the international art market. In their eyes, German moderns were claiming that modern art had originated in Germany and not in France, thereby denigrating the latter’s contribution to the twentieth-century art scene.⁶³ At the same time, Paris turned into a cultural Cold War battlefield for Soviet and American art administrators who were fighting for the heart of France. The New York Museum of Modern Art attempted to promote America’s cultural reputation in Europe during the Cold War vis-à-vis the Soviets and to redefine the United States as a leader in modern Western civilization. When they realized what was happening, French artists, administrators, critics, and the public were quick to deride the onslaught of Americanism without realizing that Paris itself had already become the center of a new modern movement: the surrealists.⁶⁴

If language and the arts preoccupied French critics of American culture, anti-Americanists across the channel worried about a completely different set of issues. In the early days of the Cold War, proponents of anti-Americanism in Britain focused on the belief that their country had yielded its status as an empire to the United States, while at the same time, many British felt that the New World could and should continue to learn from the mother country. In 1957, Art Buchwald published an advertisement in the *London Times*, calling for “people who dislike Americans and their reasons why.” He reportedly received more than one hundred replies that testified to the persistent existence of anti-American stereotypes—however diverse—in British society. On the basis of these responses, Buchwald summarized his findings by saying, “if Americans would stop spending money, talking loudly in public places, telling the British who won the war, adopt a pro-colonial policy, back future British expeditions to Suez (a reference to the Anglo-French descent upon the Suez Canal in 1956), stop taking oil out of the Middle East, stop chewing gum, . . . move their air bases out of England, settle the desegregation problem in the South, . . . put the American woman in her proper place, and not export Rock n’ Roll, and speak correct

⁶¹ Brian McKenzie, *Deep Impact: United States Public Diplomacy in France, 1945–1952* (New York, forthcoming).

⁶² Michel Winock, “The Cold War,” in Lacorne and Rupnik, *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism*, 67–76.

⁶³ Their concerns were well founded, as Marie-Amélie Zu Salm-Salm has shown. Zu Salm-Salm, *Échanges artistiques franco-allemands et renaissance de la peinture abstraite dans les pays germaniques après 1945* (Paris, 2004).

⁶⁴ Gay R. McDonald, “The Launching of American Art in Postwar France: Jean Cassou and the Musée National d’Art Moderne,” *American Art* 13, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 40–61; Serge Guilbaut, “1955: The Year the Gaulois Fought the Cowboy,” *Yale French Studies* 98 (2000): 167–181. André Breton’s “Manifesto of Surrealism” came out in 1924.

English, the tension between the two countries might ease and the British and Americans would like each other again.”⁶⁵

What Buchwald observed in the 1950s bore no trace of a popular movement. But in the 1960s, ideological criticism, frustration, and disillusionment intensified, largely fueled, ironically, by American anti-Americans, who had picked up many of their ideas from the exiled Frankfurt School, now operating out of Chicago, New York, and Washington, D.C.⁶⁶ U.S. professions of democracy seemed hypocritical in the age of segregation and the war in Vietnam. Not surprisingly, it was here that domestic and European anti-Americanism most clearly overlapped. Samuel Huntington once argued that anti-Americanism focuses on the double standard applied by both Americans and non-Americans in judging U.S. institutions and culture: liberal principles cherished in the United States often are not accorded the same status in U.S. foreign policy toward other countries and people. Anti-Americanism protests not the prevalence of American values abroad, but the absence or failure of those values.⁶⁷ That is precisely what happened in Europe. “My entire liberal education began in the Amerika-Haus [*sic*] where I studied the American Declaration of Independence,” stated a young German in a public opinion poll in the late 1960s. “What happens now is a public rape of such ideals.”⁶⁸

West German anti-Americanism clearly concentrated on an idealist review of Western values and institutions. Widespread among intellectuals, environmentalists, and peace groups, anti-Americanism in West Germany sprang from the presence there of American troops. Aversion to the U.S. military forces went hand in hand with anti-consumerism and an attack on the “McDonaldization” of Germany, a concern that originated in conservative fears in the nineteenth century.⁶⁹ Gesine Schwan has shown that in Germany after 1945, anti-Americanism—despite its appeal among the New Left—was in its essence conservative, and that means also politically conservative. Both left and right criticism originated among the same milieu, one generated by elitist assumptions critical of mass society, modernity, and new power, and favorably disposed toward *Abendland* (occidental) ideology, as well as the idea of Eurocentric cultural and political superiority.⁷⁰ A typical follower of the Green Party, for example, was young (born after 1946) and well educated with perhaps a university degree, had an affinity with both environmental causes and leftist tendencies, and felt a general disdain for the established conservative parties. He or she

⁶⁵ Marcus Cunliffe, “The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism,” in Kroes and Rossem, *Anti-Americanism in Europe*, 20–36, Buchwald quotes 23, 24.

⁶⁶ Gienow-Hecht, “Shame on US?” 465–494.

⁶⁷ Samuel Huntington, “American Ideals versus American Institutions,” *Political Science Quarterly* 97, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 1–37, quotes 22, 23; Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, 371. See also Jochen Hils, “Zwischen Hyperdemokratie und ‘Minderheitstyannei’: Die USA zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts,” ZENAF Arbeits- und Forschungsberichte 1/2004 (Frankfurt am Main, 2004), http://web.uni-frankfurt.de/zenaf/zenaf/01_04_ZAF.pdf.

⁶⁸ Cited in William J. Weissmann, *Kultur- und Informationsaktivitäten der USA in der Bundesrepublik während der Amtszeiten Carter und Reagan* (Pfaffenweiler, 1990), 66.

⁶⁹ Stephan, *Americanization and Anti-Americanism*; Diner, *Verkehrte Welten*, 36. See also Dan Diner, *Feindbild Amerika: Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 2003); Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, 384. On the perspective of peace activists in the Netherlands, see Koen Koch, “Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement,” in Kroes and Rossem, *Anti-Americanism in Europe*, 97–111.

⁷⁰ Gesine Schwan, *Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Kontinuität und Wandel nach 1945* (Baden-Baden, 1999).

typically favored “post-materialist” values and unconventional forms of political participation, including candle chains and mass demonstrations.⁷¹

Even at the height of protest against U.S. involvement in the Third World and Star Wars, anti-American political criticism remained an elitist conservative affair often borrowed by representatives from the left.⁷² Joachim Fernau, Germany’s most polemic conservative critic in the 1970s, drew an apocalyptic scenario of a world driven by sex murderers, global warriors, consumer terrorists, drug czars, and money-driven industrialists, on the one hand, and vast numbers of victims, TV-obsessed children, and artists without ideas, on the other. “For the love of things that we hunger for and what has been destroyed, I say: Hate!” Fernau finally advised readers in a survey of U.S. history titled *Halleluja*. “There, on the other side of the ocean, stands the guilty one. If Americanism wins it will annihilate the human race within the next 150 years.”⁷³ New Leftists (whom Fernau abhorred) would have wholeheartedly embraced his conclusion.

Although manifestations of West German anti-Americanism mirrored similar events in France, their origins differed significantly. In contrast to German anti-Americanism, French nationalism continues to shape French attitudes and cultural anxieties.⁷⁴ The Communist Party had a profound influence on negative perceptions vis-à-vis the United States and sympathetic attitudes toward the Soviet Union. But the party’s influence waned considerably during and after the 1960s, with the rise of an anti-Soviet cadre among the French political leadership.⁷⁵ Since that time, French anti-Americanism has been guided by a protective sense of the French language, notably since English became the lingua franca in the Western Hemisphere.⁷⁶ Philippe Roger even believes that anti-Americanism is an expression of humanism, almost a duty to defend spirit, culture, and the nation.⁷⁷ Coupled with fears among the French for their culture and continuous depression over a loss of power, the Vichy syndrome—the lack of resistance to the Nazis compensated for by emblematic resistance to the United States—continues to exist with a new face.⁷⁸

Generational affiliation seems to have played a crucial role in the formation of

⁷¹ Harald Mueller and Thomas Risse-Knapen, “Origins of Estrangement: The Peace Movement and the Changed Image of America in West Germany,” *International Security* 12, no. 1 (Summer 1987): 62, 63, 87. On the central role of peace movements and the Greens in the anti-American scene in Germany, see also Andrei Markovits, “On Anti-Americanism in West Germany,” *New German Critique* 34 (Winter 1985): 3–27.

⁷² In an effort to demonstrate the party’s opposition to the U.S. military presence in Germany, in August 1983, a member of the Green Party in the Hesse Landtag poured his own blood over U.S. general Paul S. Williams while the latter was giving a speech before some eighty U.S. military representatives, their wives, the party leaders, and committee chairmen of the Hessian Landtag. Die Grünen im Hessischen Landtag, *Die Würde einer Uniform ist anastbar: Eine Dokumentation* (Frankfurt am Main, 1983).

⁷³ Joachim Fernau, *Halleluja: Die Geschichte der USA* (Munich, 1977), 298, 318, 319.

⁷⁴ See, e.g., *France/USA: The Cultural Wars*, special issue, *Yale French Studies* 100 (2001), notably Ralph Sarkonak’s preface, “Just How Wide Is the Atlantic Anyway?” 1–10.

⁷⁵ Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, 384. On the perspective of peace activists in the Netherlands, see Koch, “Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement,” 97–111.

⁷⁶ Anthony Daniels, “Sense of Superiority and Inferiority in French Anti-Americanism,” in Hollander, *Understanding Anti-Americanism*, 65–83. See also Robert M. McKenzie, “Images of the U.S. as Perceived by U.S. Students in France,” in Yahya R. Kamalipour, ed., *Images of the U.S. around the World: A Multicultural Perspective* (Albany, N.Y., 1999), 117–133.

⁷⁷ Roger, *L’ennemi américain*.

⁷⁸ Philippe Grasset, *Le monde malade de l’Amérique: La doctrine américaine des origines à nos jours* (Brussels, 1999).

anti-Americanism since the 1960s. In the Netherlands, a public opinion poll in 1983 concluded that "almost half the population shows a more or less negative attitude toward the United States," while "young people as a group (from 18 to 29 years of age) tend to hold more negative views of the United States than those over 30." One Dutch scholar has linked these findings to an ever greater alienation from and disaffection with modern society, one that marked an entire generation and was not caused by a single event such as the Vietnam War.⁷⁹

Even in the most turbulent years of protest, anti-American critique went hand in hand with philo-American statements. This is a delicate point that Americans find hard to understand. How can people consume goods that symbolize American popular culture—jeans, pop music, hamburgers, Coke—while protesting both U.S. culture and foreign policy? The fact remains that, as in the United States, such ambivalent positions can be found in the same country, the same group, even the same person, and in most cases this duality symbolizes schisms within that very country, group, or person. For all their criticism of mass society, intellectuals such as Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno emphasized their positive personal experiences in the United States, notably in the sector of research and higher education. Likewise, from the 1960s well into the 1980s, half of those polled in Germany consistently named the United States as their country's best friend (before France), while only 20 percent advocated a withdrawal of the U.S. military from Western Europe, and up to 80 percent supported Western Germany's membership in NATO. Not a single anti-constitutional party has won in the Bundestag elections since 1953. Even at the height of Star Wars, when polls indicated an overall decline in approval rates for U.S. foreign policy and hundreds of thousands of Germans took to the streets to demand a total ban on nuclear weapons on the European continent, 64 percent of Germans believed that the Soviet Union constituted the foremost threat to world peace.⁸⁰ European polls conducted between 1975 and 1983 likewise suggested a strikingly stable attitude, with some 10 percent confirmed anti-Americanists and 30 percent pro-Americanists, while the rest preferred to remain neutral but when pressed to take sides, rallied behind the United States.⁸¹ "There is an Americano-phile lurking inside every anti-American," marvels Rob Kroes. "Much as his tolerance of ambiguity may have been waning recently, he does not seem quite ready yet for that final auto-da-fé, that final act of faith: the burning of his blue jeans."⁸²

Anti-Americanism has fulfilled starkly different functions in different societies at different times, and in this respect the American challenge represents a dividing rather than a unifying force in Europe. In Germany, anti-Americanism has taken the form of a "New Regionalism," as depicted in the 1984 TV series *Heimat*. Here we meet Paul, "the American," who has escaped the oppressive atmosphere of his war-time home village, Schabbach, to become, in the words of Michael Geisler, "a real

⁷⁹ On Dutch anti-Americanism, see Kroes, "The Great Satan versus the Evil Empire," 37–50, quotes 46.

⁸⁰ Mueller and Risse-Knappen, "Origins of Estrangement," 52–88.

⁸¹ Mass participation in anti-American demonstrations—whether related to issues of nuclear power, politics, or military intervention—is difficult to explain. Indeed, as Koen Koch suggests, opposition to nuclear weapons may not signify anti-Americanism. Koch, "Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement," 98, 106–107.

⁸² Kroes, "The Great Satan versus the Evil Empire," 48, 49.

American, in the way he behaves, in his attitudes, even in his inability to express himself." Predictably, Paul ends up leading a deplorable existence, "a man without a home ('ein Heimatloser'), without roots, a sentimental globetrotter."⁸³ The German Peace Movement of the 1980s further spurred anti-Americanist sentiments when literary giants such as Günter Grass sharply criticized the United States for its involvement in Southeast Asia and Latin America.⁸⁴ But those claims focused on specific aspects of U.S. foreign policy, and not—as in France—on a widespread rejection of U.S. society and culture.

Regional differences and a common cultural conservatism remain the most common denominators of anti-Americanism throughout Europe. In Malta, for example, people's perception of the United States is largely focused on the notion of freedom, innovation, and technological progress. Resistance to U.S. mass media messages remains strong, notably since Maltese society emphasizes community and togetherness over personal liberty and individualism.⁸⁵ Likewise, an analysis of anti-Americanism in Turkey reveals that even though the country's left has continuously echoed European concerns over U.S. military involvement abroad, regional concerns have dominated the agenda of anti-Americanism. Notably, the influx of Hollywood movies and the Cyprus problem in the mid-1970s have repeatedly served to legitimize the image of the "ugly American." In conjunction with U.S. involvement in the Gulf War, the war in Bosnia, and U.S. policies to bar imports from developing countries, in the 1990s these impressions sealed the image of "Uncle Sam" as "a giant holding the world in his arms or as a 'cowboy' sitting on top of the world."⁸⁶ The issue of Turkish involvement in the U.S. attack on Iraq has further aggravated the situation: depicting an apocalyptic scenario in which American troops invade Turkey while a Turkish agent explodes an atomic bomb in Washington, D.C., the movie *Metal-Firina* (Metal Storm) dominated the list of blockbuster films in Ankara for weeks in early 2005.⁸⁷ Likewise in Greece, both political and cultural anti-Americanism feature strongly in people's national self-perception. For one thing, the United States supported the colonels who took over the country during Richard Nixon's presidency, and many Greeks never got over that. Furthermore, the influx of American cultural productions such as films and TV programs has had a profound impact on Greek society. A study on Greek teenagers' perceptions of the United States found that they tended to be neutral and negative. The students see Americans as leading a comfortable, affluent, but boring life.⁸⁸

⁸³ Michael E. Geisler, "'Heimat' and the German Left: The Anamnesis of a Trauma," *New German Critique* 36 (Autumn 1985): 25–66, quote 63.

⁸⁴ Günter Grass, Heinz D. Oesterle, and Barbara F. Lamphier, "Interview with Günter Grass Concerning American-German Relations," *New German Critique* 31 (Winter 1984): 125–142; Alice Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace: West German Peace Movements since 1945* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996).

⁸⁵ Peggy Bieber-Roberts and Pauline Abela, "From an Island Nation: Maltese Perception of the U.S.," in Kamalipour, *Images of the U.S. around the World*, 197–207.

⁸⁶ Ayseli Usluata, "U.S. Image Reflected through Cartoons in Turkish Newspapers," in Kamalipour, *Images of the U.S. around the World*, 87–101, quote 99.

⁸⁷ "Wachsender Antiamerikanismus in Ankara: Bemühungen um Schadenbegrenzung auf beiden Seiten," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 50 (March 1, 2005): 5. Within two weeks, *Metal-Firina* sold more than 100,000 copies, because, as numerous political observers concluded, it successfully reflects Turkish people's fears of an impending collision with the United States.

⁸⁸ A key variable is Greek ethnocentrism: the more that viewers feel "safest" in Greece, and the more highly they value Greek traditions, the more they tend to see the United States as principally ridden

As in Greece, Malta, and Turkey, everywhere in Europe politics may serve as a trigger but never as a cause for the emergence and continuity of anti-Americanism. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the former states of the Warsaw Pact. Even as governments crumbled, politics changed, and state structures vanished, philo-Americanism and anti-Americanism based on its two key variables—cultural conservatism and regional concerns—remained squarely in place.⁸⁹ Much communist propaganda centered on precisely this phenomenon: the pitfalls of unrestrained modernity, the encroachment of capitalism, and the evils of democratic nationalism. Yet even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, these charges continue to affect popular attitudes toward the United States.

For example, in the Soviet Union, the Kremlin's goal was to denounce the United States—notably top U.S. officials—and its widespread appeal through the use of propaganda.⁹⁰ Russophile ideology and anti-Western propaganda consistently influenced both state and popular perceptions of the U.S. While before 1970, state-directed anti-Americanism concentrated on liberalism and American capitalism, in the 1970s and 1980s criticism shifted to the American way of life. Cultural superiority supplanted any anxieties over the increasing economic and technological gap between the Soviet Union and the United States. The average American was seen as an individual driven by material interests and an indifference to culture and community values.

Yet for all the criticism of U.S. materialism, Soviets under Joseph Stalin began to display an increasing interest in consumer products, comfort, and prestige, such as cars, foreign apparel, and electronics. Soviet artists imitated American pop artists in using video recorders and televisions in their work at the very moment when the Soviet government was denouncing those same trends in the United States.⁹¹ Ironically, then, according to the Russophiles, America was materialist and had no culture or history, while Russia represented an old spiritual nation with a long tradition. But according to most of the educated public, America was a cool place, a great culture, and, in the words of Ilya Ehrenburg, the home of many progressive and fine musicians and authors.⁹² Both attitudes have survived the demise of the Soviet Union.

In the GDR, SED party propaganda officials focused many of their state education programs on youth and youth movements. But in the 1970s and 1980s, an

by violence, accidents, and crime, and less as a place of affluence, comfort, variety, and freedom. Timios Zaharopoulos, "Television Viewing and the Perception of the United States by Greek Teenagers," in Kamalipour, *Images of the U.S. around the World*, 279–293.

⁸⁹ See, e.g., Susan Reid and David Crowley, eds., *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe* (Oxford, 2000); Mark Pittaway, *Eastern Europe, 1939–2000* (London, 2004); Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe, 1989* (Princeton, N.J., 2002). Still, since 1945, scholars of anti-Americanism have paid considerably less attention to the former Warsaw Pact states than to Western societies, mostly because they ascribed all antagonism to state indoctrination or because they believed with Paul Hollander that there was no anti-Americanism worth speaking of in Eastern Europe. Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, 367; Thomas Bruce Morgan, *Among the Anti-Americans* (New York, 1967), 3.

⁹⁰ Donald Dunham, *Kremlin Target: U.S.A.—Conquest by Propaganda* (New York, 1961).

⁹¹ Eric Shiraev and Vladimir Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin* (New York, 2000), 7–24.

⁹² Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Changeable Soviet Image of America," in Thornton, *Anti-Americanism*, 157–171; Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 15, 18, 20, 45–61.

increasing number of splinter groups de facto destroyed the monopoly of the Freie Deutsche Jugend, the major educational arm of the social government. Punks, rock fans, peace movements, and ecological interest groups opposed state and party propaganda, and indeed any form of ideological socialization. Parents and teachers began to openly confront the dogma of effective ideological education because it did not comport with reality. The image of the United States as enemy contrasted with the popular interest in American musicians such as Joan Baez, Harry Belafonte, and Bruce Springsteen, as well as with the hundreds of U.S. films shown in GDR movie theaters. A number of research institutes, including the Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft in East Berlin, investigated American themes, as did a number of departments at East German universities, all of which were expected to deride the idea of U.S. imperialism. As in the Soviet Union, the result was an official image of America that stereotypically repeated a limited number of ideological charges while popular opinion simultaneously favored U.S. cultural products: in 1981 alone, 73 percent of all moviegoers said they preferred Western (nonsocialist) films.⁹³ And these controversial attitudes remained in place beyond 1989. Today, the cultural fear of a Moloch USA that might swallow German Kultur remains a powerful topic among educators, teachers, and other multipliers who are horrified at their students' interest in American consumer culture.

The German Democratic Republic provides an excellent example of the fact that for a brief moment after the end of the Cold War, political anti-Americanism seemed to subside, perhaps because U.S. politics appeared to shift to domestic concerns. Cultural criticism, however, remained intact. In Eastern Europe, politically motivated communist anti-Americanism often transformed into cultural antagonism. Here we can discern the analytical viability of the former Warsaw Pact states.

Take, for example, the case of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakian anti-Americanism between 1945 and 1989 included a heavy dose of state-ordered propaganda fueled by official political warfare that extended to both the political and cultural sectors. It focused on an aversion to popular culture as well as a traditional sentiment of Slav superiority vis-à-vis Western materialism. Because it was risky to oppose state-ordered doctrine, most writers operated under self-censorship. Still, this did not breed a pro-American attitude among people, but rather an "*anti-American way of life*," a refusal of middle-class values that could have been found among capitalists and communists alike. As a result of forty years of official state doctrine and in the absence of any opposition, after the end of the Cold War, political anti-Americanism transformed into popular anti-Americanism.⁹⁴ This is not to say that people simply imbibed communist rhetoric on this subject. Anti-materialism and anti-Americanism had long been common denominators of the intelligentsia in many Warsaw Pact states. Moreover, one should not subsume the various East European nations under one umbrella analysis. In Central East Europe, for example, people vehemently deny any allusions of Slavophilism. Instead, the public discourse has typically exhibited a more Western point of view that celebrates the United States as a beacon of the

⁹³ Much of SED propaganda focused on children by disseminating schoolbooks, cartoons, music, and brochures such as *Frösi* (Fröhlich Sein und Singen—Be Happy and Sing), a "Pioneer Journal for Girls and Boys." Jürgen Grosse, *Amerikapolitik und Amerikabild der DDR 1974–1989* (Bonn, 1999).

⁹⁴ Justine Faure, "L'antiaméricanisme en Tchécoslovaquie, 1945–1989," in Groupe de Recherche Nord-Américaines, *Antiaméricanisme*, 83–98, quote 95.

future.⁹⁵ But as a popular attitude, anti-Americanism surfaced after the end of the Cold War and, ironically, invoked a retrospective tendency for which East Germans coined the phrase *Ostalgie*, an amalgamation of the words *Ost*—East—and *nostalgia*.⁹⁶

In postcommunist Bulgaria, in the 1990s, local newspapers typically portrayed the United States as “a global police force, often incompetent and guilty of partiality,” marked by an “international bias and political hypocrisy.” Like many East European countries, Bulgaria has witnessed an American intrusion into its culture and its media. While American cultural mass products such as films and clothes are no longer censored (and therefore are no longer attractive as forbidden goods), their popularity has not waned. Bulgarian media often portray George Soros and his Open Society Foundation as a systematic destroyer of their country’s national identity in the service of the American government. As a result, writes Dina Iordanova, “Bulgaria seems to be taking a new path in its foreign orientation, one that will bring it closer to Russia again and emphasize its difference from the West.”⁹⁷

IF THE 1990s temporarily deleted politics and diplomacy from the anti-American discourse, the events of September 11, 2001, and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, along with a host of political issues such as environmentalism, the death penalty, and the international court in the Hague, all put political issues right back into the debate. Political anti-Americanism has flared up anew and, according to some observers, even seems to supersede cultural criticism. This takes us back to the beginning of this essay and current assessments that anti-Americanism has its origins in political culture, notably the culture of foreign relations. Russell Berman talks about a “postdemocratic anti-Americanism” that criticizes the U.S. refusal to transfer sovereignty to international bodies.⁹⁸ Political scientist and sociologist Andrei

⁹⁵ I am indebted to Ivan Gregurić for this hint.

⁹⁶ Even if not confronted by outright rejection, in Eastern Europe the perception of America remains conditioned by the “old ways.” Elizabeth Dunn’s study of a rural Polish baby-food plant that was privatized by the U.S. company Gerber shows that workers as well as middle and senior management representatives remain ambivalent toward their new employer as well as toward the general influx of American values. Working on the shop floor for sixteen months, Dunn wanted to know how employees who were used to a state social system experienced the new economic model, one that stressed different performance criteria, incentives, organizational models, and market-oriented production. While both workers and managers quickly understood the inner workings of the new way, employees generated meanings and results from this experience that remained in line with their former ideological framework, complete with shortages, self-help mechanisms, lack of supplies, and constant troubleshooting. Elizabeth C. Dunn, *Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2004).

⁹⁷ Dina Iordanova, “Political Resentment versus Cultural Submission: The Duality of U.S. Representations in Bulgarian Media,” in Kamalipour, *Images of the U.S. around the World*, 71–86, quote 84, 85.

⁹⁸ Berman, *Anti-Americanism*, 43–44. Great Britain has become perhaps the most complex and complicated case in Europe today, a situation aggravated by the fact that the country’s “special relationship” with America—which competed during the Cold War with Germany’s special relationship with the United States—has also involved a peculiar diplomatic dimension. Today, America seems to be more present, prevalent, and prominent in British foreign policy than ever before. But outside the intellectual circuit, British people tend to give less thought to the United States than to any other nation in Europe. As a result, recent British anti-American criticism has focused largely on American power and the nation’s imperialistic ambitions. Opposition to the war in Iraq, according to Michael Mosbacher and Digby Anderson, may have less to do with the Middle East than with British opposition to American

Markovits even argues that the current wave of anti-Americanism originates first in anti-Zionist and antisemitic tendencies, and second in a list of complaints more than a century old that now target George W. Bush for abuse. The United States, concludes Markovits, represents to Europe an expression of “the Other,” everything that Europe does not want to be.⁹⁹

Berman, Markovits, and many others get away a bit too easily with their contemporary analyses of anti-Americanism, because they overlook the cultural origins of European political criticism, the mutual dependence between philo- and anti-Americanism, and the fundamentally historical dimension of the phenomenon. Since the late nineteenth century, a true rapprochement of both continents’ social and economic conditions has overshadowed the European debate on America. With the advent of modernity, Americanization changed from a utopian vision into a very real possibility for most Europeans. The cultural rapprochement resulted in Europeans’ having learned to understand the United States as their own immediate future. This lent a dynamic to the debate that had not existed before the Civil War. After 1920, and especially after 1945, the cultural, economic, and political hegemony of the United States heavily influenced all critics’ assessments of the “American menace.” Disillusionment—the loss of illusions that Europeans had projected onto the New World and that the United States could never have fulfilled—and the specter of an unavoidable course into the future merged to cause a polarized debate that revealed, above all, indigenous hopes, ideals, and value systems. Historical reality played much less of a role than American ideals, which, however, Americans chose to realize in terms very different from the hopes of European observers.

European anti-Americanism, then, originated in the decades after the American Revolution and turned into a cultural vision (or critique) of modernity in the nineteenth century. That critique, however, became popular only after World War I and political after World War II. Between the late 1940s and the end of the Cold War, political criticism remained consistently embedded in the critique of cultural imperialism, and it also became increasingly academic. While the 1990s witnessed a temporary retreat of political anti-Americanism, the events following 9/11 re-created a scenario reminiscent of the 1950s—but without the European sympathy generated by years of foreign investment, cultural exchange, and political goodwill on the part of the United States. While occasionally profiting from the political climate and often used by parties on the left and the right, anti-Americanism in Europe has remained a cultural grassroots habitus to which official reactions, state representatives, and governmental policy have contributed very little.

Why, then, has the phenomenon of anti-Americanism proven so enduring? Traditions and historical continuity play an important role in this scenario, but it is the adaptive quality of the discourse, its chameleon-like ability to change colors rapidly according to its environment, that has made it so enduring. The longevity of anti-Americanism lies in its conservative outlook, which attracts followers on the left; its cultural criticism, which integrates elements of political and economic concerns; and

power and George Bush. Mosbacher and Anderson, “Recent Trends in British Anti-Americanism,” in Hollander, *Understanding Anti-Americanism*, 84–104.

⁹⁹ Andrei S. Markovits, *Amerika, Dich hasst's sich besser: Anti Amerikanismus und Antisemitismus in Europa* (Hamburg, 2004).

its consistent dialectical juxtaposition with philo-Americanism, which is designed to respond to local concerns over identity, mores, and modernity. Over the course of the decades, the cultural discourse has always fueled ideological and diplomatic disputes (including those spurred by the New Left), but it has done so by changing its face innumerable times. After 1776 and throughout the nineteenth century, America remained an “enduring vision” to most Europeans, one that promised many of the ideals held by European liberal thinkers but also warned of their pitfalls.¹⁰⁰ In the twentieth century, that vision and promise began to crumble when the downside of mass society, industrialization, and individualism, along with the ascent of the United States as a hegemonic state, began to reveal itself. For many Europeans, the American Century was one in which the United States became a reality and one that they hoped did not reflect European progress any longer.¹⁰¹

Culture, conservatism, and elitism have remained the common denominators of European anti-Americanism, while the fascination with Taylorism, Fordism, technology, and sports has consistently marked its opposite, philo-Americanism. Future research may well ponder the question whether there was a Catholic variety of anti-Americanism or to what extent the debates revealed the characteristics of a gender discourse.¹⁰² Beyond those par values, however, the sample analyses from various regions and countries east and west of the Iron Curtain reveal that the function and direction of this phenomenon remain completely dependent on local conditions. French cultural nationalism, Russian Slavophilism, and West German democratic idealism never had much in common. Visions of “America” have little in common with reality; what matters is their function in countries and societies outside the United States. In a way, then, the analysis of European philo- and anti-Americanism tells us little about the United States or the nation’s international relations, but a lot about national peculiarities in Europe. These discourses have done more to divide than to unite Europeans, and they fall far short of creating a European identity.

One question remains: If philo- and anti-Americanism illuminate the heterogeneity of Europe, what does the discourse mean for the United States, not only the nation’s past but its present and its future? Most empires have experienced the basic historical lesson that power generates suspicion, and the more power a hegemonic nation exerts, the more antagonistic other nations turn. It seems that U.S. leaders in former decades were less oblivious to this fact than their successors are today. In the interwar period and even during the early Cold War years, a number of American academics grasped this point, and they tried to warn policymakers that as the U.S. had become a new kind of empire, it was inevitable that people abroad, in the words of Reinhold Niebuhr, “should hate those who hold power over them.”¹⁰³ Given the

¹⁰⁰ Not surprisingly, one of the most popular textbooks on American history in Europe is titled *The Enduring Vision*. Paul S. Boyer, Clifford E. Clark, Jr., Joseph F. Kett, Thomas L. Purvis, Harald Sitkoff, and Nancy Woloch, *The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People* (Lexington, Mass., 1992).

¹⁰¹ Tony Judt has recently argued that traditional pacifism aside, Europe in the last sixty years has come to see itself as a continent dedicated to working out international conflicts solely through communication and compromise. The military campaign in Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere threatens to endanger the approachment between Europe and Turkey, and thereby Europe’s culture of conflict management. Judt, “Europe vs. America,” *New York Review of Books* 52, no. 2 (February 10, 2005), <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17726> (accessed July 23, 2006).

¹⁰² For a beginning, see Nolan, “Consuming America, Producing Gender.”

¹⁰³ Cited in David Michael Smith, “U.S. Global Tyranny,” <http://www.abusaleh.com/index>

polemic assessments of anti-Americanism by observers such as Gibson, Berman, Hollander, and countless others, I sometimes wonder where these perceptive observers are today. For the challenge for the United States today is how to live and act conscientiously in a world where people will always blame the Americans.

.php?id=502 (accessed March 8, 2005). See also Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics* (New York, 1940).

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AHR Forum

America in Asian Eyes

WARREN I. COHEN AND NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER

IN THE 1920s, Japanese managers turned to the principles of Frederick Winslow Taylor, the American efficiency expert, to make their factories more productive. In 1950, they looked to W. Edwards Deming, an American engineer, who taught them the importance of quality control. In November 2005, another American, Bobby Valentine, former manager of the New York Mets baseball team, led the Chiba Lotte Marines to their first victory in thirty-one years in the Japan Series—the Japanese equivalent of the U.S. “World Series.” Astonishingly, he did this by reversing the traditional harsh treatment of employees on teams and in businesses throughout Japan—using a kinder, gentler American touch. His success has led Hiroshi Miyata, president of Nippon Metal Industry, to call upon corporate Japan to “start treating our employees in the same way that Bobby does”¹—another demonstration of the appeal of the American Way.

Asia is a region with an enormous diversity of cultures and political systems, as well as historical and geographic differences. Generalizations about attitudes toward the United States and Americans are of necessity fragile. Nonetheless, an overarching pattern does emerge: of peoples who find much in American life to admire and to emulate; of peoples greatly troubled by the role the United States has played on the world stage.

The study of anti-Americanism has thrived in recent years and is clearly of much greater interest since the events of September 11, 2001.² Little has been written about favorable attitudes toward the United States—which, of course, do exist—although Joseph Nye’s books and articles on the attractions of “soft power” might qualify.³ There seem to be few equivalents of Alexis de Tocqueville and James Bryce around

¹ Anthony Faiola, “Softer Take on Hardball Pays Off in Japan,” *Washington Post*, November 28, 2005, A11.

² See, for example, Alvin Z. Rubenstein and Donald E. Smith, eds., *Anti-Americanism in the Third World* (New York, 1985); Stephen Haseler, *Anti-Americanism: Steps on a Dangerous Path* (London, 1986); Thomas Perry Thornton, ed., *Anti-Americanism: Origins and Context*, special issue, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (May 1988); Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990* (New York, 1992); Peter Rodman, “The World’s Resentment: Anti-Americanism as a Global Phenomenon,” *National Interest*, Summer 2000, 33–41; Zuauddin Sardar and Meryl Wyn Davies, *Why Do People Hate America?* (Cambridge, 2002); Alan McPherson, *Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in US-Latin American Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); Paul Hollander, ed., *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad* (Chicago, 2004); Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, *Hating America: A History* (New York, 2004); Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross, eds., *Anti-Americanism* (New York, 2004).

³ See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New

to extol the virtues of American democracy. Much of the literature is exculpatory, suggesting, as does Paul Hollander, that to be anti-American is to be, by definition, irrational. Indeed, Hollander perceives anti-Americanism to be comparable to racism, sexism, and antisemitism.⁴ Much of what has been published since 9/11 is manifestly part of the culture war in the United States, concerned largely with alleged anti-Americanism at home and reminiscent of the days of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).

The debate has focused on the question of whether foreigners hate Americans because of who they are—rich, powerful, the epitome of modernity—or because of the pervasive role the United States plays on the international stage. We argue that the dichotomy is false. Certainly in Asia—the area we know best—most attitudes toward the United States have been formed by the impact of American foreign policies. But they have also been shaped by Asian perceptions of who we are. Asians have frequently admired our principles while lamenting our inability to live up to our own standards. Qualities of racism and arrogance, ignorance and hypocrisy, which are not part of the self-image of Americans, have nevertheless been influential in molding our image in Asia. Americans who find anti-Americanism incomprehensible appear to be afflicted by moral opacity.

The development of Asian attitudes can be studied best in three phases: first, the years before the Cold War, when for most Asians, Americans were far away; second, the Cold War era, when the American model competed with a rival communist system; and third, the years after the Cold War, especially those following 9/11.

PRIOR TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE COLD WAR in the mid-1940s, no systematic analyses of Asian opinion of the United States existed. Scientific polling began to evolve only in the 1930s, and it remains rudimentary in some parts of Asia even today. Nevertheless, the writings of intellectual and political elites reveal Asian perceptions of the United States and the American people. It is, therefore, possible to discern, as Akira Iriye did in his magnificent pioneering work *Across the Pacific*, positive and negative responses to what Americans did and how some Asians viewed them.⁵

Although the Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans encountered Americans earlier, Filipinos had the first intensive contact with the United States when Americans came to “liberate” them from Spain in 1898. Any joy that Filipinos might have felt at the departure of their Spanish colonial masters quickly gave way to dismay when they realized that the Americans had come to stay—which they did for the better part of five decades. U.S. forces brutally suppressed the Filipino fight for independence,

York, 1990); Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York, 2002); Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York, 2004).

⁴ Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, viii. We define anti-Americanism as negative attitudes toward Americans, U.S. culture, or the role of the United States in world affairs.

⁵ Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American–East Asian Relations* (New York, 1967). Much of Iriye's subsequent work also indicates his interest in mutual images and their relationship to policy.




FIGURE 1: The Statue of Liberty did not always symbolize U.S. virtue. In 1999, Chinese students converted it into the "Demon of Liberty" to protest the U.S. bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade. Reprinted with assistance from Peter Hays Gries; original source unknown.

during which the historian Michael Hunt estimates that as many as 800,000 Filipinos died, killed in action or lost to war-related disease and famine.⁶

The colonization of the Philippines demonstrated American racism and hypocrisy. Americans viewed the Filipinos as uncivilized, sly, and slothful, engaged in an “insane attack” on U.S. forces. American troops called them “gu-gus” and lumped them with Native Americans and African Americans as inferior beings, to be tortured and killed without remorse. Filipino insurgents used leaflets to appeal “To the Colored American Soldiers” decrying prejudice, but could not secure mass desertions.⁷

The Chinese and Japanese meanwhile struggled against the growing racism behind the Oriental Exclusion Acts passed by Congress in the nineteenth century. The earliest authors to portray the United States to Chinese readers, Wei Yuan and Hsu Chi-yu, described a country that to Hsu seemed almost a utopia. Chinese came to the United States in the nineteenth century attracted by its prosperity and initially encouraged by the country’s quest for cheap labor. But they increasingly found that Americans would neither be their champions against other imperialists nor provide them with safe homes and jobs in the U.S. In 1905, angered by discriminatory immigration rules and by repeated violent incidents against Chinese across several western states, Chinese students organized a boycott of American goods. One way they whipped up anti-American anger was by staging a play based on Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* in which they equated the plight of Chinese in the United States with that of black slaves under the lash of the brutal Simon Legree. Stowe’s Chinese translator had stressed the comparison in his preface and afterword, pointing in particular to the humiliation by immigration authorities of Chinese who had entered the country legally.⁸

The Japanese experienced similar American racism, although U.S. authorities, especially Theodore Roosevelt, recognized Japan’s successful modernization and military power and took steps to mitigate the mistreatment of Japanese in the United States.⁹ Roosevelt even sought to mediate a settlement of the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, providing for terms largely favorable to Tokyo. Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize, but Japanese citizens rioted, holding the U.S. responsible for Japan’s failure to achieve its maximum goals. Less worried about Japan’s power, President Woodrow Wilson rejected the country’s demand for a clause on racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in 1924, Congress gratuitously offended Tokyo when it drafted a new immigration law. The National Origins Act set quotas on the numbers of citizens of each country who would be allowed to enter the United States, including just 246 Japanese immigrants a year and 75,000

⁶ Michael Hunt, “East Asia in Henry Luce’s ‘American Century,’” *Diplomatic History* 23 (Spring 1999): 324.

⁷ Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Imperialism* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979), 101–116, quote 102; Walter L. Williams, “United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism,” *Journal of American History* 66 (1990): 810–831.

⁸ Wang Guanhua, *In Search of Justice: The 1905–1906 Chinese Anti-American Boycott* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001); see R. David Arkush and Leo O. Lee, eds., *Land without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), 77–80; Wei Yuan wrote the “Treatise on Maritime Kingdoms,” and Hsu Chi-yu the “Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit.” See Michael H. Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914* (New York, 1983), 45–51.

⁹ Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice* (Berkeley, Calif., 1962), 31–45.

from Great Britain. Angered by subsequent pleas for greater equity from the president, the secretary of state, and especially the Japanese ambassador, Congress eliminated Japan's quota entirely.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, much of Asia languished under colonial rule. Americans perceived themselves as anti-imperialist and urged Asian peoples to differentiate them from Europeans, who ostensibly placed less value on liberty and self-determination. Japanese and European imperialism in East Asia allowed Koreans and Vietnamese—and even some Japanese—to view the United States as offering an alternative model. American missionaries provided support for Korean nationalists, a handful of whom established a military training camp in Nebraska. Vietnamese intellectuals, including Ho Chi Minh, admired Americans as the people who had won their independence from the world's most powerful empire, established a democratic society, and supported self-determination. Anti-imperialists in Japan, despairing of Meiji determination to emulate European empire-building, imagined that the United States would be different.¹⁰ All were disappointed by the actual policies of a succession of American governments that joined ranks with the imperialists. Washington acquiesced in Japanese imperialism in Korea, paid little heed to the French role in Indochina, and built its own empire across the Pacific.

The Chinese were crushed by similar American hypocrisy. John Hay's celebrated "Open Door Notes," issued at the close of the nineteenth century, did nothing to halt foreign inroads on Chinese sovereignty, merely allowing Americans to perceive their country as China's defender. Having thrilled to Woodrow Wilson's call for national self-determination and his opposition to Japan's efforts to turn China into a satellite, the Chinese were profoundly disillusioned by the failure of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the Washington Conference (1921–1922) to restore their control over Shandong province. In 1919, anger at the Treaty of Versailles led to demonstrations in China that evolved into the famous May Fourth Movement—a tremendous stimulus to Chinese nationalism. In his first recorded criticism of the United States, a youthful Mao Zedong attacked Wilson's failure. In 1922, Chinese students in the United States voiced their protest in demonstrations in Washington. They admired the principles in which Americans professed to believe, but found it increasingly evident that the hope they had vested in the United States was ill-founded.¹¹

Thus, in the early 1920s, some Chinese political leaders and intellectuals turned instead to Moscow. Sun Yat-sen, whose political testament *The Three People's Principles* rested heavily on the writings of the American economist Henry George, looked to Soviet agents to reorganize his Kuomintang (KMT) along the lines of the Soviet Communist Party. In addition, an indigenous Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed. Together they were determined to end imperialism in China—as

¹⁰ Vipin Chandra, *Imperialism, Resistance and Reform in Late Nineteenth Century Korea: Enlightenment and the Independence Club* (Berkeley, Calif., 1988); Mark Philip Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988); Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897–1911* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).

¹¹ Chow Tse-tsung's *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) is the standard work on the subject. See also Warren I. Cohen, "America and the May Fourth Movement, 1917–1921," *Pacific Historical Review* 35 (February 1966): 205–207; Robert T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917–1931* (New York, 1933).

well as subdue regional warlords who stood between them and the unification of the country. Eager to throw all imperialists out, the KMT-CCP alliance made few distinctions among them. After the two parties split and after the KMT established a national government in Nanjing in 1928, the Chinese Communists, nudged by the Comintern, condemned the ostensibly benign Americans, labeling them the most dangerous of the imperialists, "one hundred times worse than England or Japan." Moscow declared American policy toward China to be "a liberal hypocrisy designed to cover up imperialist aggression," a clear precursor of the kind of anti-American sentiment the Soviets would promote during the Cold War.¹² That propaganda fell on fertile ground because it was consistent with Asian experience, however much it ran counter to the principles for which most Americans believed that their country stood.

There remained prominent reformers such as China's Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Hu Shi who accepted the United States, warts and all, and persisted in looking to the U.S. as a model for the modernization of their own countries. Kang wrote that "of all the countries on earth, none is as prosperous and contented as the United States of America." Peking University brought Hu Shi's idol, American philosopher John Dewey, to China to lecture on pragmatism to enthusiastic audiences across the country. Cai Yuanpei, the leading educator of his time, introduced Dewey as a "greater thinker than Confucius." And beginning in the 1920s, Chinese increasingly adopted American ideas about higher education. By the 1940s, 15 to 20 percent of all Chinese college students were enrolled in institutions founded by American missionaries (although it should be noted that the great writer Lu Xun denounced American-educated Chinese as "foreign slaves").¹³

Asians, particularly Japanese, were attracted to many other elements of American culture in the era between the world wars. They perceived American society to be more dynamic and freer than European societies. Historian Carol Gluck has pointed to the admiration some Japanese intellectuals had for the vitality of life in the United States early in the twentieth century. Imitating American-style democracy could solve the problem of underemployment of educated Japanese, one argued, if, as in the U.S., a university graduate in Japan could drive a taxi without shame. Those who admired the egalitarianism of American life, including the Japanese writer Nagai Kafu, remarked upon the independence of American women, who could be a man's social and intellectual equal without losing their femininity. Japanese intellectuals brought out versions of the *Saturday Evening Post* and the *Harvard Classics*, creating a mass culture that historian Miriam Silverberg argues "recoded" American institutions and practices for local consumption.¹⁴

¹² Central Committee Circular no. 34, April 10, 1929, and "Letter of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to the Chinese Communist Party," in *Red Records* (Shanghai, 1938), quoted in Warren I. Cohen, "The Development of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States, 1922–1933," *Orbis* 11 (Spring 1967): 230.

¹³ Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York, 1984); Tu Wei-ming, "Chinese Perceptions of America," in Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam, eds., *Dragon and Eagle: United States–China Relations—Past and Future* (New York, 1978); Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, N.J., 1985).

¹⁴ Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*; Nagai Kafu, *American Stories*, trans. Mitsuko Iriye (New York, 2000). Miriam Silverberg, "Constructing a New Cultural History of Prewar Japan," in Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Haratonian, eds., *Japan in the World* (Durham, N.C., 1993), 115–143.

American jazz excited young people in the cities of East Asia—in Tokyo, Peking, and Shanghai. The Japanese studied American poetry and admired Walt Whitman's *Leaves of Grass*. Guo Moruo, who was to become a Chinese Communist cultural icon, discovered Whitman while a student in Japan. Many of his early poems reflect Whitman's influence. He wrote poetry in praise of George Washington before he shifted his admiration to Lenin, Stalin, and Mao. David Roy, a Guo biographer, contends that it was Whitman who radicalized Guo and facilitated his acceptance of Marxist-Leninism.¹⁵

No discussion of Asian attitudes toward the United States can ignore the Pacific war and the American role in it. Even as some intellectuals absorbed culture from the U.S., radical Japanese nationalists, alarmed by Japan's economic problems and angered by Washington's opposition to the 21 Demands and its exclusion policies, began to portray Americans as treacherous enemies. Sato Kojiro, a retired general, published *If Japan and America Fight*, one of many indictments of U.S. corruption and insolence, capping his story with an invasion of California and a victorious assault on New York. Through much of the 1930s and the ensuing war years, the Japanese government did all it could to whip up hatred of the United States as the nation most determined to deny Japan its place in the sun. Knowing that Japan did not have the power to defeat a fully mobilized U.S., Japanese leaders convinced themselves that lazy, hedonistic, and irresponsible Americans could be deterred from joining the war through a spectacular attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, who initiated the Hawaii surprise, although a Harvard graduate, misread the Americans, thinking they could be made to "think of the Japanese as a crazed and reckless people against whom it would not pay to fight."¹⁶ Thereafter, although many Japanese understood that the miseries inflicted on them could be attributed to their own leaders, Americans were killing their husbands, sons, and brothers. Americans preached race hatred, firebombed Tokyo, and dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.¹⁷ But even Prince Konoe Fumimaro, Japan's prime minister in 1941, upon committing suicide at the war's end left behind a passage from Oscar Wilde's prison memoir: "I must say to myself that I ruined myself, and that nobody great or small can be ruined except by his own hand."¹⁸

Of course, the unleashing of American power against Japan endeared the United States to many Chinese and other victims of Japanese aggression. They perceived the Americans—the Flying Tigers, for example—as their champions. For them, the knowledge that the Yanks were coming was liberating.

In brief, all of the elements that would color Asian attitudes toward the United States during the Cold War appear to have surfaced much earlier. Widespread admiration for American economic success and for American professions of anti-im-

¹⁵ David T. Roy, *Kuo Mo-jo: The Early Years* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); Leo Ou-fan Lee, *The Romantic Generation of Chinese Writers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973). Whitman apparently had a similar appeal for Latin American radicals, including José Martí and Huberto Alvarado Arellano. See Greg Grandin, "Your Americanism and Mine: Americanism and Anti-Americanism in the Americas," this issue.

¹⁶ Asahi Shimbun, *The Pacific Rivals* (New York, 1972), 84.

¹⁷ Robert J.C. Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War* (Stanford, Calif., 1961), 17–19; John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1986).

¹⁸ John Hunter Boyle, *Modern Japan: The American Nexus* (New York, 1993), 193; Asahi, *The Pacific Rivals*, 359–360.

perialism existed already. American democracy and the freedoms it promised had enormous appeal to intellectuals living under oppressive regimes, colonial or home-grown. Only the oppressors themselves hated the U.S. for its principles and values. But informed Asians questioned whether Americans lived by those principles and values. How could one account for American imperialism as evidenced in the Philippines and prewar China? What had Americans done to further Wilson's call for self-determination? How could they speak proudly of their free and democratic society when they mistreated people of color?

ASIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS during the era of the Cold War differed markedly from those of the preceding hundred years or so as a result of two formidable new realities that characterized the region in the aftermath of World War II. On the one hand, communism emerged to dominate governments on the Chinese mainland, in North Korea, and in Indochina, as well as to threaten the security of fragile decolonizing or war-torn states. On the other hand, the U.S. had become a far more expansive presence, whether through its economic aid and trade, the dissemination of its values and cultural artifacts, the basing of its troops, or its insistence on recruiting allies and collaborators in the fight against communism. These changes reinforced images of the United States as a land of opportunity, freedom, and even altruism, but as Washington's priorities increasingly diverged from those of the people of Asia, images of Americans and their government became more negative.

At the conclusion of World War II, the United States unquestionably stood at the peak of its prestige in the region. It was clearly the most powerful nation in the world, and it had used that power to facilitate the liberation of hundreds of millions of Asians from an often brutal Japanese occupation. American opposition to imperialism, voiced frequently by its leaders, stirred hopes among subjects of the British, Dutch, and French empires that a Pax Americana would mean the end of colonialism. Even the Japanese, anticipating the worst from the victors, soon marveled at the generosity of their American occupiers. Although the firebombing of Tokyo and the atomic attacks triggered anti-Americanism, according to one of Japan's major newspapers, the *Asahi Shimbun*, "the level of anti-American sentiment has remained remarkably low."¹⁹

Americans earned as much admiration from Asians for their professed commitment to liberty and democracy as for their wealth and power. The United States attracted millions of immigrants and hundreds of thousands of students from East and South Asia. A new openness appeared to exist when Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Acts in 1943 and followed that in 1946 with legislation to permit immigration and naturalization of Filipinos and Indians. In 1947, Asian war brides were permitted to accompany their American husbands home from overseas deployments. The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 finally lifted racial barriers to citizenship and provided annual quotas for immigration by Asian ethnic groups.²⁰ Those

¹⁹ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, 1999); Asahi, *The Pacific Rivals*, 359.

²⁰ Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middle Brow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley, Calif., 2003), 225–226.

quotas, initially restrictive and minimal, were radically liberalized in 1965, and a flood of migrants began. America was the land of opportunity for them as it had been for Europeans in previous centuries. Its graduate schools, especially in science and technology, served as magnets for young Asians.

From the outset, of course, there were unfavorable views of Americans and their culture among Asian elites, as there had been prior to the Cold War era. In the period after World War II, greater exposure to Americans, who sometimes wielded more immediate influence in their societies, aggravated these resentments, as did the propaganda from Moscow and Beijing that sought to exploit them. Traditionalists in China and Japan, for instance, did not share values such as individualism and democracy. Japanese conservatives were appalled at the reforms that U.S. occupation authorities attempted to impose on their country, fearful that it would lose its national identity. In India, in particular, but in Indochina and Indonesia as well, the upper classes frequently had internalized the contempt that their colonial masters had shown for the alleged vulgarity of American culture. Socialists across Asia rejected the unrestrained, exploitative capitalism rampant in the United States. The violence and sexual license portrayed in Hollywood's motion pictures and subsequently in recycled television programs appalled some Asians, perhaps Muslims most of all.²¹ In the last years of the Cold War, militant Islamic groups emerged in Southeast Asia, expressing hostility toward the United States as the avatar of modernization and the champion of Israel.

Racism also remained a point of contention. As people of color, Asians had long been angered by their treatment at the hands of insensitive white Americans. After World War II, more Asians traveled and studied in America, experiencing discrimination firsthand, and many others heard tales told by friends or relatives. But mostly, reports of the violence in the U.S. that accompanied the struggle for racial integration in the 1950s and 1960s horrified Asians. These were among the bitterest years of the civil rights movement, and also the years in which American discriminatory practices became a major issue in the Cold War. Eleanor Roosevelt lamented after her travels in India, "we have against us their feeling that we, because our skins are white, necessarily look down upon all peoples whose skins are yellow or black or brown. This thought is never out of their minds [and] they always asked me pointedly . . . about our treatment of minorities in our country."²²

The Cold War itself determined attitudes toward the United States throughout Asia. Various Asian states found that American priorities shifted dramatically with the advent of the anticommunist crusade and that they had difficulty securing Washington's attention or sympathy for any issue unless it could be painted in Cold War

²¹ Harry Haratoonian, "An 'Etiquette of Anti-Americanism': Being Japanese in the American Imperium," in Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross, eds., *Anti-Americanism* (New York, 2004), 197–220; Ainslee Embree, "Anti-Americanism in South Asia: A Symbolic Artifact," in Rubenstein and Smith, *Anti-Americanism in the Third World*, 137–150.

²² See, for example, Mochtar Lubis, "From Indonesia," and Pura Santillan Castrence, "From the Philippines," in Franz M. Joseph, ed., *As Others See Us: The United States through Foreign Eyes* (Princeton, N.J., 1959), 194–214 and 215–239; Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, N.J., 2000), and Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2003). Roosevelt quote from Matthew Jones, "A 'Segregated' Asia? Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954–1955," *Diplomatic History* 29 (November 2005): 845.

colors. The one-dimensional focus of U.S. policymakers also left them open to manipulation by those whose goals might differ markedly, but whose ability to package their positions and intentions played to Washington's anticommunist obsession.

Whatever friction grew out of the enlarged U.S. presence in Asia quickly became ammunition for communist attacks on Washington. Anti-American propaganda emanating from Moscow had disappeared after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, only to begin anew in 1945 as the wartime alliance frayed—and U.S. tolerance of communist expansion in Eastern Europe and East Asia came into question. In China, most notably, the warm wartime relationship between Mao Zedong's communist regime in Yan'an and American observers, military and civilian, cooled rapidly in the months following Franklin Roosevelt's death. The Central Committee of the CCP interpreted the FBI's arrest of Jack Service, an American foreign service officer who had reported favorably on communist prospects in China, as evidence that reactionaries led by Harry Truman had gained control in Washington.²³ In June 1946, convinced that the United States was committed to supporting his enemy, Chiang Kai-shek, in the newly declared civil war, Mao commenced a virulent anti-American campaign. The actions of U.S. forces in China, most infamously the rape of a Peking University student by two drunken Marines on Christmas Eve in 1946, contributed to the success of the campaign among Chinese students.²⁴

A similarly incendiary issue in the aftermath of World War II was U.S. support for the reconstruction of Japan and the concomitant fear that the United States would condone remilitarization. Washington believed that the anticommunist alliance system required a vibrant Japan at its core, but hatred for Japan ran deep in China and Korea, fueling demands for punishment and reparations. Although the Chinese Communists stirred much of the anger in the late 1940s, anticommunist and noncommunist Chinese shared their distress over what all Chinese saw as a resurgent Japanese threat to their security. Few Chinese, moreover, could accept the use of American resources to help Japanese "war criminals" when scarce money and materiel ought to have been dedicated to the reconstruction of China.²⁵ Similarly, in the mid-1960s, American pressure on Seoul to normalize relations with Tokyo led to massive anti-Japanese demonstrations that had clear undertones of anti-Americanism.

Japanese intellectuals and perhaps most Japanese welcomed the democratic reforms that the American occupiers began to impose on their country at the conclusion of World War II. After the terrible defeat their country had suffered in 1945, many Japanese concluded that pacifism was preferable to militarism and accepted restrictions against rearming imposed by the "peace constitution" written for them by Americans. Things went wrong as the Cold War evolved and Washington reversed course, restoring the influence of the very Japanese leaders who had subverted democracy in Japan in the 1930s. Japanese pacifists opposed the U.S.-sponsored res-

²³ Warren I. Cohen, "The Development of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States, 1934–1945," *Orbis* 11 (1967): 551–569.

²⁴ Hong Zhang, *America Perceived: The Making of Chinese Images of the United States, 1945–1953* (Westport, Conn., 2002), 77–118; see also Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth Century China* (Stanford, Calif., 1991).

²⁵ Jon W. Huebner, "Chinese Anti-Americanism, 1946–1948," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 17 (January 1987): 115–125; Zhang, *America Perceived*, 119–146.

urrection of the Japanese military under the guise of “self-defense forces.” They knew that remnants of the Imperial Japanese Navy had participated in the Korean War, and they resented the persistent pressure to rearm that was emanating from Washington. Some feared that the Japanese-American treaty of alliance with which the occupation had ended would embroil Japan in a war with the communist powers. On the right, however, a small fringe of strident nationalists believed that the U.S. had not done enough or, as in the case of the famed novelist Mishima Yukio, that Japan had wrongly “entrusted her national defense to foreign hands,” prolonging the “shame of defeat.” Mishima’s answer was to take his life through hara-kiri to shame the authorities.²⁶ In brief, most Japanese welcomed American efforts to democratize and demilitarize their country, but some, perhaps many, were disillusioned when American policymakers concluded that strengthening Japan’s ability to oppose communism was a higher priority.²⁷

The American ideals of anti-imperialism and self-determination captured the attention and admiration of many Asian elites before and during World War II, rendering betrayal of those principles by the United States during the Cold War especially bitter. One Indonesian journalist wrote of listening to American wartime broadcasts extolling freedom, democracy, and self-determination, only to witness the return of Dutch troops in 1945 who were armed and outfitted by the United States.²⁸ The Vietnamese, hoping that U.S. principles and wartime intelligence collaboration were meaningful, played “The Star-Spangled Banner” when, in September 1945, they proclaimed independence from France, and they used portions of the U.S. Declaration of Independence in their own short-lived declaration.²⁹ Indian intellectuals, who could not dispute actual American support for their country’s independence from Great Britain, insisted nonetheless that the United States had become the world’s leading imperialist power, pointing to Washington’s aid to Chiang in China, Syngman Rhee in Korea, and Bao Dai in Vietnam as evidence. Krishna Menon, the Indian ambassador to the United Nations, was second to none—not even communist delegates to the organization—in the vituperativeness of his attacks on the United States.

In 1946, the Filipinos were at last set free from the American empire, which would have been testimony to delayed, but real, U.S. anti-imperialism, except that their liberation proved incomplete. Their former colonial masters insisted on retaining bases and economic privileges. Filipinos perceived themselves as being bullied by the Americans who remained in their country, many of whom did not seem to understand that colonialism had ended. Over the next decade, the U.S. covertly engineered the rise of Ramon Magsaysay and helped him suppress the presumably communist Huk-balahap Rebellion. Edward Lansdale, who was the inspiration for William Burdick and Eugene Lederer’s *The Ugly American* as well as Graham Greene’s *The Quiet*

²⁶ Asahi, *The Pacific Rivals*, 200.

²⁷ Kazuo Kawai, “The New Anti-Americanism in Japan,” *Far Eastern Survey* 22 (November 1953): 153–157; Hilary Conroy, “Young Japan’s Anti-Americanism,” *American Quarterly* 7 (Autumn 1955): 247–256.

²⁸ Robert McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–1949* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1981), explains the machinations of American policymakers brilliantly.

²⁹ George McT. Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (Garden City, N.Y., 1987), 14–15.

American, used his CIA network to boost the Filipino's status. But whereas Mag-saysay delighted in being Washington's proxy, many Filipino intellectuals imagined themselves engaged in a great struggle against American cultural imperialism.³⁰

Some Chinese, especially those on the left, were also troubled by the evolution of American policy in the years immediately following the Japanese surrender. All sides initially welcomed General George C. Marshall's mission to prevent civil war in China. It quickly became apparent, however, that his impartiality did not reflect the position of his superiors in Washington, and that the United States was committed to supporting Chiang's forces even when they violated truces. As tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union increased, the Truman administration refused to facilitate a communist victory in China—even if it meant interfering in China's internal affairs to support a regime it considered corrupt and repressive. Continued American aid to Chiang prolonged the Chinese civil war of the late 1940s and further alienated politically alert Chinese, heightening their receptivity to communist propaganda.

Throughout Asia, the image of the United States as a country born in a revolt against imperialism, committed to self-determination and self-government for all peoples, gave way to the less attractive portrait of Americans as imperialists. The promise of liberty and freedom for all, so deeply ingrained in American society, was perceived by countless Asians as hypocrisy. Viewed from Asia, U.S. postwar policy consisted of support for European governments seeking to regain control of their colonies and intervention against uprisings in Korea, China, Indochina, and the Philippines on behalf of what appeared to be puppet regimes. Asian views of the United States, moreover, drew heavily upon direct contacts with Americans in the region, usually military personnel, and travel to the United States. Most striking is the overwhelming evidence that Americans were admired for their ideals—and despised for their failure to live by them.

Indeed, for much of the Cold War era, the U.S. government carefully monitored Asian as well as other foreign attitudes toward the United States, its policies, and the values of its people. The United States Information Agency (USIA), usually working with local polling organizations, constantly surveyed Asian opinion. Officials, notably President Dwight D. Eisenhower, expressed a specific interest in this data and asked to see it regularly.³¹ Polls invariably confirmed admiration for American values but demonstrated that the popularity of the United States fluctuated with events and the impact of U.S. policies on the country being surveyed. Indians, for example, indicated a very high opinion of the United States when the American government supported India during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, but slipped steadily afterward. Polls showed consistent dissatisfaction with U.S. arms sales to Pakistan and awareness that the Nixon administration had tilted toward Pakistan. Filipinos exhibited overwhelmingly favorable attitudes toward the United States, admiring its democracy, freedom, and prosperity, but mounted anti-American demonstrations

³⁰ Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image* (New York, 1990), 346–349.

³¹ Memorandum by Henry Loomis, Chief, Office of Research and Intelligence, USIA, October 22, 1956, "Japanese Public Opinion: Mid-1956," Record Group 306, Records of the United States Information Agency, Special Reports, 1953–1963, 1956, S-5-56, Box 12, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. Loomis noted that "Barometer" reports had been requested by the president.

when problems emerged over U.S. military forces or trade policy. Racism in the United States exerted a consistent downward drag.

Another important postwar development that quickly became the source of great hostility toward Washington was the establishment of long-term U.S. military bases in Asia. Although they provided essential security to unstable governments, their intrusiveness strained the patience even of those who welcomed the economic benefits. In addition to prewar facilities in the Philippines, outposts obtained after the conclusion of the war against Japan stayed in American hands because of both the Cold War and U.S. determination to dominate world politics and world trade. Resentment of the presence of foreign soldiers was widespread and intensified by the racist behavior of some American troops, who characterized the people they were protecting as “slopeys,” “dinks,” and “gooks.” Moreover, communities were affronted by the privileged positions of American soldiers, angered by the blighting of the countryside, and dismayed by the cultural insensitivity of the troops as well as the corruption and victimization of local populations. When U.S. forces fought in Korea and subsequently in Vietnam, they committed massacres and atrocities occasioned by contempt for Asians as a lesser people, as well as fear of “the other” and the inability to distinguish hostile guerrillas from civilians. Even in the Philippines, where they saw little if any action in the Cold War years, American soldiers were accused of bigotry in their contact with locals.

To cope with the friction between U.S. soldiers and the local population as well as provide for the rights of Asian peoples, legal arrangements known as status of forces agreements (SOFAs) had to be signed to govern the actions of American military personnel. To some Asian intellectuals, these arrangements were reminiscent of imperial-era concessions of extraterritoriality, which denied the host country the right to arrest, try, and punish nationals of the imperialist powers—who were subject only to authorities and laws of their country of origin. Extraterritoriality and SOFAs humiliated Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, and Vietnamese, suggesting that local law was inferior and seeming to give immunity to foreign criminals for assault, rape, theft, and murder so long as the victims were Asian.

There can be no doubt that the U.S. government generally, and the Pentagon in particular, was eager to shield Americans serving overseas from the prejudices of foreign nationals and the presumed capriciousness of Asian legal systems. In those instances when the United States had maximum leverage over client states, SOFAs minimized the ability of host governments to control the actions of U.S. service personnel in their countries. And far too often, criminal behavior by these Americans seemed to go largely unpunished. In 1957, for instance, a mob of 25,000 ransacked the U.S. embassy in the Republic of China on Taiwan after a military court acquitted an American of murdering an alleged “peeping tom” and the Americans in the courtroom gave the defendant a standing ovation.³²

On the other hand, as the bargaining power of the host country increased and as public anger against the behavior of Americans intensified—in Japan and later South Korea, for instance—SOFAs were renegotiated. Servicemen guilty of particularly heinous crimes were turned over to local authorities, who tried and im-

³² Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945–1992* (New York, 1994), 90–93.

prisoned them, often angering members of Congress. Neither the Pentagon nor Asian nationalists were pleased with the compromises, but they eased pressures to eliminate the bases.

The existence of American bases on Asian soil also encouraged the growth of military camptown prostitution. Military prostitution historically had been a virtually inevitable result of deploying young men—from any country—far from home and the restraints of family and community. The Japanese, in preparing for the U.S. occupation, and hoping to avoid the widespread rape that their own troops had inflicted on the Chinese, turned to professional prostitutes to service the troops. However, wartime propaganda suggesting that Americans were “demonic figures [who] . . . possessed oversized sexual organs that could injure them” led the courtesans to refuse, and the government instead recruited ordinary women to do their patriotic duty and comfort the incoming Americans. Even after the official “recreation centers” were disbanded, the “pan pan” girls continued what historian John Dower has called “personal diplomacy,” becoming closer to and more influenced by Americans than any other sector of society. Japanese men, who already felt anti-Americanism as a result of defeat, added to it resentment born of shame and powerlessness.³³

In Korea, the prostitutes similarly were seen as helping to contain foreign influence and rescue innocent girls from sexual assault, but nevertheless were blamed for consorting with Americans. Their Amerasian children were often shunned (especially those whose fathers were black). Later, Filipinos became so alarmed by the rise in HIV/AIDS among the roughly 55,000 brothel workers and bargirls that in 1988 a feminist group convinced the government to demand that all U.S. troops be certified AIDS-free before entering the country. Some Thais blamed American GIs for launching the nation’s sex tourist industry. Particular fury, however, could be found in Okinawa, where a high concentration of American soldiers produced repeated rapes.³⁴

Wherever bases sprouted, communities were divided between those appalled by the vice they witnessed and those who profited from it. What occasionally brought these interests together was the fact that some bases occupied valuable land, angering local citizens and especially real estate developers. In downtown Seoul, U.S. forces held a parcel conceivably worth billions of dollars. Okinawans complained bitterly that American installations impeded their island’s economic development and that the noise of U.S. planes taking off and landing greatly reduced the quality of life. In the Philippines, there were endless assertions that the United States paid too little to lease Clark Air Force Base and the naval facility at Subic Bay. For some Filipinos, the ultimate outrage came in 1989 when American planes, flying out of Clark, buzzed Manila in a show of support for the government of Corey Aquino, which was being threatened by a military coup. Backing for the coup was minimal, but the use of the base to interfere in the politics of the Philippines seemed a worrisome harbinger of the role the former colonial master might choose to play.

U.S. foreign economic policy became a continuing source of tension with Washington’s friends in Asia. To Asian governments, American wealth and power sug-

³³ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 124–138.

³⁴ Katharine H. S. Moon, *Sex among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.–Korea Relations* (New York, 1997), 27–47.

gested that the United States should behave with virtually unlimited generosity. To Americans, memories of the Great Depression, a determination to control world-wide markets and sources of raw materials, and growing concerns about communist expansion dictated a different agenda. Immediately after World War II, the United States forced Chiang to act contrary to his own preference for a state-controlled economy, the advice of his economists, and the will of Chinese intellectuals who objected to American economic imperialism. Instead, his government accepted a commercial treaty designed to open China to American exports and investments in order to guarantee military and political support from the U.S. Similarly, when negotiating an economic aid package for the newly independent Philippines, Washington compelled Manila to accept the terms of the Bell Trade Act, criticized by the Filipinos as exploitative and intended to reserve a privileged position for American investors.³⁵

The most persistent case of trade frictions involved Japan. In the years immediately following the end of the American occupation, Washington restricted Japan's trade with the People's Republic of China. Historically, exports to China had been an important source of Japan's prosperity, and Japanese businessmen eagerly sought to exploit opportunities they saw there. In the United States, however, fear of strengthening communist-bloc countries had led to the Battle Act of 1951, legislation that denied American aid to any nation trading in strategic materials with the Soviets or their allies. A Coordinating Committee for exports to Communist areas (COCOM) was established, and Japan joined it in 1952—the same year the China Committee (CHINCOM) was created. Determined to isolate the Peking regime and to separate it from Moscow if it could not be destroyed, the United States insisted on more severe restrictions on trade with China than with other communist countries—known as the China differential. Washington compelled Tokyo to make its own prohibitions even harsher by adding four hundred more items to Japan's list.

Japanese calls for liberalization of trade with China found a responsive ear in President Eisenhower. Eisenhower openly expressed sympathy for Japan's position and contempt for the China differential—and the total U.S. embargo against China. He argued that these trade policies forced China to be more dependent on the Soviet Union and created a situation in which the Japanese economy would require endless subsidies from American taxpayers. Nonetheless, his advisers, the bureaucracy, and an unsympathetic Congress found countless ways to frustrate his efforts to ease trade restraints. In 1956, a State Department assessment of Japanese-American relations concluded that “the one major area in which U.S. policy is opposed by virtually all segments of Japanese opinion . . . is in Japan's desire for closer trade and eventual diplomatic relations with Communist China.”³⁶ It took another year—and great

³⁵ Simei Qing, “From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-Chinese Diplomacy, 1945–1960” (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1994); “Mr. Bullitt's Plan: A Chinese Reaction,” *Far Eastern Survey* 16 (November 5, 1947): 226–228; Shirley Jenkins, “Great Expectations in the Philippines,” *Far Eastern Survey* 16 (August 13, 1947): 169–174.

³⁶ Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, “The Present and Projected Foreign Relations of Japan (1956–1961),” September 12, 1956, Declassified Documents Reference System (70) 194C; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “American Policy toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years: Politics and Prosperity,” *Diplomatic History*, Summer 1984, 183–208; Qing Simei, “The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy against China,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960* (New York, 1990), 121–142.

pressure from Britain as well—before the United States agreed to ease controls on its allies' trade with China.

Unfortunately, as the issue of trade with the People's Republic faded, bilateral trade problems began to plague Japanese-American relations, and they continued to do so through the remaining years of the Cold War. Integrating Japan into the trade patterns of the United States and the rest of the noncommunist world proved difficult. Initially Japan's manufactured goods simply failed to pass a minimum quality threshold, but during the occupation, Census Bureau specialist W. E. Deming lectured in Japan on how statistical analysis could improve standards—becoming so popular that an industry prize was named for him—and the U.S. hosted groups of executives eager to learn from American business. By the late 1950s, Washington was pressuring Japan to restrain its exports of a number of labor-intensive products, especially cotton textiles.³⁷

As economic problems at home grew in the 1960s, given impetus by the strains of financing the Vietnam War, Washington retreated from the generous practices of the early Cold War days. Increasingly, U.S. protectionism became a point of contention even as Washington attempted to force open markets in places such as Korea. The critical point is that the United States could no longer subsidize the development of the economies of its friends, could no longer be the market of last resort for their products. Economic considerations rivaled and eventually overtook security concerns. American economic policy became more nationalistic, more responsive to the demands of manufacturers and domestic labor and less sensitive to those of allies in Asia (or anywhere else), inevitably triggering resentment abroad. The image of the United States as a benign force in the lives of Asians eroded and in some quarters disappeared altogether.

Unsurprisingly, tensions over economic policy did not subside during the remaining years of the Cold War. In 1968, Lyndon Johnson demanded a temporary limit on Japanese steel exports to the United States. In 1971, after several years of bitter wrangling over the trade deficit and synthetic textiles, came the "Nixon Shocks," which included the de facto devaluation of the dollar and a 10 percent surcharge on import tariffs, both of which hit Japanese exporters particularly hard. Indeed, to reach a textile accord, Nixon threatened to use the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act, prompting future prime minister Ohira Masayoshi to declare the U.S. agreement to be "the second coming of Commodore Perry's black ships."³⁸

But if some felt that Tokyo had been coerced, Japan's growth stumbled only briefly in the 1970s despite financial strains, oil shortages, and export quotas. Eventually, the burgeoning Japanese economy inspired Ezra Vogel to write his famed *Japan as Number One*, and the mounting U.S. trade deficit led to the phenomenon of "Japan bashing." Several writers, most notably Chalmers Johnson and Clyde Prestowitz, argued that Japan was engaged in economic warfare against the United States and demanded that the American government fight back. U.S. pressure on Japan to restrain its exporters and open its markets to American goods angered

³⁷ Boyle, *Modern Japan*, 372–373.

³⁸ Stephen D. Cohen, *An Ocean Apart: Explaining Three Decades of U.S.-Japanese Trade Frictions* (Westport, Conn., 1998), 22; Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S. Japanese Relations throughout History* (New York, 1997), 351–354.

Japanese nationalists and prompted them to rally behind the politician Ishihara Shintaro, who called for *The Japan That Can Say "No."* Only as the Japanese economy stagnated in the 1990s, at the very moment that there was a resurgence of the American economy, did hostility over trade issues subside between the two countries.³⁹

Economic differences did not stand alone in generating friction between Washington and Tokyo in 1971. The Nixon administration's decision to initiate relations with the People's Republic of China without notice to Tokyo struck the Japanese as "callous." Its unwillingness to address rumors that weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear and chemical weapons, had been stockpiled on Japanese soil also stirred anger about Japan's subservient status.

America's war in Vietnam, more than any of these other issues, demonstrated how differently the U.S. and much of Asia looked at developments in the region. The United States' decision to involve itself in Vietnam defined it as an imperialist power brutally denying colonial subjects the freedom they thought they had won in their long struggle against France. The U.S., of course, believed that its fight would spare Asia the scourge of communism and preserve the credibility of Washington's commitments. Exploiting this disparity, the communist regimes of the region found the war useful in generating anti-Americanism abroad and confirming U.S. iniquity within their own borders.

Even in the American client state in southern Vietnam, there were anti-American currents among Buddhist priests and university students. Thich Tri Quang, known to have been the "mastermind" of the 1963 uprising against Ngo Dinh Diem that ultimately led to Diem's death, and "widely described as the single most influential individual in South Vietnam," argued in late 1964 that American intervention was prolonging the war and setting Catholics and Buddhists against one another. He deemed the U.S. to be such a serious enemy that Marxism and the National Liberation Front could serve as temporary allies of the Buddhists in the fight to drive the Americans out. In 1965, Quang had a key role in an assault by a mob of five thousand on the United States Information Service (USIS) building in Hue, which helped bring about the fall of the sitting southern government five days later. As the numbers of U.S. forces subsequently increased, so too did the frequency of protests and the perception that each Saigon government was little more than a puppet of Washington.⁴⁰

The most intense noncommunist opposition in Asia to the war in Vietnam came in Japan. To be sure, Japanese communists were at the forefront of the criticism of the United States, but tens of thousands of Japanese university students filled the ranks of the antiwar demonstrators. Some were pacifists, and some identified with Asians who, like the Japanese, had become victims of American power. Many were hostile to the conservative government of Sato Eisaku and found its support for the U.S. effort in Vietnam a convenient focus for their efforts to undermine it. The American "incursion" into Cambodia in May 1970 revived Japan's antiwar move-

³⁹ Ezra Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979); Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford, Calif., 1983); Clyde Prestowitz, *Trading Places* (New York, 1988); Ishihara Shintaro, *The Japan That Can Say "No"* (New York, 1991).

⁴⁰ Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999), 240-241, 316.

ment—and anti-Americanism—just when it had seemed to be fading. But the Japanese were not alone, and the Cambodian operations also triggered anti-American demonstrations in Manila.

Elsewhere, the events in Indochina, however much they may have been deplored, do not appear to have had a major impact on attitudes toward the United States because of the profits that countries anticipated making. Seoul sent troops to fight alongside the Americans in Vietnam once Lyndon Johnson agreed to put up enough money. The Korean public remained unhappy with the United States, but worried less about Vietnam than about Washington's insufficient alarm at a barely thwarted North Korean attack on the presidential palace. In Hong Kong and Bangkok, events in Indochina boosted local economies as American forces in the region spent dollars on procurement and R&R. Even Taiwan secured a contract for training Vietnamese troops.

Priorities between the United States and idealistic Asian populations also diverged when it came to guarding against communist subversion. Washington wanted to take no risks and preferred to support stable, if authoritarian, regimes. This was perhaps most apparent in Korea, but it was evident across Southeast Asia as well. In Korea, simmering outrage erupted after Korean troops massacred antigovernment demonstrators in the city of Kwangju in May 1980. Many, perhaps most, Koreans, aware that the U.S. military exercised operational control over the nation's military for the defense of the south from an attack by its northern adversary, assumed that the Americans also regulated domestic deployments and had authorized the use of force. They held the Americans complicit in the killings and, building upon anger over trade and the behavior of U.S. soldiers, became increasingly hostile to the United States. The American cultural center in Pusan was firebombed in 1982, as was the residence of the U.S. ambassador in 1989. In 1985, protesters staged a sit-in at the American cultural center in Seoul, and in 1987 a massive demonstration was held against the United States, alleged to be the largest in Korean history. In the last decade of the Cold War, Koreans were less likely to perceive the United States as their friend and protector and were more likely to hold Americans responsible for what they had suffered under a series of military dictatorships—and for the division of the Korean peninsula.⁴¹

Pakistanis—that is, the educated minority and the government—also began with very positive attitudes toward the United States in the 1950s, when they judged it on the basis of aid for development or opposition to India. John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's secretary of state, was considered strongly pro-Pakistan. In the 1960s, however, relations deteriorated rapidly as a result of President John F. Kennedy's interest in India and his support for Delhi in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. A survey of Pakistani university students in 1963 indicated that they still viewed the United States positively, describing the country as strong, modern, progressive, efficient, democratic, and freedom-loving. Thereafter, persistent complaints of betrayal, almost certainly orchestrated by the government, appeared to explode when the U.S.

⁴¹ Tim Shorrock, "The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of Anti-Americanism," *Third World Quarterly* 8 (October 1986): 1195–1218; David Kang and Paul Chamberlain, "A History of U.S.-ROK Relations to 2002," in Derek J. Mitchell, ed., *Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.-ROK Alliance* (Washington, D.C., 2004), 16–17.

remained neutral in Pakistan's wars with India in 1965 and 1971 and cut off military assistance in 1965.⁴²

For Pakistanis, a critical turning point in the development of anti-Americanism came with the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran. In 1979, mobs sympathetic to Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini burned the American embassy and attacked U.S. government buildings across the country. Attitudes toward the United States grew more negative whenever the U.S. was in conflict with another Muslim country, as with Libya in 1986, when 68 percent of those polled favored Libya. Pakistanis also complained that Americans were pro-Israel, although this did not appear to have been central to their negative attitudes.⁴³ In the 1980s, on the other hand, Islamists found anti-Americanism a useful tool in attacking the government of Pakistan, arguing that it was being propped up much as the Americans had propped up the shah in Iran. Reductions in U.S. aid increased anti-American attitudes among non-Islamists, who, according to polling data, actually wanted closer ties with the United States as well as economic and military assistance. The ruling elite manipulated anti-Americanism to force more attention and aid from Washington.

Dependence bred its own version of anti-Americanism. People on Taiwan might be unhappy with the behavior of American troops on the island, restrictions against the use of force against the mainland, or trade policies that limited exports, but they understood that opportunities for protest were very circumscribed. That changed somewhat when the Nixon administration moved to ease tensions with the People's Republic. Fears that the United States would abandon Taiwan, never far from the surface, resulted in attacks on USIS offices in Taipei and Tainan, threats against the U.S. embassy, and the firebombing of several cars driven by American military men in 1970. In February 1971, the Bank of America office in Taipei was bombed. These sporadic acts, however, hardly predicted the outpouring of anti-American violence, condoned by the Taipei government, after the United States recognized the Beijing regime as the government of China in December 1978. More than ten thousand people surrounded a motorcade carrying Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary of state, throwing tomatoes, eggs, and stones, as well as brandishing bamboo poles with which car windows were broken and American officials injured. Fury at and fears generated by abandonment stoked a brief spasm of anti-Americanism before officials settled down to discuss the future U.S.-ROC relationship.⁴⁴

Throughout the Cold War, Washington was concerned not only with how Asians perceived the United States, but also with how they—especially the Japanese—ranked the U.S. relative to the Soviet Union and China. In 1957, a report of Japanese

⁴² Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Chinese Objectives in South Asia: 'Anti-Hegemony' vs. 'Collective Security,'" *Asian Survey* 18 (October 1978): 996–1012; Oren Stephens to Mr. Murrow, "Opinions and Attitudes of University Students in Pakistan," June 14, 1963, RG 306, Records of USIA, Special Reports, 1953–1963, 1963, S-19-63, Box 24, National Archives.

⁴³ Embree, "Anti-Americanism in South Asia"; Shafqat Hussain Naghmi, "Pakistan's Public Attitude toward the United States," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26 (September 1982): 507–523; Hussein Haqqani, "Pakistan: Yankee, Go Home—Pro-Libyan Demonstrations Greet US Fleet in Karachi," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 132 (April 1986): 33; Hamid H. Kizilbash, "Anti-Americanism in Pakistan," in Thornton, *Anti-Americanism*, 58–67.

⁴⁴ Charles Snyder, "Taiwan-US: That Sinking Feeling," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 69 (September 19, 1970): 17; Sheldon L. Appleton, "Taiwan: The Year It Finally Happened," *Asian Survey* 12 (January 1972): 32–37; Warren Christopher, *Chances of a Lifetime* (New York, 2001), 92–93; interview with Soong Chu-yu, November 2000; interview with Stephen S. F. Chen, May 1992, Washington, D.C.

dissatisfaction with recent American foreign policy was balanced by data indicating an even more negative view of Soviet policies. At no time did the Japanese indicate more favorable views of the major communist powers than of their American allies, but in 1974 a USIA report indicated concern about the declining numbers supporting a favorable view of the U.S., and an improvement in opinion of China and the Soviet Union from unfavorable toward more neutral assessments. The years 1973–1974 appear to have been the high point of anti-American views among Japanese. Thereafter, more favorable views prevailed through the remaining years of the Cold War.⁴⁵

Opinion of the United States relative to the Soviet Union fared less well in India. In 1956, a USIA report noted that results of an extensive poll had proved “distinctly unfavorable to the U.S.,” despite respondents’ awareness that the United States contributed more aid to India than did the Soviets. The analyst thought the more favorable picture of the Soviets might have reflected the recent visit to India by Soviet leaders and remarks by Secretary of State Dulles critical of India’s seizure of the Portuguese colony of Goa. But the poll results also indicated hostility to what was perceived as an exploitative U.S. economic system. The Americans took the lead in late 1962 and early 1963 as a result of supporting India during the Chinese invasion, but had slipped behind again by 1965—despite the fact that Lyndon Johnson was second only to the Indian prime minister as the world’s most admired political leader. Indian views of the United States remained largely favorable for the remainder of the Cold War, but not as favorable as views of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, two Indo-American friendship societies existed in India—and about fifteen hundred Indo-Soviet friendship organizations.⁴⁶

AT NO TIME DURING THE ERA OF THE COLD WAR did Asians take to the streets to protest against American democracy or freedom. On occasion, intellectuals or politicians expressed contempt for American culture, comparing it invidiously to their own traditional culture or to that of one or another European country. The ubiquity of *Bay Watch*, blue jeans, and Coca-Cola engendered enormous frustration—almost as much as among French elites. On the left, there were always reservations about American capitalism. Awareness of racism in the United States, underscored by the behavior of American troops in Asia, evoked criticism. But when anti-American demonstrations occurred, when U.S. government facilities were attacked in Indo-

⁴⁵ USIA, “Trends in Japanese Attitudes toward the U.S. vs. Communist Powers and toward the Present State of Relations with the U.S.,” September 4, 1957, RG 306, Public Opinion Barometer Reports of Office of Research, 1955–1962, FE 13, Box 1, National Archives; USIA, “Japanese Public Opinion Relevant to US-Japan Relations,” April 11, 1974, RG 306, Special Reports, 1964–1982, 1974 SI through 1975 S-16, Box 14, National Archives; Nathaniel B. Thayer, “Japanese Attitudes toward the United States,” in Thornton, *Anti-Americanism*, 89–104.

⁴⁶ W. Farah, “Indian Attitudes towards U.S. and USSR,” undated summary of 96-page report by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion, RG 306, Records of USIA, Special Reports, 1953–1963, 1956, S-25, Box 13, National Archives; “Soviets Edge Ahead of US in Indian Esteem,” USIA Current Brief 181, August 25, 1965, RG 306, Records of USIA, Special Reports 1964–1982, 1965, S-13-65, Box 2, National Archives; “Attitudes towards the U.S. and Other Major Countries among University Educated Indians in Metropolitan Cities,” RG 306, Records of USIA, Special Reports, 1964–1982, 1973, S-56-73, Box 14, National Archives; “Indian Elites Generally Favor USSR More Than U.S.,” February 10, 1984, RG 306, USIA, Office of Research, Research Reports, 1953–1986, Box 3, National Archives; Embree, “Anti-Americanism in South Asia.”

nesia, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, or Taiwan, it was invariably as a result of American foreign policy—usually policies perceived as detrimental to the interests of the demonstrators' native land. Communist influence appears to have been minimal. Negative attitudes toward the United States, and anti-Americanism when and where it existed outside the communist world, were always rational, albeit at times misconceived.

IN THE YEARS SINCE THE END of the Cold War, there have been variations on earlier themes, but the basic pattern seems consistent: Asians find the democratic ideas of the United States appealing; they continue to see the United States as a land of opportunity and are impressed by its scientific advances. On the other hand, few believe that the United States does much good in the world, and many are critical of its government and of policies that seem at odds with its principles.

The collapse of the Soviet Union confirmed Americans in their belief that democracy and a market economy had enabled them to prevail over an undemocratic society weakened by an inefficient planned economy. In the new "unipolar moment," there was considerable interest within the foreign policy elite in revitalizing the national mission to spread democracy and market economies across the planet.⁴⁷ But much of the rest of the world feared American assertiveness, feared the unchecked use and abuse of American power. Government-controlled Chinese media and Chinese foreign affairs analysts argued that the United States was less interested in spreading democracy than in expanding American hegemony.⁴⁸

In the last years of the twentieth century and the initial years of the twenty-first, some issues that shaped Asian attitudes toward the United States were not new. Communist governments still existed in Asia and—in North Korea and China especially—continued to inculcate negative views of the United States. The Pyongyang regime's near-monopoly of information made its task relatively easy. In an increasingly open China, more educated citizens had sufficient access to foreign sources to be less susceptible to manipulation—which did not by any means ensure that their attitudes would be more favorable. On the other hand, according to a 2002 poll, the Vietnamese, for all they had suffered directly at the hands of Americans, trailed only Filipinos and Japanese among Asians with favorable views of the United States.⁴⁹

American bases continued to provide security but also to anger surrounding populations. In the Philippines, where nationalist sentiment waxed stronger in the 1990s,

⁴⁷ See seminal articles by Charles Krauthammer, "Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World," *National Interest* 18 (Winter 1989/1990): 46–49, and "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1991): 23–33; and William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (July/August 1996): 18–32.

⁴⁸ Wang Jisi, "The Role of the United States as a Global and Pacific Power: A View from China," *Pacific Review* 10 (1997): 1–18; Zhang Ming, "Public Images of the United States," in Deng Yong and Wang Feiling, eds., *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World* (New York, 1999), 141–157.

⁴⁹ Poll by Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, reported by Adam Clymer, "World Survey Says Negative Views of U.S. Are Rising," *New York Times*, December 5, 2002, 11. The polling data corroborates our experience in Vietnam in 1998. We were surprised by the warmth of Vietnamese responses to us as Americans, and were told by amused Vietnamese officials that this was because they had always told their people that the American *people* opposed the war and supported Vietnam's struggle for freedom.

Washington despaired of reaching what it perceived as a reasonable price for keeping its bases and concluded that it no longer needed them. In Korea, more incidents, such as the acquittal of two soldiers who had accidentally crushed two young girls with their military vehicle, helped elect Roh Moo Hyun, a presidential candidate highly critical of the United States. Thousands of protesters joined in the singing of the popular song "Arrest Tank," which suggested that "at least their armored vehicle should be arrested before it leaves Korea." Still, an agreement to move the most controversial U.S. base out of Seoul did not materialize until the U.S. Defense Department opted to redeploy its forces as part of a region-wide plan.

In Okinawa, basing rights continued to seem essential to the Pentagon after the Cold War. Although the Soviet menace had disappeared, even more volatile challenges remained, including a brief nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1994, North Korean missile testing, mounting friction between China and Taiwan and between China and Japan, and China's accelerating military modernization. But thousands of incidents between American servicemen and Okinawans in the 1990s, including more than five hundred serious crimes such as rape and murder, produced anti-American demonstrations. The rape of a twelve-year-old girl by three U.S. Marines in 1995 greatly exacerbated this Okinawan anger against the United States—and the government in Tokyo that seemed indifferent to the complaints of the islanders. Indeed, overall views of the United States among Japanese remained highly favorable, suggesting that the majority of them were content to host the American military presence—provided that it was concentrated in Okinawa.⁵⁰

Economic frictions similarly did not dissipate with the end of the Cold War. Throughout the 1990s, Chinese held the United States responsible for keeping China out of the World Trade Organization; and after their country was admitted in 2001, they complained about American trade practices they perceived as protectionist. Japanese negotiators often indicated to their American counterparts that *giatsu*—foreign pressure—was necessary for the liberalization of Japanese economic policy, but the Japanese public and politicians resented the application of such pressure.⁵¹ The Asian financial crisis of 1997, which severely damaged financial institutions in Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and Japan, revealed the United States' reluctance to act quickly or provide bilateral assistance. Instead, the International Monetary Fund, perceived to be an American appendage, demanded humiliating market-opening concessions, encouraging conspiracy theorists in Asia to imagine an American plot to undermine their otherwise thriving economies.⁵²

Remnants of the Cold War—the de facto independence of Taiwan and the con-

⁵⁰ Shin Gi-wook, "A New Wave of Anti-Americanism in South Korea," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, December 27, 2002, www.lexis-nexis.org (accessed July 27, 2004); Philip Bowring and John McBeth, "Philippines: Military Facilities' Row Stir Debate on US Regional Role—Basis of Dependence," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 148 (April 12, 1990): 20; Anthony Rowley, "US-Japan Ties Take a Sudden Turn for the Worse," *Business Times* (Singapore), October 26, 1995, 12; Chester Dawson, "Yankee Go Home? Facing Protests in Japan and South Korea, the U.S. Military Defends Its Role in Asia," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 163 (August 10, 2000): 38–41; Brad Glosserman, "Anti-Americanism in Japan," in David Steinberg, ed., *Anti-Americanism in Asia* (Washington, D.C., 2004), 34–45.

⁵¹ Rosalie Chen, "China Perceives America: Perspectives of International Relations Experts," *Journal of Contemporary China* 12 (2003): 285–297; William Nester, "Rules of Engagement: Psychological and Diplomatic Dynamics of American-Japanese Relations," *Asian Survey* 35 (April 1995): 323–335; Glosserman, "Anti-Americanism in Japan."

⁵² Ian Stewart, "Mahathir Meets French Mate as Anti-American Tirade Grows," *The Australian*,

tinued division of Korea—fueled anti-American attitudes on the Chinese mainland and on both ends of the Korean peninsula. Nationalism replaced communism as the prevailing ideology in the People's Republic, leading officials and politically informed citizens to hold Washington responsible for encouraging pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan to impede the unification of their country. These suspicions were intensified by the visit of Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, to Cornell University in 1995, which marked a reversal of U.S. policies that had been in place since derecognition of the Republic of China in 1979, and by the arrival of two U.S. carrier battle groups in the vicinity of Taiwan when the PRC attempted to intimidate Taipei in 1996. Continuing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan's government also provoked China, particularly when two presidents named Bush put together weapons packages of unprecedented size and offensive capabilities.

In South Korea, a generation that privileged the story of alleged U.S. complicity in the Kwangju massacre of 1982 over their parents' memory of American sacrifice in resisting the communist invasion in 1950 held the United States responsible for dividing the country. Washington's inept efforts to manage North Korea's nuclear threat, especially the decision by George W. Bush to brand the North as part of an "axis of evil," further contributed to anti-Americanism in South Korea. A Gallup/Chosun Ilbo poll released in August 2005 revealed that two-thirds of South Koreans of military age, both men and women, indicated that they would support North Korea if it went to war with the United States.⁵³

Some problems that emerged after the Cold War had been inconceivable in the age of Soviet power. The Gulf War of 1991 and the humanitarian interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo would not have been possible when two superpowers confronted one another. The Indian government, so critical in the 1960s of U.S. actions against Cuba and Vietnam, displaying what Washington saw as "knee-jerk anti-Americanism," perceived the Gulf War as legitimate. The Japanese, on the other hand, free of Cold War obligations to support Washington, voiced anger when their taxes were raised to pay the \$13 billion that the U.S. government had extorted from Tokyo as Japan's share of its ally's war expenses. The Chinese labeled the American attacks in the Balkans as interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia/Serbia—a precedent they feared for intervention in their own country on behalf of oppressed Tibetans or Uighers.⁵⁴

Nothing, however, inflamed anti-American sentiment in China as much as the supposed direct attacks on Chinese persons and property that many believed to be part of a strategy to weaken the country. The first incident came with the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, which the U.S. insisted was accidental and which the CIA blamed on out-of-date maps, but which killed three Chinese. Demonstrations, some facilitated but not controlled by the government, swept two

November 19, 1997, 8; Seth Mydans, "Thais Angrily Blaming Universities for Deadlock on Trade Post," *New York Times*, May 8, 1999, 2.

⁵³ James Brooke, "North Korean Communists Visit Seoul Parliament for First Time," *New York Times*, August 17, 2005, A5.

⁵⁴ J. Mohan Malik, "India's Response to the Gulf Crisis: Implications for Indian Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey* 31 (September 1991): 847–861; Susumu Awanohara, "Japan-US: Ties Frayed by Resentment," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 153 (June 20, 1991): 54.




FIGURE 2: "Fuck your crazy American!!!" Graffiti marking anti-American anger at People's University in Beijing, China, in 1999. Reprinted with permission from Scott Kennedy and with the assistance of Peter Hays Gries.

dozen Chinese cities, during which thousands of students stoned the U.S. embassy in Beijing, burned the residence of the American consul in Chengdu, and advocated the expulsion of McDonald's from Guangzhou. Two years later, Chinese nationalists rallied again when a young Chinese pilot died presumably defending the motherland from the arrogant intrusion of a U.S. spy plane flying along the Chinese coast.⁵⁵

Perhaps the most predictable post-Cold War policy problem for the United States was finding a way to integrate China into Washington's conception of the new international order—to manage the peaceful rise of a China that seemed likely to emerge as the principal competitor to American power. Americans had long insisted that they favored the emergence of a strong and prosperous China. But some feared that such a China might become a threat to the influence and conceivably the security of the United States. They argued that their government ought to be containing rather than engaging China. Young Chinese, aware of these debates in the United States, interpreted American criticism of their human rights record, their political system, their quest for reunification with Taiwan, and their record on proliferation and on trade as an effort to undermine their government. Indeed, many of these youths, having looked to the United States as a teacher and a model in the 1980s,

⁵⁵ "Bombs in Belgrade, Bricks in Beijing," *The Economist* 351, no. 8119 (May 15, 1999): 41–42; Ezra Vogel, "What the United States Must Do to Get Relations with China Back on Track," *Boston Globe*, July 8, 1999, 7; Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism* (Berkeley, Calif., 2004), 14.

felt rejected and angry in the 1990s. Reviving the sort of cultural attack on American society that had characterized nineteenth-century Chinese travelogues, the 1993 smash TV hit *A Beijinger in New York* provided a harshly anti-American portrait of heartless, immoral, and cutthroat economic competition. So too the 1996 best-selling book *China Can Say No* vividly denounced the United States and its invidious influence on the Chinese people. Less luridly, but with similar conviction, scholars worried about American hegemony and desire to bury communism.⁵⁶

The attack on New York and Washington by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, had a profound effect on relationships in Asia, as it did on those between the U.S. and peoples around the world. The initial devastation and American distress evoked sympathy, but surveys taken soon thereafter showed that opinion leaders across Asia believed that the United States had overreacted with its war on terrorism. In Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines—as in Europe—polling data showed that 76 percent thought it was good for Americans to feel vulnerable, and 60 percent contended that U.S. policy had provoked the attacks. Even though these opinion-setters reported widespread favorable feelings toward the United States in their countries, they also contended that American policies were responsible for the dangerous gap between rich and poor countries.⁵⁷

September 11th may have evoked compassion in some places and *schadenfreude* in others, but for the Chinese it created a welcome opportunity to accelerate a process of repairing relations marred by anti-American attacks on one side and fears of a China threat on the other. Although in China, as elsewhere in Asia, there were some who celebrated as the Twin Towers fell, China's president quickly called Washington to offer condolences and assistance. Beginning in those early hours, the rhetoric of anti-Americanism virtually disappeared, to be replaced by declarations of cooperation and friendship.

In Asia, as in most of the rest of the world, favorable attitudes toward the United States dropped significantly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Muslim countries were especially troubled. Polls showed that 72 percent of Pakistanis and 74 percent of Indonesians professed to fear an American attack on their country. Favorable views of the United States in Indonesia dropped from 61 percent in 2002 to 15 percent in 2003. The Japanese public disliked the war and opposed the decision of the national government to send troops to Iraq to support American occupation activities. But pollsters found anti-Americanism "especially prevalent" in South Korea, where hostility to the Iraq war simply magnified anger over a panoply of other issues. Only in Singapore, where the regime nursed its own historic fears of Muslims, did strong support for the United States materialize.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Gries, *China's New Nationalism*, 18, 42, 110; Geremie R. Barme, "To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic: China's Avant-garde Nationalists," *The China Journal* 34 (July 1995): 210–214, 231–234; Wang Jisi and Liu Zhimin, "Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era: Three Images of the United States," *Asian Survey* 32 (October 1992): 902–917; Philip C. Saunders, "China's America Watchers: Changing Attitudes towards the US," *The China Quarterly* 161 (March 2000): 41–65; Rosalie Chen, "China Perceives America: Perspectives of International Relations Experts," *Journal of Contemporary China* 12 (2003): 285–297.

⁵⁷ Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen as Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders: Little Support for Expanding War on Terrorism," December 19, 2001.

⁵⁸ Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "War with Iraq Further Divides Global Pub-

THE ATTITUDE OF EDUCATED INDIANS and Indian officials toward the United States might serve as a paradigm for Asian views generally. Citizens of the world's most populous democracy manifestly had no quarrel with the U.S. political system or the freedoms that Americans enjoyed. Nonetheless, they favored the Soviet Union over the United States for most of the Cold War. Their leaders and their media often expressed extraordinarily negative views of the U.S. Why?

The United States asked the world to adhere to a very high standard of behavior and proclaimed itself a model to the international community in the wake of World War II. Accordingly, the people of the world, and particularly those in Asia whose struggles with colonialism, imperialism, and inequality continued, held Americans to that high standard. When Americans failed, and they did so repeatedly, they sparked anger at what appeared to be hypocritical principles and policies.

Analysis of polling data and commentary in the Indian press, for instance, indicates skepticism about American society. As socialists, Indian political leaders and some intellectuals were predisposed to see American capitalism as exploitative, and they shared delusions about the virtues of Soviet "socialism." But they were not deluded when they denounced racism in the United States and questioned the commitment of the American people to their professed ideals of freedom and equality. As they read about discrimination against their nationals in the U.S., about Jim Crow, about lynchings, and about the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., who had espoused Gandhi's methods of peaceful confrontation, the evidence of a contradiction between American principles and practices was overwhelming.

Similarly, it was easy for Indians, so recently freed from British imperialism, to identify with the struggle of the people of Indochina against French imperialism—and to see the intervention of the United States in Vietnam as betraying a fundamental inconsistency between American anti-imperialist rhetoric and its imperial actions. They saw American support for Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, as well as for Bao Dai and Ngo Dinh Diem, as Washington's effort to impose leaders of its choice on Asian peoples.

In large part, negative Indian attitudes toward the United States were founded on the paradox of a counterrevolutionary revolutionary state. Americans saw themselves as fighting for democracy, freedom, and equality against a godless Soviet communist conspiracy that threatened to impose a monolithic system of control across Asia. The Indian view of the causes and consequences of the Cold War clearly differed significantly.

But none of this explains fluctuations in Indian responses to the United States as much as do specific American policies toward India and toward India's adversaries—Pakistan, in particular, but also China. For much of the Cold War, the United States allied itself with Pakistan and provided the Pakistanis with substantial economic and military aid, outraging Indian opinion. In 1955, Secretary of State Dulles appeared to prefer the steady hand of a declining European colonial state when he condoned Portuguese control over the enclave of Goa rather than see India recover its coastal territory. In 1971, Richard Nixon sided with Pakistan against India to try,

lies," June 3, 2003; Keith B. Richburg, "Kerry Is Widely Favored Abroad: Hostility toward Bush Revealed in Surveys and Interviews," *Washington Post*, September 29, 2004, 14.

unsuccessfully, to prevent creation of the state of Bangladesh. On the other hand, when the Americans supported India, as in the Sino-Indian War of 1962, images of the United States became more favorable. In short, American policy also mattered. The Cold War per se was relevant only in that anticommunism produced Washington's anger at India's flirtation with Moscow, and the U.S. desire to contain communist influence in China led to American aid to Pakistan and support for India against China.

Comparable stories could be told about other countries in the region regardless of regional diversity. Polling data, probably most extensive on Japanese public opinion, as well as the writings of Asian analysts demonstrate positive views of democracy and freedom in the United States among noncommunist populations, and even among an emerging middle class in China.⁵⁹ Criticism of American society overwhelmingly has focused on the failure of Americans to live in accordance with the principles they espouse and the unwillingness of their government to conduct its foreign affairs in accordance with those principles. Where U.S. racism or criminal conduct tested the tolerance of Asians, they lashed out at the United States as much out of disappointment as from simple anger.

If anti-Americanism is defined as disapproval of the principles of liberty and equality to which virtually all Americans believe themselves to be committed, there is very little of that in Asia. What exists can be found among the ruling elites of the surviving communist countries of the region and amid the increasing numbers of Islamists—who are appalled by secularism, popular culture, and especially the freedom of women in the United States and the West in general. More often than not, Asians appear to admire and enjoy American popular culture. Disneyland, Starbucks, McDonald's, and KFCs proliferate. Chinese performers emulate American modern dance companies. In Hong Kong, the official program for preparing mainland Chinese children to enter the city's public schools concludes with a stop at McDonald's for a Big Mac, fries, and a Coke. The millions who emigrate to the United States every year still see it as the land of opportunity. American soft power continues to have enormous appeal in Asia.⁶⁰

At various times during the Cold War, peoples all over Asia, like those in India, opposed American policies that placed the fight against communism above their national priorities, appeared to favor the interests of their adversaries, or seemed recklessly and insensitively to be extending American interests at any cost. Thus America's war in Vietnam alienated large numbers of ordinary people in the region. Often they disapproved of Washington's support for dictators or unpopular governments, including those in their own countries. Governments in the communist states did what they could to poison the minds of their people against the United States.

At the same time, strong majorities in Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan—and for most of the Cold War years, in South Korea—were grateful for American aid and protection. Since 2003, as the focus of American military activity has shifted to the Middle East, favorable views of the United States have not declined as sharply

⁵⁹ Alastair Iain Johnston, "Chinese Middle Class Attitudes towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?" *The China Quarterly* 179 (September 2004): 603–628.

⁶⁰ Warren I. Cohen, *The Asian American Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 2002).

in Asia as elsewhere in the world, except, of course, in Muslim countries—although Pankaj Mishra has noted that anti-American sentiments remain rare among India's more than 100 million Muslims, and Kashmiri Muslim leaders continue to appeal for American mediation in the India-Pakistan dispute.⁶¹

Preoccupation with the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq, however, has robbed U.S. policy in Asia of many of the virtues that kept Asian opinion favorable. Because Washington has narrowed its approach in Asia, as elsewhere, to issues that appear to revolve around security imperatives, leaving economic and other ties open to exploitation by competitors, the future for the United States in Asia may be more difficult than the past. Unless policies change soon, anti-Americanism may become less of a problem for the United States in the Asian region than its irrelevance.

⁶¹ Pankaj Mishra, "The Misunderstood Muslims," *New York Review of Books*, November 17, 2005, 17, n. 6.

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AHR Forum
Anti-Americanism: It's the Policies

JUAN COLE

EXPLAINING ANTI-AMERICANISM is more difficult than it may seem on the surface, and the phenomenon itself is far more varied and complex than can be conveyed by the stock image of rallies in the global South demanding that the Yankees go home. Each of the articles in this *AHR Forum* focuses on a particular geographical region (Latin America, Europe, and Asia) and advances an explicit or implicit thesis about the nature of anti-Americanism. Among the main explanations for hostility toward the U.S. have been rejection of democratic ideals and preference for various forms of authoritarianism. Given that the United States has been a democratic success story for more than two centuries, this line of thinking concludes, it is necessary to critique it if classic liberalism itself is to be discredited.

Other authors have argued that hostility toward the United States is generated not by fears of its uncontrolled grassroots politics, but by foreign policy stances taken by U.S. elites, which have an impact on publics in the rest of the world that those publics perceive as negative. Yet another common thesis is that the rapacious and unrestrained character of American capitalism alarms observers abroad, especially in a globalizing world where U.S. monopoly practices can have an immediate and wide-ranging impact.

The authors in this Forum attempt in various ways to complicate these easy narratives of perfidy and hypocrisy, of irrational fear and calculated self-interest. All put forward theses about the nature of the phenomenon in their area of the world. I have been assigned the task of commenting on these arguments, and also of injecting the Middle East into a discussion that for the most part touches on it only tangentially. Do the Middle Eastern cases cast any light on the generalizability of the authors' perspectives, which have been arrived at by consideration of other regions of the world?

IN GREG GRANDIN'S ESSAY on anti-Americanism in Latin America, a fourfold distinction is made. There are American liberal and universal ideals, with Jefferson, Whitman, and FDR instanced. Then there is American imperial power, often exercised in ways starkly contrary to the country's stated ideals. Likewise, there is the Latin American perception of the central ideals of the United States, and the Latin perception of Washington's deployment of brute power in the hemisphere. Grandin quotes authors on the right, such as Jean-François Revel, to the effect that anti-

Americanism seeks to “discredit liberalism” by “discrediting its supreme incarnation.” That is, these authors argue that anti-Americanism springs from the rejection of individual liberties, democratic governance, and free market capitalism. Grandin argues that this definition is one-dimensional, defining the United States only with regard to its constitutional ideals, and missing the complexity of the Latin American critique.

That complexity is underlined at the beginning of Grandin’s essay with regard to Guatemalan activist Humberto Alvarado Arellano, a communist whose response to heavy-handed U.S. intervention in his country and the rollback of the social reforms of the 1940s was to turn to the poetry of Walt Whitman. In some sense, America the ideal survived in his mind America the calculating cold warrior, which backed dictatorship, death squads, and repression (a repression that helped end his own life in 1971).

Grandin argues that “anti-Americanism” as it came to be used by elite writers in the U.S. during the Cold War was indeed deeply imbued with ideology. Whereas much anti-American political activity in Latin America, he alleges, came in response to Washington’s support for dictators and strong men, American ideologues attempted to blunt the force of the critique of actual policy by claiming that the opposition derived instead from dislike of high American values. The Latin dissidents themselves, in contrast, tended to define themselves not as “anti-American,” but rather as “anti-imperialist” and anti-racist, and they seldom lost sight of a pan-American universalism to which the ideals of the United States heavily contributed. In this reading, “what is often taken for anti-Americanism in Latin America is, in fact, a competing variant of Americanism.”

Although Grandin tends to focus on the Latin American censure of Washington’s heavy-handed and calculating interventions in the Southern Hemisphere, the four-fold grid of the analysis allows for a subdued admission that some Latin writers did critique not only imperialism but also liberalism, as Revel would maintain. Thus, Grandin admits that they often contrasted Spanish Catholic spirituality and aesthetics with Anglo-Protestant notions of secular individualism and utilitarianism. Likewise, the Latin left, whatever its attitude to the Declaration of Independence or the Bill of Rights, often despised the corporations and free market entrepreneurs that sought profits in Latin American markets, automatically equating such activity with exploitation and repression. These admissions are, however, most often elided in the argument of the article, which instead insists that “Over the course of two centuries, it has not been clashing universalisms that served as the primary fault line between the two Americas, but how the expansion of the United States’ political and economic power fractured a shared sense of exceptionalism.”

Grandin shows that the phenomenon of overbearing American institutions was hardly a figment of Latin activist imaginations. Even Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Nelson Rockefeller recognized the discontents generated by U.S. corporate sharp practice in the region. Grandin argues that the 1940s were a sort of golden age in which the U.S. government under Roosevelt accepted “hemispheric pluralism,” fore-swore military intervention, and was even known to side with Latin Americans against overly rapacious U.S. corporations. With the end of World War II, however, the United States went back to supporting coups to ensure “stability,” and during

the Cold War it intervened widely in both politics and social policy in the name of stopping the spread of communism. Grandin concludes his essay with a quote from *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman, who argued with regard to Iraq that “we need to go into the heart of [the Arab] world and beat their brains out, frankly,” and then “partner with them” to “build a decent and different Iraq.” Grandin is convinced that given the failures of the U.S. in Latin America, where at least there was a shared belief in Americanism, the prospect that such a project can succeed in the Middle East is low.

JESSICA C. E. GIENOW-HECHT’S ANALYTICAL APPROACH is very different. She concentrates on a distinction between cultural anti-Americanism and political anti-Americanism, and argues that the relative strength of the two varies with the historical period. She also insists on a dialectical approach, such that anti-American and pro-American impulses struggle with each other within each of the major political currents on the Continent over time. She argues that anti-Americanism has been as strong on the European right as on the left, and that it would be difficult to separate out the cultural, economic, and political dimensions of the phenomenon. In the end, however, she believes that European anti-Americanism is primarily a cultural orientation, and that its political aspect is a mere mask. The American model is ultimately a cultural model, and governments in countries of all ideological stripes have rejected it over time.

Gienow-Hecht holds that after the failure of the French Revolution, the U.S. was the main model for the republican variant of Enlightenment values in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, and so, as in Latin America, an ideal of Americanism was often shared by European liberals. Before World War I, she says, it was mainly conservative elites and competing commercial interests in Europe who expressed alarm about the United States. (She earlier had acknowledged anti-Americanism in Marx and Engels and their followers, but appears to discount it as unimportant in this period.) In the twentieth century, every decade brought its own concerns about the U.S., from Fordism in the 1920s to economic instability and depression in the 1930s. As Gienow-Hecht shows, each theme generated both positive and negative appraisals in a variety of political movements. (She even finds some philo-Americanism among Nazi thinkers who admired the country’s industrial might and techniques.) The U.S. as symbol of capitalist modernity and urbanized mass society both fascinated and repelled Europeans on the left and the right.

Gienow-Hecht, it seems to me, tries so hard to sustain her thesis of a dialectical relationship within each movement and country between anti-American and pro-American sentiments that she is in danger of insufficiently stressing the vast difference between the generally pro-American Weimar Republic and the anti-American Nazis, or between the views of intellectuals in the French Third Republic and the stridently anti-American and nativist Vichy.

She maintains that only with the advent of the Cold War did some Europeans adopt anti-Americanism as a key part of their political ideology, as opposed to their cultural orientation. (This conclusion, which dismisses the anti-Americanism of in-

terwar communist and fascist parties as merely cultural, strikes me as not entirely convincing.) She continues to emphasize the anti-Americanism of French and German parties on both the left and the right during the Cold War, mainly articulated, she says, as a critique of the disjuncture between the constitutional ideals of the U.S. and the brutality of its foreign policy in the Third World and its brandishing of weapons of mass destruction on European soil. She points to a growing anti-American sentiment among the young in the 1970s and 1980s. She is careful to use opinion polls to show, however, that pro-American feelings remained powerful, often even in the same political currents that denounced the U.S. She argues that the polls conducted between 1975 and 1983 reveal that 30 percent of Western Europeans were pro-U.S., 10 percent were reliably anti-American, and the rest declined to take sides except when pressed. If asked whether the United States or the USSR represented the greater threat, 64 percent of Germans in the 1980s said Moscow, and half maintained that the U.S. was Bonn's greatest friend.

Ironically, many of the things that Europeans, from Malta to Greece to Turkey, object to in American cultural influence are the same issues that enrage the religious right in the U.S. itself—concerns about Hollywood films and secular values, the weakening of the family, and urban alienation. Some of the critiques of the United States by European communists, of unrestrained individualism and consumerism, sounded a good deal like those of U.S. evangelists. With the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the question of international institutions and human rights, Gienow-Hecht says, political anti-Americanism has again come to the fore, overshadowing the cultural anti-Americanism of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath.

Gienow-Hecht's dialectical approach and emphasis on culture seem to me in the end less successful than Grandin's analysis of Latin Americans' negative assessments of the United States. She has relatively little to say about American investment and corporate presence, about the way Washington used loans to pressure postwar governments, and about occasional American anticolonialism (e.g., Algeria and the Suez Crisis) as a complicating factor in U.S. relations with the European right. Reaganite and post-Reaganite neoliberalism and hostility to unions, as well as growing tolerance of monopolistic practices in Washington, are also key sites of European critical thinking about the United States. Economics and hard-edged politics, it seems to me, were more important than she allows, even at the level of the public as opposed to political elites. Her emphasis on a dialectic of competing pro-American and anti-American currents within each political movement and within each country makes it hard for her to come to clear conclusions about the weight of each in many instances, and it is their relative weight at any one time in any one political current that is at issue. Finally, it seems to me that she could have usefully brought out more fully the impact on Europeans' feelings about the U.S. of their perceptions of and experiences with its rival, the Soviet Union, and the implications of the latter's fall.

WARREN I. COHEN AND NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER ARGUE that both perceptions of who Americans are (i.e., their values and way of life) and perceptions of U.S. policy in Asia have combined to affect Asian attitudes toward the United States. Their his-

torically grounded treatment begins with the poor impression made on Asia by U.S. colonialism in the Philippines, which was brutal and heavily inflected with blatant racism (although not as universally as the authors imply, with Arthur McArthur and other officers sometimes an exception). They also discuss the Chinese Exclusion Acts and limitations on Japanese immigration, although it is likely that the Japanese in Japan understood the impulses behind the latter all too well. Initial Asian hopes that the United States would form a counterweight to the imperialism of Europe gave way to bitter disappointment, in Mao Zedong and others, when it turned out that Wilson's "14 Points" were not intended to be taken seriously for non-European populations, and when it transpired that the U.S. was as imperialist as the older powers.

The authors point to the Soviet Union as an instigator of anti-American sentiment in the Chinese Communist Party after 1928, with the result that the CCP condemned the U.S. as "one hundred times worse than England or Japan." The instigation was successful in part because it accorded with Chinese experiences of U.S. policy. Nevertheless, liberal reformers in both China and Japan during the interwar period often continued to look to America as a model and success story. In Japan, that admiration declined in the 1930s and 1940s as the Japanese government demonized the United States, but Japan-U.S. conflict actually helped America's image in China.

Cohen and Tucker see four main developments as fashioning attitudes toward the U.S. in Asia during the Cold War. These were the rise of communist regimes in China, North Korea, and Southeast Asia, the benign character of the U.S. occupation of Japan, the vast increase in the American economic presence in the region, and the growing egalitarianism in the U.S. itself, leading to the gradual removal of race-based immigration restrictions. Anti-Americanism was led on ideological grounds by the communists, socialists, and Islamists, but conservative elites in East Asia and India joined in on other grounds, decrying the vulgarity of American culture and the perils of unrestrained individualism.

In the two decades after World War II, say Cohen and Tucker, Jim Crow and violent responses to the civil rights movement gave Asians the firm impression that white Americans were racists, and Asian experiences in the U.S. sometimes did little to counter it. (The authors have little to say about racist attitudes within Asian societies themselves, and the ways those sentiments may have shaped perceptions of the U.S.) Likewise, expanding U.S. power in the region transformed the image of the United States into that of an imperialist power for many Asians, with U.S. military bases and rowdy GIs a poor argument to the contrary. Trade frictions and overbearing U.S. trade treaties, which often attempted to dictate domestic policy, were a further irritant. U.S. anticommunism may have cemented Washington's alliances with Asian governments and entrepreneurs, but its willingness to resort to propping up military dictatorships, in Korea and elsewhere, as bulwarks against Marxism also contributed to a souring of public opinion toward the United States.

Cohen and Tucker's essay focuses primarily on East Asia but does occasionally have things to say about South Asia. They turn to Pakistan, and posit that the 1979 Khomeini revolution in Iran was a turning point in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, because in 1979 the U.S. embassy in Islamabad was burned down. This hypothesis is incorrect; the vast majority of Pakistanis are Sunni Muslims, who had little sym-

pathy for Khomeini's Shiite vision of rule by mullah. Rather, the attack on the U.S. embassy was sparked by inaccurate rumors that the Americans had had something to do with the takeover of a mosque in Mecca by Saudi religious dissidents that same year. The authors note Pakistani hostility to the Reagan administration's bombing of Libya, but mysteriously neglect the elephant in the living room—the alliance of the CIA and the hard-line Pakistani Islamists in a jihad against the Soviet occupation of neighboring Afghanistan. As for India, Cohen and Tucker note that much negative public opinion toward the U.S. in that country, as reflected in polls, had to do with a perception that the U.S. economic system was exploitative and grasping.

Cohen and Tucker conclude that anti-American street demonstrations in most of Asia during the twentieth century typically had nothing to do with attitudes toward the U.S. political system of democracy and free elections, but rather derived from rational local responses to the perceived damage done to Asian publics by specific U.S. foreign policy initiatives.

They argue that the fall of the Soviet Union saw, for the most part, a replacement of ideological struggles with a renewed nationalism in Asia that was often critical of the sole remaining superpower—whether the issue was bases in the Philippines or Okinawa, the continued division of the Koreas and the aggressive stance of the U.S. toward Pyongyang, or, for China, U.S. support for Taiwan. They conclude that after September 11, as well as before, the major source of anti-American attitudes was not hostility toward the democratic system but a pervasive perception of hypocrisy in U.S. foreign policy, whereby the country failed to live up to its own high standards. The Bush administration's virtually unilateral invasion of Iraq universally lowered its poll numbers throughout Asia, often quite substantially, because it was seen as a betrayal of the U.S. commitment to national self-determination for all and of a commitment to the rule of law.

PERHAPS IN NO REGION OF THE WORLD have U.S. interests suffered more from public anti-Americanism than in the Muslim Middle East (excluding Israel). The hostility of Middle Eastern publics to the United States in the opening years of the twenty-first century is perhaps unparalleled in the entire world. According to Dafna Linzer of the *Washington Post*, polling by Zogby International showed that the proportion of the Egyptian public holding a negative view of the United States increased between 2002 and 2004 from 76 percent to 98 percent.¹ A poll released on June 13, 2006, by the Pew Global Attitudes Project showed that even after opinions of the U.S. improved following its humanitarian intervention to help victims of the late 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, views in the Middle East edged lower again in 2006.² In Pakistan, Jordan, and Turkey, respectively, 27, 15, and 12 percent of the public expressed a favorable view of the U.S. in 2006, in comparison to 23, 21, and 23 percent the year before. The regimes of all three countries are strong geopolitical allies of the United States, with Turkey a member of NATO and Jordan a non-NATO ally.

¹ Dafna Linzer, "Poll Shows Growing Arab Rancor at U.S.," *Washington Post*, July 23, 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7080-2004Jul22.html> (accessed July 24, 2006).

² "America's Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, Hamas," June 13, 2006, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252> (accessed July 24, 2006).

But their publics clearly would not put the U.S. ambassador at the top of their invitation list for any galas they planned to throw.

But do these negative views reflect a clash of civilizations or a dislike for democracy? The answer is clearly no. The World Values Survey at the University of Michigan, run by Ronald F. Inglehart, found that in Muslim nations (Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey), 87 percent of the public approves of democratic ideals, and 68 percent approves of the way democracy actually performs as a governmental system.³ Despite negative views of the U.S., around half of Turks and Moroccans say that those who move there will have a better life.⁴ The Revel thesis that anti-Americanism derives mainly from hostility to U.S. democracy and free market capitalism does not hold much water. When asked, Middle Eastern publics are not shy in saying precisely what they mind about the United States. Before 2003, it was what they considered to be a foreign policy criminally slanted against Palestinian victims of Israeli expansionism. After 2003, it was the Palestinian issue plus what they see as the brutal American occupation of Iraq. Linzer writes of 2004, "Those polled said their opinions were shaped by U.S. policies, rather than by values or culture. When asked, 'What is the first thought when you hear "America"?' respondents overwhelmingly said: 'Unfair foreign policy.' And when asked what the United States could do to improve its image in the Arab world, the most frequently provided answers were 'Stop supporting Israel' and 'Change your Middle East policy.'"

The modern Middle East was forged in a dialectic of European colonialism, nationalist revolt, and postcolonial conflict. France in Algeria, 1830–1962, is emblematic of the arrogance of Western power, in the struggle against which twentieth-century Middle Easterners forged their political identities. The French neglected their Algerian subjects, let them starve in the famine of 1866–1871, brutally repressed uprisings, and brought in a million settlers to usurp the best land and economic opportunities; and when the Algerians arose to struggle for independence in 1954–1962, the French did not scruple to commit a sort of genocide, killing hundreds of thousands. After decades or in some cases more than a century of European political and economic dominance, Middle Eastern publics came to see national independence and cultural authenticity (often coded as Islamic law and practice) as inseparable components of what they call "democracy." Polls show that although they strongly support free elections as the best system, if they had a choice between elections held under conditions of foreign occupation or an indigenous dictatorship, a substantial number would choose the latter hands down.

After World War II, the United States gradually supplanted France and Britain as the major power in the region. Fairly or not, many Middle Easterners transferred their grievances toward and distrust of Paris and London to Washington. Initially, under FDR and Eisenhower, the U.S. showed substantial sympathy for local nationalist aspirations and urged the end of colonialism, lest local populations go communist as a means of throwing off the foreign yoke. Roosevelt met with the Moroccan

³ Pippa Norris and Ronald F. Inglehart, "Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis," *Comparative Sociology* 1, no. 3/4 (2002): 235–264.

⁴ Pew Research Center, "A Year after Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists," March 16, 2004, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206> (accessed July 24, 2006).

sultan in 1943 and encouraged Morocco's independence from France. Eisenhower intervened against the conspiracy by Britain, France, and Israel to take down Egyptian nationalist leader Gamal Abdul Nasser in 1956, saying that their war of aggression endangered the ideals of the United Nations. Eisenhower also twisted the arms of the French to decolonize in Algeria, threatening to call in Paris's substantial postwar debt to the U.S.

But where Eisenhower feared an onslaught by the left, he did not scruple to intervene in a neo-imperialist way himself, as he did in overthrowing the elected government of Iran in 1953 over the oil nationalization issue—something for which Iranians have never forgiven the U.S. He also invaded Lebanon in 1958 to forestall a mostly imaginary demarche by communists or Arab nationalists. A new, muscular American interventionism was driven by anticommunism on both sides of the ledger—fear that bourgeois nationalists might go communist if decolonization was delayed, but determination to crush those nationalist movements that had already drifted to the left.

The nexus of local conflicts and Cold War alliances powerfully shaped local attitudes toward the United States. As the U.S. allied more and more strongly with Israel under Johnson, Arab regimes began to seek other support. Abdul Nasser welcomed Khrushchev to Cairo in 1964 and became more explicitly a Soviet ally. Syria likewise increasingly warmed to Moscow. Libya after 1969, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Algeria, and Baathist Iraq all developed close ties to the Soviet Union, such that both regimes and their publics came to be critical of the United States. There were two brakes on Cold War anti-Americanism in the region. First, many Middle Eastern regimes and publics were more afraid of the spread of communism than they were of U.S. influence. Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf mostly had good relations with the U.S. throughout this period. Second, the U.S. was so wealthy and powerful that there was a constant temptation to establish dealings with it, as Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat did in the 1970s, turning Egypt into a Washington ally.

The Arab-Israeli conflict increasingly polarized the region, especially from 1967, when the Arabs were humiliated during the Six-Day War, and Israel occupied Jerusalem (Islam's third-holiest city) and thereafter ruled as a colonial power over the stateless Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. As the Israelis began colonizing the occupied territories in earnest, they evoked shock and outrage throughout the Muslim world, and as it became clear that the United States would do nothing practical to stop this project, it earned a share of the hostility directed by Arabs and Muslims toward the Zionist state.

How to make sense of these attitudes? One researcher found, in a tight statistical study, that anti-Americanism in Pakistan in the late 1970s was driven by only two big issues: whether the United States lived up to its promises of foreign aid, and whether it supported Pakistan versus India in the central political conflict that consumed the Pakistani public. The gradual U.S. abandonment of its earlier alliance with Pakistan in the 1960s and 1970s, the adoption of a stance of neutrality in the

Indo-Pak wars, and the reduction and then cutoff of U.S. aid were statistically the independent variables in anti-American attitudes.⁵ The third issue—the impact of the metropolitan power on local autonomy—did not arise in this study, but I think it is obvious from the polling done in the Middle East that it is absolutely central to phenomena such as anti-Americanism (or, during the 1980s Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, anti-Sovietism).

Most countries have enemies, and humans seem to like binary ways of thinking, of which the Cold War was a prime example. Conflicts between India and Pakistan, Israelis and Arabs (or Muslims), and China and Taiwan all center on geopolitical fault lines where overlapping claims on territory galvanize larger political allegiances. U.S. relations with China improved when Washington adopted the “one China” formula. One source of anti-American feeling in the Middle East is clearly that the U.S. is siding strongly with one party in such a grand binary geopolitical struggle. All of Israel’s opponents and critics of its treatment of the Palestinians thereby bear some degree of resentment toward the United States. This resentment does not necessarily mean bad diplomatic relations with Washington. But whereas regimes might moderate their displeasure with the U.S. in order to gain strategic rent, for instance, the Egyptian public has no reason to pull its punches with the pollsters.

The United States can sometimes offset this hostility by being perceived as a generous friend in crisis. Thus, both Indonesians and the publics of many other countries had a better opinion of the U.S. after it clearly made major efforts to help the victims of the tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Likewise, the U.S. got a slight bounce in the polls in Pakistan for diverting military helicopters from Afghanistan to help the earthquake victims in Pakistani Kashmir. The substantial amount of foreign aid that the United States gives Egypt, in contrast, appears to have no positive effect on public opinion, although it is true that much of that aid is military or structured in such a way that ordinary Egyptians see little of it. What the Egyptian public sees as the neo-imperial policies of the U.S. in Palestine and Iraq outweighs the value of simple aid. For those Egyptians, probably not a majority, who deeply dislike the Mubarak regime, the fact that it is propped up by the U.S. is also a sore point.

After such a long time spent under often exploitative Western domination, post-colonial publics in the Middle East simply do not trust Westerners to rule Muslims benignly. In the 2004 Pew Global Attitudes poll cited above, 61 percent of Pakistanis, 70 percent of Jordanians, and nearly half of Moroccans expressed the belief that Iraq would be worse off after Saddam Hussein fell and the Americans took over. They also for the most part approved of suicide bombings against Americans in Iraq. Clearly, they consider the country to be occupied by a foreign power—the United States—and Middle Easterners on the whole view that as a fate worse than death, against which taking extreme measures is entirely understandable.

The three main determinants of Middle Eastern perceptions of an outside power such as the United States, then, are which side it takes in the Arab-Israeli struggle, how much it is perceived to contribute to economic development in the region, and whether it promotes or detracts from the national autonomy of regional states.

⁵ Shafqat Hussain Naghmi, “Pakistan’s Public Attitude toward the United States,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26, no. 3 (September 1982): 507–523.

THE POLLING DONE in the Middle East and Pakistan suggests ways of looking at sentiments about the United States in the other regions considered in this Forum. Take Europe, for example. The United States' Marshall Plan helped rebuild Western Europe after World War II, for which many Europeans of that generation remained grateful. The grand binary geopolitical struggle in Europe in the postwar period was obviously the Cold War, and so the generally high marks that West Germans, for example, gave the United States throughout this time clearly had to do with their alliance with Washington. (The less some Europeans, such as the left, feared the Soviet Union, the less reason they had to view the U.S. favorably.) The enormously important place that the U.S. had in Western European politics and the economy, however, did detract from national independence, and so generated some degree of anti-American feeling. (Sentiments against the influence of "vulgar" American mass culture, which are common in the Middle East as well, would come under this heading.) In the post-Cold War period, Europeans are forging a new union and feel protected by the rule of law and international coordination, and they clearly feel that warfare without UN sanction is illegal. The unilateral, almost rogue foreign policy of the Bush administration in Iraq and elsewhere has put Washington on the wrong side of this new binary. The U.S. has also ceased contributing much to Western Europe, and indeed is a net debtor. "What have you done for me lately?" might be an apt question for Western Europeans to ask Washington.

The polling in all four of these regions tells us that anti-Americanism is anything but an essentialist cultural phenomenon. It is highly volatile, and sensitive to the changing weight of these major variables. Pew found that in 1999, late in the Clinton administration, some 75 percent of Indonesians had a favorable view of the United States. By 2002, in the wake of the war fought in Afghanistan after September 11 by the Bush administration, that number had fallen to 61 percent. When Bush invaded Iraq in 2003, Indonesians' opinion of the United States plummeted to 15 percent. When the Americans proved so helpful after the tsunami, it rebounded in 2005 to 38 percent. But by the spring of 2006, the slow grind of bad news from Iraq and, courtesy of Aljazeera, Palestine had sent the numbers down again, to 30 percent. The U.S. did not change its way of governing or its basic value system, at least domestically, during this period, but the numbers have bounced up and down like a yo-yo. Some of this volatility, moreover, may come from the new vigor of Indonesia's relatively free press and freewheeling democratic debate in the wake of the demise of the military dictatorship. What is indisputable is that the sentiments are not generated by a clash over basic values. It's the foreign policy, stupid.

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Reviews of Books

METHODS/THEORY

J. J. A. MOOIJ. *Time and Mind: The History of a Philosophical Problem*. Translated by PETER MASON. (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, number 129.) Boston: Brill. 2005. Pp. 287. \$134.00.

The intimate relation of philosophy and history has given rise to a series of issues concerning the "question of time." This book provides an extensive history of a central problem in the philosophy of time, and opens the preface with the question: "Can time exist independently of consciousness or mind?" J. J. A. Mooij addresses the history of this question and analyzes the answers and arguments extended on its behalf in their historical context. The historical scope extends from classical antiquity to the year 2000. Although one may have opined that "the problem of Time and Mind had been solved" either "by Newton around 1700, by Kant around 1800," or "by Bergson around 1900," Mooij maintains, the question remains "open today" (p. 261).

The Ionian cosmogonies of the sixth century B.C.E. explained how an ordered world evolved out of an undifferentiated initial state of "things." In the fifth century, science became more particularly an inquiry into the ultimate constitution of material substance: the uniform and permanent "nature of things." The notion of substance derives from tactile sensation. The belief in substantial things outside us reverts to the original detachment of self from the object. With Heraclitus of Ephesus, philosophy focused on knowing the thing, not on that which is known. Thought controls the phenomena as it constitutes the thinker. The problem of understanding nature was taken to a new level. The Milesian school of philosophers had moved it to the realm of the intellect in that they claimed the universe to be an intelligible whole. The manifold was to be understood as deriving from a sustaining principle or first cause, but was to be perceived in the phenomena.

For Aristotle, chance is a cause, similar to nature as a cause. Natural motions operate both for a purpose and in accordance with necessity. They are purposive since the sequences of natural processes are not at random. Having set forth the principles, causes, and kinds of motions, Aristotle proceeds in the third and fourth books of his *Physics* to determine the nature of motion and to examine fundamental concepts, such as infinity,

place, void, and time, associated with motion. It is at the end of the fourth book of the *Physics*, Mooij maintains, that Aristotle posits the principle, "there can be no time without the rational mind, that mind is only required to measure something that in other respects has full existence independently of the mind" (p. 77).

In Book XI of his *Confessions*, Augustine formulated the dialectic between historical time and eternity: "Some such different times [past, present, future] do exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see. The present of past things is the memory; the present of present things is direct perception; and the present of future things is expectation. If we speak in these terms, I can see three times and I admit that they exist." According to Mooij, "for Augustine . . . the dependence of time on the soul or mind was only partial" (pp. 68, 78).

In an effort to overcome David Hume's skepticism, Immanuel Kant attempted, among other things, to establish both the validity of knowledge and the impossibility of knowledge without sensory experience. The idea of times derives from the succession of our perceptions. For, as it is from the disposition of visible and tangible objects that we receive the ideas of space, it is also from the succession of ideas and impressions that we form the idea of time. Time, then for Kant, becomes a "necessary" representation that underlies all "time," he remarks, "is therefore a purely subjective condition of our (human) intuition [. . .] and in itself, apart from the subject, is nothing" (p. 166). G. F. W. Hegel proceeded beyond Kant to posit that "the narration of history and historical deeds and events appear at the same time; a common inner principle brings them forth together." In discussing Paul Ricoeur's approach to the question of time, formulated in *Time and Narrative*, Mooij traces the philosophic traditions of idealism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics in that three-volume work. For Ricoeur, "time requires narratives in order to manifest itself fully" (p. 240).

Closely related to the philosophical problem of consciousness of time was the question of the meaning of time and duration in psychology and in literature. Although Mooij mentions William James's notion of "specious present" in passing, he fails to explicate James's perception of time, which attempted to provide an empiricist account of our temporal concepts through the influence of John Locke (p. 197). Apart from this ca-

veat, the book's strength lies in its perceptiveness and breadth of interpretation of the history of the concept of time. Mooij's accuracy in comprehending and in transmitting the essence of such difficult and complicated philosophies is remarkable.

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JEFFREY H. JACKSON and STANLEY C. PELKEY, editors.
Music and History: Bridging the Disciplines. Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi. 2005. Pp. xvii, 268.
\$50.00.

For decades, musicology and history have seemed to revolve in different orbits. Musicologists inherited the Romantic notion of a transcendent art work and discussed pieces as things unto themselves. Where historical connection was sought, it was of stylistic influence strictly within the musical sphere. The second half of the twentieth century saw that model recede if not collapse, to be replaced by a new emphasis on cultural context. The context remained inward looking, however: how can a culture illuminate a musical work, rather than how can a musical work illuminate a culture? For most historians in the Anglo-American tradition, music has been predominantly a sideshow, a fascinating bit of the past but mostly decorative, of little fundamental importance to understanding the past. Music's place in the historical dialogue has been further complicated by the sheer technical difficulties of musical analysis. Few historians have the training or the inclination to engage in nuanced discussion of musical details, and for those that do, who would be able to read it?

This book attempts to do precisely what the title suggests. Edited by Jeffery H. Jackson and Stanley C. Pelkey, it consists of thirteen chapters by different authors, plus an introduction, and a concluding response, by the editors. Not counting Jackson and Pelkey, four of the contributors are musicologists, six are historians, and two specialize in language and literature. The topics themselves are diverse. Lawrence Levine reminisces on his discovery of nineteenth-century music; Helen Marsh Jeffries examines music in a sixteenth-century Oxford college; Laura Mason investigates women and music in the French Revolution; Pelkey discusses national identity and music in British periodicals; Dorothy Potter focuses on Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart's music published in Federal America; Burton Peretti raises the issue of jazz and conservative politics; Charles Freeman seeks to uncover progressive idealism in two twentieth-century operas; Sandra Lyne deals with portrayals of Asians in Puccini operas; Michael Antonucci illuminates encoded messages of resistance in southern blues; William Weber and Donald Burrows consider Henry Purcell's reception in early eighteenth-century England; James A. Davis suggests ways "Dixie" could be used in the classroom; and Michael Kramer proposes a model for interpreting 1960s rock.

Some of the articles deal with more specific musical issues, such as Weber and Burrows's, which considers

the implication of comments in the eighteenth-century *Universal Journal* in the formation of the Western classical canon. Most of the studies in this book address issues of reception or the conditions of production: for instance, who sang in the Chapel College Choir in Oxford in the sixteenth century, or Mozart's reputation in America as determined by music published in Philadelphia, or jazz funding by the U.S. government in the 1950s and 1960s.

Several chapters are framed around important current historical topics. Antonucci's discussion of the blues leads to nuanced political discussions; Mason's discussion of musical activity in the French Revolution addresses central gender issues; Pelkey's examination of British periodicals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries assesses the role of music in the formation of national cultures; and Lyne's analysis of two Puccini operas deals with questions of European attitudes toward other cultures. Although Pelkey is a musicologist, any of these articles, it should be noted, could have been written by a historian with only minimal knowledge of music. They demand little or no expertise into the nature of music itself as a historical document.

Kramer addresses issues of the musicological/historical divide more clearly than anyone else. Using the multitrack metaphor of the recording studio, he envisions a quadripartite disciplinary division of musicology, ethnography, theory, and cultural history; his model clearly privileges cultural history as the grand overseer that pulls all the other tracks together. His analysis is rich and nuanced, although I question whether the boundaries between musicologist, ethnographer, theorist, and cultural historian are as distinct as he portrays them. This is especially true in the study of popular music, which necessitates a more cultural approach than the transcendent model of some classical music studies. Emphasis on recent popular music has another advantage to the historian: the recording, not the score, is the primary document. While transcription requires as deep a musical knowledge as score reading, the recording itself is at least accessible.

Does this book succeed in what it sets out to do: bridge the disciplines? In itself, probably not, in part because, as the final chapter, "Response," reveals, Jackson and Pelkey may be critiquing more past than current practice, confining historical musicology to the study of great works, separating musicology and ethnomusicology, and continuing to view music as object rather than experience. Heuristically, yes: the editors have done a valuable service in raising the basic question of the two disciplines, each of which has as a goal an examination of the past, and some essays do hint at roads to rapprochement. As musicologists and historians both draw on cultural studies, more common ground will likely be found.

MICHAEL BROYLES
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GAVRIEL D. ROSENFELD. *The World Hitler Never Made: Alternate History and the Memory of Nazism*. New

York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 524. \$30.00.

September 11, 2001, reminded people that events can change the course of history, and that no amount of structural reasoning can completely erase the force of contingency in human affairs. Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, a historian of twentieth-century memory, has turned his focus to the genre of writing that centrally turns on contingency: counter-factual history, or alternate history, or, as most people know it, "what-if" history. What if Adolf Hitler had won the war? What if he had survived? What if he had been shot in 1930? Shot in 1944? What if the Holocaust had happened differently? In historical or futuristic fiction, comic books, film, works of history, and even in works by professional historians, these scenarios are played out. Rosenfeld has gathered together the scenarios, considering them in terms of chronology, the national origins of their authors, and the response of their audiences. He starts with the assumption that counter-factual history tells us a great deal about memory, and ends with an insight that Nazism and the Holocaust have in the half-century after their occurrence become normalized to a problematic degree.

To argue his case, Rosenfeld scrutinizes what appears to be an absolutely prodigious amount of material; a scrupulous historian, he gives us the precise number, kind, and date of counter-factual scenarios. Those in which Hitler won the war number sixty-three, with the United States proving the most prolific producer, having generated twenty-eight such works, including fifteen novels; Great Britain is then a close second, with twenty-seven, and Germany a distant third, with six, five of which were written in the period from the mid-1960s on. One could be skeptical about what such a small sample could tell us about collective memory. Yet Rosenfeld offers surprising insights. He shows, for example, how British works slowly abandoned the belief that World War II represented the "finest hour," culminating in Robert Harris's account of British and American willingness to collaborate with the victorious Axis, and in the arguments of the conservative publicists Alan Clark and John Charmly that England might have been better off had it stayed neutral. The questioning, according to Rosenfeld, reflects a declining sense of self-confidence in Great Britain, and a greater desire to question national myths. Such desires have hardly troubled the United States, where the opposite tendency has emerged, the Vietnam era notwithstanding. Here the tendency to see American involvement in moralistic terms has remained central, and has often been used against politically pacifist positions—in a famous 1967 episode of *Star Trek*, for example. If anything, American triumphalism has increased, with Newt Gingrich's novel *1945* (1995) serving as an example. The United States, not the Soviet Union, keeps Nazism at bay in Gingrich's telling. Curiously, we have Patrick J. Buchanan, in his book

A Republic, not an Empire: Reclaiming America's Destiny (1999), arguing the reverse: that the United States should have stayed out of Europe, for intervention only made Europe safe for Stalinism.

Compared to the British and the Americans, the Germans have proved reluctant to take up the topic, although Rosenfeld has unearthed a curious quarry. His gems include the classicist Alexander Demandt's essay, "If Hitler Had Won," which argued that Germany would have softened over time, with the racial state adopting a human visage; and Michael Salweski's portrayal of an aging Nazi totalitarianism with its teeth gradually falling out. Rosenfeld sagely acknowledges that these essays do not represent the views of Germany as such, and is careful to point out their critical reception. Most Germans, he shows, retain a highly moralistic and critical approach to the past, even if this, too, is slowly changing.

Rosenfeld then considers those works that imagine that Hitler survived the war (twenty-nine in number), and those works that wonder whether the world was better with or without Hitler (eighteen). Surprisingly, we find few authors who argue that the world would have been unequivocally better off had Hitler been assassinated. Finally, Rosenfeld tells us about a few works (only six) that imagine alternative Holocausts.

The larger analytical point that Rosenfeld tries to make involves the sea change from moralistic narratives to normalizing narratives—a change that occurred, however hesitatingly, in the 1960s. In different countries, this normalization took different forms, but Nazism and the Holocaust, according to Rosenfeld, no longer cast the same pall over the imagination. The thesis is convincing in its outlines and makes sense, but Rosenfeld pushes it to make bold claims that his evidence, clearly and precisely delineated, strains to support. In his conclusion, for example, he writes: "The waning of the fears and fantasies that have animated alternate histories suggests that Western Society has largely recovered from the traumatic experience of the Nazi era" (p. 380). Perhaps he is right. This is a fine book, fluidly written and smartly conceived, that puts an important topic on the table. But for the sake of debate, I would suggest that traumas stay with people in uncanny ways, often across generational divides. I would also point out that in real history, the exceptionally traumatic points of the Nazi past, in particular the destructive fury associated with the Holocaust, is only now being researched in its excruciating local detail; and Germans, as Daniel Jonah Goldhagen rightly if controversially argued, had by the mid-1990s hardly scratched the problem of the excessive cruelty of individual perpetrators during the Holocaust. Put differently, there are many ways to sear traumatized nerves.

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COMPARATIVE/WORLD

VICTORIA TIN-BOR HUI. *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 294. Cloth \$70.00, paper \$24.99.

All good books start out with a clear statement of the problem, and this excellent comparative study of war and state formation in China and Europe is no exception: "why is it that political scientists and Europeanists take for granted checks and balances in European politics, while Chinese and sinologists take for granted a coercive universal empire in China?" (p. 1). Victoria Tin-bor Hui argues that the assumption needs to be re-examined. She begins her case by rightly noting that China during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (656–221 B.C.) was composed of states often in conflict with each other in ways that were remarkably similar to the European experience in the early modern period (A.D. 1495–1815). The question is why China ended up becoming a unified empire for so long, and why Europe did not. Her answer is to suggest a much more dynamic and fluid process of interaction than historians have hitherto been willing to acknowledge—so fluid, in fact, that at several points China could conceivably have gone in a direction more analogous to that of Europe, and Europe, by the same token, could conceivably have gone in a direction more analogous to that of China.

The book is divided into five main chapters. The first sets up an overall theory of world politics. Here the author proposes a "dynamic theory of world politics" (p. 1) that takes into account two countervailing forces: those that facilitate domination and those that inhibit domination. She argues that the interaction between these two forces is not static but a constantly changing process whose final outcome is uncertain at every step of the journey. While Hui is careful not to make undue claims for the applicability of her theory to all human history, she does express the hope that her study will stimulate scholars to step outside their own comfort zone and risk cross-cultural comparisons "of whole systems" (p. 7). Throughout, she avoids assuming that because Europe and China turned out the way they did, there was no other alternative. Briefly, she argues that in the centuries leading up to the unification of China in the late third century B.C., the rulers of the main competing Chinese states were successful in appropriating the principal instruments of social and economic capital into their own hands. In early modern Europe, however, rulers of nascent states had to compromise with other power centers in society to gain access to tax revenue and manpower. By adopting such "self-weakening expedients" (p. 50), they opened the way for compromises that ultimately led to constitutional government. Had they followed Niccolò Machiavelli's advice and not been compelled to rely on mercenary soldiers, for example, their armies would have been more successful, and one of them might have been able to defeat the others and unify Europe.

The second chapter focuses on ancient China and discusses the specific stratagems developed by the various states in the period from 656–221 B.C., as well as those adopted by the Qin that made it possible for that state to defeat all the other competitors for power. Of particular interest was Qin's ability to gain its ends through wit, bribes, deceit, and diplomacy rather than by exhausting its resources in endless fighting. Hui stresses that the process took three centuries, during which time balance of power politics still prevailed, and the eventual outcome—unity—was by no means inevitable.

The third chapter focuses on specific aspects of international politics in early modern Europe. The fourth chapter treats more directly the theory that the need for European monarchs to bargain for resources with their own constituencies in order to fight wars forced the rulers to make concessions that ultimately led to constitutional government. Hui then compares that experience with China. The primacy of the principle of balance of power in Europe, she concludes, was a consequence not of some specifically European dynamic but primarily of the weakness of European states in acquiring full control over the means of coercive domination. In the final chapter, the author applies the lessons of the past to the present world order and to the presumption that the ideals of democracy and human rights were unique to the Western tradition. She cautions against the kind of "unilinear thinking" (p. 224) that fails to account for the interactive reality of international politics and the complexity of state building.

There are some assertions that I might question, as when Hui implies that Confucianism had only a "cosmetic influence" on politics (p. 18). Ideas do matter, even in the rough and tumble of realpolitik. Nevertheless, the book is a wonderful and courageous effort to understand the underlying patterns of state formation in Europe and China, and it deserves to become a landmark study in comparative history.

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DANIEL T. REFF. *Plagues, Priests, and Demons: Sacred Narratives and the Rise of Christianity in the Old World and the New*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 290. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$21.99.

Daniel T. Reff has delved more deeply into the beliefs of Jesuit missionaries than any other scholar of northern Mexico. Reff was trained as an anthropologist, and this book, which emphasizes disease as a key factor in attracting converts in the periods of early Christianity and the missionary north of Mexico, reflects both his previous publications and his comparative approach. In *Disease, Depopulation, and Culture Change in Northwestern New Spain, 1518–1764* (1991), Reff drew on the work of William McNeill and Alfred Crosby to answer questions raised by his own fieldwork in Sonora, Mexico. He boldly proposed that epidemic disease (which began to devastate the north even before effective

Spanish contact) was the major factor explaining why indigenous peoples accepted Jesuit missionaries and allowed the reorganization of their communities and subsistence strategies under the mission system. Subsequently Reff participated in the translation and annotation of a key ethnohistorical source for the early period of Jesuit missions in northern Mexico: *History of the Triumphs of Our Holy Faith Amongst the Most Barbarous and Fierce Peoples of the New World*, by the Jesuit Andrés Pérez de Ribas (1645; translated by Reff, Maureen Ahern and Richard K. Danford, and published in 1999). More than ever struck by Pérez de Ribas's rhetorical strategies, Reff looked to their origins, and what he found led to the book under review.

Reff's central thesis is that epidemics of acute and chronic infectious diseases constitute key explanatory factors for the spread of Christianity in late antiquity and early medieval Europe (150–800) and in the Spanish "New World" (1520–1720). In each case, pagans or Indians were attracted to Christianity through monks and missionaries who offered the means (spiritual and material) to deal with calamity. Reff uses early Christian writings and later Jesuit missionary accounts, as well as an extensive array of secondary works, to fashion his main arguments. In both periods, epidemic diseases and their consequences (e.g. agricultural shortages) facilitated conversion efforts among peoples in need of spiritual consolation, healing, and new subsistence strategies. Drawing on the lives of saints, both medieval missionaries and later Jesuits imagined themselves at war with Satan and his heathen familiars or shamans. Both groups confronted shamans directly but also accommodated pagan and Indian beliefs and practices through the cult of saints and other Christian or hybrid rituals and devotions (one more illustration of the heterogeneity and porosity of Christianity). In both eras, monks and missionaries countered institutional church proponents of the primacy of a contemplative life for a cleric in emphasizing the centrality of the missionary role in effecting conversion and dealing with catastrophe. In both cases, clerics created physical spaces (e.g. monasteries and missions) to reorganize lives shattered by disease as well as warfare, migration, and social unrest.

Because Christian biographies and hagiographies rarely explicitly identify real-world events like epidemics as major factors in attracting converts (instead they glorify God's enduring and activist presence in the world), Reff has used secondary studies to provide context. As a historian of colonial Mexico, I cannot comment authoritatively on his command of the early period literature, but in the second chapter, the author provides a history of infectious diseases and links it to the evolution of social welfare in monasteries that offered Christian charity, ministered to the ill, provided new means of subsistence, reconstituted social life through fictive kinship and co-parenthood, and employed relics and saints that resonated with pagan practices. In chapter three, Reff follows the same trajectory in outlining the similar effects of demographic collapse

and parallels in Jesuit missionary strategies. In both of these chapters, the primacy accorded disease discounts the importance of explanatory factors advanced by other scholars: for example, that the Benedictines' defensive monasteries and emphasis on improvements in agriculture were attractive to surrounding peasantries for protection and better yields, or that the missionaries succeeded in targeting elites for conversion to get their subjects. In chapter four, Reff highlights specific mendicant and Jesuit borrowings from early Christian literature that reflected their shared experiences and miracles. He provides an entirely convincing explanation of the relevance of early Christian literature to the experience of Jesuit missionaries facing demons and martyrdom. Finally, he argues that the Jesuit missionary enterprise fell apart in the eighteenth century when Enlightenment thinking undermined a shared understanding of a more immediately present deity that linked Jesuits and Indians.

The last assertion points to a larger issue: that Reff's emphasis on intellectual or theological history downplays the larger canvas of mission history in northern Mexico, where recent scholarship illustrates that the Jesuit mission enterprise (never as monolithic and successful as Reff's scheme suggests) was weakened by a multiplicity of factors over time. Indigenous acceptance of Jesuit missions was highly contested at different times by distinct groups, but the specificity of this history, and differences in scale, get lost in the larger narrative that accords priority to disease as a determining factor over others and Jesuit strategies over competing elite interests and indigenous beliefs and actions. Moreover, the larger history of New Spain shows that some groups resisted conversion in spite of huge demographic losses. Nonetheless, this book is a captivating testament to the ways in which innovative comparative scholarship has the potential to trigger new analysis and complicate causality in history.

SUSAN M. DEEDS

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JOHN SMOLENSKI and THOMAS J. HUMPHREY, editors. *New World Orders: Violence, Sanction, and Authority in the Colonial Americas*. (Early American Studies.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2005. Pp. vi, 362. \$49.95.

Comprised of revised essays presented at a conference of the McNeil Center for Early American Studies, these eleven chapters, along with an introduction and afterword by the editors, are fascinating case studies of how authority was both brutal yet precarious and malleable in the French, Spanish, English, and Dutch empires of the New World. In the eloquent essay that begins the volume, Christopher L. Tomlins links the racial violence portrayed on the English stage with the practices and justifications for colonization. William Shakespeare and Christopher Marlowe tell us that the Elizabethans knew what they were about—and its ethical problems. Tomlins also demonstrates how either igno-

rance or willful avoidance of the need to conquer a continent continued in U.S. law and legal texts, becoming the foundation to justify the social order that persists to this day.

As most of the western hemisphere's inhabitants were (and are) people of color, and about half women, one can only applaud that for once a collection adequately reflects these proportions. Several of the essays deal with violence toward slaves. Richard Price shows how slaves executed in Surinam prevented their deaths under torture from having the desired effect of intimidating bystanders. Time after time, they heroically exhibited stoic indifference, humor, and defiance. At the same time, maroon communities tried to use European methods of torture and execution to maintain their own stability through deterring crime and dissent. Cecile Vidal's work on colonial Louisiana describes brutality toward slaves as routine and legally sanctioned, undermining the notion that African Americans had a relatively good deal in this society. In her discussion of the torture of slaves as part of legal procedures, four of the five cases she describes occurred in 1764, immediately after the Spanish took over the colony from the French. Some explanation of whether this change of sovereignty made a difference would have been helpful. Gene E. Ogle elucidates the meaning of an almost incredible legal case in Saint Domingue where a slave spent five years in jail—before being released—for chastising a white man by order of his master. Apparently while the slave was supposed to obey his master, he was also supposed to be sufficiently well informed to realize that violence toward any white threatened the social order to an equal extent.

Racial differentiation in punishing crime to ensure the authority of white society appears also in Matthew Dennis's essay. When, in 1821, a Seneca leader was freed in New York for executing a witch after legal tribal procedures, the state immediately passed a law subjecting Indians to state jurisdiction in future cases. Sharon Block persuasively argues that whereas white men were tried for sexual crimes when they raped women, nonwhites suffered greater penalties when they were accused of violent offenses.

Although harsh, the New World orders were manipulable as authorities overlapped. Women in colonial Quito, Kimberley Gauderman points out, could turn to the civil courts to sue husbands who abused them or committed adultery, collecting damages or placing the culprits in jail and thereby circumventing church courts, which rarely helped them. Native American officials in Sonora, Mexico, and eastern Bolivia, Cynthia Radding shows, maintained considerable leverage in protecting their charges from Spanish authorities. In a less happy case, Mark Meuwese tells the story of a Dutch Indian interpreter murdered by another official. Angered that Jacob Rabe had married a Tupimamba and formed close ties with them as they assisted the Dutch against the Portuguese, Georg Garstman (whose father-in-law was a Portuguese they killed) murdered Rabe and yet escaped punishment through powerful connections.

I found the essays by Tamar Herzog and Ann Twinam disappointing in this context. Herzog shows how citizenship requirements developed differently in Spain and Spanish America during the early modern period, whereas Twinam explains how people of color obtained privileges reserved to whites (attending universities, becoming doctors and notaries) in the late Spanish colonial period. Yet without demonstrating the actual interactions between people of different social and class levels—how important was formal citizenship in alleviating social inequality? Did white doctors accept whitened doctors as equals, for instance?—the significance of these articles remains ambiguous.

Overall, however, the mostly excellent articles and the framework provided by the editors ample proof that whatever one thinks of the "New World Order" politicians offer us today, the orders of early America may have been legally and philosophically rationalized but for the most part were morally reprehensible (even by the standards of those who implemented them), except perhaps as they were sufficiently contradictory and inefficient to provide the oppressed with opportunities to resist them.

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GWENDA MORGAN and PETER RUSHTON. *Eighteenth-Century Criminal Transportation: The Formation of the Criminal Atlantic*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2004. Pp. xii, 238. \$65.00.

This is the third and most recently published volume to emerge from Gwenda Morgan and Peter Rushton's wide-ranging and invaluable work on crime and punishment in northern England during the eighteenth century. Having surveyed the nature of crime, judicial administration, and penal practices in Newcastle, Durham, and Northumberland and then moved on to a close study (and published diary) of Edmund Tew, an industrious Durham magistrate of the 1750s, the authors have now turned their attention to deepening our knowledge and understanding of convict transportation, the most important and distinctive of serious English punishments during the early Georgian era.

For the present reviewer, the first half of this new book was more compelling and persuasive than the second. Morgan and Rushton carry further the intriguing arguments, initially explored in their *Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law: The Problem of Law Enforcement in North-East England, 1718–1800* (1998), as to the extent of differences in penal practices on England's northern circuit by comparison with the more intensively studied London and Home Counties. In the present work, they have extended their range to include the West Country and Bristol, the latter a substantial metropolitan center in its own right as well as the main western port for the shipping of convicts to America, second only to London itself. Many of their findings are intriguing and suggestive. Devon and Newcastle mag-

istrates occasionally seem to have been far more industrious in applying transportation to vagrants—as opposed to convicted criminals proper—than other known jurisdictions (pp. 17–18). Women in Bristol and Newcastle accounted for more than twice as many transports who received that sentence as a condition of pardon from capital conviction, a finding which suggests more extensive activity by them in the serious criminality of those towns by comparison with most other parts of the nation (pp. 46–51).

As their title suggests, however, the authors are especially interested in the extent to which convict transportation may afford a lens through which to explore the emergence of a common transatlantic culture, a theme that has attracted much innovative scholarship among imperial scholars in recent years. (Morgan began her career as a historian of law and society in the American colonial and early republican eras.) In the second half of their study, Morgan and Rushton consider the extent to which the convict trade helped build and sustain a common Anglo-American culture of assumptions about crime and criminals. They explore the blend of factual material and prevailing perceptions, as expressed in pamphlets, newspapers, and ballads, that helped sustain the belief—always vastly overstated—that the same growth in transatlantic shipping that helped facilitate convict transportation in the first place also enabled the most determined and dangerous criminals to return to England. In fact, of 125 West Country and northern English convicts advertised as having run away from their masters in Virginia, Maryland, or Pennsylvania, only two are known actually to have made it home, and only thirty-five of about 5,000 convicts transported from western and northern England between 1718 and 1776 ever came to trial for returning before expiration of their sentence (pp. 106–107, 116–117).

If the authors sometimes seem to overplay their novel theme, readers will nonetheless appreciate the detail and vigor with which it is pursued. One wonders how far the notion of a common Anglo-American culture can truly be applied to the consideration of convict transportation. The process could not be systematized until after the British government had decisively intervened to overturn the early efforts of colonial legislatures to forbid the imposition of convicts upon their societies. The flow of traffic was pretty much one-way in character, in terms of legal and political advantage, as well as in the more literal sense of how few British transportees seem actually to have returned to their native shores. This was surely one of the most compelling reasons why the leaders of the new-born United States could not accede to the readiness of citizens of the Chesapeake region once more to receive cheap indentured labor from Britain after 1781. The resumption of that traffic would have been a distasteful reminder of an irremediably lopsided power relationship, one that could no longer be tolerated between equals.

That minor quibble aside, Morgan and Rushton have made a valuable addition to an area of study one might

have thought to be largely mined out after A. Roger Ekirch's superb *Bound for America: The Transportation of British Convicts to the Colonies, 1718–1775* (1987). From this point on, students of American convict transportation will be best advised to read both books (along with important work by J. M. Beattie and Kenneth Morgan) in conjunction with one another.

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I. I. KURILLA. *Zaokeanskie partnery: Amerika i Rossiia v 1830–1850-e gody [Partners Across the Ocean: The United States and Russia, 1830s–1850s]*. Volgograd: Volgograd State University Press. 2005. Pp. 487.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and rise of the Russian Federation as an independent state led to a revision of the traditional Marxist-Leninist/Cold War paradigm of Russian diplomatic history by a new generation of post-Soviet historians. At the same time, these young historians, whose mentality was shaped during the last decades of late socialism, preserved the best traditions of the Soviet historiography in studies of Russian-American relations, as represented by the work of Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov. A good example of this combination of post-Soviet revision and the research traditions of Bolkhovitinov is Ivan I. Kurilla's book on Russian-American relations from 1832, when the United States and the Russian Empire signed a trade treaty and established relatively good political, economic, and diplomatic contacts, to 1860, a period after the Crimean War and before the American Civil War when, according to Kurilla, an estrangement of the two countries began. Following the approaches and structures of Bolkhovitinov's books on Russian-American relations, Kurilla concentrates not only on official diplomacy but also on so-called "people's diplomacy" (connections among scholars, writers, engineers from both countries), on cultural influences, and on images of both countries among Russians and Americans during the 1830s and 1850s.

In the first part of his book, Kurilla deals with the evolution of Russian-American diplomatic relations before the European Revolutions of 1848–1849, when a rapprochement between the two countries was shaped by the necessity of mutual diplomatic action against Britain, to after Russian participation in a suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1849, when Russian-American relations oscillated between a "negative" phase immediately after 1849 and a friendly phase during the Crimean War. The author also discusses the role of American technological achievements in Russian modernization, and how Russians used American technological innovations to build the first steam boats and railway lines in the Russian Empire. Using a wide variety of archival sources (from secret diplomatic documents to private correspondence, diaries, and memoirs) in his analysis of "asymmetrical collaboration" between Russia and the United States (p. 413), Kurilla

convincingly demonstrates that positive and friendly moments prevailed throughout the entire period of Russian-American diplomatic relations.

The second part of the book tells a story of various Russian and American visitors (from professional diplomats to engineers, merchants, and revolutionaries) who described differing impressions of visits to Russia and the United States during this period. In the third part of his book, Kurilla analyzes the "mirror-images" of Russia in the United States and the United States in Russia, concentrating on the "images of similarity" (serfdom and slavery, territorial expansion) and on "contrasting images of difference" (democracy vs. autocracy, freedom of the press vs. censorship).

Kurilla's book is based on prodigious research in archival and library collections in Russia, United States, and Canada, where he tried to recover everything written on his subject. In some cases, this "total" approach to secondary sources does not work; Kurilla pays more attention to present Russian studies and overlooks Western research. This is obvious in his analysis of the literature on the Russian images of the United States. On the one hand, he mentioned everything that was published in Soviet Union and Russia on this subject, including even such a superficial, pretentious, and badly criticized study as a book by Aleksandr Etkind (pp. 17, 18, 299, 377). On the other hand, he omitted some important Western studies on the "Russian imagination of America," including Abbot Gleason, *European and Muscovite: Ivan Kireevsky and the Origin of Slavophilism* (1972) and Mark Bassin, *Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840–1865* (1999). The Western research, especially Bassin's book, offers interesting insights for the study of the "mirror-images" of Russia and the United States. Inclusion of Western research would provide a theoretical basis (missing in Kurilla's book) for his revision of Bolkhovitinov's and Norman Saul's studies of Russian-American relations and would strengthen Kurilla's main arguments.

Despite these criticisms, Kurilla's book is an important contribution to the history of Russian-American relations. This well-organized and well-written study not only expands our knowledge of forgotten Russian-American contacts but also will stimulate controversy about Russia's role in U.S. diplomacy before the Civil War.

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SUSANNA DELFINO and MICHELE GILLESPIE, editors. *Global Perspectives on Industrial Transformation in the American South*. (New Currents in the History of Southern Economy and Society.) Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2005. Pp. x, 240. \$24.95.

This collection of essays is the first volume in a series produced by the Southern Industrialization Project under the rubric of "New Currents in the History of Southern Economy and Society." Determined to transcend

the image of the antebellum American South as "a backward, wholly agricultural" region, the series "endeavors to place southern economic development in a dynamic and expanding context" (p. ix) while examining the southern economy in a comparative and transatlantic mode. While this approach may not be as novel as the editors contend—after all, two decades ago Eugene D. Genovese and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese made much the same argument in *The Fruits of Merchant Capital: Slavery and Bourgeois Property in the Rise and Expansion of Capitalism* (1983)—the book joins a growing rank of recent works seeking to "globalize" southern history, including at least two other collections of essays published in 2005, *The American South in a Global World*, edited by James L. Peacock, Harry L. Watson, and Carrie Matthews, and *Globalization and the American South*, edited by James C. Cobb and William Stueck. Where those works emphasize the place of the Sunbelt in post-World War II international political economy, the volume under review focuses primarily on the previous era of globalization, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, emphasizing especially the place of southern slavery, emancipation, and industrialization in the emerging contours of the Atlantic economy.

The volume opens appropriately with an essay by Stanley Engerman, a pioneer of the comparative approach to the intertwined dynamics of slavery and capitalism in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world. Engerman's essay, in an argument now almost congruent with his name, punctures the "myth" of a "stagnant southern economy" (p. 17). Summarizing many of the arguments made in the volume's subsequent chapters about the vitality of antebellum southern capitalism, Engerman contends that the antebellum South stood out as an advanced part of the nineteenth-century world—perhaps because of, rather than in spite of, chattel slavery. Noting that "the South was probably among the most productive economies in the world at the time" (p. 22), Engerman shows that only by invidious comparison to the North or to Great Britain could it be considered an economic laggard. If anything, he concludes, even though "the strength of the agricultural sector held back industrial change" (p. 21), the region still "ranked among the world's leading industrial producers" (p. 23).

Engerman's insistence on the economic dynamism of the South sets the tone for the rest of the volume. The second essay, by Emma Hart, argues that Charleston, South Carolina's eighteenth-century "diverse urban domestic economy" (p. 29) should be regarded as akin to the evolving proto-industrial entrepôts elsewhere in the Atlantic world, rather than as an outpost of the "drowsy plantation society" (p. 8) surrounding it. Despite the existence of "production networks, professionalization, waged working weeks, and diversified firms with dozens of employees" (p. 48), one balks at Hart's insistence that the widespread presence of urban slaves "did not fundamentally reshape the urban economy" (p. 29) in late eighteenth-century Charleston. Similarly, economic historian Brian Schoen makes the case that an-

tebellum southerners actively pursued free trade and integration into the global economy in order to avoid dependence on the North. But, just because many southern entrepreneurs maintained a "faith that, within the context of global interdependence and international free trade, a slave-based, cotton economy could modernize" (p. 67) did not make it so, as the beleaguered Confederacy discovered.

Moving from transnational to comparative history, Shearer Davis Bowman extends a comparison he first made in *Masters and Lords: Mid-Nineteenth-Century U.S. Planters and Prussian Junkers* (1993). Bowman argues that while the antebellum South achieved respectable levels of economic development, much like eastern Prussia its lack of internal homogeneity and economic integration left it weak compared to its international competitors, as did the crushing economic blow of defeat in the Civil War. Drawing similarly on an international comparison, Susanna Delfino uses the regional divisions prevailing on the Italian peninsula in the nineteenth century as a point of departure. In her essay, "The Idea of Southern Backwardness," she regards the alleged underdevelopment of both the U.S. South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno* in the mid-nineteenth century as largely a figment of the "northern" imagination, a deliberately constructed image that served primarily to secure northern hegemony in both cases. Delfino claims that both the Italian and the American Souths saw the modernization of agriculture and the growth of manufacturing during this period. Nevertheless, her insistence that virtually all southern economic distinctions derived from a cultural construct rather than material reality treads perilously close to erasing the very real regional differences—qualitative as well as quantitative—in economic development that prevailed in both Italy and the United States.

Other essays in the volume recognize the continued importance of these distinctions, while trying to develop new explanations for the South's economic trajectory. John Majewski and Viken Tchakerian suggest that, while rational from the point of view of individual farmers, the southern propensity to leave large amounts of land unimproved and the region's subsequent low rural population densities hampered the development of internal markets and manufacturing. Finally, a pair of provocative essays by Beth English and the redoubtable team of economic historians, David L. Carlton and Peter Coclanis, examine the *longue durée* of the southern textile industry in its global context. The relocation of American textile production from New England to the southern Piedmont during the last two decades of the nineteenth century stemmed from the South's regional advantages, as it offered a low-wage labor force and a nonrestrictive regulatory environment. At the same time, however, as both essays argue, this shift reflected larger global trends in capitalism's migration to the "periphery of the industrial world" (p. 156) that would ultimately lead to the southern industry's demise in the face of ever-cheaper international competition. "When it ventured out into the world,"

observe Carlton and Coclanis, "the southern textile industry lost its primary advantage, that of being the lowest cost producer" (p. 166). Moreover, as English concludes, the South's low-wage strategy "ultimately circumscribed the possibility for diversified economic growth" (p. 176) even while it still left the region vulnerable in the global race to the bottom of the wage scale and working conditions.

There is ample evidence, as the uniformly strong essays in this volume show and as the editors contend in their introduction, that in global historical context the American South should be regarded as a dynamic economy. Still, it may be premature to unmoor the region from "theories of colonial or quasi-colonial dependence of the southern economy on the northern one" (p. 5), as the editors propose. By many measures—consumption levels, value-added manufacturing, mechanization of agriculture, literacy, failure to attract immigrants, and, not least, the persistence of feudalistic systems of land tenure, labor exploitation, and political repression—it is hard to deny that much of the American South remained stubbornly backward well into the twentieth century. Indeed, as the concluding essay by Erin Elizabeth Clune on the failure of the New South's white immigration promotion campaign shows, like other societies in the Atlantic world the South came up against "limits imposed on southern economic development by the pursuance of a racist labor policy" (p. 13). As it turns out, even the modernizing, forward-looking New South resembled nothing so much as other postemancipation and colonial societies in its persistent efforts to thwart the "resistance and mobility of people of African descent" (p. 208).

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PAOLA GEMME. *Domesticating Foreign Struggles: The Italian Risorgimento and Antebellum American Identity*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2005. Pp. ix, 204. \$39.95.

The movement toward a comparative approach to American Studies and its internationalization receives an important contribution from Paola Gemme's volume. In her analysis of nineteenth-century American responses to the Italian struggle for independence and unification, known as the *Risorgimento*, Gemme shows how the Italian scene often served as an important term of reference in discourses on national identity. Seen as a sort of emulation of the process that had led, in the previous century, to the birth of the United States, the *Risorgimento* was narrated, discussed, interpreted, and portrayed in American journalism, essays, historical studies, fiction, and poetry as well as the figurative arts. Focusing on the shared narrative quality of these different genres and media, Gemme offers a comprehensive and compelling panorama of antebellum American views on the international role of the United States and the character of American democracy.

Gemme argues convincingly that American interest

in the cause of Italian independence was motivated, to a large extent, by a desire to emphasize and celebrate, more or less indirectly, the uniqueness of the United States as the ultimate pattern of republicanism. Gemme shows how American writers, diplomats, and artists constructed the Italian uprisings against foreign domination as a conscious reenactment of the American Revolution, and stressed the importance of the American example for all those who aspired to the achievement of nationhood and democracy. Gemme's comparative approach, as well as her remarkable knowledge of Italian sources (both primary and secondary), allow her to lay bare the largely fictive nature of such a reading of Italian history. She justly reminds us that Italian nationalists conceived of their movement as a revival or resurgence (hence the term "Risorgimento") of the country's ancient glory rather than an attempt to reproduce a foreign model. Indeed, as Gemme points out, more than one leading Italian republican (most notably Giuseppe Mazzini) had serious reservations about American society, especially the presence of slavery in the self-proclaimed land of freedom.

More often than not, the difficulties and disappointments experienced by Italian patriots prior to the liberation and unification of their country were taken as evidence by American observers that their own model was unattainable. Most of them considered that Italy was not mature enough for freedom and was much in need of guidance and discipline, an idea they frequently conveyed, both in writing and the figurative arts, by portraying Italian people as children or women. Particularly insightful is Gemme's analysis of the work of Thomas Nast, an American artist who followed Giuseppe Garibaldi's expedition in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and narrated the campaign in a series of illustrations for American and English periodicals. Like other contemporary American commentators, Nast used images of social and sexual misrule (in which women figure prominently) to conjure up the specter of anarchy and subversion as the inevitable outcome of the Italian uprisings.

As Gemme aptly reminds us, however, American skepticism as regards the Italians' capacity and readiness for self-government coexisted, more or less awkwardly, with a widespread sympathy for the Italian cause. Many Americans believed it was their duty to encourage and support those revolutionary movements (in Italy and other European countries) for which the United States, it was assumed, had been the major source of inspiration. Others, especially diplomats and entrepreneurs, approved of the possible future rise of an independent and democratic Italy mainly as a potential new market for American goods. To have drawn attention to this previously underrated aspect of the American attitude toward the Risorgimento is one of the chief merits of Gemme's work; another is her assertion that this exploitative nineteenth-century American attitude toward commercial expansion in Italy

must count as one of the early manifestations of U. S. imperialism.

No less innovative is the way in which Gemme reads the Italian experience of one of America's leading nineteenth-century intellectuals, Margaret Fuller. Fuller's Italian writings, Gemme argues, belong to the tradition of the American jeremiad and, as such, employ a rhetorical strategy that, while seemingly censuring the United States for failing to live up to its promise, ultimately reinforces the idea of American political exceptionality and superiority.

Throughout the book, Gemme's international and comparative perspective, combined with her clear, jargon-free prose, makes for stimulating and fascinating reading. Exemplary, in this sense, is the way in which she highlights and examines the interconnection between American opinion on Risorgimento Italy and American concerns over race, ethnicity, and religion. For, depending on the observer's point of view and agenda, the plight of nineteenth-century Italians could, variously, be compared with that of African Americans (given their common condition of thralldom); serve as a warning against the insidious influence of the Catholic Church (at the time Irish Catholics were entering the United States in large numbers); demonstrate that Catholicism and the American model of government were compatible; or, indeed, be cited as evidence that non-Anglo-Saxons were unsuited to democracy.

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MARY C. KELLY. *The Shamrock and the Lily: The New York Irish and the Creation of a Transatlantic Identity, 1845–1921*. New York: Peter Lang. 2005. Pp. xvi, 262. \$29.95.

Mary C. Kelly's study of what she terms the creation of "a transatlantic identity" adds much to the broadening study of the Irish American experience in the post-Famine decades. Her central thesis challenges that of other historians who view the formation of Irish American identity as a consequence of the often bitter Irish immigrant experience in the unfamiliar, alien environment of urban America. Kelly suggests that Ireland was not just a place from which the Irish escaped but that the Irish transported and transplanted social, cultural, and political beliefs and practices to the new world. These products of the ancestral homeland, when fused with the New York identity, gave rise to a "dual-culture genesis" and the basis of a new nineteenth-century Atlantic world.

Focusing on the city of New York, "one of the most prominent of the 'untypical' cities," Kelly's study builds upon the growing body of regional and local stories that make up the Irish immigrant experience, most particularly upon the exemplary *The New York Irish* (1996), edited by Timothy J. Meagher and Ronald H. Bayor. She stresses, however, that the chapters she presents do not constitute "local history" per se. While it is the formation of the New York Irish character that is explored

through the lenses of gender, religion, the arts, and politics, this character reflects a confluence of new and old world identities and a complex culture that echoes the settlement process more generally. The book is nonetheless replete with New York characters, street names, and institutions that reflect its vibrant cosmopolitanism and provide a specific backdrop for this particular settlement.

Throughout the book, Kelly highlights the diversity of the New York Irish. Citing accountants, shoe and boot wholesalers, plumbers, lawyers, booksellers, and a long list of prosperous and educated people, she portrays groupings of middle-class and thriving Irish men and women who have remained largely invisible within the familiar Irish American canon, especially on the east coast. Focusing on women in particular she highlights an array of varied classes and convictions: middle-class women who had fallen on hard times; society women organizing balls and charity functions; nuns; and, most significantly, the more hard-edged, female-led, political groups, especially the Fenian sisterhood and the Irish Women's Council, which combined nationalism and feminism. In terms of religious diversity Kelly estimates that there were at least 50,000 Irish Protestants in New York by 1860, whom she terms the "quiet men (and women)" but who nonetheless played a distinct part in the formation of the city's Irish identity. Less quiet perhaps were the parades of the Orange Order, the most important of which took place on July 12 and which occasioned a violent riot in 1871. Yet, clashes between the two Irish traditions were not the mainstay of Protestant Irishness in New York, and Kelly cites connections and cross-cultural affinity between them in organizations such as The Friendly Sons of St. Patrick and the Protestant Friends of Ireland and in the rhetoric of republicanism.

Rhetoric and language provided a fundamental link with Ireland during these decades. Referencing popular literature and the pages of New York's Irish press, Kelly points to a shared memory of the "race" and suggests that the language of writers, poets, and balladeers who extolled a proud Irish heritage and tradition provided a "beacon of hope" for immigrants and a central unity of purpose in the search for pride in an independent Ireland. This solidarity of the race was again evident in the fact that every window in the new St. Patrick's Cathedral bore the name of an Irish benefactor. Kelly suggests that while Catholicism was in the midst of a devotional revolution in both Ireland and America at this time, it was New York City that gave the Irish the freedom to build an edifice as splendid and as central as St. Patrick's. This freedom of organization also allowed the Irish to grasp opportunities in the political sphere. Once again, Kelly provides insight not just into the ward politics long associated with the Irish but into the "black tie" division epitomized by Michael Norton, Thomas F. Grady, and William Bourke Cockran as well.

Kelly challenges the hegemonic picture of the Irish immigration experience in a specific location. As other historians have observed, the Irish were less Catholic,

less rural, and less poor than has commonly been assumed. The links between Ireland and America are portrayed in an insightful and fresh manner, as more symbiotic and evenly balanced than previously thought. At times, however, experiences on either side of the Atlantic appear to be more parallel than transplanted, and the generational differences, especially between Irish-born immigrants, remain underexplored. The crucial risk throughout is that the impact and dynamics of location and place are minimized. Overall however, Kelly's repositioning of Irish influence in the Irish American encounter represents a valuable and important contribution to our understanding of the multidimensional nature of Irish settlement and posits an engaging and appealing argument.

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MICHAEL DOORLEY. *Irish-American Diaspora Nationalism: The Friends of Irish Freedom, 1916–1935*. Portland, Ore.: Four Courts Press. 2005. Pp. 223. \$55.00.

Despite its rise to prominence at a dramatic juncture in Irish American history, the Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF) is typically overshadowed by the Fenians and Clan na Gael within the turbulent Home Rule era of the later nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth. Nonetheless, the organization occupied a distinct niche within early twentieth-century Irish American political culture. The political upheavals shifting Ireland out of colonial dependency and into Free State sovereignty also influenced the development of modern Irish American identity, and the FOIF merits attention as a key contributor to the process. Although the road to Ireland's independence has been heavily trafficked by historians, Michael Doorley's transatlantic perspective presents new vantage points. His study of the FOIF as the public face of "diaspora nationalism" bridges national boundaries at a crucial point in the course of modern Ireland and the evolution of modern Irish America.

A product of political currents earlier mobilized within Fenianism and Clan na Gael and subsequently fed by several other organizations invested in the constitutional-nationalist agenda, the FOIF reflected the variegated nature of Irish American nationalism by the 1910s. Mindful of Tone-like republicanism, O'Connellite influence, and Young Ireland radicalism, the organization shepherded a broadly configured political legacy through the aftermath of the 1916 Easter Rising. Invoking the Fenian spirit—if not its methods—and Mitchel-inspired dynamism, Doorley argues that the FOIF foundation in the year of rebellion marked a new phase in Irish American activism. Famine-era trauma and "a hostile American environment" (p. 13) yielded a compelling platform from which to mine both recent past and ancestral heritage to cultivate an organization worthy of representing twenty million Irish Americans.

Doorley dutifully weighs and measures a slew of nationalist influences, and it is not until midway through the book that he breaks from familiar territory to expand his transatlantic focus in distinct fashion. The FOIF's reaction to post-1916 progressions in Ireland and to Wilsonian responses at home grounds Doorley's argument that despite its best efforts, the organization proved incapable of directing affairs three thousand miles eastward. The FOIF emerged as the most coherent political voice of Irish America, Doorley claims, testifying to its achievement at a point of transition between settlement and integration for the ethnic community. However, the transatlantic gap between ancestral home and New World assimilation proved too expansive to bridge. Beneath the shadow of international war (and localized rebellion in Dublin), thousands joined a group dedicated to a dream for Ireland, but more invested in full integration into the nation of their birth.

Judge Daniel Cohalan, activist John Devoy, and the bold-faced FOIF leadership professed loyalty to America and opposition to Britain through a trying period as the FOIF beat a convoluted path in support of America's role in World War I. Wilsonian concern with a sound American-British relationship solidified hostilities and the League of Nations campaign intensified the disquiet as Éamon de Valera, Patrick McCartan, and other visitors from Ireland in 1919–1920 further complicated the FOIF mission. Doorley charts a careful course through the treaty negotiations and the Paris peace conference, framing the Government of Ireland Act as the showdown that finally nailed FOIF colors aloft. Irish Americans in general, and the FOIF in particular, responded positively to the treaty, and Doorley exploits the reaction to persuade us that Irish American nationalism could finally shift away from its roots across the Atlantic to play out within its United States home base.

Acceptance of the treaty in Ireland and the resultant degeneration into civil war encouraged the FOIF to replace primary attention to Ireland with American issues. These failed to sustain momentum within the group, and Doorley situates the resultant decline of the organization within the twin pillars of accomplishment and redundancy. The achievement of Ireland's Free State status as the vital disconnect between the ancestral home and the adopted homeland rendered the organization moribund within a decade as the membership entered a more comfortable phase in the course of ethnic identity development.

Doorley's history builds on several landmark studies of the forces and personalities shaping Irish America, deploying the FOIF to clarify points of divergence between the American diaspora and the people of Ireland. The book makes a solid contribution to the history of the Irish in America and presents a welcome example of a study grounded in the transatlantic context. The sidelight into non-Irish ethnic politics in the epilogue is too brief to generate much comparative insight, but the appendixes add value on the FOIF mission and lead-

ership and should be consulted throughout. While much remains to be explored on interconnections between ethnic Irish American culture and the political world beyond the bounds of nationalist affiliation, Doorley's study offers a judicious assessment of the trials and tribulations of a key contributor to Irish American culture. His careful account of the organization's role in grounding modern Irish American ethnic identity merits the attention of all interested in the process.

MARY C. KELLY

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STEPHEN BROADBERRY and MARK HARRISON, editors. *The Economics of World War I*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 345. \$80.00.

Economics matter in waging war; the question is, how much? For Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison the answer is straightforward: "Ultimately, economics determined the outcome" of World War I (p. 5). One of the objectives of this collection of essays, a companion to Harrison's earlier volume, *The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison* (1988), is to convince the skeptical that this is in fact so. A second is to trace the legacy of the war, to demonstrate that its costs lasted decades after the guns had fallen silent. To make their case the editors have solicited contributions that cover the economic history of the major belligerents as well as two leading neutrals, the United States and Holland. The result is a welcome addition to the historical literature on the war.

The economic history of the war has been written, at least in the West, with a marked emphasis on the doings of Britain, Germany, France, and to a lesser degree, the United States. Other states appear fitfully, as part of a larger story, such as Russia, where the economic history of the war has been seen as preparatory to the Russian Revolution. Still others, notably the Ottoman Empire, are neglected entirely. Happily this volume goes some way to rectifying these oversights. Among the most interesting essays are those devoted to the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire. For many historians the contribution on the Ottoman Empire will break new ground, because so little exists in English on the economics of its war effort. Şevket Pamuk demonstrates that the "predominantly agrarian" (p. 113) structure of the Ottoman economy imposed shackles upon the state's ability to fight a large-scale modern war. Similarly, Max-Stephan Schulze on Austria-Hungary and Peter Gatrell on Russia show the strains that the war imposed upon these frail economies, although both challenge the assumption that prewar difficulties were insurmountable in waging modern war.

Scholars will find that the charts, tables, and figures that abound in these essays constitute a rich source of information that furnishes the means to tackle diverse questions. Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur on France and Broadberry and Peter Howlett on the United Kingdom provide numbers that allow for clearer argument in the

long-running debate on what effect the war had on women. Another instance, with both narrow and broad implications, is provided by Italy, where the gross domestic product (GDP) figures do not make sense. As Broadberry notes (pp. 305–307) in his appendix to the essay by Francesco Galassi and Mark Harrison, the Italian GDP figures are in a state that does not permit definitive conclusions to be reached about whether the Italian economy grew or contracted during the war. The care taken here is evidence of the efforts made throughout the volume to produce detailed, reliable figures on economic indexes. Why is this important? GDP numbers offer a snapshot of economic health. What the contributors demonstrate is that the off-hand nostrum that war results in a ramping up of the economy, and thus an expansion of GDP, is not accurate. Of the major belligerents, only Britain and the United States experienced real GDP growth during the war. Other states saw GDP diminish, often markedly, and in the case of Austria-Hungary, this contraction was amplified by the fact that war-related expenditure was falling as the war went on. The consequence was that the Austro-Hungarian war effort had to make do with ever less of a smaller pie. Such clarity should pour cold water on those who imagine that war is a cure for economic malaise.

The costs of war, in human and material terms, did not end when the fighting ceased in 1918. Some of this was due to the reality that hostilities did not cease in November 1918. In many parts of Eastern and Central Europe, along with the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, conflict continued well after the armistice on the Western Front, making the process of determining costs even harder. Beyond this, there are thorny problems associated with assessing issues such as pensions, war finance costs, and infrastructure rebuilding among others. Evaluating the burden of war-related costs in the postwar period is thus a difficult task. Several of the essays take as a starting point estimates originally made by E. L. Bogart in 1920 to calculate updated figures. While the authors have done yeoman work in this regard, the results need to be treated with caution, as the variables involved are so many. What is undoubtedly true is the point made by Albrecht Ritschl in his essay on Germany. Ritschl notes that the war cannot be treated in isolation from what ensued. In short, there was continuity. Intuitively this makes sense, but there has been a tendency to treat the war as an apotheosis in economic history surveys. Many works often end their treatment of the nineteenth century in 1914, gloss over the war, and then resume with the postwar world. This book is compelling testimony that doing so distorts our understanding of twentieth-century history.

The least satisfactory aspect of the volume is the introductory essay. The trouble is not with the overall economic contours of the war that are sketched here. The real difficulty is that in a desire to stress the singularity of the volume's contribution the editors overstate their case. The argument that economics was decisive in the outcome of the war is not new. Paul

Kennedy, in his wide-ranging survey, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, advanced a similar view nearly twenty years ago. A number of these essays point to another conclusion: that some belligerents managed to continue the war despite considerable economic handicaps and that economics alone does not explain their perseverance. Nor do economic factors explain why Germany collapsed when it did. In this regard, writings by historians such as Brian Bond, Gary Sheffield, and Holger Herwig have made it plain that Germany was defeated militarily in 1918. If Broadberry and Harrison do not share this view (pp. 35–36), the German generals canvassed in November 1918 by General Wilhelm Groener were clear that further military resistance was impossible. Nor is it convincing to suggest, as the editors do in the last sentence of their introduction (p. 36), that economics has been overlooked in accounts of the war. Readers will only have to glance at volume one of Hew Strachan's Oxford history of the war to realize that this is tilting at windmills. These criticisms should be tempered by the recognition that this is a book that belongs on the shelves of every serious student of World War I.

MARTIN HORN
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ROBIN WAGNER-PACIFICI. *The Art of Surrender: Decomposing Sovereignty at Conflict's End*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 210. \$19.00.

Surrenders are, and have long been, a prominent feature of armed conflicts, although they have not been a prominent subject of academic study in their own right. Robin Wagner-Pacifici intends to fill this gap, at least in part, by studying surrender as a means of "decomposing sovereignty." What this grand-sounding ambition actually entails is a tracing of the "semiotic phases" of surrenders, with a view to grasping surrenderer's "deepest meanings and mechanisms" (p. 13).

The task is pursued at an extremely abstract level. Whether the author has succeeded or failed in her mission is likely, however, to remain a mystery to most readers (including, it must be confessed, this reviewer). The chief reason is the virtual incomprehensibility of the writing style. Although the text is scarcely 150 pages long, it is excruciatingly difficult to read. The blitz of postmodernist jargon is utterly unrelenting and overpowering, from the very first page to the very last one. Many readers will end up none the wiser about the "deepest meaning" of surrender by the end of the book.

Wagner-Pacifici purports to concentrate on three actual surrenders to illustrate her thesis: those of Dutch insurgents at Breda in 1667, of Robert E. Lee's army at Appomattox in 1865, and of Japan in 1945. In reality, she says hardly anything in detail about any of these three events. Nor, clearly, has she any interest in the actual rules or practice governing surrenders. As a result, some of the most elementary aspects of the subject have escaped her attention. For example, it is blithely

stated that surrender entails the “unmitigated abjection” of the surrendering party (p. ix). A superficial glance at the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War would suggest a rather different conclusion. It specifies that prisoners of war “are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honor” and goes on to set out a host of specific rules to implement that goal. The essential idea underlying the Geneva Convention is that a captured person (including one who has surrendered) loses *only* the opportunity to participate in future hostilities. He suffers no forfeiture of the fundamental rights and privileges of lawful belligerents.

Since there is little hope of explaining what the author is attempting to say, it might be helpful to take brief note of what she is not attempting to do. There is, for example, nothing about either the strategic or psychological aspects of surrender. Nor are the legal consequences of surrender treated. No attempt is made to explore the question of whether rules on humane treatment of prisoners have operated to increase soldiers’ incentives to choose to surrender—as an alternative to fighting to the death in a hopeless cause—with the possible result of mitigating the suffering involved in armed conflict. There is also little acknowledgment of the distinction between the surrender of a country, as a political collectivity, and the surrender of individual soldiers or armies or besieged cities. The one is a means of terminating the state of war itself, while the others are mere incidents that occur during a war. Outside of the colonial context, there is only one good example in history of a war ending by the surrender of a whole country: the Pacific War in 1945, which is, at least nominally, one of the author’s chief interests. Even so, this point does not occupy her attention.

If this book were better written, it could make a useful contribution toward the study of ritualistic aspects of war. Such a study would include much more than surrenders. It would encompass such phenomena as declarations of war, along with the conduct of sieges, truces, armistices, and peace negotiations. As it stands, the appeal of this book will be narrowly confined to deconstructionists, decompositionists, and semiologists.

STEPHEN C. NEFF

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JOHN CONNELLY and MICHAEL GRÜTTNER, editors. *Universities under Dictatorship*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 305. \$55.00.

Academic freedom is contested terrain, especially within modern societies where universities and their faculties face constant demands to conform to the imperatives of the state or those of other outside entities. Yet, as these essays about dictatorships and higher education reveal, the academy is surprisingly resilient. Even under the most repressive regimes, professors can sometimes preserve a precarious measure of autonomy by insisting on the maintenance of professional standards. That there may be lessons here for contemporary

academics is this volume’s obvious subtext, as coeditor John Connelly candidly admits.

Because these essays emerged from a conference at Berkeley in 2000 that posed some very specific questions, this volume is much more coherent than most such collections. All the contributors recognize—nay, emphasize—the contingent nature of the threat dictatorships posed to the academy. Not only did different regimes make different demands for political conformity, but their requirements shifted over time. Thus, for example, although, as Michael David-Fox shows, Soviet academics enjoyed considerable autonomy during the NEP period of the 1920s, when Joseph Stalin decided to crack down after 1928, the universities were nearly destroyed, only to resurface a few years later as partners in the nation’s industrialization. Similarly, according to coeditor Michael Grüttner, the Nazis imposed stringent restrictions on their institutions of higher learning in the first few years of the Third Reich but then relaxed them to recruit scientists, in particular, before the war began. Ralph Jessen tracks the same phenomenon in East Germany, where the massive purges that took place after World War II gave way to inducements—again, for scientists.

Traditions mattered. Some systems, like that of Germany, had always operated as part of the state, so that the Nazi takeover did not, at least initially, create a major break. Similarly Chinese intellectuals, according to Douglas Stiffler, had a long tradition of service to the regime. There were other continuities as well. Both tsarist and Soviet universities, for example, sought to develop elite cadres for Russia’s bureaucracies and professions, albeit from different political classes. By contrast, as Connelly shows, Poland’s long struggle for national independence gave its academic institutions a patriotic oppositional culture that enabled their members to retain considerable autonomy under the post-war communist government and avoid the widespread purges that characterized the other regimes.

Those purges—which invariably eliminated political opponents and people from targeted minorities—were ubiquitous, even if their methods varied. Most of the time the state or the ruling party coordinated the dismissals, although sometimes, as Jan Havránek shows for Czechoslovakia, student radicals took the lead. Because of the Spanish Civil War, Francisco Franco’s purge, Miguel Angel Ruiz Carnicer notes, was especially ferocious, though the German Democratic Republic, where most professors were former Nazis, eventually eliminated the largest percentage—over eighty percent of the faculty at some schools. The Third Reich got rid of Jews and radicals early on, ultimately purging some twenty percent of its faculties; Benito Mussolini, on the other hand, waited a few years before beginning serious purges and, as Ruth Ben-Ghiat tells us, did not expel Jewish professors until the late 1930s.

Loyalty to the regime was the standard prerequisite for university employment. As of 1926 aspiring Italian academics had to obtain a certificate of “good conduct” from their local mayors; by 1932 they had to join the

Fascist Party (p. 55). A similar process occurred in Germany; by the end of the Third Reich, two-thirds of the nation's professors were Nazis. The communist regimes also demanded political conformity. Thus, for example, East German professors, according to a 1965 directive, "must above all be socialist educators" (p. 276). Such requirements usually aroused little opposition. In China and Czechoslovakia, many professors actually backed the Communist takeovers, at least at first. And in almost every country, most academics were, if not enthusiastic supporters of the government, compliant, or at least passive, ones. Only twelve out of 1,250 Italian professors refused to take a loyalty oath to the Fascist regime in 1931.

Students, as well as faculty members, had to be vetted. Jews were purged in Germany and Italy; women in both countries, and Spain as well, were hardly more welcome. At the same time, every dictatorship, whatever its ideology, wanted its universities to produce a new politically loyal elite. Communist countries adopted affirmative action for workers and peasants. In Germany and Italy, where students were already among the regimes' strongest supporters, the academic purges brought opportunities for those seeking a university career. Ultimately, however, the push for a reliable cadre of future leaders failed; and in places like Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Spain, students emerged as the core of the opposition.

Except in Poland, few professors joined that opposition. The dictatorships' carrots and sticks worked well. And yet, as the political appointees became acclimated to the academy, some joined their more traditional colleagues in resisting impositions on their autonomy. That resistance was subtle, often based upon an insistence on maintaining professional standards in the face of some new recruits' meager credentials. Even the Nazis realized, as one official noted in 1936, that it was not always possible to "turn a good old fighter, who was an academic nobody . . . into a pillar of German higher learning" (p. 93). There was concern, as well, about the intellectual isolation caused by these dictatorships' tendency to turn inward and limit international contacts.

Structural reforms also created problems. In the Soviet Union and China, for example, the regimes tried to promote technical and vocational training at the expense of a broader liberal education. At one point, the Soviet system became so narrowly specialized that medical schools no longer produced general practitioners, while a parallel system of party schools developed to provide ideological training for cadres. Such schools existed in almost every country. So, too, did attempts to sever research from teaching, usually by drawing the most productive scientists out of universities into academies of science and similarly prestigious institutions.

For obvious reasons, people in the humanities and social sciences had more difficulty than scientists in maintaining the integrity of their disciplines. In some countries, entire fields simply disappeared from the curriculum. The Third Reich, for example, eliminated

theology departments after 1938, while creating new ones in racial science and racial hygiene. Communist-run universities added Marxism-Leninism. Ironically, however, although that field was designed to legitimize the regime, as György Péteri notes with regard to Hungarian economists, it was also possible to do intellectually respectable work within the Marxist framework.

In almost every instance, the contradictions between a regime's desire for political control and its desire for economic progress or military prowess required it to grant some independence to its academics. At the same time, those academics, including many who had entered the university as political appointees, sought to uphold their own professional status by pressing for greater autonomy. The compromises that ensued did not, of course, restore academic freedom as we know it. Far from it; and it may well be that, in making their case for the limited and contingent authority some professors retained, this volume presents too sanguine a portrait. Nor is it clear that the traditional university's linkage of teaching and research is as essential for preserving academic freedom as many essays claim. Even so, this valuable comparative study does raise, even if it does not completely answer, useful questions about the nature of universities in every political system. I only wish the editors had provided some information about their contributors.

ELLEN SCHRECKER
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GERALD HORNE. *Red Seas: Ferdinand Smith and Radical Black Sailors in the United States and Jamaica*. New York: New York University Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 359. \$45.00.

Gerald Horne has not attempted to write a biography of Ferdinand Smith in the sense of providing details about his personal life or insights into his personality, but he has succeeded in using Smith's life as a central focus around which he narrates and examines the multifaceted history of labor and communism in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s and Jamaica in the 1950s.

Smith was born in Jamaica in 1893, at a time when the sugar economies of the British Caribbean colonies were in crisis and thousands of poor people migrated in search of work. Smith went as a young man to Panama, where he worked for five years and encountered "US-style Jim Crow" (p. 4) for the first time, and he moved to Cuba at the end of World War I and then to the United States in 1920. "Smith was not unique in being a migrant laborer, inveterate traveler, Marxist, and proletarian intellectual" (p. 7), and, unlike the Trinidadian Marxist intellectual, C. L. R. James, he became a powerful trade union leader. Smith settled in New York, where there was a growing West Indian population that was influenced by his fellow Jamaican, Marcus Garvey, and joined the Marine Workers Industrial Union. He was one of the founding members of the powerful National Maritime Union in 1937 and was its second-in-command until his expulsion in an anticommunist

purge in 1948. Smith was a cofounder of the Harlem Trade Union Council in 1949, but in 1951 he was deported from the United States. He worked for the World Federation of Trade Unions in Vienna and returned to Jamaica in 1952. In the four decades Smith was absent, Jamaica had experienced Garveyism, a major labor rebellion in 1938, and the formation of trade unions and modern political parties and had achieved universal adult suffrage in 1944. Although still a British colony, it was undergoing a "constitutional decolonization" that led to internal self-government and, in 1962, independence. Smith's attempt to create a more radical trade union and political party in Jamaica was not successful, and he died in 1961.

Horne skillfully depicts the complex intersections between class and race factors in the shaping of labor radicalism and political culture in the United States and suggests some of the ironies in this history. For example, communist trade union leaders, like Smith, were often more democratic than the anticommunists, and the post-1950s civil rights reform came after and at the expense of the radical trade unionism that benefited working-class African Americans. I wish Horne had said more about how the anticommunist struggle of the Cold War reinforced authoritarianism in the name of "freedom" and "democracy," and how civil rights reform benefited a black middle class while neglecting the poor. The period he examines is crucial to these important issues. The transfer of U.S. ships to "flags of convenience" reduced the number of jobs for African American seamen, in particular, but the war against trade unions undermined job opportunities and wages for African American workers in general.

Horne is less successful when trying to describe the complexity of the politics of labor in Jamaica in the 1950s. Not only does he make factual errors (for example, Douglas Manley was Michael Manley's older brother, not his son; p. 240), but he also seems unsure about Jamaica's political culture. He claims that "Jamaicans were ripe for the kind of radicalism Smith symbolized" (p. 226), but he also says Smith "found that many Jamaicans were looking to the United States" and that the suppression of left-wing politics that resulted from anticommunism "undercut Smith's appeal" (pp. 230–231). Horne often quotes sources that are quite contradictory, such as Smith's Jamaican colleague Richard Hart and dispatches from the U.S. consulate in Kingston, without reconciling them. Although intelligence reports emphasized the dangers of an increase in communist activities in the Caribbean in the 1950s, Smith's People's Freedom Movement had little appeal among Jamaicans. In the general election of 1955 his party contested only two of the thirty-two constituencies and received just 0.36 percent of the total votes. The "decline of left-wing trade unionism in Jamaica" did not begin in the late 1950s, as Horne claims, as a result of "the decline in health of Ferdinand Smith" (p. 283). Rather, it had declined since 1952 when the People's National Party purged its left wing, and Smith could not revive it.

Although Horne's analysis of the United States is more reliable than that of Jamaica, he has made an important contribution to a neglected aspect of labor history.

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JOHN SOLURI. *Banana Cultures: Agriculture, Consumption, and Environmental Change in Honduras and the United States*. Austin: University of Texas Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 321. \$21.95.

Among the commodities that symbolize Latin America to those outside the region, few are as multivocal as the banana. At once an emblem of carefree sensuality in 1940s musicals and of U.S. domination over "banana republics," the meanings we impute to the banana speak volumes about the ambiguities of hemispheric interactions. Nor is it possible to overstate the impact of bananas in Central America, where no other commodity has so altered the region's ecology, ethnic relations, and power dynamics. In the early 1900s, U.S.-based banana companies such as United Fruit transformed vast stretches of rainforest into monoculture plantations, while laying railroads and creating settlements that attracted a polyglot mix of workers. For the fruit companies, these daunting accomplishments were "improvements" wrought by the civilizing influence of the United States. In contrast, the region's intellectuals, such as Honduran novelist Ramón Amaya Amador, viewed banana plantations as dangerous and oppressive environments that enriched the companies at the cost of human dignity and national sovereignty. The title of his best known work, *Prisión Verde* (1950) succinctly captures this point of view.

Since the muckraking exposés of Charles David Kepner in the 1930s, the dominant role of the U.S. fruit companies in Latin America has generated a sizable scholarly literature. A spate of recent works examine power relations within particular locales incorporated into the global banana trade. These sites permit a close examination of the strategies of plantation managers to create a segmented labor force by manipulating workers' ethnic and national identities. Other locales, where independent farmers produce fruit under contract, illustrate how growers have cultivated allies to circumscribe the influence of U.S. firms. Recent studies have done much to challenge earlier unidimensional views of workers, growers, and the state as simply the pawns and/or victims of United Fruit. One is tempted, then, to ask what is novel about John Soluri's contribution to this growing literature.

Plenty, as it turns out. Emphasizing a dimension of banana production mentioned in passing by others—the ecological challenges posed by monoculture farming—Soluri offers a major rewriting of the industry's history. His eminently readable account starts on the north coast of Honduras, one of the first regions incorporated into the banana trade. In its early years, much banana production in Honduras rested in the

hands of *poquiteros*, independent growers who farmed just a few acres of land. At the time, production required little in the way of capital or inputs and represented a viable livelihood for small farmers. The fruit companies that eventually created vast plantations began more humbly as shippers and railways. United Fruit obtained much of its land in exchange for building railroads, and entered production primarily to pay for its investments and to provide full cargos for its ships. In essence, the corporate-controlled plantation that forms our dominant view of the industry began as an afterthought.

From the outset, tensions developed between independent growers and the companies, each of which tried to block rival firms from contracting with "their" growers. As the companies entered production themselves, fruit grown by *poquiteros* was accorded lower priority in shipping than bananas from company plantations. Yet Soluri demonstrates that the exclusion of small farmers from the industry originated not from company machinations but from the growing susceptibility of banana production to disease. After 1910, Panama Disease, a virulent, soil-borne fungus, regularly forced the companies to abandon plantations and relocate production to virgin lands. With each relocation, the companies rerouted railways, cutting off *poquiteros* from the export market. Their fate was sealed in the 1930s by Sigatoka, another fungal infection that could be controlled only through costly spraying. By the 1950s, banana production—now entirely plantation-based—was plagued by an endless succession of pathogens, to which the companies responded with an ever more toxic arsenal of agrochemicals. The most notorious of these was Nemagon, a nematocide known to cause sterility in male workers. Soluri's account powerfully weaves the recollections of former *veneneros*, the unprotected workers who handled chemical "poisons," with fruit company records betraying an acute concern for the monetary but not the human costs involved in pest control.

Soluri argues that disease outbreaks are not solely natural phenomena, as companies' marketing practices have played a significant role in rendering plantations susceptible to pathogens. Believing that consumers would reject any banana variety other than the Panama Disease-prone Gros Michel, the companies hesitated nearly fifty years before adopting the more resistant Cavendish as the industry standard. While most pathogens that beset the industry were long ago known to plant scientists, the companies' insistence on cultivating a single variety of banana over large areas created a prime setting for epidemics. As Soluri shows, introduction of the Cavendish radically altered banana production and required a major marketing campaign to ensure its acceptance in the U.S. From this was born the Chiquita-branded banana and today's quality standard of fruit that is uniform in shape and color. Achieving this formidable aesthetic has only enhanced the exploitation of labor and accumulation of environmental toxins in Central America.

Soluri's account is infinitely richer than can be described here in passing. It is significant both for its rethinking of industry history and in its skillful integration of the material, ecological, and symbolic aspects of banana production and consumption. In sum, the book is essential reading for anyone interested in the production and social life of everyday commodities.

MARK MOBERG

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MARCUS HALL, *Earth Repair: A Transatlantic History of Environmental Restoration*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 310. \$35.00.

We must credit the insights of this book to Marcus Hall's creative use of comparative analysis. After introducing George Perkins Marsh's analysis of the human causes of Mediterranean land degradation, Hall writes of the work by Italians in restoring Cuneo province's degenerated alpine uplands and of American efforts to restore degraded Wasatch mountain and plateau meadows. Most importantly he applies his creative ability to compare and contrast the ideological interpretations of the reason for land degradation and restoration.

Hall finds that Italians and Americans have divergent views of the causes of degradation. Italians and most Europeans see degradation as resulting from acts of nature. Americans and Canadians, by contrast, tend to see such destruction as caused by humans. The Italian point of view has resulted from the nation's long history of human interaction with the land. Humans in the Italian view restore the land by cultivating and domesticating it. Italians argue that human gardeners restore the land that nature has degraded by constructing such works as check dams, diversion ditches, and retaining walls, and by planting forests in a practice called *bonifica*. Significantly, much of the extensive restoration of degraded lands in Italy occurred under the fascist regime of Benito Mussolini.

In the American view, humans almost invariably degrade the land by changing it from its wild condition. In support of this view, Americans cite floods from Wasatch canyons from the 1880s through the 1930s that originated in soils denuded of ground cover by overgrazing. Americans sought to repair the land by contour trenching and reseeding with exotic plants and later by reintroducing native plants. Range managers in Ephraim Canyon and at the Davis County Experimental Watershed conducted scientific and practical experiments to restore the land. Although many considered the experiments controversial and some experiments failed, the methods eventually succeeded in rehabilitating the land to the degree that people did not have to suffer from dry mantle summer flooding that had previously destroyed property and killed inhabitants.

Although observers as early as Plato had discussed land degradation, as Hall points out, the modern conception originated with Marsh in the mid-nineteenth century. A distinguished diplomat, Italiophile, and trav-

eler, Marsh originated the ideas that underpinned the American conception of land degradation. Italians also read Marsh, but they interpreted his work much differently from Americans. They saw it as reinforcing their view of beneficent gardening. As these efforts at restoration proceeded, Frederic E. Clements and, in a somewhat different formulation, Henry Cowles Hart, developed a climax theory of ecology. Clements argued that in the absence of human intervention, the land would naturally evolve toward optimum health and productivity.

During the same period, Americans and Europeans viewed and commented on each others' efforts. Predictably, although both Americans and Europeans saw similar restoration, they reacted in generally divergent ways. "Germany's rich forestry tradition" (p. 161) impressed Aldo Leopold, but "he criticized the straight rows, geometric plots, and dense monocultures" (p. 161). "European ecologists, by contrast, were less willing to believe that 'natural' landscapes depended on extended periods of human absence. Britain's leading ecologist of the [1930s] . . . Arthur Tansley, criticized the rigid Clementsian view of climax precisely because it eliminated humans from the land" (p. 167). Significantly, even Hart and range management scientist Arthur Sampson disagreed with Clements over the subject of retrogressive succession: that is, that something other than a beneficent ecological climax could occur, a theory that Clements denied.

In recent years, as Hall points out, a number of ecologists have parted even more basically with Clements. In a historical ecological study of the Mediterranean, Oliver Rackham and Alfred Thomas Grove argue that much of the soil erosion "was completely natural—and such erosion may have been as beneficial to human civilization as it was detrimental, as by creating floodplains and deltas useful for cultivation" (p. 244). Moreover, the American point of view assumes, erroneously, that pre-Columbian American Indians made few changes in the land, plants, and animals. Hall declines to take sides "in the ruined Landscape debate" (p. 244), but rather shows that "much the same evidence can be used to tell very different stories" (p. 244).

Although Hall argues successfully for the general dichotomy between European and American views, he points out that even Americans have recognized that with farmlands and woodlots people can improve the environment "as by refertilizing, restocking, and replanting" (p. 233). Leopold "held out the possibility that gardening could be a vital management strategy" (p. 233). Indeed, in work that is beyond the scope of Hall's book, a number of scientists and range managers like August L. Hormay (*Principles of Rest-Rotation and Multiple-Use Land Management* [1970]) have demonstrated that proper grazing can actually improve the land and its vegetation.

All things considered, Hall's book is an excellent

study that helps to clarify attitudes about land use through a well-reasoned transatlantic analysis.

THOMAS G. ALEXANDER
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ASIA

WANG ZHENPING. *Ambassadors from the Islands of Immortals: China-Japan Relations in the Han-Tang Period*. (Asian Interactions and Comparisons.) Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 387. \$53.00.

This book aims to study roughly one thousand years of Sino-Japanese relations from the Han through the Tang dynasties. Due to the paucity of sources for the first seven hundred years of this period, it is mainly a study of Chinese foreign relations during the Tang dynasty. Wang Zhenping argues that Chinese ambassadorial investiture was a flexible and multipolar system in which ideology, relative distance, and opportunity all played their roles. For the Sino-Japanese relationship, this resulted in diplomacy characterized by what he calls "mutual self-interest." The author's attempt to get away from the traditional China-centered approach to East Asian diplomacy is refreshing, and it is enhanced by his having brought together a remarkable array of Chinese and Japanese sources. However, while both types of sources are mostly written in classical Chinese, they require very different kinds of background knowledge for sound interpretation. I regret to say that where ancient Japanese history is concerned I do not always find this study to be an impeccably trustworthy guide.

Sometimes this is due to a too-literal reading of the Japanese texts; at other times it seems that the author's research in secondary materials was focused too narrowly on the Sino-Japanese relationship, resulting in a lack of familiarity with a wider range of pertinent Western and Japanese scholarship. For example, barely eight pages into the text, Wang proclaims that "Recent excavation conducted . . . at Yoshinogari, Saga prefecture, Kyūshū, gives the Kyūshū theory [concerning the location of the Yayoi kingdom of Yamatai] more weight" (p. 14). As Mark Hudson, Gina Barnes, and Walter Edwards have pointed out, the Yoshinogari excavations do nothing of the kind (*Monumenta Nipponica* 46: 2 [1991]: 234, and 51: 1 [1996]: 78).

The author seems to be unfamiliar with the studies on the dating of ancient Japanese history, particularly important when dealing with entries in the oldest Japanese sources concerning events predating the sixth century. So we find statements like: "In Japanese legend, the *Confucian Analects* . . . and the *Thousand Character Text* . . . were the first two books that a Paekche ambassador presented to the Wo ruler in 286" (p. 193). A note refers us to the *Kojiki* by "Ō no Yasumaro," and its nineteenth-century translation into English. The *Kojiki*, however, does not give this date, and neither does translator Basil Hall Chamberlain. Moreover, the study of this text and of its companion volume, the *Nihongi* (which does give dates) is complicated by the fact

that much of their chronology needs to be adjusted by two sixty-year cycles (i.e. 120 years) to yield, if not fully historical, at least factual, as opposed to legendary, data.

Wang has a general habit of treating Japanese texts as if they had been written by a single person. The authorship of these texts is not a simple matter, however, and it is standard practice to list them under their titles (or possibly under the names of their modern editors). Wang, however, chooses one of the names known to be connected with a text and then presents this person as the "author" in his notes and bibliography. The practice becomes doubly dubious when we find an imperial prince like Toneri Shinnō listed as the author of the *Nihon shoki* in the Iwanami edition, but as only one among several compilers in the *Kokushi taikēi* edition of the same text (p. 349).

Sometimes, Wang's lack of sophistication in Japanese history leads him to make statements such as: "Yamato rulers used Buddhism to promote political unification. They identified themselves with the Buddha and portrayed the Buddha as occupying a plane higher than that of the native Japanese deities, thus elevating themselves above other clan chieftains" (p. 194). If true, these sentences contain a completely new interpretation of the introduction of Buddhism into Japan and would require a monograph by themselves. However, as readers, we will be better off dismissing this remark as a shot in the dark.

Still, there is much material from the Chinese side that is new here. I found especially original and stimulating Wang's reading of the ways in which Japanese contemporary composers of diplomatic documents addressed to China referred to their own superiors, the rulers of Japan: while the Chinese side may have taken these to be transcriptions of unpronounceable, "barbarian" names, thus making them into acceptable forms of communication, in reality they contained expressions in Japanese proving that Japanese rulers were not inferior to Chinese emperors.

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ZHENG YANGWEN. *The Social Life of Opium in China*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 241. Cloth \$70.00, paper \$29.99.

Anyone who has even a modest knowledge of China knows the importance of opium in that nation's modern history. Indeed, much has been written on opium and opium-related issues since Hosea Ballou Morse's classic, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (1910–1918). Yet little has been published on the role of opium smoking in China's social history and on patterns of opium consumption in China. Zheng Yangwen's book helps fill that gap.

The book tells the story of opium from the late fifteenth century to the end of the twentieth century. Opium as a type of herbal medicine for treating pain, diarrhea, sunstroke, and other ailments has ancient

roots in China that can be traced as far back as the seventh century, but it became a recreational drug only after it was introduced as a form of *yanghuo* (foreign goods) in the late fifteenth century. Zheng clearly delineates how opium was spread along class lines, from the imperial court to grass roots society, and along geographic lines, from coastal areas to the hinterland. In the process, Chinese scholar-officials played a decisive role. They brought opium consumption into sex-as-recreation in the late eighteenth century, spread the gospel of opium at the turn of the nineteenth century, and urbanized it in the decades around the Opium War of 1839–1842. Zheng's account of opium includes a discussion of its proliferation as a crop and as contraband, how it generated a literature that contributed to the spread of vernacular Chinese, and vice versa, and how it performed multifaceted functions—boredom killer, livelihood, and means of protest and protection—in women's lives. Throughout the book, Zheng frequently makes references to or comments on scholarly works in Chinese studies on the various subjects under discussion. The author's command of the literature allows her dialogue with the existing scholarship to integrate seamlessly with the narrative. China specialists will find the book engaging and intellectually stimulating.

The book is distinctly intended for non-Sinologists as well, and it succeeds very nicely in this regard. As the title indicates, the author's approach is not to treat opium in the usual way, which is to say as commodity, but to personalize it and recognize that it had a "social life," and thus, on that basis, construct a type of "cultural biography" for it. Such a biographical approach provides a framework that both academics and general readers can appreciate. The abundant use of anecdotal sources also serves this purpose well. In the author's own words, in preparing for the book she "dived into the ocean of unofficial histories and unconventional sources, such as *biji* or *zaji*, that is, notes, jottings or miscellaneous and pornographic books" (p. 6). The anecdotal sources also include missionary reports and memoirs of Western expatriates in China. The personal experiences and observations of contemporaries are woven together with official sources, such as maritime customs documents, opium trading company records, and British Foreign Office papers, creating a fabric of vivid and memorable images of opium consumption in both private and public settings.

Readers may be disappointed, however, that the biography of the social life of opium comes to a sudden halt when "Mr. Opium" had just reached the prime of life. About half of the book is devoted to the nineteenth century; only sixteen pages are given solely to the history of opium after the St. Louis Exposition of 1904. As the author points out, "By the early twentieth century opium smoking had become a part of a larger culture, a sister culture, and was a culture all of its own" (p. 173), but her discussion of the "opium culture" in the Republican period is extremely sketchy. Given the fact that opium smoking in the nineteenth century has been the subject of some recent works, such as Keith Mc-

Mahon's *The Fall of the God of Money: Opium Smoking in Nineteenth-Century China* (2002), devoting more pages to the twentieth century could have made a much-needed contribution. Topics such as the communist government as an "opium regime," the Golden Triangle phenomenon, and the resurgence of opium consumption in the post-Mao era are touched on in the last chapter but are far from fully explored. These are indispensable parts of the social life of opium.

Overall, the book makes for pleasant reading, but I wish the author had been better served by the copyeditor. In particular, some word-for-word repetitions should have been eliminated. For instance, the statement that the book is "a biography of 'Mr. Opium' from his birth as a recreational item to his old age as a social icon" is duplicated (pp. 1–2, 6); the quotation "Language is of critical importance in cultural transmission," which is not necessarily of critical importance to the point the author is making, is used at least three times (pp. 7, 131, 205); Sidney Mintz's words about "intensification," "extensification," and the "diet of workers looked 'both calorically and nutritively inadequate and monotonous'" are also repeated (pp. 32, 78, 101, 149). Since this book is not very long, repetitions like these are particularly noticeable. It is also unclear why, since virtually all Chinese words are appropriately translated, the numerous French words and sentences quoted are not (for instance, pp. 3, 60, 143–144, 182, 186, 188, and 190).

Despite these defects, the book makes an important contribution to the growing literature on material culture and social change in late imperial and modern China and is likely to be recognized as an essential part of an account of the global history of opium consumption. The author's accessible style of presentation will also make the book welcome reading in the college classroom.

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HANCHAO LU. *Street Criers: A Cultural History of Chinese Beggars*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 269. \$45.00.

Hanchao Lu has scoured a wide range of Chinese and English sources for materials concerning beggars. His focus is on the period from 1600 through 1950, and he argues that during this long period a fixed cultural identity for beggars prevailed throughout China. Lu's eight chapters discuss various facets of beggary in China in a topical manner. In the book's conclusion, however, he returns to a subtheme, stressing how ever-increasing millions descended into poverty and beggary accompanying the decline of the Qing dynasty. Consequently, from around 1820 through 1950 the culture of beggars grew more common and elaborate.

By the late eighteenth century, the state network of granaries originally intended to succor the needy could no longer meet the demands of China's growing population. Thus, a culture of beggary expanded and grew

to become a major presence, especially in Chinese towns and cities. Lu does not play down the threatening and harassing qualities of beggars who would disrupt a shop's business or a family wedding unless they received their proper due. Still, he provides numerous examples of how Chinese beggars served socially useful functions such as night watchmen, mourners at funerals, and corvée laborers, and are said to have invented famous dishes such as "beggar's chicken," in which a stuffed bird is baked in a mud shell.

Lu quotes Chinese writers such as Feng Menglong (1574–1645) who wrote that since they were low in the social order, "we may hold beggars in contempt, but we should not compare them with prostitutes and actors, [yamen] runners and lackeys" (p. 37). Beggars ranked higher because they avoided these mean employments and simply were poor. Lu gives evidence that some beggars did slip into the truly mean categories, but being a beggar was different. Lu concludes "despite the usual sentiment of contempt for or fear of street people, the most common feeling toward them among the general public was compassion and pity" (p. 35).

Lu's categorization of beggars can be reduced to four basic types: rural beggars who often combined mendicancy along canals and roads with banditry; urban beggars who usually were organized into groups under the control of a headman and operated in a specific enclave; sturdy beggars who left their agricultural livelihoods behind during slack seasons to descend for a time on urban charity kitchens before returning to the land; and a few individuals who took up mendicancy for some special cause or rose to high position from being vagrants. This final category provided beggars with their heroes.

As was typical in late traditional Chinese culture, these heroes usually were drawn from elite literature. For example, Han Xin (d. 196 B.C.E.) rose from a vagabond to become a famous military commander and strategist. As an example of a person who reversed his unfortunate circumstances, beggar groups took him as their patron saint. The ancient historian, Sima Qian, included Han Xin's biography in his works, and that account became the source of a legend that permeated the common imagination, even that of the largely illiterate beggar class in late imperial China.

Lu's account contains many entertaining vignettes from Chinese and foreigners about begging, including techniques such as "driving swine" in which beggars pursued ordinary people (the swine) along the street until they contributed some coins. He recounts how many beggars developed routines in which they became buskers performing songs, dances, or acrobatics around temples or markets to earn their daily living. Others used elaborate make-up to elicit the public's pity. Most urban beggars, in the fashion described by Charles Dickens in *Oliver Twist*, belonged to groups with whom they gathered in the evenings to hand over their take and share in a common meal under a leader's control. Lu, whose previous book, *Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century* (1999),

is a rich evocation of a way of life almost gone today, takes many of his examples from that vibrant city.

After 1949, the new Chinese government quickly reformed or suppressed all the former undesirable social classes, including beggars. Since 1980 beggars, like prostitutes, bandits, and local toughs, have reappeared on Chinese roads and streets, but a full revival of the old culture of beggars seems unlikely. In the early reform era the suppression approach continued, as is reflected in the title of the 1982 "Regulation for Detaining and Deporting Urban Vagrants and Beggars." Today, the Chinese state proclaims a more gentle approach. Lu cites a wry example from 2003, when the State Council issued "Regulations for Aiding and Managing Helpless Vagrants and Beggars" (p. 203).

This a useful and readable survey of the life faced by tens of millions of unfortunates who sought to survive as beggars during China's increasing disorder before 1950.

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QITAO GUO. *Ritual Opera and Mercantile Lineage: The Confucian Transformation of Popular Culture in Late Imperial Huizhou*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2005. Pp. 366. \$65.00.

The opera *Mulian Rescues His Mother*, about a pious monk who saves his sinful mother from the sufferings of purgatory, has long been popular in China because of its combination of Buddhist salvation for the uncared-for dead with the deliverance of family ancestors. It was performed at community temple festivals, particularly during the "Ghost Festival" on the fifteenth day of the seventh lunar month. The Mulian story first appeared in China in a Buddhist text composed there in the fifth century C.E., and a Mulian opera was first performed in the twelfth century. In 1582 a scholar named Zheng Zhizhen (1518–1595) published a new version of this opera that included more specifically Confucian teachings and stories. Zheng was from Huizhou, a prosperous area of six counties in southern Anhui and northeastern Jiangxi provinces in south central China with a population of about 1.2 million in 1600 and 2 million by 1820, including many merchant families and their lineages. These merchants promoted trade in local products such as tea, lacquer, bamboo, and lumber as well as paper, rice, silk, and porcelain, which they sold all over China, sometimes leaving home for years at a time. Huizhou had also long been the center of a Confucian culture that by this time had developed "mercantile ethics" advocating "industry, frugality, honesty and rationalism" (p. 56) and "female marital fidelity" for wives left at home. This perspective encouraged economic activity but, at the same time, continued to support as the highest goal for men the passing of state-sponsored civil service examinations to obtain official status and positions. Merchant families in Huizhou formed lineages that promoted these values

and built lineage shrines where their ancestors were honored by ritual offerings before their tablets, genealogies, were compiled and regular gatherings held to recite moral injunctions. Zheng Zhizhen was a member of one such lineage who turned to playwriting after failing civil service examinations several times over a period of thirty years. Guo Qitao argues that through the text of his Mulian opera, Zheng sought to inculcate the Confucian values that he had studied for so long, here supported by promises of divine rewards and punishments intended to appeal to ordinary folk. His version of the opera was a "staged form of Confucian ideology" that led to a "subtle but thorough Confucian remolding of local popular culture" (p. 5). It was "rooted in the mercantile lineage, the dominant social institution in Huizhou" (p. 210); through it the "local elites sought to . . . penetrate the spiritual and mental world of the ordinary folk" (p. 219), a theme repeated several times in this book. Unfortunately for the author, such repetition does not prove his point, which goes beyond what the evidence supports.

The basic problem is that Guo begins his study of popular culture with the Huizhou elite and a text composed by one of their members, not with the ritual traditions and values of the local communities that sponsored performances of the opera. As he notes, Mulian opera was "always staged in a ritual context of thanking the gods for their protection, and exorcising ghosts" (p. 4). There is a detailed discussion of the lively context of performance, which involved offerings both to placate "Five Fury" spirits and to appeal for their aid in driving out demons (pp. 183–194). The author attempts to argue that all this represented a "gentry logic," because the Five Furies were ambiguous demons who supported moral order, but coopting such spirits to support the good was common in China, and local gods everywhere were expected to support moral order. In Huizhou, as elsewhere in China, merchants and gentry promoted and enjoyed opera performances, built stages for them (p. 78), and shared the common hope that such performances would bring blessings and drive away harm. Mulian opera from the beginning expressed ancient Chinese concerns for the blessing of both ancestors and the living, concerns that were supported by Confucians but shared by all.

Zheng Zhizhen's restatement of these ideas in Confucian terms no doubt further consolidated their appeal, particularly for lineage elites, but there is no evidence that his text reshaped the basic values and expectations of those who participated in the festivals during which the opera was performed. Those values, before and thereafter, were to seek divine aid and drive away harmful forces, with concern as well for the entertainment of humans and gods through music and acrobatics. Zheng Zhizhen certainly added Confucian content to the opera, but the result was not the transformation of popular culture that the author claims. Changes in local culture, in China and elsewhere, can only be demonstrated through careful investigation of

the actual practices of local communities and the values and beliefs they express.

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THEODORE HUTERS. *Bringing the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 2005. Pp. ix, 370. \$55.00.

In this wide-ranging and erudite book, Theodore Hutters addresses problems of modern China in the transitional period from 1895 to 1919. Beginning with China's defeat by Japan and ending with the rise of the May Fourth cultural movement, this period is riddled with contradictions between old and new. In the throes of change, the millennial tradition seemed to be dying and the modern was yet to be born.

There are two advantages in focusing on this period. Its murky atmosphere highlights the tenacious persistence of the traditional past within the drive for modernization, challenging the conventional divide between the two along a linear timeline. Second, the period's intense intellectual debate opened up a floodgate of intellectual and literary creativity, giving rise to an early modern bloom of hundred flowers. In studies of history and literature, intellectual context is often treated like a backstage for mounting the work under scrutiny. What makes this book stand out is a managerial synthesis encompassing debates on literary theory, mutations of genres, recommendations of modernity, ideas of universalism, and, most importantly, close readings of key works of fiction.

Yet this is not a survey of intellectual and literary trends. A paradox runs through the book. The need to appropriate Western models and to break with China's past is troubled by a nagging anxiety: hopes of maintaining continuity with the cultural legacy constantly pull back the forward outlook. Hutters fleshes out this theme in a nuanced discussion of the late Qing debate on China's orientation during the Yangwu period of technology appropriation. He goes on to reexamine Yan Fu's thinking about Western political theory. Keeping a close eye on the politics of culture, he identifies the new forms of writing emerging from the past or grafted to the Western models, analyzes the world outlook that informed new literary theories, and describes the polemicist writing that engaged the ongoing politics, as exemplified by the reform leader Liang Qichao.

In the second part of the book, motifs of conceptual debate are worked into close readings of a number of representative authors. Wu Jianren's works, for example, are well chosen for analysis. Exposing social ills and government corruption, Wu fulfilled the function of literature as a vehicle for governance and a new civic consciousness. Working in the commercial environ of treaty-port Shanghai, Wu signaled the change of the writer from the literati to a cultural producer and was able to

absorb elements from Eastern and Western cultures to make good sales. Zeng Pu's novel, *Flower in a Sea of Retribution* (*Nie hai hua*), is a more engaging work obsessed with the coming of the West to China. By contrast, while denying the usefulness of Western ideas to the Chinese situation, Zhu Shouju grounded his work firmly in a capitalist print culture and hybrid circulations of images and ideas. Then came Lu Xun, who cast such market-oriented writing in doubt and refused to bridge the gap between the way things are and the way they are represented.

Hutters's reading of these texts not only offers insight into literature but also substantiates the theme concerning the dilemma of borrowing the new and discarding the old. As he goes into an analysis of universalism in chapter eight, Hutters rightly invokes Chinese intellectuals' elaboration of universal standards of civilization and political system. But the universal standards were compromised by their overt or covert links to the European or North American context. In other words, universalism may disguise eurocentrism. In my view, this need not always be the case. Universalism can be disengaged from its particular context. In the postmodern divisive mode, we tend to attribute the meaning of utterance to the speaker, her position and history, but the valence of ideas must transcend one's narrow position and culture to be meaningful and relevant to others. It seems this overrated difference enshrined in a specific history or tradition versus a suspect universalism accounts for the use of "hybridity" in the description of the cultural mix in modern China. Hybridity is not that important if, as history has shown again and again, every cultural formation is necessarily hybrid from its birth to maturity. What make hybridity sound paradoxical are the geopolitical dividing lines in the modern game of power and their stereotyping, of cultural essence. The paradox will lose its sharpness if we think of past, present, and future not in terms of before and after or East and West but as always already overlapping, intermingling resources for sociohistorical creativity in the present.

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PAUL R. KATZ. *When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Tapa-ni Incident in Colonial Taiwan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 313. \$59.00.

In this book, Paul R. Katz introduces one of the most significant instances of anti-Japanese violence in Taiwan's history to the English-speaking audience. Katz's account, influenced by Paul A. Cohen's landmark work on the Boxer Rebellion, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (1998), focuses on three areas. First, he describes the event: "the broad range of political, socio-economic, and cultural factors that helped spark this particularly dramatic act of armed resistance during Taiwan's colonial era" (p. 5). Second, he examines Japanese colonial policies that contributed to the one-month conflict and how the in-

cident shaped the subsequent development of Japanese rule. Third, Katz situates the events of 1915 within broader historiographical contexts. Here, he makes an important contribution to the field, as the author makes connections between Ta-pa-ni and Taiwanese, Chinese, and global colonial history. Taiwanese historiography is bedeviled by attempts to force events in the island's past into either a Chinese (unification) or Taiwanese (independence) national narrative. Katz, however, casts a skeptical eye on all the political agendas that have sought to claim the tragedy of 1915. One key aspect of this work is the author's discussion of the overlapping and shifting identities of the island's inhabitants, none of which could be considered simply "nationalism."

Most of Katz's book is devoted to an account of the incident and its immediate aftermath. The volume also includes an extensive glossary and a bibliography that can guide any scholar interested in the colonial era. Nonspecialists, however, may find the level of detail daunting, as the biographical sketches of the main characters and the statistical information placed within the narrative threaten to obscure the author's main points. Katz begins by examining motivations for the incident, which he defines as a combination of millenarianism and economic difficulties. Simply put, the religious traditions and cultural environment of southwest Taiwan created the framework for a violent reaction to island-wide colonial policies designed to promote modernization. Here, Ta-pa-ni is contextualized as part of the rich historical literature on revolts and religious movements in China. The author suggests that recruiters for the uprising often relied on "oral traditions that had circulated throughout China for many centuries" that combined vegetarian movements and secret societies (p. 93). Economic development brought the intrusive and effective exactions of the state to the local level. Policies that ensured government control over sugar and forest products, implemented effective and comprehensive land taxation, and established a constant police presence in villages all served to increase tensions. In response, Han Chinese and aborigines forged a short-lived alliance to wrest control of sections of Gaoxiong and Tainan counties from the Japanese. The uprising only lasted about a month, and its initial success indicated the lack of Japanese preparation as much as effective rebel military strategy or unity among inhabitants of that part of the island.

Katz does not shy away from exposing the brutality of the uprising and its aftermath. If the attacks on Japanese policemen, officials, and their families were vicious, the Japanese response to the uprising represented a systematic oppression. For example, after the initial suppression of the uprising, the Japanese forced some women and children to leave their villages and to move into wilderness areas. Their pleas and plight would convince the remaining rebels to surrender, the Japanese assumed. "The police apparently expected the rebels to give up after seeing their families suffer, but this did not prove to be the case" (p. 187). A final tally of over 1,000 dead made this one of the most vi-

olent episodes in the island's modern history. Hundreds more died in jail or were executed.

The aftermath of the incident included the appearance of "widow villages" due to the death of men, and other local demographic changes detailed by Katz. The uprising did not herald the start of growing resistance to colonial rule that scholars could place under the rubric of nationalism (whether Chinese or Taiwanese). Rather, the Japanese became better at policing and administration, and only one other uprising of comparative scope occurred between Ta-pa-ni and the end of colonial rule in 1945. Katz concludes by briefly examining how the incident is remembered and commemorated in southwestern Taiwan.

Katz provides a detailed account and cogent analysis that enables scholars to make comparisons to religious-based uprisings in modern China and elsewhere. This volume presents what should become the standard account of Ta-pa-ni in the English-language literature.

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XU GUOQI. *China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*. (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 316. \$80.00.

The frequency with which new analyses of World War I continue to appear must startle even the most zealous aficionados. Since Paul Fussell's classic, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (1975), examinations of personal experience, memory, and cultural impact have attracted particular attention. But orthodox studies of specific battles, war aims, and leadership endure, the best of which take an explicitly comparative approach. Among the more interesting new investigations of the military/diplomatic/political dimensions of the Great War are tales of developments far away from the principal theater of the western front.

Xu Guoqi's book is one of these notable new titles. Although not the first English-language study to examine China during the 1914–1919 years, it is the only one to do so primarily from the perspective of Chinese war aims. Thomas E. LaFargue (*China and the World War* [1937]) and Madeleine Chi (*China Diplomacy, 1914–1918* [1970]) long ago canvassed the British, American, and Japanese diplomatic record to tell a tale of hapless Chinese leadership incapable or unwilling to advance China's interests on the international stage. By contrast, Xu mines diplomatic documents from archives in China, Taiwan, Britain, France, Germany, and the United States—plus the public discussion of a new Chinese "foreign policy public" found in more than twenty-five Chinese and English-language periodicals published in China, Britain, and the United States—to return a sense of agency to wartime Chinese diplomacy.

By any measure, Chinese war aims fared miserably: Chinese statesmen could not keep hostilities from their soil (Japan immediately advanced on German interests

in Shandong province in 1914), curb Japan's appetite for an expansive new set of political and economic rights (the Twenty-One Demands of 1915), or foil great power recognition of Japan's new position in Shandong at the Paris Peace Conference. But these failures were not without rigorous efforts to fashion a more favorable outcome. In particular, Xu highlights extraordinary Chinese attempts to join the war, in a bid for Great Power validation of Chinese sovereignty and integrity.

For students of the Great War, Xu's coverage of China's initial response to the outbreak of hostilities offers intriguing confirmation of a familiar pattern. Although China specialists typically privilege trepidation in Beijing over the effect of war on Japanese power, Xu finds among the informed Chinese public significant recognition of the benefits of a European conflict. Many policy makers and pundits spied an ideal opportunity for China to become an active and respected member of the international community.

The overwhelming impulse to join the global community led to some incredible wartime initiatives. President Yuan Shikai informed the British minister to China in August 1914 that China could contribute 50,000 troops to ejecting Germany from Shandong province. Although British and French statesmen rejected this and subsequent offers of Chinese troops for fear of antagonizing their Japanese ally, they jumped at Chinese proposals to send laborers to Europe instead. Between 1915 and 1918, 140,000 Chinese workers made the long and precarious journey to Europe to risk their lives for the allied cause. Although they did not engage in direct combat, they worked near the battlefields, doing heavy lifting, constructing, and trench digging, at a death rate of approximately ten percent.

If classic accounts of China during the Great War stumble in their detachment from their subject matter, one might argue that Xu errs on the side of proximity. Clearly a champion of China's recent rise in international status, he echoes the assessment by China's May Fourth-era intellectuals of prerevolutionary China as a bastion of "isolation" (p. 22) and "ignorance" (p. 69) and attempts to locate the roots of today's "international" China squarely in China's participation in the war. In so doing, he obscures critical Qing-era transformations long detailed by China specialists and attributes to wartime Chinese leaders nothing but the best intentions for the nation. Nowhere is there any hint that some policy makers, as in Europe or Japan, may have thought less for the nation than for domestic political gain.

Having said that, the evidence presented here of a sincere and profound Chinese commitment to the war is incredible. As Xu notes, this ardor derived less from any natural affinity for the Allies than from anticipation of significant national gains from comporting, for the first time, as a legitimate member of an international coalition. In this respect, one might say that Chinese wartime diplomacy was ahead of its time. It anticipated the era of 1920s multilateralism that, ironically, China's more politically and economically advanced neighbor,

Japan, spurned throughout the war (in its persistent refusal to send Japanese troops to Europe). With this captivating glimpse of Chinese wartime "internationalism," we understand, for the first time, the true depth of Chinese disappointment at Paris.

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MARK McNALLY. *Proving the Way: Conflict and Practice in the History of Japanese Nativism*. (Harvard East Asian Monographs, number 245.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center. 2005. Pp. xiv, 287. \$49.50.

Kokugaku, variously translated as "national learning" and "nativism," has been the subject of several monographs in recent years, among them works by Peter Nosco, Harry Harootunian, and, more recently, myself. While my work and that of Nosco are oriented around the work of Motoori Norinaga, Mark McNally's study of *kokugaku* focuses on Hirata Atsutane, Norinaga's self-proclaimed successor. In this he is following in the wake of Harootunian's massive and monumental study of Hirata and his rural followers, *Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Nativism* (1988). Taking on a well-studied topic is of course not an easy task, but McNally boldly argues that recent studies, most notably Harootunian's, are flawed in that they "ignore any causal relationship between the text and its historical conditions of productions" (p. 244) and thus fail to elucidate the significance of *kokugaku* as discourse and cultural institution during the Tokugawa period. For McNally, the key to "restoring historicity" (p. 13) to our understanding of *kokugaku* is to be found in the work of Randall Collins, Pierre Bourdieu, and Roger Chartier, whom he cites repeatedly (and deploys uncritically) in order to argue that ideas must be viewed as the product of competition and conflict between authors, who "struggle in a social space populated by other authors, each competing for particular stakes" (p. 245).

McNally uses the idea of "struggle" to good effect to frame his examination of the internecine debates between members of the so-called Edo-ha of Kamo no Mabuchi students, the Suzunoya headed first by Norinaga and later his adopted heir Ōhira, the latter Suzunoya of Norinaga's son Haruniwa, and Kido Chidate's Nudenoya over such issues as the place of poetry in nativist practice, the nature of the indigenous way, and the relationship between Confucianism and nativism that shaped relations. According to McNally, Hirata's turn to eschatology, the topic of his best-known works *Shinkiron* and *Tama no mihashira*, must be understood as an attempt to negotiate the competition to define what constituted orthodox nativist practice, while propelling himself to a position of stature among the multiple claimants to Motoori Norinaga's mantle. Similarly, Atsutane's delineation of the orthodox lineage of *kokugaku* development, which has ordered much modern scholarship on *kokugaku*, too had the aim of privileging his own work, by establishing that he

alone was carrying on Norinaga's work, even as he in fact abandoned the "textualism" and the philology that was its foundation. The result of Atsutane's project of self-legitimation was, according to McNally, the formation of an "ideological definition" of *kokugaku* as the form of native knowledge that "articulated the true cultural essence of Japan" (p. 209).

These are valuable, although not very original, conclusions. The Japanese scholar Uchino Gorô (cited liberally throughout the work) in particular is the source of many of McNally's insights. However, this book is marred by McNally's frequent and pointed attacks on Harootunian's work, even as it parallels *Things Seen and Unseen* to a disconcerting degree in its organization and choice of topics. Perhaps McNally's point was to demonstrate in his own work his claim that the "struggle in a social space populated by other authors" is productive of ideas, but the result is a book that seems narrow in its scope and aims. This is not the place for a defense of Harootunian's work, but contrary to McNally's assertion about the limitations of discourse analysis, *Things Seen and Unseen* sought to demonstrate the central importance of the work of Hirata and his students in late Tokugawa society, asserting that their nativist writings contested official representations of culture and society by imagining new forms of political community. Harootunian argued as well that the failure of this new conception of community to contribute significantly to the Meiji Restoration had profound consequences for modern Japan. In contrast, McNally, in his focus on school relations, in the end suggests that there was nothing more at "stake" for Hirata and the other nativist scholars than a competition for students and fame. Equally unsatisfying is McNally's treatment of the significance of *kokugaku* for the modern period. His epilogue on the "association of *Kokugaku* and ultranationalism" is all of six pages long and does little more than state that in the 1930s and 1940s intellectuals of every ideological persuasion referenced the *kokugaku* of the Tokugawa period. Even critics of Harootunian are unlikely to be satisfied with this work.

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GAIL LEE BERNSTEIN. *Isami's House: Three Centuries of a Japanese Family*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2005. Pp. xxviii, 283. \$19.95.

Gail Lee Bernstein has written a rich and engaging history of the people who have constituted her "Japanese family" since her doctoral dissertation days in the early 1960s. This history of the Matsuura family is indeed, as Bernstein claims, "a prism for viewing modern Japanese history" (p. xii).

The Matsuura family is by no means "typical" or "average," considering that its heads were village headmen for thirteen generations from the late seventeenth century until the late 1950s. But their wealth and authority as members of the rural elite did not insulate the twelfth and thirteenth generations from having to make some-

times difficult adjustments to cope with the wide-ranging social, economic, and political changes associated with modernization, imperialism, and war during the twentieth century.

The history of the Matsuura family provides many possibilities for linking micro with macro historical trends because it is so large and consequently diverse. In addition, family heads conscientiously kept records, providing many sources for an illuminating case study of the wealthy rural elite that emerged with agricultural commercialization during the eighteenth century but gradually declined during the twentieth century. The twelfth generation head Isami is the central character in the story. In the early 1950s he wrote a chronicle about the family and village, the core source for Bernstein's history along with interviews with family members. Isami and his wife Kô had fifteen children (numerous even by early twentieth century standards), so that with spouses, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren they constitute an exceptionally large extended family. Being born over the first three and a half decades of the twentieth century, the children grew up and entered adulthood in greatly differing historical as well as family circumstances.

The children's lives reflect the complexity of Japan's transformation from a rural, agricultural to an urban, industrial society. By the time Isami wrote his family history, the Matsuuras' wealth had all but disappeared and the values of family loyalty and harmony that he espoused were dwindling. Most of the family had become part of the educated urban middle classes, characterized by salaryman husbands devoted to their work and full-time housewives responsible for household management and their children's upbringing. But the transition was by no means smooth or successful for all. The twelve eldest benefited from Isami's recognition of the importance of formal education for careers (or becoming good wives and mothers for the girls) in modern Japan. They attended prestigious private and public universities and colleges in Tokyo. But ironically, educating the heir in Tokyo resulted in his becoming a "playboy" with a liking for fashionable Ginza entertainments and a reluctance to return to the village. The expense of the commitment to education also contributed to the decline in the family's fortune. Moreover, the youngest three children were disadvantaged because wartime conditions prevented them from obtaining a Tokyo education, and they entered the postwar workplace when employment opportunities were poor.

Arranging marriages for his numerous children was Isami's other major family preoccupation and a further drain on the family's assets. Despite the rise of first "companionate" and then "love marriage," all of the children and many of the grandchildren had arranged marriages. Appropriate upper-middle-class family background, good education and career prospects, and status and economic security constituted the primary criteria for selecting marriage partners. But not all marriages worked out smoothly. Several became strained when husbands proved unfaithful or when war or work

forced separations. For the thirteenth generation, divorce was not a way to resolve conflict because of its unacceptable social stigma, especially for women. Only the current fourteenth generation shows resistance to the traditional marriage system.

It is impossible in this short review to give many examples of individual experiences that make this family history interesting and enjoyable to read as well as illustrative of broad historical trends. Just a few topics enhanced by family examples are the use of adoption to maintain family lineage, women's education, Japanese experiences as "privileged interlopers" in the empire, wartime struggles on the homefront, middle-class lifestyles of the 1960s, and, of course, various kinds of "kin work." Bernstein is especially successful in interweaving the family's story with major developments of the Tokugawa period through the early postwar years, though perhaps a little less so for the post-1960s decades.

A minor quibble is with the chapter structure, which is a combination of the chronological and thematic. Movement back and forth chronologically, as in part one on "Ancestors and Descendants," is sometimes a little confusing. To enable further reading in historical studies, it also would have been desirable to cite more of the secondary literature and to provide a bibliography rather than just endnotes. But these are minor quibbles that do not detract significantly from the readability or insightfulness of this family history. It would make great supplementary reading in undergraduate courses and is equally accessible for general readers.

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RANDOLF G. S. COOPER. *The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2003. Pp. xvii, 437. \$85.00.

This is a truly fascinating work. Focusing on an important theme in Indian military history, it is a welcome addition to historical literature on the rise of the Indian Empire. At a time when military history is unfashionable, despite a lamentable paucity of such work, Randolph G. S. Cooper presents a close, action packed narrative of each major battle, in riveting detail. Drawing heavily on a welter of first-person accounts by British officers that blend anecdotes, insights, and prejudices, he has painstakingly fitted together what was seen and heard—through the smoke and the thunder—when no one could fully comprehend what was happening, or clearly explain the final outcome. Cooper is at his very best when he is telling the story, fact by fact. In doing this, and in explaining distinctions in the intricacies of technical details about various kinds of arms and armaments—especially when describing flintlocks and matchlocks, artillery and other forms of ordinance and their use—he is superb. As a consequence, there is much in this book that makes for first-class reading.

Alas, narrative excellence is not matched by compa-

table broader analysis. Ironically, while mainly English-language sources explain how forces of the raj triumphed in each and every one of the pivotal battles, Cooper goes on and on and on, with endless repeated ad hominem remarks, trying to show how and why it was that the British failed to understand what they were doing and, more seriously, how historiography has been blinded by a triumphalist adoration of the "sepoys" general who, after becoming Duke of Wellington, later led forces that defeated the armies of Napoleon Bonaparte.

But perhaps the most serious failures of understanding within this study lie in areas that are most touted: namely, in appreciating cross-cultural and historical contexts. The Marathas, in their warlords and war bands, represented only one portion of cultures within the whole of South Asia. Even so, not even all Maratha elites were incorporated into the system of Maratha military expansion. The Maratha Brahman Peshwas of Pune, being Konkanastha (or Chitpavan), could be looked down upon by families of older and prouder Desastha diaspora who, having once served as generals and ministers under Goikonda and other regimes, had flocked into upper cadres of the Madras Presidency by the 1790s. Where does Cooper think Arthur Wellesley learned how to maximize the utility of cavalry, if not from Purniah, the former Diwan of Mysore? (The two old soldiers were still writing to each other forty years later.) Similarly, Sir Thomas Munro, while governor of Madras, made it a point to consult with his old Desastha advisors, while walking along the marina each morning before breakfast. Company records in the south, according to Vennelacunty Subha Rao, were usually kept in vernacular, Marathi, and English. In short, by the time the Company's forces went up against the Scindia's armies, they came equipped with all of the accumulated lore of nearly two centuries. Bengal and Madras, not London alone, provided the resources—in manpower, money, methods—that enabled the Company to subdue the Marathas. Bengali elites settled wherever the Company's flag was planted in the North, inasmuch that their colonies came to Delhi in 1803 and thereafter provided essentials for both the conquest and the consolidation of the Northwest. Thus, at the elbow of each political resident or agent, in negotiations with each prince, was a Bengali or a Desastha or similar "native" diplomatic *dubashi*, whether listed as a "*munshi*," "*vakil*," or whatever. Cooper might well have asked why, amid all the Maratha desertions, Company ("British") forces did not suffer from the same maladies. After all, apart from a few crown regiments, all troops in India, Company sepoys and sardars included, were mercenary soldiers. Part of the answer lay in regularity of monthly pay. But, by far the larger answer lies in that ephemeral but most essential feature of indigenous culture—"honour" or "loyalty" epitomized by the term "*namak-hallāl*." In short, the author is correct in pointing out that deeper cultural factors were more crucial than Wellesley's military prowess. The problem is that Cooper does not appreciate just how deeply these very factors undermined the Maratha power within larger mil-

itary and political economies of the subcontinent. His own understandings, like his archaic spellings, come more from the records than from broader understandings of India (South Asia) as a whole. The raj that slowly evolved before 1803 was, indeed, a hybrid culture. This the author seems to miss.

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JANAKI BAKHLE. *Two Men and Music: Nationalism in the Making of an Indian Classical Tradition*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 338. \$19.95.

In this book, Janaki Bakhle presents a compelling and original study of the widening cultural sphere of music in late colonial India, an aspect of artistic life not hitherto thought to be "touched" by colonialism. The book explores the development of pedagogy, organization, notation, and classification in struggles to define a classical tradition for music by following the careers of two leading musicologists, Vishnu Narayan Bhatkhande and Vishnu Digambar Paluskar. Colonial texts, music appreciation societies, and all-India music conferences form the general context and backdrop to their histories. The author sketches out a complex narrative in which notions of separate "forms" of classical music and performance were delineated and imagined: among them, ideas of separate Hindu and Muslim spheres.

Despite the paucity of systematically ordered sources and the need to rely on hagiographies, newspapers, and biographies, Bakhle has constructed a wide-ranging, detailed, and subtle argument. The author makes it clear that direct comparisons between Indian and Western classical music are problematic, due to the difficulty of clearly separating secular from sacred forms in the former. Instead, more complex dialogues between colonial/Western forms of knowledge and Indian musicological debate are a persistent refrain of the book. Chapter one contains a detailed case study of a princely state, Baroda, in which Bakhle argues that colonial modernity transformed music in non-British Indian contexts, as the court established a more bureaucratized environment for performance. It is possible to question how representative Baroda is of courtly responses to themes of modernization in music. But chapter two moves on to a broader consideration of the emerging nonunitary, gendered, public cultural sphere in music. This is introduced through a survey of colonial sociologies of music, from early ethnographic explorations and commentaries of Sir William Jones, to tracts by N. Augustus Willard and C. R. Day. This excellent contextual chapter demonstrates how colonial stress on "nation, notation and religion" (p. 52) served to foster a kind of evangelical Hinduism in music. It moves on to narrate the foundation of music societies, educational reform movements, and the changing position of female artists and audience, each inflected in their own way by colonial epistemologies.

The following two chapters, on the careers of Bhatkhande and Paluskar, provide the best-researched and most compelling overall arguments of the book. Here, Bakhle expertly teases out the subtle effects of the colonial environment on musicological debates. Although the concrete political events of the early twentieth century are only distantly apparent in the background, it is made clear that the older separation of music history from general political contexts is not sustainable. Specifically, the stress on a sanskritized Hindu foundation for musical theory and practice, by both Bhatkhande and Paluskar and by the key institutions, is described as marginalizing the ubiquitous Muslim performers. The juxtaposition of these two men is appropriate and masterful. Bhatkhande, the "flawed secularist" and "failed modernist" (p. 97), wanted a separation between music and religion but pursued it through Hindu bigotry. In a series of astoundingly arrogant academic encounters and projects, he pushed for the institutionalization and centralization of music. Paluskar, in contrast, promoted an unambiguous bhakti-inspired or Brahmanical musical pedagogy and set up quasi-religious training institutions, whose projects "dovetailed" with "modern" Hindu reformist and revivalist institutions such as the Arya Samaj and Sanatan Dharma (p. 139). The comparison between the two men allows the author to compose a complex and varied score, suggesting that the impact of colonial modernity on this particular cultural sphere is often contradictory, distorted by curious individual foibles and prejudices. The juxtaposition is rounded off in chapter five, in a compelling and intricate survey of the all-India music conferences. This chapter illustrates not only the very different approaches of Bhatkhande and Paluskar to classical music but also a powerful Indian argumentative tradition.

After these rousing chapters, the final departure from the main theme in chapter six, although picturesque and novel, seems truncated in structure and less relevant to the main argument. The author might also have developed the nature of the middle-class Marathi audience more fully, and there is probably still a need to examine in more depth the nature of Muslim responses to the Hinduized classical tradition in music. Finally, the specific ways in which some of the debates and changes Bakhle describes are colonially derivative are left vague, suggesting that more varied and complex notions of "modernity" and "public sphere" might have framed this excellent research. Nevertheless, Bakhle has produced superb history, and with this book has probably established herself as the *ustad gharana* in a new historical field.

WILLIAM GOULD
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SHRI KRISHAN. *Political Mobilization and Identity in Western India, 1934-47*. (Sage Series in Modern Indian History.) Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. 2005. Pp. 279. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$24.95.

Once upon a time, historians of colonial India concentrated on relations between British rulers and elite Indians. Then, the Subaltern Studies school brought in the subcontinent's "subalterns": tribals, Dalits (untouchables), peasants. The Subalternists produced some first-rate scholarship, often predicated on the assumption that Indian society comprised two monolithic and perpetually hostile bodies: subalterns and the elite. Shri Krishan challenges both this notion and a chain of further Subalternist assumptions: the elite's sole interest was maintaining hegemony; the only authentic subaltern protest was violent revolt; a sense of membership in an Indian nation was confined to the elite; when subalterns joined elites in nonviolent struggles against rackrenting landlords, predatory moneylenders, and the colonial state, they were being duped by their hegemon. Krishan's subject is the way that, in the 1930s and 1940s, elite nationalists of the Indian National Congress (and to a lesser extent their Communist and Socialist rivals) "mobilized" rural subalterns, organizing protests against exploitation and mediating grievances. He argues that by uniting them in common goals, mobilization eventually made subalterns feel part of the Indian nation.

The book is marred by stylistic inconsistency. Readers averse to jargon-laden theory will not get through the introduction, which says everything imaginable about the historiography of lower classes and of group identities. Those seeking analysis will be equally frustrated by the next chapter, an exhausting survey of land tenures and exploitation, complete with twenty-one statistical tables. Less serious, but equally irritating, is repetition, which replays everything from Louis Gottschalk's ideas about history (pp. 30, 236) to landlordism in the Konkan region (pp. 54–57, 109–110). On the whole, Krishan's four core chapters, based on English-language government records and papers and reminiscences of Congress leaders, combine readability and analysis. The first three explore the mobilization of peasants, tribals, and Dalits. From 1934, Congressmen established links with the peasantry, motivated, Krishan argues, both by the need for votes following an extension of the franchise and by a sincere desire to help the downtrodden. The assistance was welcomed because Congress adhered to the nonviolent protest and compromise traditionally favored by peasants, and because the Congress leaders used their understanding of colonial politics and law to obtain real benefits.

In order to drag in theories on criminality, Krishan's chapter on the mobilization of tribals wrongly lumps tribals in general with those tribal communities which, according to colonial anthropology, had a propensity to crime. Almost half the chapter on Dalits is a critique of Gail Omvedt's analysis of the Dalit leader Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar, who Krishan argues was not as exclusively focused on Dalit interests as Omvedt asserts. The final substantive chapter uses the Quit India Movement revolt of 1942 to challenge two Subalternist arguments: that when pushed too far by exploitation, subalterns resort to mindless violence; and that the rural risings of

1942 were subaltern rebellions, independent of Congress control and nationalist goals. As Krishan notes, while Quit India was violent, it was never indiscriminate, and carefully targeted agents and symbols of the colonial state. At the same time, attacks were often directed by local Congressmen; when they were not, rebels frequently identified their goals with those of Congress.

Unfortunately, in two crucial areas, Krishan follows the Subalternists in building his case on unsupported assertions. One concerns sweeping promises that Congress made in the mid-1930s to end agrarian exploitation. After winning the Bombay election of 1937, the new Congress government did little to honor its undertakings, and indeed suppressed peasant agitation. For Subalternists, this is a key piece of evidence in proving that Congress was merely using subalterns. Given that Krishan contends that party leaders really did want to alleviate rural misery, one would expect him to marshal evidence to explain this apparent contradiction between words and deeds. Instead, he tells us that undefined "Important practical considerations" (p. 112) prevented change, and that post-1937 "Congress opposition to tenant and labour radicalism was based on its policy of settling class disputes amicably, so as to give primacy to the national struggle over class struggle" (p. 121). Perhaps, but this is hardly a convincing refutation of the Subalternists. Krishan similarly fails to prove that national sentiment prevailed among Indian subalterns by 1947. There is no doubt that many leaders of the 1942 revolt were nationalists, but there is simply not enough evidence to show that nationalism "was the most significant articulation of mass political activity during the Quit India Movement" (p. 245).

Much of Krishan's criticism of the Subalternists is on the mark. Unfortunately, beside asserting rather than proving, he is like the Subalternists in that for him, human behavior is an all-or-nothing business. Surely the truth is that many Congressmen wanted to banish rural exploitation, and many others wanted to keep it; and many subalterns were Indian nationalists, and many others were not.

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OCEANIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

ALAN ATKINSON. *The Europeans in Australia: A History*. Volume 2, *Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. xxiii, 440. \$55.00.

If you read one book about the Australian colonies in the nineteenth century, choose this one. Focused on the emergence of "democracy," this second volume of *The Europeans in Australia* is a work of historical insight, imaginatively conceived and beautifully written. "Among any people, in any degree of civilisation there is glory in material well wrought," writes Alan Atkinson about the vast bureaucratic labor of census-taking and

statistics that developed in the mid-nineteenth century. Such glory attaches to his own fine work.

Atkinson's history is an account of the forging of democratic communities in which the constitution of sexual and racial difference—and similarity—are key dynamics. His attention to the distinctive experiences of women from all backgrounds is striking: women's opinions, women's speech, women's loyalty to bushrangers are noted and interrogated. And as an account of the establishment of European civilization through the dispossession of indigenous peoples, so are the trauma and tragedy that underpinned the process of settlement. Writing of the Port Phillip district, Atkinson notes that the Europeans spread as usual with overwhelming speed and that the state-appointed protectors "were a feeble shield between invaders and invaded" (p. 203).

Charting the transformation of convict colonies—attuned to listening and speaking—into imperial outposts based on literacy and legality, Atkinson himself shows a keen eye for the telling phrase. "The tongues of convict women," he writes, "were their leading weapons" (p. 75), and so the "penal punishment of solitary confinement was a direct hit at the talk-based power of convict life" (pp. 83–84). In the new bureaucracy of the British Empire, subjects were "hit hard with the written word" and the paper flow between the Colonial Office and colonial governments accordingly became a flood. In the new "democratic settlement" that blossomed in the south eastern colonies in the 1850s, literacy was deemed a key prerequisite for participation: "Citizens must be something like scholars" (p. 257).

Atkinson's fresh, sometimes startling prose renders the abstractions of feeling and reason, manhood and womanliness, race and science, and the tapestry of place into vivid historical argument. With the spread of literacy and literature, he remarks, "reading gave a loftier self-consciousness to the individual's sense of race" (p. 172). One of his main interests is to identify the intellectual frameworks of understanding within which people made sense of their changing world. He charts the power of ideas about system and science, information and government, self and others.

His themes are explored through the life stories of colonial characters, some famous, like William Charles Wentworth, James Macarthur, Caroline Chisholm, and Raffaello Carboni, and others known only from convict records, migrants' letters, diaries, and the local press. Newspapers provided a "common store of knowledge" and Atkinson has researched them conscientiously. He also weaves into the tapestry the stories of his own ancestors John and Eliza Atkinson, who arrived in Melbourne in 1855 "with their two small children, Eliza's brother and John's brother and parents, among twenty-seven second-class passengers on board the *Sir Colin Campbell*." Atkinson's identification with the European people whose history he writes renders this book about the destruction and dispossession of indigenous peoples a more complex moral undertaking than most.

In place of Aboriginal civilizations, Anglo-Saxon democracies were built in which "glorious manhood as-

serts its elevation," in the words of local poet and republican, Daniel Deniehy. Democracy cancelled social rank. A key theme in Atkinson's account of the emergence of democracy is the new value attributed to "a common manhood" based on "independent feeling" and a "higher self-possession." In the brotherhoods of skilled working men such as composers "all the pride of manhood and science combined" (p. 245). Democracy specifically enshrined the power of white manhood (women, blacks, and the thousands of Chinese who came to Victoria's goldfields in the 1850s were democracy's "anti-types"), and as time went on, white men became more explicit and more scientific in their expressions of racial exclusiveness.

In this, as in other ways of knowing, they drew on writings from around the world. Developments in transport technologies, on land and sea, meant that this was a global age. Book reading, the proliferation of weeklies and monthlies, the overland telegraph, an efficient postal service, and mass migration meant that Australian colonists were also members of, and related to, larger transnational communities. Although writing a national history, Atkinson is careful to locate local developments in larger contexts and to emphasize connection and communication rather than isolation and distance. Ideas about freedom and self-government derived from a larger Anglo-Saxonist discourse, yet paradoxically it was self-government that contradicted the interlinking with the rest of the world, because self-government "allowed people to go about their own refashioning" (p. 336). Atkinson's book helps us understand the ways in which this emergent national culture—literate, secular, egalitarian, scientific, and masculinist—both rested on and rejected its connections with that larger world.

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AMIRIA J. M. HENARE. *Museums, Anthropology and Imperial Exchange*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xix, 323. \$80.00.

For a first book, the extraordinary scope of the study in this text must have, at times, been daunting for its author. Yet, what is apparent even from the opening chapter is that Amiria J. M. Henare has three specific skills that make her remarkable as an academic, especially one still at the early stages of her career: a solid and consistent scholarship, a flair for moving across academic disciplines as though there were no boundaries between them, and the ability to present her findings in an intelligent yet entirely readable fashion. The combination enables the alchemy that turns potentially dense topics and themes into a coherent, lucid text and elevates this book to the select group of works that deal with aspects of New Zealand history in a truly innovative and engaging manner.

Henare makes no apologies for the fact that much of this book derives from doctoral work she had under-

taken. Often, such an admission serves as a warning for readers, suggesting that a thesis has simply been typeset and published. However, the author has obviously gone to great efforts to remove the rigid stylistic and structural enclosures that so often surround theses while simultaneously maintaining the intellectual rigor that accompanies them. The book is heavily (but not disproportionately) referenced, and footnotes rather than endnotes are used, allowing sources to be identified immediately. In addition, there are almost fifty illustrations, all of which are relevant to the surrounding text, and many of which are photos by the author. Judging by their geographical spread, the latter are suggestive of extensive fieldwork.

With the foundations of outstanding scholarship firmly established, Henare executes a thorough investigation of the main themes of her book. These revolve around examining how material culture—a photo, a strand of flax, or an axe head; museums (about which the author exhibits particular expertise); colonizing personalities; even nationalities (particularly Scottish and Maori)—informs a perception of the history of New Zealand that thus far has escaped the illumination of other academics. However, Henare does not present a history of New Zealand using aspects of material culture to illustrate it. This would have been a comparatively simple but equally unrewarding approach. Instead, the author draws on anthropological literature to show how material artifacts are more than just remnants of history or, worse still, items of passing curiosity. She demonstrates that they are, in fact, important markers to the cultural, economic, and social transformation that took place, as a corollary to the migration of Scots to New Zealand in the nineteenth century. In addition, Henare offers a counterpoint to this aspect of analysis by linking certain milestones in her survey with the development of anthropological thought. These two lines of argument run more-or-less simultaneously throughout the book, thus producing layers of perspectives on material culture in the period and among the people under review. By the end of the book, readers are likely to be left with a profound sense of the significance of artifacts in a country's historical development.

Finally, the style of the text in this book deserves comment. The great British historian George Macaulay Trevelyan argued that history must not only be well researched but also presented in a literary style that makes it accessible, even interesting. In an age when academic writing continues to grow more intricate and technical, thereby also becoming more abstract to the informed layman, Henare seems to have gone out of her way to make her prose clear and concise. Most importantly, she succeeds (to use her metaphor) in combining the strands of diverse academic disciplines into a distinct and unitary fabric. As just one example, in chapter five the author commences with a personal account of a trip to Otago in New Zealand. In the space of one page, the topics traversed include the symbolic similarities of place names in Otago and Edinburgh, a con-

sideration of a museum collection in Otago, the importance of topography in relation to colonial expansion, issues of migration, and the changing character and importance of the “relics” that accompany the movement of migrants. These themes and ideas are all fleshed out as the chapter develops, but the fact that Henare is able to provide such a tightly worded yet engaging précis offers more than enough encouragement for readers to continue.

It is the combination of Henare's abilities as an academic—so competently represented in this book—that make her work such an important contribution to New Zealand anthropological and historical studies. It may prove to be a seminal publication, opening up opportunities for further research in this field in years to come.

PAUL MOON

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KIM MUNHOLLAND. *Rock of Contention: Free French and Americans at War in New Caledonia, 1940–1945*. New York: Berghahn Books. 2005. Pp. xi, 251. \$60.00.

The intentional ambivalence in the subtitle of this impressive book by Kim Munholland tells it all. Were the Free French and Americans allies in war, or at war with each other? Most books on the French colony of New Caledonia contain a paradox in their titles. Often it is a variant on the concept of “a stormy paradise,” and few histories of this mineral-rich South Pacific island avoid some prominent allusion to its multiple scenes of conflict. A norm, one might argue, for a colonized people struggling to free themselves from the colonizers, but added to this there was a series of flamboyant rivalries between authority figures on the island that made it “a graveyard” for colonial governors. When Jacques Tallec arrived in February 1944, he was the sixth governor since the fall of France in June 1940, and this was no departure from the prewar pattern of governance.

Colonial imbroglios alone furnish Munholland with abundant material, but they are only one thread in his complex account of the period, which foregrounds the historic split between Vichy France and the Free French, the economic and cultural impact of the massive U.S. military presence on the island, and the multi-interest entanglement of Australia and Great Britain. In all this the leading players are the Free French political authorities, controlled at a significant distance by General Charles de Gaulle in London, and the Americans commanded initially by General Alexander M. Patch, and then by Admiral William S. Halsey. The theme is *mésentente*, disagreement at almost every turn of events, and yet there was no fatal outbreak of internecine violence and no substantial weakening of the war effort against the Japanese in the Pacific. Hostile friends is the conclusion of this intriguing story, meticulously told: the two parties stopped short of becoming enemies. At times, however, it was a close-run affair.

The rigorous archival depth and scholarship of the

book allows every twist and turn to be detailed down to the hour, and peopled by an array of characters whose self-belief and delusions would make a fictional tale appear absurdly unrealistic. Yet in this factual history of egoistic persistence and rampant paranoia, it is the unyielding realism of the situation that comes across so clearly. Almost by necessity the vast quantities of American personnel and material needing accommodation in the town and harbor of Nouméa, and penetrating into every facet of daily life, were bound to create new problems and possibilities for all sectors of the diverse population. No less necessary was the obstinacy of General de Gaulle, if he was ever to convince the Allies of his claim to represent a free and fighting France, genuinely at war. Ultimately the book widens its canvas to feature the personal hostility between de Gaulle and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and this well-known antagonism, by being set within the specifics of colonial and imperial designs in the South Pacific, gains its full historical dimension.

De Gaulle's legitimacy was first endorsed within parts of the French Empire, including New Caledonia: his acquiescence in an outmoded imperialism, like his subsequent active role in decolonization, was grounded in this wartime conjuncture. Munholland is shrewdly accurate in his comment on the Brazzaville Conference of early 1944. In contrast, Roosevelt's plans to put large tracts of the French Empire under international control expressed his anticolonial ideals but could not mask the controversial growth of American global power, which amounted to a new form of imperialism. The book shows the raw nature of this imperial presence and does so with a finesse that brings President Harry S. Truman into the final scene and opens the door to the postwar world with a section entitled "Anti-Communism versus Anticolonialism." In just such ways the book provides ingredients essential for understanding the international history of the following forty years, at least.

The reader will value the balance of interpretation achieved by Munholland and his keen sense of perspective. The intricate unraveling of the plots and subplots calls for patient and attentive reading, and a readiness to keep in mind a plethora of personalities and the sequence of their incursions into the story. It is a blow-by-blow reconstruction of a remote island's four years as one of the transient centers of the war, bursting to the seams with minor happenings that occasioned major reactions. Arrogance, deliberate misunderstanding, and falsification mix with serious negotiation and flexibility: both the first American commander, Patch, and the last French governor, Tallec, stand out by their capacity to adapt. If the same cannot be said of many others, it has to be understood that the stakes were often too high for compromise. This would be the claim of the indigenous Kanak in their revolts against marginalization and injustice, which lie outside the frame of this book. Inside the frame there is nonetheless an equally consuming clash of vital interests. The author has successfully brought a little-known community and its wartime saga into the spotlight. The details revealed, and

the importance of the backdrop, make an often petty *mésentente* into an important and significant history.

ROD KEDWARD
University of Sussex

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

SHEILA MCMANUS. *The Line Which Separates: Race, Gender, and the Making of the Alberta-Montana Borderlands*. (Race and Ethnicity in the American West.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2005. Pp. xxiii, 236. Cloth \$69.95, paper \$29.95.

When they read "borderlands," most people will think about the United States-Mexican borderlands. In fact, they might be only vaguely aware of the growing literature on the U.S.-Canadian borderlands. In this study, Sheila McManus focuses on the Alberta-Montana borderlands during the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s, when the United States and Canadian governments tried to make their common border something more than a line on a map.

Admittedly, the northern borderlands are different than the southwestern borderlands. Much of the present-day southwestern United States is former Mexican territory, and Spanish-speaking people lived in parts of that region for two and a half centuries before they became Americans in the late 1840s. The Hispanic influence in that region is obvious. But the forty-ninth parallel has marked the western U.S.-Canadian frontier continuously since 1818, before permanent nonaboriginal settlement began. The Americans never conquered British or Canadian communities or territory there. Still, the border has long been, and remains, remarkably porous. It is remarkable, even today, how many residents of that borderland have lived a significant portion of their lives on both sides of the border and continue to visit family, friends, shopping centers, and restaurants on either side. Furthermore, as McManus shows, precisely because the border does not follow any natural features, and the aboriginal and settler populations on either side of that border were so linguistically and culturally similar, those borderlands became an important site of the unevenly successful nation-building efforts of the Canadian and American governments between the 1860s and 1880s. McManus's sophisticated new study of the northern borderlands is important because it traces the role of government officials and local populations in establishing, challenging, and changing ideas of nation, race, and gender on both sides of the border.

The book's six chapters deal with three main themes. The first two chapters explore the two governments' perceptions of the border and land itself. The forty-ninth parallel bisected the country of the Blackfeet peoples, and chapters three and four explain the Canadian and U.S. governments' efforts to integrate the Blackfeet into their respective states, and the responses of the Blackfeet to their changed circumstances. The final

two chapters investigate women's perceptions of the borderlands during these crucial decades.

This study's greatest strength lies in its interpretive flair. Except for the last two chapters, which are based on the unpublished papers of seventeen women on either side of the border, the primary evidence is drawn overwhelmingly from published primary sources, especially the annual reports of relevant government departments. Thus, the research can be characterized as extensive but not deep. But McManus draws on a great deal of theoretical work to develop subtle and innovative interpretations of the interplay of nation, race, gender, and environment that should be of interest to a wide range of readers. The influence of Benedict Anderson, Paul Carter, Michel Foucault, Ruth Frankenberg, and Anne McClintock is particularly noticeable. Each chapter begins with an explicit, clear, and significant thesis statement that is carefully defended in the rest of the chapter. For example, chapter four "argues that while the line between the United States and Canada was needed to create each nation, other lines, distinguishing 'Indians' from 'whites,' Indian land from white land, femininity and masculinity, were equally necessary in the borderlands because both nations depended on assumptions about race, space, and gender to make all of their demarcations meaningful" (p. 83).

There are curious gaps. The book would have been more nuanced if McManus had analyzed the importance of the border for aboriginal communities other than the Blackfeet. The cross-border Crees, Sioux, and Gros Ventres were treated differently from the Blackfeet. For example, the Americans decided that all of the Crees were "Canadian Indians." And an examination of the hybridity of the cross-border *métis* would have illuminated differences in the ways race and ethnicity was conceptualized on either side of the border. Still, this book should inspire further research in other sources (and on other periods) and related questions. Some of this research may challenge some of McManus's conclusions, but much will elaborate upon her findings.

Although it is very different from Hana Samek's *The Blackfoot Confederacy, 1880-1920: A Comparative Study of Canadian and U.S. Indian Policy* (1987), Beth LaDow's *The Medicine Line: Life and Death on a North American Borderland* (2002), or David G. McCrady's *Living with Strangers: The Nineteenth-Century Sioux and the Canadian-American Borderlands* (2006), McManus's study is a welcome addition to the literature on the western Canadian-American borderlands.

THEODORE BINNEMA

University of Northern British Columbia

PAIGE RAIBMON. *Authentic Indians: Episodes of Encounter from the Late-Nineteenth-Century Northwest Coast*. (A John Hope Franklin Center Book.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 307. Cloth \$79.95, paper \$22.95.

In the summer of 1999 the international media streamed images of Makah hunters, Aboriginal peoples

of the northwest tip of the lower forty-eight states, as they attempted to harpoon a Grey whale and then finish the kill with a gun. Outraged citizens of both the United States and Canada vented their contempt for the Makah in newspapers and on radio, focusing on the inauthenticity of their use of guns and motorboats. The 1855 treaty, which reserved Makah rights to whale hunting, was dismissed as insignificant in relation to the demands of moving into the twentieth century. This episode is the opening salvo in Paige Raibmon's fascinating account of the use of the idea of authenticity in the colonial domination of Aboriginal peoples in the American Pacific Northwest. Raibmon shows why the response in 1999 is but a recent manifestation in the history of white imaginations of the authentic Indian in ways that limit claims to resources, land, and sovereignty. Raibmon's project is not so much a documentation of public policy or legal decisions, although these are considered, but the examination of the creation of a hegemonic view within which the general public, legislators, and jurors worked. Aboriginal peoples themselves, she demonstrates, trapped within a structure of power, collaborated unequally in the creation of a notion of authenticity, a powerful yet unstable yardstick. She clarifies that by authenticity she means colonially defined notions, not "purity or timeless tradition" (p. 212, n. 13).

There is real utility to Raibmon's approach in thinking through contemporary colonialism by drawing the connections between the opposing discourses of modernity and authenticity, and the difficulties Aboriginal peoples face in defining themselves. For example, in 2000 Tom Happynook, a hereditary whaling chief, and I debated Paul Watson of the Sea Shepherd society and others at the Autry Museum in Los Angeles. Watson criticized whaling as a relic of the past before knowledge of whale cognition (a failure of modernity) and dismissed Happynook as a fake Indian, unable to properly conduct spiritual life as his ancestors had done (a failure of authenticity). Raibmon notes that "Notions of authenticity were key elements of a colonial cosmology" (p. 3) and that "real Indians could never be modern" (p. 7).

Raibmon uses three well-known stories to show how authenticity has been produced and transformed historically. The first of these concerns the Kwakwaka'wakw people from Vancouver Island who performed at the 1893 World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago under the direction of Franz Boas. Raibmon draws in Boasian anthropology by arguing that the emphasis on salvaging ways of life thought to be rapidly disappearing played into the creation of colonial categories and the project of modernity. While Boas and his dancers at the fair in Chicago saw the event as a way to demonstrate their existence as a people and earn good incomes, it was nonetheless built on perceptions of authenticity. Authenticity, Raibmon writes, "was a structure of power that enabled, even as it constrained, their interaction with the colonial world" (p. 11). During a turbulent period, anthropology turned Aboriginal

societies timeless, erasing history. This is fair commentary, and one might add in a related vein, the misapplication of anthropological models is an issue today. An example is the 1996 case *R v Van der Peet* in British Columbia, in which the crown argued that band level societies did not sell fish. Now-dated anthropological models were used to support this proposition, and an Aboriginal defendant was convicted for selling fish inauthentically and hence illegally.

A second of Raibmon's stories concerns nineteenth-century hop pickers in Puget Sound who were besieged by white tour groups on excursions from nearby towns to observe the colorful spectacle of Indians at work and play. Hop camps, Raibmon says, became a "de facto performance for Aboriginal pickers who found themselves in front of an audience" (p. 92). Some responded by organizing formal dance performances by admission, others by selling sex, and still others by selling baskets and other items. In the third account the merchant Tlingit family of Rudolph and Mary Walton were repulsed in an effort to enroll their children in public school in Sitka because they were deemed insufficiently civilized. They ended up in a legal process that distinctly revealed the binary discourse of modernity; the Waltons had the material trappings of white life (the use of butter, for example) but maintained "tribal relations."

With Raibmon's work authenticity joins tradition, the imaginary, academic models, and the practice of selective visibility, among others, as recognized devices deployed in the imposition of the mainstream's views on Aboriginal peoples.

BRUCE GRANVILLE MILLER
University of British Columbia

STEVE FRASER and GARY GERSTLE, editors. *Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 369. \$18.95.

This book contains eight substantive essays on American elites from the late eighteenth century to the present. Gary Kornbluth and John Murrin begin with a superb study of revolutionary America. They argue that the colonial elite successfully united against a British oligarchy with vast military and patronage powers only to divide over two competing visions. Alexander Hamilton's would have recapitulated the British model: a powerful center welded to the financiers and supportive of growth (via subsidized banking and high tariffs) and order (via coercion and censorship). Thomas Jefferson sought, by contrast, a decentralized regime of "agrarian republican virtue." The election of 1800 was a contest between these visions, which Jefferson won by enlisting the interests and passions of "middling" smallholders and planters. This election transformed America by popularizing politics, liberalizing political speech, and opening a space for mass agitation that would constrain future elites. It also privileged expansion, states rights, and slaveholding and therefore opened an unbridgeable elite division that led to the Mexican War, seces-

sion, and the shattering of the slave power, the "glorious yet horrific culmination of the Jeffersonians' remarkable Revolution of 1800" (p. 63).

Adam Rothman analyzes how antebellum slaveowners dominated the Southwest (through the slave trade), poor whites (patronage and race solidarity), and the nation (the three-fifths clause). The system's heart, argues Rothman, was the owners' control of their slaves, which produced a sense of absolute masterdom and, by this interpretation, a complex ideology (freedom for white men, obligation for everyone else) sharply at odds with the individualistic, reformist North. This precluded an alliance with bourgeois northern elites to thwart the dual specter of Yankee abolitionism and growth. Secession was the logical result of these irreconcilable world views.

Sven Beckert rounds this cluster of essays by examining the North's merchant capitalists, who collaborated with the planters in order to capture the profits of the Atlantic cotton trade, even accepting southern expansion to keep the peace. They built family networks and financial and cultural institutions that produced a distinctive urban upper class. And they accommodated rambunctious local artisans because they employed few. Artisans, however, sometimes became small, and eventually large, manufacturers. These were aggressive, rough-mannered "producerists," not reserved investors; pro-temperance, antilabor, and antislavery; pro-northern, not southern, expansion. They made money, stormed the citadels of merchant exclusiveness, and successfully championed pro-industry Republicans, not pro-trade Democrats. Beckert rightly calls this the "greatest defeat of the Northern mercantile elites"—who, having lost mastery, redirected their capital and political loyalties and joined forces with the parvenus to form "the world's most powerful bourgeoisie" (p. 122).

David Nasaw, Alan Dawley, and Jackson Lears follow the course of this "big money" turn-of-the-century bourgeoisie. Their three essays are difficult and diffuse. The era lacks dramatic internal clashes over vision and ideology. Unions posed only spasmodic problems. The real dilemmas derived from the instability of the capitalist system, which forced the rich to look to the state to alleviate competition, to investment bankers to alleviate overproduction, and to professional managers for competent leadership. Nasaw's discussion of Social Darwinism and the reluctant turn to state power is superb, as is Dawley's on how the Great Depression, capitalism's ultimate example of instability, undermined the efforts of the Newport-era rich to monopolize power and opened the way to a revitalizing American democracy.

Geodfrey Hodgson discusses the "foreign policy Establishment," a slippery term denoting elite lawyers and other professionals with special interests in diplomacy. What it shared with Dawley's upper class is clear: wealth, eastern education and family, an unchallenged sense of leadership entitlement. World War II was its greatest triumph, and this carried over into the Cold

War. But the Establishment's instincts were moderate and cautious, leaving it ill-equipped to deal with criticism from Left and Right over its greatest mistake, Vietnam, a turning point that discredited it and led to its overthrow, avers Hodgson, by the Sunbelt Right.

Michael Lind concludes with an essay on this conservative "counterrevolution." Led by antilabor, antitax businessmen benefiting from the growth of the most reactionary region, the South, conservatives, says Lind, have southernized the nation, producing "a low-wage society with weak parties, weak unions, and a political culture based on demagogic appeals to racial and ethnic anxieties, religious conservatism, and militaristic patriotism" (p. 285).

These are superb essays, strong on the interplay of economics and ideology, shifting elite tensions and composition, the importance of specific events, and the transitions between eras. The writing is clear and bold, the clashes dramatic, a consequence of studying groups that exercise genuine power as opposed to "empowerment." Here is a ready-made scaffolding for survey instructors, history that students will not only learn from but enjoy. There are flaws. Definitions are vague and inconsistent. Some elements—ministers, generals, most intellectuals—are invisible. Proto-Marxian class struggles sometimes intrude unpersuasively. But the strengths, including many unmentioned here, overwhelm the flaws. Will this volume inspire historians to study the rich and powerful as well as the voiceless and oppressed of recent focus, as editors Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle hope? If not, it is hard to know what will.

RONALD STORY
University of Massachusetts,
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SCOTT A. SANDAGE. *Born Losers: A History of Failure in America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 362. \$35.00.

Scott A. Sandage explores the dark side of the American dream. Examining the lives and records of unsuccessful men, as well as the way the larger society regarded them, his book fills a significant gap in the scholarship on American capitalism. While there are studies of the work ethic, the ideal of the self-made man, the lives of successful entrepreneurs, and the transformation of capitalism, historians have neglected to examine those whose reach exceeded their grasp: the failures, who have been remarkably common in America's history.

The book takes up this subject and then goes further, exploring not just the meaning of failure but the meaning of identity in a market economy. Sandage maintains that, during the nineteenth century, a new definition of personal identity emerged: human worth (and especially, masculine worth) came to be measured in terms of market worth. Assessments of individual success and failure came to rest on bank balances and credit reports.

This carefully argued and well-researched book pro-

vides a compelling explanation for why and how this happened. The volatile economy of the nineteenth century led many Americans to reconsider the goal of life. While citizens of the early republic had idealized the yeoman, content with his modest competency and independent of larger financial entanglements, the market revolution of the nineteenth century led many to abandon this model of non-aspirational economic behavior and instead to try to rise in life. By midcentury, Sandage maintains, ambition had become an obligation, not a choice. Yet the same market revolution that filled so many with hope about their limitless futures also led many to founder and ultimately to fail. In this age of both boundless optimism and financial panic, Americans struggled to understand and explain failure.

Popular culture, playing on older republican fears of decadence, idleness, and luxury, perpetuated the idea that ruined men had caused their own downfall. Journalists and novelists contended that moral failings caused economic failure; perhaps a man drank too much, gambled his savings, or frittered away his time. Such a perception was enhanced by the establishment of Lewis Tappan's Mercantile Agency, which later became Dun and Bradstreet. The chapters Sandage devotes to this organization are his best. He tells a fascinating and little-known tale of the creation of the first credit investigation agencies. Using a nationwide network of informants, Tappan and his successors gathered information on businesses and their proprietors. Bad reports, even those with little grounding in fact, could and did damage businessmen's prospects. Informants reported not just on financial transactions but also considered their subjects' personal habits and family relations as indicators of financial reliability. They increasingly conflated the personal with the financial, forging the idea that an individual's worth could be easily quantified, analyzed, and sold. These credit agencies commodified human identity, and made a good profit doing so.

While credit agencies represented the view of identity that would become dominant by the twentieth century, when they first emerged, their methods of measuring individual worth were controversial. Some appealed the negative reports of the agencies; others, like the National Bankrupt Association, sought legislative relief. In 1867, Congress passed the nation's first comprehensive bankruptcy relief law. The law supposedly gave debtors "a new birth of freedom," so that they might start anew in their efforts to realize the American dream; with bankruptcy declared and debts forgiven, they once again might compete in the race of life.

While the bankruptcy law offered a second chance, society often did not. The idea that financial failure signaled total individual ruin was firmly established by the late nineteenth century. By the twentieth century, judgments had grown even harsher. An individual no longer had to be "a bankrupt or drunkard" or even to experience a dramatic crash to fail; instead, a life lived in "routine obscurity" (pp. 253–254) counted as failure. Charlie Brown and Willie Loman—who worked but to

little effect—now symbolize the modern American failure.

This is for the most part a beautifully written book. There are instances, however, where literary flourishes and metaphor obscure rather than clarify crucial points. The book also digresses. Discussions that link Walt Whitman to Tappan because both worked in Manhattan and categorized people, or that show that George F. Kennan's grandfather's uncle worked for Tappan's agency, add little to the understanding of failure and identity. Such tangents and stretched connections divert the readers' attention away from the original and significant points the book makes.

This book is important both for its focus on the understudied topic of failure and for its larger questions about the changing meaning and assessment of identity in a capitalist economy. It eloquently demonstrates the effects of liberal ideology on individual lives, and should be of great interest to economic, cultural, and social historians.

SUSAN J. MATT
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PHILIP F. GURA. *Jonathan Edwards: America's Evangelical*. (American Portraits.) New York: Hill and Wang. 2005. Pp. xv, 284. \$24.00.

The tercentenary of Jonathan Edwards's birth in 2003 precipitated a flurry of new books on various aspects of Edwards's writings, thought, and legacy. The 2003 celebration—featuring conferences at the Library of Congress, Princeton Seminary, and other venues—followed decades of development in Edwards studies. Secondary works on Edwards have grown almost exponentially since 1950. Yet more importantly, the completion of the twenty-three-volume critical edition of *The Works of Jonathan Edwards* (1957–2004) added immensely to the fund of available knowledge. George Claghorn's edited volume of *Letters and Personal Writings* (1998) in the *Works* provided a wealth of new biographical material. Five volumes of selected sermons, most previously unpublished, presented a conspectus of Edwards's pastoral labors. The four-volume *Miscellanies* offered a clearer picture of Edwards's entire intellectual development.

With the rapid expansion of the *Works* during the 1980s and 1990s, an up-to-date and critical biography of Edwards was sorely needed. Ola Winslow's *Jonathan Edwards, 1703–1758: A Biography* (1940) had long been out of date. Perry Miller's *Jonathan Edwards* (1949) was illuminating and yet often erratic. Iain Murray's *Jonathan Edwards: A New Biography* (1987) tended toward hagiography and was deficient in local context and coloring. Yet the new millennium brought two biographies worthy of the long editorial labor that preceded them: George M. Marsden's *Jonathan Edwards: A Life* (2003) and Philip F. Gura's more recent volume. Marsden's biography won the Bancroft Prize in American History and comes from the scholar generally regarded as the preeminent authority on American evangelicalism. It is inevitable that Gura's book will be compared

to it. Remarkably, though, Gura's biography does not suffer from the comparison. It is a fully independent work and in no sense dependent on Marsden. While Marsden's biography exceeds Gura's in terms of its sheer depth of material, Gura's knowledge of American colonial history adds nuance and color to his narrative.

Gura's book is a gem. The prose style is exceptionally lucid, and the work can be recommended without hesitation as a reliable first book on Edwards for all readers at the college level or beyond. Historical context shapes biographical content throughout this work. That is, Gura interprets Edwards's life and career in relation to the geography and economy of the Connecticut Valley (chapter one), life at Yale College (chapter two), the influential ministers Solomon Stoddard and William Williams (chapter three), church turmoil in Northampton (chapter six), political conditions in Stockbridge (chapter seven), and the beginnings of Princeton College (chapter nine). The early chapters are especially good at showing the internal complexity of New England Congregationalism in the late 1600s and early 1700s, and at situating Edwards within this complexity. While Gura's biography devotes limited space to expounding Edwards's theology, the eighth chapter on "Transatlantic Debate" is an effective summary of key arguments in Edwards's *Freedom of the Will*, *End in Creation*, *Nature of True Virtue*, and *Original Sin*.

If the mark of a true artist is to make his accomplishments seem effortless, then Gura fits the bill. His graceful paragraphs conceal the author's erudition at the same time that they reveal an eighteenth-century colonial life. Like Michelangelo, who said that he had released his statue of David from the block of marble containing it, Gura has released his image of Edwards from what might have been, in less talented hands, an unpromising mass of historical information. It is no easy thing to write so learnedly, simply, and aptly.

Among the few faults of this book is its neglect of Edwards's youthful philosophical speculations. Such terms as "empiricism," "idealism," and "immaterialism" do not appear in the index, even though these may be among Edwards's most important and distinctive ideas. Also curiously absent from the biography is a discussion of Edwards's typological interpretations of scripture or the natural world. Occasionally Gura speaks of Edwards's outlook as "mystical" (pp. 40, 67) without an indication of how he uses the term. Gura may have overstated his case when he claims that the "divine light" for Edwards was "not at all mysterious" and "worked rationally" (p. 69). Thus Gura's renderings of Edwards's ideas sometimes lack the razor-sharp clarity that one finds in his historical reconstructions of colonial life. Gura may have exaggerated the extent to which Edwards in the 1750s tempered his revivalism and felt the need to "cage the monsters that he had created prior to 1743" (p. 232), that is, in tolerating or encouraging spiritual exuberance. One wonders how Edwards contributed to the nineteenth-century "discourse of sentimentalism" (p. 235) as Gura claims, inasmuch as his concepts of selfhood and experience were

colored by a notion of original sin largely lacking in post-Romantic authors. Yet, by and large, these objections are little more than quibbles in relation to a work that—like Michelangelo's statue—embodies a beautiful, compelling, and memorable figure, destined to endure.

MICHAEL J. MCCLYMOND
Saint Louis University

HARVEY J. KAYE. *Thomas Paine and the Promise of America*. New York: Hill and Wang. 2005. Pp. 326. \$25.00.

EDWARD LARKIN. *Thomas Paine and the Literature on Revolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 205. \$65.00.

Thomas Paine has, by and large, been at least somewhat better served by historians than by his contemporaries. Nearly guillotined in France for supporting exile rather than death for Louis XVI, excoriated on his return to the United States for his deist religious opinions, he nonetheless enjoys the near-unique status of having been a central figure in both the American and French Revolutions, and of plebeian origins to boot. The existing secondary literature on Paine is now mostly dated, though there is a relatively recent larger biography (John Keane, *Tom Paine: A Political Life* [1995]) and one somewhat shorter (Jack Fruchtman, Jr., *Thomas Paine: Apostle of Freedom* [1994]), to which should be added Fruchtman's study of Paine's religious ideas, *Thomas Paine and the Religion of Nature* (1993). Yet Paine has often been under fire from conservatives for supporting parliamentary reform in Britain and revolution in France, and rarely gets anything like a balanced handling in such treatments. Nearly a century after Moncure Daniel Conway's four-volume edition of Paine's writings, and more than half a century since Philip Foner's edition thereof, there remains no remotely satisfactory scholarly edition of his work. One can but hope that the upcoming bicentenary of his death will instill sufficient enthusiasm to rectify this.

Harvey J. Kaye's study is an openly engaged attempt to relocate a seemingly marginalized figure within mainstream American political thought, indeed to claim, somewhat disingenuously, that Americans have been "radicals at heart" (p. 4) since 1776, and that the conservative reading of Paine is consequently wrong-headed. Kaye offers a survey of the impact of *Common Sense* (1776) on colonial sentiment, of Paine's subsequent *The American Crisis* (1776–1783), which aided morale greatly during the revolutionary wars, and of his return to Britain. He touches only tangentially on the subsequent controversy with Edmund Burke, however, entirely ignores the now large literature on Paine's impact in Britain in the 1790s, and has no interest in Paine's period of residence in France during the revolution. Despite the book's title, there is very little hard analysis of what Paine actually meant by his attempt, notably in *Rights of Man* (1791–1792), to interpret the American Revolution to French revolutionaries and

British radicals, and why this might have been an ill-conceived enterprise given the vastly different circumstances in which European reforms were being sought. Whether or how Paine's ideas actually evolved and altered through this period we are not told. (Indeed there is no real effort to reinterpret any of the major texts in any detail.) By page 89 we are back in the United States, and the bulk of Kaye's study is essentially a reception-history of responses to Paine's ideas in nineteenth and twentieth-century America that provides a good summary of the mostly anecdotal, unanalytical existing literature. Thomas Jefferson and his followers, of course, were friendly to Paine. Subsequent generations of republicans and freethinkers kept his memory alive, despite the deist taint, later transformed into the accusation of atheism, with birthday celebrations and constant invocations (rather than serious study) of the sacred texts. Gradually, however, interpretations of Paine began to grow apart, until conservatives hostile to "big government" could claim his inheritance, too. Just why this might be an illegitimate interpretation, however, we do not learn.

Edward Larkin has recently given us an extremely useful—indeed, now much the most useful—new edition of *Common Sense* (Broadview Editions, 2004). His study of Paine is also chiefly concerned with Paine's American readership, and in particular the impact of his forceful, direct, pungent literary style, so often commented on by contemporaries. For crucial to this style was the assumption that politics, and political theory, could be understood by the common man and woman if demystification rather than smoke and mirrors governed political discourse. Just what it was about Paine's prose that was so compelling, even irresistible, to readers, is one of Larkin's main concerns. He offers a careful account, in particular, of Paine's early journalism in Pennsylvania, of the reception of *Common Sense*, and of Paine's *Letter Addressed to Abbe Raynal* (1783), but skates relatively quickly over *Rights of Man* (pp. 106–111), Paine's most important work. Particular attention is given to Paine's use of scientific and technical metaphors. There is no attempt to position Paine within any type of intellectual history as such, however, and the one linkage of Paine to a major previous source (James Burgh's *Political Disquisitions* [1774]; p. 128) ignores very substantial differences between both writers, particularly when set in conjunction with a discussion of Paine's "faith in the influence of commerce" (p. 131), which was certainly not shared by Burgh. There is a useful account of the *The Age of Reason* (1794), however, and a brief (pp. 149–177) account of Paine's reputation in nineteenth-century America, concentrating on the obituaries and early biographies. The assertion that George Chalmers's early government-commissioned biography had little impact may be disputed, but by and large this is a solid and illuminating study which assists our understanding of Paine's achievements.

GREGORY CLAEYS
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JERRY WEINBERGER. *Benjamin Franklin Unmasked: On the Unity of His Moral, Religious, and Political Thought*. (American Political Thought.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2005. Pp. xvi, 336. \$34.95.

Historians may have mixed feelings after reading Jerry Weinberger's book. A highly versatile and accomplished person, Benjamin Franklin had a long and colorful life, not to mention that the self-portrait in the several hundred editions of his *Autobiography* (1791) has for the last two centuries obscured his historical identity. Reacting to a lovable image of a quintessentially self-made man, the effort to unmask him began at least more than a century ago when Paul Leicester Ford wrote *The Many-Sided Franklin* (1899). Since then the search for the "true," the "real," the "not-so-simple," the "elusive," the "complicated," the "hidden," and the "devious" Franklin has consumed the energies of not a few scholars and popular writers. Weinberger joined this crusade from a different angle. Contrary to those who took Franklin's humor at face value, Weinberger believed that some of his subject's most serious thought could be found in those seemingly not so serious writings. Indeed, the more hilarious Franklin's comic essays were, the deeper and more profound his philosophy might turn out to be, according to Weinberger. Thus, his quest for the "true" and "real" Franklin was based not on any new evidence that he discovered but on his reinterpretation of several commonly known pieces by Franklin.

Early portions of the book read like the author's own notes and contain little new information or insight. The first two chapters recasting Franklin's *Autobiography* seem to have only a tenuous connection with the book's theme and conclusion. Weinberger's approach is to analyze several of Franklin's publications written under different circumstances over a long period of time, including "Letter of the Drum" (1730) and "Speech of Miss Polly Baker" (1747) in chapter three, "Old Mistresses Apologue" (1745) and an article from the *Boston Independent Chronicle* (1782) in chapter four, *Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity* (1725) in chapter five, and "On Simplicity" (1732) in chapter six. Not entirely without a sense of irony, his journalistic approach and stylistic analysis do not, however, seem to support the bold claim of uncovering a profound and fundamental philosophical conviction. One has to wonder why, if Franklin did possess such deep and profound philosophical thought, no one has noticed it until Weinberger. Was Franklin's humor really another Da Vinci code that required deciphering by a modern scholar? If so, Franklin really should be credited as the only philosopher who has successfully hidden his true views for more than two and a half centuries.

In the end, Weinberger believes Franklin to be "a nearly full-blown Baconian, just as he was a nearly full-blown Hobbesian" (p. 254). An apt description of Franklin's philosophical bent, perhaps. Yet Franklin scholars have generally agreed that he was both a positive thinker and a skeptic of human nature. A perceptive

rationalistic observer, Franklin was also known for his acute observations concerning the limitations of rationalism. More puzzling is the fact that Weinberger traces the connection between Franklin and Francis Bacon to a single essay, "On Simplicity," not counting a note in *Poor Richard's Almanack* for 1749 about the anniversary of Bacon's death in 1626 (pp. 195–199, 254–256, 273). A useful but brief reflection on the virtue of the plainness and integrity of the mind, "On Simplicity" is hardly the most pertinent example of Franklin's philosophical convictions. One wonders why, if Franklin was indeed "a nearly full-blown Baconian," his extensive writings on natural observations and electricity were not analyzed here and compared with Bacon's *Novum Organum* (1676).

That the seriousness of Franklin's thought can be discerned in his not so serious writings is not a new proposition among Franklin scholars. Many would agree with Weinberger that "Franklin's humor discloses a complex interaction between reason and belief—even between reason and fantastic credulity. Faith and credulity can grow from reason, reason can support faith and credulity, and rationalistic skepticism can itself be a form of dogmatic belief" (pp. 79–80). Readers may wish that Weinberger had taken more time to conduct a thorough search for evidence and to streamline his chapters to fulfill the ambitious goals of revealing Franklin's "true" thought.

NIAN-SHENG HUANG

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MARGARETTA M. LOVELL. *Art in a Season of Revolution: Painters, Artisans, and Patrons in Early America*. (Early American Studies.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2005. Pp. x, 341. \$39.95.

In economic terms, portraits are "expensive but valueless," material goods that only their subjects are usually interested in possessing. Yet as colonial Americans amassed wealth, a hunger for portraiture widened among the elite. Collections of landscapes and historical subjects were confined to cheaper engravings; when it came to canvases, eighteenth-century Anglo-Americans wanted images of themselves. What then did art signify for them? Portraits were more than indulged vanity or an ostentatious show of moneyed status. Margaretta M. Lovell argues persuasively that portraits functioned to mark significant events—for women, typically marriage; for men, perhaps some other major personal achievement—as well as to fix lineage during uncertain times. The term "patron" itself only makes sense in the context of family networks; just ten percent of John Stuart Copley's sitters became repeat customers, and one may presume the figure would be lower for less talented portraitists. By the same token, a successful painting portrayed a social self and a strong physical resemblance, not psychological insight. In "picturing" individuals and families, portraitists were thus thinking about social relationships; their subjects—and others

who bought, kept, or merely saw the paintings—are also implicated in these visions.

Lovell situates art in the “private” patriarchal family on the one hand and in the commercial Atlantic world on the other. She uses both individual artworks and sets of objects to interrogate the transatlantic culture that produced and consumed them. At the heart of Lovell’s book lie two case studies of Copley portraits: Mary Turner Sargent (Mrs. Daniel Sargent) from 1763, and Joshua Henshaw from 1770. In each case, thick description of the subject’s apparel, gesture, posture, and props leads the reader along fascinating and painstakingly researched lines of inquiry. The most vibrant instance of this is the riddle of the “itinerant dress” worn by three different portrait subjects in Copley’s repertoire: Mary Sargent, Mary Toppan Pickman, and Mercy Otis Warren.

Other chapters study internal portraits and self-portraits in the work of Benjamin West and his circle; the place of drawing and design in art makers’ education and status; and the conventions of family portraits, which changed dramatically. After 1760, mothers occupy a more central place in compositions; children become dynamic, “gamboling” figures, arrested in the midst of play; fathers abandon visual dominance, stiff postures, and authoritarian distance in favor of relaxed engagement with their wives and children. These large, complex paintings thereby document the rise of new family models emphasizing ties of affection and “sensitivity.” The image of a wife tenderly resting her arm against her husband’s shoulder eloquently captures the emerging ideal of companionate marriage; and, Lovell points out, these visual representations are doubly valuable because they often predate written evidence of the same ongoing social transformations.

Lovell writes that her aim in this book is to use objects to illuminate history, not use history as backdrop to understand particular works of art, as art history conventionally does. In fact, she engages in both approaches, at times favoring more formalist analysis and at others emphasizing provenance or social context. Her field of vision is strikingly broad, primarily focused on portraiture but also traversing silver, frames, furniture, and architectural plans. The chapters are thematic, and (for good or ill) the book overall is more a collection of interrelated essays than a monographic exploration of a cohesive, sustained argument.

More puzzlingly, especially given the book’s title, the War for Independence appears only in flashes (as when a mob defaces a governor’s portrait, p. 58), even when the subject of scrutiny is Henshaw, a Son of Liberty. The book does not ask how emerging political identities of both artists and patrons might be relevant, whether for instance revolutionary ideology helped push forward the artisan and elbow aside the gentleman as masculine ideal, or how challenges to the king—the patriarch of patriarchs—might ripple through beliefs about family and lineage. Lastly, Lovell’s reading of objects as evidence is unfulfilled in the last chapter. Although she sketches out with great care the social history of New-

port (Rhode Island) cabinetmakers, she does not analyze the products of that labor with the same attention that she employs when it comes to paintings and drawings. For example, Lovell painstakingly dissects the allusions suggested by the shell in Copley’s portrait of Mary Sargent (p. 69) but remains silent about the pervasive shell motif in Newport furniture, which might evoke similar associations.

Despite these minor blemishes, Lovell’s book is as rich, subtle, and detailed as the portraits she examines. Lavishly illustrated, it is essential reading for historians of this period and indeed anyone with an interest in “the visual turn.”

LAURA R. PRIETO
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DANIEL VICKERS. *Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail*. Assisted by VINCE WALSH. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 336. \$35.00.

From the great chronicles of seafaring by Herman Melville and Richard Henry Dana in the mid-nineteenth century to the scholarly studies by Samuel Eliot Morison and Bernard Bailyn a century later, the maritime history of New England has been richly served. Yet, in recent decades, some of the most innovative work on the maritime world of the northwest Atlantic has come not from American scholars but from Canadians associated with the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project at Memorial University in St. John’s, Newfoundland. In particular, Eric W. Sager’s *Seafaring Labour: The Merchant Marine of Atlantic Canada, 1820–1914* (1989) and *Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820–1914* (1990) set new standards for employing prodigious amounts of quantitative and qualitative data to recover the social and economic history of Atlantic Canada’s shipping industry. Daniel Vickers brings knowledge of this Canadian scholarship as well as insight into Newfoundland’s contemporary maritime society to bear in his superb study of Salem’s maritime past.

Already familiar with Salem through his earlier account of *Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630–1850* (1994), Vickers focused on Salem because it was neither too large to study (e.g. London, New York) or too small to be significant (e.g. Ipswich, Manchester); also, as one of the foremost ports in America during the colonial and early republic periods, “Salem simply matters” (p. 5). Moreover, the voluminous records in the Essex Peabody Museum made a detailed case study possible. Setting out to explore the relationship between young men and the sea, Vickers, his collaborator Vince Walsh, and numerous students assembled an enormous database drawn from legal records, town histories, account books, customs records, shipping papers, vital records, ship registries, provincial records, and tax records. From this database, Vickers and his team constructed a series of core files that comprised 10,451 man voyages

between 1641 and 1850, as well as a series of biographical files for a sample of 2,620 mariners.

From this welter of information, Vickers creates a chronological narrative, beginning with English settlement at Salem in the early seventeenth century and running through to the town's transition to the textile industry in the mid-nineteenth century. The six chapters that cover this approximately 200-year-period are immensely rich, covering such topics as sailors at sea, their careers, their lives on land, their families and widows. A penultimate chapter, serving almost as a separate essay, explores the relationship between masters and mariners, maritime law and shipboard discipline, and a conclusion draws out the main points of the study. Throughout these discussions, Vickers reveals a mastery of the sources (although notice of Lindsay Ride and May Ride's *An East India Company Cemetery: Protestant Burials in Macao* [1996], would have provided information on the fate of several Salem mariners), illuminates countless lives, situates people in their historical and geographical contexts, and writes with considerable sympathy and lightness of touch. To enhance the readability of the book, Vickers places discussion of primary sources, graphs, and ship's logs in appendixes.

After years of labor in the archives, what do Vickers and his coworkers find? First, that there was a shift in the maritime economy of Salem, from cod fishing, coasting, and the Caribbean trade during the colonial period to a global roaming for cargo that took Salem vessels into the Indian and Pacific oceans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This geographic shift had profound consequences for the composition of crews. During the colonial period, the overwhelming majority of mariners resided within five miles of the sea and were part of a deeply rooted maritime community in which seafaring was a part of life. Yet as Salem vessels ventured farther across the oceans, ships tended to get bigger and crews larger and more varied. Moreover, growth of New England industry provided Salem men with alternative employment. As a result, working at sea became less common, until by the time of Melville and Dana it had become an exceptional activity. Second, Vickers stresses the importance of age in marking a person's life chances. Nearly a third of mariners died young; those who survived were frequently promoted to the quarter deck, especially during the colonial period. Whereas Morison argued in *The Maritime History of Massachusetts* (1921) that young men went to sea because of "tradition, love of adventure, desire to see the world . . . social prestige of the shipmaster's calling" and high wages (pp. 109–110), Vickers has shown convincingly that Salem men went to sea simply because it was a natural part of growing up by the shore. Although he has removed the romantic gloss from seafaring, Vickers has produced a study that will surely take its place among the classics of New England maritime history.

STEPHEN J. HORNSBY
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RODNEY HESSINGER. *Seduced, Abandoned, and Reborn: Visions of Youth in Middle-Class America, 1780–1850*. (Early American Studies.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2005. Pp. 255. \$45.00.

In this ambitious book, Rodney Hessinger explores the response of early national Philadelphia to disorderly, urban, middle-class youth, arguing that these young men predicted and indeed shaped emerging, middle-class values. Hessinger demonstrates that the leaders of colleges and churches, reformers, and advice literature authors worked to "seduce" these young men to internalize proper middle-class values. Mimicking Lockean methods of childrearing, these cultural authorities used persuasion rather than coercion in their crusade. This change in society's response to unruly young men, particularly in urban areas, emerged as the power of the rural patriarchs of colonial America declined. In Hessinger's formulation, men left the farm to work in the burgeoning cities instead of waiting for what had become a meager inheritance of land. Without parental oversight, these young men made their own rules as society struggled to tutor them into middle-class adulthood. Together, cultural authorities and the young men of the city crafted a model of manhood that emphasized both self-control and independence.

Although the colonial period here has a static and one-dimensional quality in the character of the rural patriarch, Hessinger does tell a subtle and complex story of the cultural landscape of the early republic. In the world Hessinger uncovers, chronologically overlapping cultural institutions vied for the attention of their young, male audience. Colleges, faced with increasing competition for students, created a grading system to moderate student behavior rather than twisting arms using draconian discipline. Traditional churches, finding their pews empty thanks to the Sunday school movement of their evangelical competitors, felt compelled to start youth-controlled Sunday schools of their own. Advice literature writers, rather than lecture their intended audience about the dangers of young manhood, sugar-coated their message to make their books palatable as well as marketable. Hessinger is at his best when explaining this cultural dance between authorities and the young men of the city.

Although the book's argument is persuasive and the material presented fresh and thoughtfully explicated, Hessinger does leave out the important issue of the heterosexism of the message middle-class authorities were sending. This issue emerges even in the material he presents but remains undeveloped. Hessinger points out that anti-masturbation writers assumed that men learned proper technique from one another and even practiced their skills together, but he says nothing about the homoerotic quality of such encounters. Did reformers think of masturbation as a foundational sexual vice not just because these young men might be tempted to have sex with women but because they might be tempted to have sex with men? There is a suggestive historical literature about eighteenth-century boarding

schools and dandyism that would make such an interpretation likely.

The author's examination of the cultural response to illicit heterosexual behavior by young men, however, is wonderfully elaborate. Hessinger traces a remarkable shift in blame for such sexual misconduct from seducing men to seductive women using period fiction, the records of the Magdalen Society in Philadelphia, and advice literature. Hessinger argues that pity for "fallen women" turned to resentment as these women increasingly avoided the institutions set up to reform them. Unable to change female behavior, the reformers turned to young men, warning them to avoid these stubbornly unrepentant prostitutes. Similar stories can be found in the rich almshouse records for Philadelphia during this period. Like the Magdalen Society, the almshouse admitted "fallen women" and the overseers made their middle-class judgments. Unlike the Magdalen Society, the women of questionable sexual character that entered this other Philadelphia institution were old as well as young. Pregnant women claiming they were widowed or women suffering from venereal disease blaming an absent husband struggled to get aid from suspicious reformers. Hessinger does not exploit the almshouse records, however, preventing him from studying a broader range of women and variable responses to these women over a longer period of time.

Even with these missed opportunities for further study and analysis, this is a book well worth reading because of its wonderful stories and fresh insights. In addition, Hessinger convincingly proves his contention that young men were central to middle-class cultural development in early national, urban America. He takes on complex and overlapping institutions and stories without hesitation untangling patterns of change. Although the story here is a story about Philadelphia, Hessinger's outsized argument is suggestive for early national America as a whole.

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DAVID A. GERBER. *Authors of Their Lives: The Personal Correspondence of British Immigrants to North America in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: New York University Press. 2006. Pp. x, 422. \$55.00.

David A. Gerber suggests that past studies of immigration have provided us with little in the way of a theoretical approach to examining the correspondence of individual immigrants. Such studies have tended to use letters primarily for quotations and information about the details of the immigrant experience. The other major approach to immigrant letters has been the edited collection. In this genre, editors frequently cut out what they considered was repetitive detail about everyday life and kinship networks, the very sorts of things that social historians today might well be interested in. Gerber seeks to remedy the situation. His study is divided into two distinct parts. The first provides an analytical examination of immigrant correspondence based on

seventy-one collections, with only occasional examples from these to illustrate a point. The second provides a close examination of four collections of immigrant letters and is meant to illustrate the points made in the first.

Gerber provides an insightful examination of the role letters play in the shaping of identity. Identity is a life-long project rather than something fixed, and since memory is at the heart of identity, correspondence with those left behind helped individuals to shape and confirm their identity as well as sustain their relationships. For immigrants, most of whom did not expect to see their correspondents again, the letter became the relationship. Ethnicity as a group identity was therefore no guide for individual identity. Gerber goes on to argue that several different types of negotiations are involved in these relationships. These revolve around remaining in contact, lived experience and emotion, and descriptions of the state of affairs.

The problem of silence and its meaning must also be considered, although it can never be solved. Gerber's chapter on voice, theme, and rhythm suggests that although we have an image of the first letter home as the epic story of the voyage and hardships endured, in fact the first letter might not be written until years after immigration. Each individual's correspondence follows its own pattern, but finding the time and space to write seems to have been a problem shared by many immigrants. Most correspondents seemed to want an equal reciprocity in letters, but this was sometimes difficult to achieve. For a number of reasons, correspondence also came to an end. We cannot know why some letters were kept and others not, but Gerber makes clear that more British families kept the letters of immigrants than the reverse. We can seldom be sure, therefore, if correspondence truly ended, or if it is the archiving process that ended. There is much food for thought here for historians using personal correspondence of any kind as a source, not just immigrant letters.

In part two of the study Gerber examines the correspondence of Thomas Spencer Niblock, Catherine Grayston Bond, Mary Ann Wodrow Archbald, and Dr. Thomas Steel. Although the basic story of these immigrants emerges from the analysis, the approach is not biographical. It is the correspondence and the relationships it encompasses that are Gerber's focus. These case studies support his contention that individual cases can vary considerably from the experiences of the group. Someone who had financial resources and support from home, like Niblock, for example, could still fail as an immigrant. How could immigrants measure the success of their immigration since some of the factors involved such as emotional well-being and a sense of belonging did not have a price tag? Nor did their idealized image of home necessarily correspond to reality since the place left behind continued to change. Gerber brings out these questions in the correspondence of both Bond and Archbald. Steel, who liked to write accounts of adventure in his letters, often left his

readers dissatisfied because of the lack of information about his own personal situation as a result.

This analysis will certainly be unsatisfying to anyone looking for detail about these immigrants' lives, or even the tone of their correspondence, as they are seldom quoted. The examples do serve to illustrate Gerber's point, however, that every immigrant experience is different and that to understand immigrant letters, it is the individual, in relationship to others, whom we must seek to understand. Gerber's insights will certainly help historians to address personal immigrant letters more critically. Unfortunately that option is available for only those few whose letters were saved, and we can never know the extent to which they are representative of others. By implication, therefore, there are limits to the extent that immigrants' personal letters can help us understand the group.

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TIMOTHY CUFF, *The Hidden Cost of Economic Development: The Biological Standard of Living in Antebellum Pennsylvania*. (Modern Economic and Social History Series.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2005. Pp. xvii, 277. \$99.95.

Timothy Cuff has written a timely, important, and very dry book that only a statistician could truly love. A scholar of historical anthropometrics, "the study of longitudinal or cross-sectional patterns in human body size" (p. 10), Cuff has scrutinized the height records of 20,000 Pennsylvania Civil War soldiers. Cuff compares the soldiers' heights to their region of origin in Pennsylvania and correlates each soldier's biological standard of living with the degree of market orientation present in his home region.

Cuff seeks to measure the past by using a variant of the human development index, the modern concept for assessing the standard of living that moves beyond merely quantifying gross national product (GNP) or real income. While both measurements are obviously important, the United Nations, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and even the World Bank are concluding that a more meaningful measurement includes such things as nutrition levels, life expectancy, access to health care and education, and intangibles such as a sense of fulfillment and general satisfaction with one's lot in life. Using this more complete measurement, the modern U.S. is not the leader on the human development index.

What happens when a modified version of this measurement is applied to antebellum Pennsylvania, a vanguard state in the market revolution? Cuff points out that height is closely related to nutrition during the formative years, access to calories, and general healthiness. His study shows rather persuasively that "population growth, urbanization, and market integration seem to have had a deleterious effect on the biological well-being" of antebellum Pennsylvanians (p. xv). By dividing Pennsylvania into seven regions and analyzing

their degree of market orientation, Cuff shows that the regions with the least degree of market integration, those most untouched by internal improvement, produced startlingly taller men. In one generation average differences could be as much as one full inch. The less market oriented and more rural antebellum Pennsylvanians were (and often, one assumes, the lower their real incomes), the higher their biological standard of living, with "farmers ha[ving] a substantial advantage in height over most other men during the early stages of industrialization" (p. 122).

The disparity grew between 1820 and 1860, particularly for Philadelphia County, the most urbanized and market-oriented area. There "as time went on, the cost in biological terms, of staying in the state's largest urban area became increasingly high" (p. 131). Cuff found the same trend in the western Pennsylvania region dominated by Pittsburgh, a city of under 500 in 1790 and with a population of 50,000 by 1860. In the west, from the standpoint of the biological standard of living, the further from Pittsburgh the better, with "the tallest men . . . found in the most remote counties" (p. 138). Pursuing more statistical measurements than most historians confront in a month of Sundays, Cuff concludes that "men from counties which were the least involved in market activity and least developed economically were significantly taller than men in the most market integrated locales" (p. 207). Thus Cuff provides an arresting and, for me, a lasting image of early national Pennsylvania: a place where "[t]hose who were economically 'behind' literally looked down on those who were 'ahead'" (p. 207).

Cuff's book is a creative work of historical measurement that achieves its goal. Historians of political thought, culture, social and gender relations, and political economy more generally should incorporate his findings into their frameworks. His argument does not, and need not, address what early national Pennsylvanians thought about these changes or whether they minded the trade offs. Cuff does mention that exchanging goods high in nutrition for durables was, in some areas, voluntary. But by placing rising standards of living as traditionally measured in the broader context of the biological standard of living, Cuff has shown that we must think about this issue, for the past and in the present.

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NIKKI M. TAYLOR, *Frontiers of Freedom: Cincinnati's Black Community, 1802-1868*. (Ohio University Press Series on Law, Society, and Politics in the Midwest.) Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 2005. Pp. xvii, 315. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$24.95.

In recent years there has been increasing attention to the importance of the antebellum African American experience in the states that formed out of the North-western Territories. Nikki M. Taylor's book takes its

place in this growing body of literature by providing a long overdue book-length study of Cincinnati's African American community, which numbered among the North's largest in the antebellum period that constitutes the heart of this account. Taylor rescues its remarkably rich history from a sometimes thin historical record, tracing the period from the dawn of the nineteenth century through the Civil War and its immediate aftermath. She focuses on "the process by which a transient population of former slaves developed into a self-conscious black community" (p. 2) whose center was not the church but the school. She details how African Americans "moved from alienation and vulnerability in the 1820s toward collective consciousness and, eventually, political self-respect and self-determination by the 1840s" (p. 2) in some of the most hostile conditions faced by any antebellum northern black community. Indeed, it is one of the manifestations of that racial climate—the riot of 1841—that Taylor identifies as the "watershed moment for this community" (p. 9). In its aftermath, Cincinnati's African Americans engaged in "a wave of institution-building" (p. 117) that "suggest[ed] that black Cincinnati had developed an articulation of what freedom was . . . and [had] developed at least a provisional blueprint to achieve it" (p. 118).

Taylor devotes half of the book's ten chapters to the period leading up to the 1841 riot, half to the decades that followed it. While the former are broken down chronologically, the latter present a largely thematic account of what Taylor describes as a community that had "reached its maturation" (p. 139). Cincinnati's harsh terrain dominates the first half of the narrative, vividly captured in the title of chapter two, "A City of Persecution." Indeed, a high point of the early black experience is the exodus of "between 460 and 2,000" Cincinnati African Americans (p. 65) (or, according to her figures, between twenty and eighty-nine percent of the city's 1829 black population of 2,250) in response to an order to enforce Ohio's draconian Black Laws and the mob violence against African Americans that ensued. In what she characterizes as "an act of collective *self-determination*," these emigrants left, originally bound for the new settlement of Wilberforce, Canada, although many, perhaps most, never made it, and the colony itself "passed into the margins of history" (p. 79). Meanwhile, the response throughout the northern black communities helped launch the black convention movement, a central component in the "rebirth and renewal" (p. 80) of black Cincinnati.

The second half of the book opens with yet another race riot intended to disrupt or dislodge Cincinnati's African Americans, one that met with a very different reaction. In "Standing Their Ground," Taylor relates how a stronger black community successfully defended itself and used the momentum this resistance provided to build schools, civic associations, newspapers, and a vigilance committee in the ensuing two decades. Subsequent chapters treat the Underground Railroad, Cincinnati's black public schools, and African Americans' crusade for citizenship. Her account of the building of

the schools constitutes a highlight. She argues that the separate school system mandated by the state legislature, by becoming an incubator of community leaders, nurtured the freedom struggle and provided the space for self-determination and "freedom from racism" (p. 173).

The book's final chapter, "The Shadows: The Other Black Cincinnati, 1860s," is in some ways the most interesting, covering the "black lower classes." The separate treatment they are accorded is justified in part by the provocative assertion: "It is not the place of the historian to provide a corrective to history by integrating the shadow people into the narrative more fully than reality allows" (p. 8). Terminology and approach aside, the chapter reveals a "black community that differed from the larger black community," one in which, intriguingly, "racial codes were broken and alternative relations dominated" (p. 186). The "shadow community" was at once a center of "interracial collaboration and cohesion" and "the usual site for ethnic and racial conflict in the 1850s and 1860s," where "residents and laborers collaborated for work and crime and convened for strikes and revelry" (p. 186).

Taylor's book represents an important contribution to the study of both the antebellum and urban black experiences. It will go a long way in helping to refocus scholarly attention on a region of the nation whose significance to African American history has traditionally been underappreciated.

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TIYA MILES. *Ties That Bind: The Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom*. (American Crossroads.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press in association with the George Gund Foundation Input in African American Studies. 2005. Pp. xix, 306. \$34.95.

This book by Tiya Miles is an impressive work that attempts to trace the story of an African or African American woman, Doll, her Cherokee warrior husband, Shoeboots, and their children of mixed ancestry from the end of the eighteenth century through the end of the nineteenth and beyond. To tell such a story would seem to be difficult, given the absence of autobiographical records and the rarity of written evidence of any kind. However, because of Shoeboots's prominence in the Cherokee nation and his friendship with several English-literate Cherokees and Anglo-Americans, Doll and her descendants emerge out of the mists of time.

Miles uses the basic information on the Shoeboots family as a framework on which to hang evidence derived from many kinds of sources including autobiographical statements from other descendants of Afro-Cherokee mixtures, from ex-captives (slaves) held before the Civil War by Cherokee owners, from applications for citizenship in the Cherokee nation, from fictional accounts of black experiences in slavery (e.g.

Toni Morrison's novel *Beloved*), from records of Cherokee governmental enactments, and from a very thorough perusal of a large secondary literature relating to Cherokee history and other aspects of Native American and Afro-Native experiences.

Miles is able to flesh out the story of the Shoeboots in such a manner as to give the reader a great deal of knowledge about the family's struggle within the Cherokee world, but, more than that, she provides a very convincing overview of Cherokee history between the early 1800s and the 1890s. The story she presents is extremely valuable in revealing how the Cherokee nation was radically altered through ever-growing contact with the fledgling United States, both by virtue of the presence of white persons in the Cherokee homeland, and also because of the rise of white-Cherokee mixed-bloods to positions of political and economic dominance. The latter part of the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth was a period in which the southern tribes were still independent sovereignties; however, their territories had been included in the external boundaries granted by Great Britain to the new United States.

The Washington government soon began to attempt to establish a dominant influence over the Indian nations, and that influence steadily grew until the 1830s when most southern Natives were forced to move to new lands west of Arkansas. During this period Christian missionaries, white traders, and mixed bloods began to transform Cherokee society and culture in the direction of imitating the economic and legal models being adopted in the neighboring states, where captive labor was the norm for ambitious men and where certain newborn babies were held as captives, with neither the commission of a crime nor a bill-of-sale being necessary for the status of "slave."

Many Cherokees descended from white trader fathers, and even some "full-bloods" with a white education, gained control over the Cherokee nation and adopted laws governing the position of Africans that generally mirrored those of nearby states, such as Georgia. This created obstacles for the descendants of Shoeboots and Doll, that Miles explores in great detail. She is also able to explore ways in which Cherokee attitudes and customs tended to conflict with the white-inspired captive codes, and ways in which the Shoeboots' descendants were partially able to merge into the Cherokee nation.

Miles's story is very well told, but I wish to mention a few areas for future research. I think that it will be necessary to examine more carefully the manner in which non-African captives were dealt with under Cherokee customary law. For example, in Euchee traditions the Cherokee are credited with having destroyed a segment of the Euchee Nation in the Tennessee area. What happened to the Euchee captives taken? My impression is that captives allowed to live were often required only to pay tribute or to work during their lives (at most) and, in any event, newborn babies could never be held as captives. If I am correct,

then the transition to white-style captivity for newborn African or African-Native babies and their future descendants forever would be a drastic change in Cherokee law.

Miles has made a major contribution that should be built upon in the future.

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RICHARD FOLLETT. *The Sugar Masters: Planters and Slaves in Louisiana's Cane World, 1820-1860*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 290. \$54.95.

Richard Follett's book paints a grim portrait of Louisiana's cane country in the decades before the Civil War. Citing evidence from a wide array of planters' papers, antebellum periodicals, and Works Progress Administration (WPA) interviews with former slaves, Follett argues that the region's planters practiced an especially oppressive form of agro-industrial capitalism. The book confirms former slave Ceceil George's recollection that she had grown up in "hard times" (p. 46).

The North American outpost of a global economy, southern Louisiana's sugar plantation complex rose from the scattered ashes of St. Domingue in the 1790s to become one of the world's leading producers by the middle of the nineteenth century. This remarkable growth depended on increasing demand for sugar and a favorable tariff that offered Louisiana's producers some protection from foreign competition. Sugar planters took advantage of the opportunity presented by their privileged position in the national market. After the United States prohibited the importation of Africans, Louisiana's sugar planters successfully tapped the interstate slave trade to replenish and increase the enslaved population, which suffered mightily under the harsh conditions of sugar plantation labor. The sugar planters augmented this human power by pouring capital into technological innovation, installing steam-driven mills to press cane and vacuum evaporators to transform its juice into sugar. By the eve of the Civil War, Follett observes, the most heavily capitalized and technologically advanced agricultural sector in the United States could be found in southern Louisiana.

The tough core of Follett's book is the sugar planters' cunning orchestration of slave labor. He documents a range of strategies designed to elicit maximum productivity, beginning with the planters' decisions in the slave market to purchase men and women at the height of their physical and reproductive capacities. Sugar planters brutally punished slaves for not working hard enough and for running away, but, like other slaveowners, they complemented the lash with more positive incentives. They hired extra slaves during seasons of peak demand for labor. They used both gang and task patterns of labor depending on the occasion, and they as-

signed certain slaves to specialized and skilled positions. They paid slaves for overwork, doled out presents during the holidays, and allowed slaves to engage in an "informal economy" on their own time—at night and on Sundays. Follett argues that these various material incentives had contradictory effects: while they allowed enslaved people to gain a sense of the value of their work, they also endowed them with a genuine stake in the sugar plantation economy and mitigated the possibility of collective resistance.

Entering the long historiographical debate over American slaveowners' ideology, Follett argues that sugar planters cloaked their exploitative practices in a shroud of "market paternalism" that allowed them to conceive of themselves as the slaves' legitimate guardians (p. 155). They saw to it that their slaves were fed, clothed, housed, and provided with medical care. These rituals of generosity satisfied the masters' consciences, served the masters' interests, and were staged to confirm their power. Not surprisingly, Follett insists that while enslaved people succumbed to the sugar planters' overwhelming power, they never accepted its moral legitimacy. In step with the prevailing historiography, Follett discerns an oppositional stance in various aspects of slaves' behavior ranging from stealing chickens and wearing colorful clothes to (more plausibly) the forging of a largely autonomous religious sphere out of African, Afro-Catholic, and Afro-Protestant elements. I disliked Follett's frequent use of "negotiation" to describe the everyday struggles between masters and slaves, but he is certainly not the only social historian of slavery who is enamored with this euphemism.

Unfortunately, Follett's book stops short of what Eugene Genovese called "the moment of truth" when the slaveowners' world fell to pieces. Genovese's concept of paternalism mattered not only because it helped to describe how slavery actually functioned, but also because it helped to explain why southern slaveowners could not remain in a Union that appeared to threaten slavery. Here Follett misses an opportunity to elucidate how their commitment to slavery shaped the sugar planters' attitudes toward secession and war. He also misses an opportunity to trace the unraveling of "market paternalism" as military occupation and slave resistance derailed the sugar plantation economy. In a brief epilogue, Follett suggests that the slaves' antebellum familiarity with paid work schooled them to enter the wage labor market that came with freedom, yet the sugar planters seem to have been dragged kicking and screaming into the world of "free" labor despite their own apparently successful experiments with paying slaves to work. Readers will have to consult John C. Rodrigue's *Reconstruction in the Cane Fields: From Slavery to Free Labor in Louisiana's Sugar Parishes, 1862–1880* (2001) and Rebecca J. Scott's *Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery* (2005) to follow southern Louisiana's sugar plantation complex into this new era of struggle.

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ERSKINE CLARKE. *Dwelling Place: A Plantation Epic*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 601. \$35.00.

Even though Erskine Clarke's book focuses on life in the atypical Georgian Sea Islands, it is one of the best and most important studies of American slavery I have ever read.

Clarke, now winner of a much-deserved Bancroft Prize, conveys the distinctive features of Liberty County, ranging from its task system of work to its islands, marshlands, rivers, and hidden trails known only to slaves. But he also reveals the effects of market forces on slave sales and shows how a seemingly stable society, in which continuing generations of black "servants" worked for continuing generations of Puritan (Calvinist) whites, resembled the larger slaveholding South. If Liberty County long seemed like a permanent home to both whites and blacks, it eventually became a lost dwelling place that a former plantation mistress saw, as she left for New Orleans in 1868, as "the grave of my buried hopes and affections" (pp. 461–462).

Beginning his narrative in 1804, Clarke vividly traces the ways that black and white children acquired identities as they watched favored slaves serving tea to whites on the verandas of great mansions and guessed whom they would serve or be served by in adulthood. The reader soon meets little Phoebe, who would become the sometimes rebellious personal servant of little Mary Jones, the first cousin and future wife of Charles Colcock Jones, the central figure of the book. And along with young Charles we learn to watch the maturing of the slave who would be closest to him in the future: the extraordinary Cato, who *seems* to internalize the paternalistic ideology and who will eventually run the Montevideo plantation on his own, deciding what and when to plant and how much.

Few works on slavery have captured so well the intricacies and complexities of slave-master interactions, especially the power and skill of slaves in negotiating with their owners for more land and time for growing their own provisions, or for the opportunity to hunt and fish, or to own and bequeath such private property as pigs, chickens, and even horses. While such privileges stand in marked contrast to the life of most Mississippi field hands, it is somewhat misleading to see the slaves' negotiations as "resistance." Successful planters understood that some negotiations and concessions were vital in maximizing production and profit. For the system to work as well as it did, many carrots were needed as well as sticks. And an "enlightened" recognition that even slaves needed incentives in no way mitigated the intrinsic oppression of slavery, as blacks like Phoebe and Cato knew all too well.

Clarke's exhaustive research presents us with so many individual slaves and members of the master class that readers will greatly appreciate the nine pages of genealogical charts and the brief biographies of "Principal Characters" at the end of the book: sixty-seven African Americans and forty-eight European Ameri-

cans. It is a mark of the book's clear and lively prose that no pages are boring, even though some contain minute details on the cultivation and processing of rice and cotton, to say nothing of the gathering and preparation of an extraordinary range of foods ranging from fruit and vegetables to fish, shellfish, fowl, and wild game.

The writing of Clarke's book would not have been possible without the publication in 1972 of Robert Manson Meyers's prize-winning *Children of Pride*, which introduced diligent readers to the fascinating Reverend Charles Colcock Jones and his family and friends. But this masterpiece is an edited collection of 1,200 letters and covers only the period 1854–1868. Clarke has unearthed a vast range of other sources and takes us back not only to Jones's birth but to his profound religious conversion and remarkable education, starting in Georgia and then moving to Phillips Academy (1825–1827) and Andover Theological Seminary, in Massachusetts, and finally to Princeton University.

In the North, the wealthy, slaveowning Charles Jones became immersed in the theology that was at that very time fostering much antislavery sentiment. He even had close contact with such abolitionist minds as Catharine Beecher and Benjamin Lundy. Both he and Mary Jones, whom he married in 1830, developed the deep conviction that slavery was an unmitigated evil that threatened the future of the nation and should be abolished as soon as practicable. Clarke thus presents us with a fascinating dilemma. The new abolitionist movement would soon be dedicated to "moral suasion"—to the mission of converting southerners to precisely the state of mind reached by Charles and Mary Jones. But what could they then do? Charles wondered if he should free his slaves, or not return to his beloved homeland (the path taken by the Grimké sisters). But Charles's love for home and his commitment as a minister of God and missionary reformer led to what Clarke terms a "bridge" between his home and the people he loved and his new "convictions about the evils of slavery and the freedom of the human will to turn from self-love and self-interest to a concern for the good of others" (p. 356).

Charles convinced himself that since slaves were not yet prepared for freedom, he would dedicate his life to their conversion and religious instruction. This vow led him to courageous and finally successful efforts to persuade coastal slaveholders to accept the Christianization of their slaves. But as Clarke dramatically shows, this bridge also led Jones and his wife away from their antislavery convictions "to the unwavering support of a southern home and human bondage." Ironically, Harriet Beecher Stowe used Jones's writings to show that even a "mind capable of the very highest impulses" "may be perverted by constant familiarity with such a system" (pp. 96, 356).

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CHRISTINE JACOBSON CARTER. *Southern Single Blessedness: Unmarried Women in the Urban South, 1800–1865*.

(Women in American History.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2006. Pp. x, 220. \$35.00.

Because the majority of women through time have married, the never wed remain on the periphery of family and women's history, rarely the focus of scholarly inquiry or integrated into social analyses. In her study of antebellum southern spinsters, Christine Jacobson Carter argues for their centrality as "the glue" that kept "elite social networks as well as individual families intact." They were the "communicators, caretakers, surrogate mothers, family servants, and benevolent women extending feminine virtues to individuals and organizations," holding kith, kin, and community together (p. 7).

Rooted in economic security and respected connections, Carter's subjects engaged in rich social, spiritual, and intellectual lives centered in a coterie of like-minded and similarly situated sisters and friends. Even as they occasionally imagined themselves called to politics or war, they rarely pined for occupation. Self-governing in homes of their own, and familiar members of families and communities, they felt confident of their usefulness and social integration. Viewed on occasion as individually eccentric, the "ever-single" garnered public appreciation for their contributions to families, churches, and benevolent institutions.

Yet during the 1830s, growing anxiety about northern economic power, social influence, and antislavery politics aroused less tolerance for women's unwed state. The Civil War stripped away their homes and disrupted their social networks as security needs drove them out of the cities where friends and associations provided fulfilling relationships and opportunities for the practice of benevolence. Those with means fled north or to Europe; those without settled in rural areas or small towns. Defeat brought new struggles. Economic necessity drove many into wage labor. Without volunteers, funds, or the social relations that sustained their organizations, benevolence lost its spiritual benefits. Lacking the resources that made it a blessing to their elders, young women faced singleness as a burden to be borne, one secured by pity for those facing a depleted marriage pool.

In developing this narrative, Carter focuses on the women of Charleston and Savannah. She chose these cities for the rich primary sources associated with their female inhabitants, their degree of social organization, and a rate of singlehood as high as thirty-seven percent of white women, according to the 1848 Charleston census. Carter frames her story as a regional one, contrasting southern conservatism, connectedness, and satisfaction with northern complaint, their critique of female dependence, and search for a fulfilling vocation and a room of their own. Yet for every southern spinster such as Harriett Campbell who celebrated her role as family helpmeet and caretaker of widowed parent, sickly sibling, and orphaned nephew or niece, Carter notes the struggle of a Henrietta Augusta Drayton. The bonds of family could be as taxing in the South as North.

Satisfaction with family roles depended upon the resources and social connections that family provided. Wealth and status offered choices. Single women more happily embraced family demands for assistance when they chose the comings and goings. When their economic independence was compromised by a poorly constructed will, and a sister's choices limited by a brother's assessment of her requirements, the resulting dependence constrained their choices, augmenting frustration and distress. So, too, the character of family caretaking (and, for that matter, the practice of benevolence) was mitigated by slavery. While Carter notes her subjects' wealth, she makes little in her analysis of how class shaped family duties, and nothing of how slave-owning informed the experience of "help-meet."

While more analysis of class and race would have sharpened Carter's picture of southern "single blessedness," an excellent assessment of the city as an independent variable strengthens her study. She demonstrates the rich texture of urban institutions and social networks in shaping spiritually fulfilling, intellectually stimulating, and emotionally satisfying lives. And she does so in graceful prose, with strikingly etched portraits of fascinating individuals.

This book makes a valuable contribution to the growing literature on single women and might well be read in conjunction with the published diaries of more rural, less well-to-do singles such as *An Evening When Alone: Four Journals of Single Women in the South, 1827–1867*, edited by Michael O'Brien (1993); *The Diary of Miss Emma Holmes 1861–1866*, edited by John F. Marszalek (1979, 1994); and *A Heritage of Woe: The Civil War Diary of Grace Brown Elmore, 1861–1868*, edited by Marli F. Weiner (1997). As Elmore wrote from Columbia, South Carolina, after the war, "I do not consider [marriage] the only means of happiness, if one has an aim in life whether married or single in that aim does her happiness consist, many people marry for the one interest to which they wish to devote their life but my desire and will is to find an interest without the appendage of a husband" (p. 176). Like their northern sisters, independence and a calling made for these southern spinsters a better husband than love.

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BETH A. SALERNO. *Sister Societies: Women's Antislavery Organizations in Antebellum America*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 233. \$38.00.

The relationship between the antislavery and women's rights movements has been the subject of much recent scholarship. Lori D. Ginzberg, Judith Wellman, Michael D. Pierson, Julie Roy Jeffrey, and several other historians have lately challenged traditional accounts that depict activist women walking a straight path from benevolence campaigns to antislavery activity and thence to women's rights crusades. Instead, these schol-

ars have offered more nuanced interpretations, exploring how kin networks, property rights, citizenship debates, and religious activity all influenced antebellum contests over slavery and sexual equality. In tracing the origins, intentions, activities, and fate of over two hundred women's antislavery organizations, Beth A. Salerno makes an important contribution to this dynamic field of inquiry.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Salerno argues, women became identified with benevolence work. The association of women with charity increased during the 1820s and 1830s, when the market revolution, Second Great Awakening, and Jacksonian democracy contributed to the creation of a "separate spheres" ideology that idealized white women as the moral guardians of the home while portraying white men as the natural overseers of the gritty public space. Yet the question of slavery complicated this neat dichotomy, for some women assumed that the plight of bondspersons fell under their moral purview. As a result, scores of women's antislavery societies were established during this period. Meeting in private homes or local churches, these groups established correspondence networks, organized sewing circles, read antislavery literature, distributed abolitionist tracts, and generally engaged in activities that could be defended as moral endeavors rather than political acts. In the mid-to-late 1830s, these organizations coordinated massive petition campaigns and held national conventions, decidedly more "public" ventures that inspired mob violence and engendered divisions among the women themselves. Disagreements among female activists heightened in 1840, when male abolitionists divided into competing camps. While William Lloyd Garrison's American Anti-Slavery Society promised women equal rights within the movement, the group's harsh stance toward ecclesiastical bodies alienated women whose religious sensibilities had led them to join the antislavery cause in the first place. The American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society offered more traditional (and perhaps more comfortable) roles for its female members, but it also advocated taking the fight against slavery into the political arena. Women's attitudes toward these rival organizations, contends Salerno, were informed by personal relationships, race, religion, and economic status.

As time passed, things did not get any simpler for female abolitionist societies. During the 1840s and 1850s, women's antislavery organizations seemed less conspicuous as longtime leaders died, old organizations dissolved, and the rise of antislavery political parties moved the slavery debate into a realm in which females exercised little direct influence. In truth, insists Salerno, women's antislavery groups were as active—and as political—as ever. Some women participated in partisan debates and rallies; other, more reticent activists challenged gender norms by establishing antislavery sewing societies that brought a public issue into the domestic sphere, or by holding antislavery fairs that raised critical funds for the abolitionist movement. The blurring

of the public and private spheres continued during the Civil War, when women's antislavery organizations aided fugitive slaves and gathered petitions that called for African American freedom, citizenship, and suffrage. In the end, concludes Salerno, women's antislavery societies "were fundamental to the success of the whole antislavery movement" (p. 159).

As the foregoing summary suggests, "separate spheres" ideology is central to Salerno's analysis. Although some scholars have questioned the utility of separate spheres as an interpretative concept, Salerno defends its use, arguing that she is "not yet convinced that we can cease to explore an issue that arose repeatedly in antislavery women's debates, arguments, and personal letters" (pp. 213–214). So in addition to providing an impressive account of women's antislavery groups, her book reminds us that historiographical debates over antebellum women are far from finished.

While this study sheds much light on women's antislavery organizations, Salerno might have both narrowed and widened her scope of analysis. On one hand, the reader learns very little about rank-and-file members of these groups. By examining such women more closely—perhaps by investigating federal census records—Salerno could have discussed their property holdings, household composition, and other subjects that recent scholars have deemed critical to understanding women's reform activities. On the other hand, Salerno might have expanded her scope of inquiry. She says little about the places in which women's antislavery organizations were established. Nor does Salerno provide a sustained analysis of the larger sociopolitical context, leaving the reader to wonder how female abolitionist groups responded to the crystallization of proslavery ideology, the rapid growth of the bonded population, and other important events in the battle over slavery. These observations notwithstanding, her book is a useful contribution to the ongoing debates about women's role in the antislavery movement.

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BRUCE LAURIE. *Beyond Garrison: Antislavery and Social Reform*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xix, 340. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$23.99.

In this ambitious and complex work on the politicization of abolitionism in antebellum Massachusetts, Bruce Laurie seeks to understand the working-class and "middling" people of the Liberty and Free Soil Parties, and to defend them from what he believes are three unfair appraisals: Garrisonian approaches (historical and contemporary) depicting them as unprincipled politicians; "whiteness studies" scholarship that lumps them together with all the other antebellum white supremacists; and recent arguments that nineteenth-century politics were essentially a superficial pursuit. Laurie responds vigorously through a detailed narrative and analysis of the leadership, organization, ideology, and tactics of Massachusetts's political abolitionists

from the late 1830s through the mid 1850s. He argues that the political abolitionists were both pragmatic and principled; that their racism was on the mild, paternalist end of a spectrum of white supremacist positions; and that their political engagement was both passionate and effective—in brief, "that political action was an effective strategy consistent with moral rectitude" (p. 5). In the first four chapters, he confidently presents the story of the emergence and rise to prominence of the political abolitionists in the Liberty Party, paying close attention to their ideological diversity and to their many efforts to ally with labor activists during that decade. In the next four chapters, he turns to the later rise of the Free Soil Party and its uneasy coalition with the state's Democrats. He concludes by charting the ways the politics of these movements would play out in the Know-Nothing and Republican parties, especially in the success of nativist politics.

Laurie's method is eclectic. He pays close attention to legislative and convention voting patterns, carefully parses ideological and tactical maneuvers by political leaders, and offers a series of mini-biographies of representative figures from various corners of the movement. He makes cultural arguments as well, contending that antislavery politics drew strength from country towns and industrial villages in large part by appealing to the "anti-Southern ethos" shared by many Yankees (p. 65); this ethos, he suggests, was in the process of coalescing into a regional identity (he calls it "'Yankeedom,' or 'the country'" [p. 102]) that idealized "a unique social and moral order rooted in the rough economic equality and political integrity of village New England" (p. 103).

The power of Laurie's analysis rests in his ability to weave together the organizational, social, and ideological dimensions of political life. He persuasively demonstrates that Massachusetts's political abolitionists took both politics and abolition seriously. They passed civil rights legislation, elected Charles Sumner to the U.S. Senate, and undermined the authority of the anti-abolitionist Whig leadership. Laurie's fine-grained narrative of state reform politics yields a nuanced picture of "a precarious union of temperance advocates, labor reformers, country dissidents, and so on, drawn together under the leadership of antislavery advocates and professional politicians, and united by shared antipathy to the presumed union of the Money Power and the Slave Power" (p. 163). The book is capacious enough in conception and execution to give each of those constituencies life beyond the label.

The book's arguments about political abolitionists and the question of racial equality invite further questions. White political abolitionists, Laurie says, were not preoccupied simply with establishing the differences between black and white; while he concedes that "white liberalism" in antebellum Massachusetts was "flawed and limited" (p. 101 n. 58), he argues that white racial practices in the Bay State ran along a spectrum from paternalism to exclusionism (p. 87). If the alternatives to this analysis are the self-congratulatory fic-

tion of New England antiracism or the procrustean contortion of all forms of racial thought and practice into the confines of "whiteness," then such a spectrum of white supremacist positions may well represent an improvement. Yet such the juxtaposition of paternalism with unapologetically racist exclusionism calls to mind models of "race relations" that have had their own procrustean effects in the writing of postemancipation southern history. There, the label "paternalist" has allowed historians to attribute good intentions to some white supremacists without demanding an analysis of paternalism's relationship to the pervasive violence and coercion that characterized social, political, and economic relations. Whether "paternalism" can serve northern history any better remains an open question. If it can, it may be because most Yankees (unlike their "country" counterparts in the postemancipation South) could, as Laurie concludes, engage the question of black inclusion largely in abstract and symbolic terms. At the levels of both individual experience and coalition politics, Laurie shows, some white people did wrestle with the question of full inclusion for black citizens, but not (yet) in a way that forced them to confront all that such inclusion would mean.

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PETER S. CARMICHAEL. *The Last Generation: Young Virginians in Peace, War, and Reunion*. (Civil War America.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 343. \$39.95.

Recently Civil War historiography has entered into an era where a blurring of the lines between military and social history has opened the field to a broad spectrum of subjects and methodologies. While this book is certainly more social history than military history, author Peter S. Carmichael provides an important contribution to both subfields and in doing so enhances the reader's appreciation of the Civil War as the nation's seminal event.

Carmichael examines the lives of 121 Virginians born between 1830 and 1842. Well educated and well heeled, these young men stood poised to become Virginia's greatest generation. Instead, they became the Commonwealth's last generation: the last generation to come of age in antebellum Virginia. Through a skillful use of primary sources generated by his subjects, Carmichael dispels the notion that these Virginians were wild-eyed, reckless rebels bent on the destruction of the Union solely for the sake of enslaving other men. Instead, Carmichael's young Virginians come forward as constitutionalists, intellectuals, and idealistic antebellum progressives who held an "extraordinarily optimistic view of progress" despite warnings from their elders to restrain their impulses toward modernization (pp. 23–24).

While these southern progressives parted company with their northern counterparts on issues such a sla-

very, religion, and democracy, it is the conflict between the young Virginians and their elders that draws the author's focus. Carmichael suggests that the young Virginians revered their state's founding fathers and lamented Virginia's loss of stature within a Union increasingly dominated by northern political and economic interests. They blamed their parents, generation for allowing northern hegemony to spread and argued that the conservatism of the so-called "old fogies" had facilitated Virginia's decline. In short, Yankee ascendancy was their parent's fault, and if allowed to continue unchecked, it would lead to Virginia's demise.

Many in the older generation considered their college-aged children arrogant upstarts whose "foolish and intellectually immature" complaints and protests constituted an overt "attack on adult authority and family values" in Virginia (p. 39). Nevertheless, the younger generation did not allow their elders to badger them into silence or submission. As a result, Carmichael identifies the emergence of a nineteenth-century generation gap as the defining characteristic of Virginia's last generation.

An appreciation for Virginia's generation gap is essential to understand how and why Carmichael's last generation came to embrace secession. In the wake of John Brown's raid, many young Virginians began to consider secession as a solution to the problems that plagued the Commonwealth. By the time of Abraham Lincoln's election, the last generation had grown wary of attempts by Virginia's elder statesmen to secure the state's constitutional guarantees through negotiations with northern politicians. As the secession crisis unfolded, those young Virginians who had supported the Constitutional Union Party began to join the state's Breckinridge Democrats in opposition to the Crittenden Compromise and in support of secession.

Carmichael asserts that motivations for this shift ran deeper than political and economic considerations. The young Virginians considered Republican power a challenge to their principles, both intellectually and practically. Since the younger generation stood to inherit the mantle of leadership in Virginia, the further erosion of the commonwealth's prominence within a northern-dominated Union would affect them directly and on a personal level. The formation of a southern nation, the author argues, presented an opportunity for these young idealists to return Virginia to its preeminent political status and for forward-thinking Virginians to lead the state into a future complete with progressive economic reforms.

Although Carmichael devotes just two chapters to the military experiences of the last generation, and one chapter to Reconstruction, the reader gains valuable insight into the impact of war on the maturation of Virginia's young progressives. The men served primarily as junior officers in the Army of Northern Virginia and used their positions as a means to secure leadership status among the citizen soldiers—their future constituents. Young Virginians sought to mitigate much of the

harshness inherent in army life with a paternalistic approach. "Having been denied authority by their elders in the 1850's," Carmichael affirms, "they set themselves up as the moral arbiters of the Confederacy" (p. 193). As the war wound its way to a conclusion, however, their belief in Confederate nationalism as a manifestation of progress, combined with an unswerving religious faith, blinded the young Virginians to the inevitability of defeat.

Notwithstanding the devastation of their peacetime world, the generational divide that characterized pre-war Virginia survived into Reconstruction. In fact, Carmichael maintains that the young generation embraced Reconstruction as a "second chance to reform Virginia character and instill the state with a spirit of innovation and prosperity" (p. 216). The author concludes that the Reconstruction process left the young Virginians disillusioned, and as they grew older many turned inward, became more conservative, and embraced the Lost Cause ideology. While their optimism and idealism had survived the war, it could not survive Reconstruction, and so Carmichael's last generation came to mirror their parent's generation.

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EDMUND J. RAUS, JR. *Banners South: A Northern Community at War.* (Civil War in the North.) Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 333. \$39.00.

The American Civil War has been looked at from almost every conceivable angle, and more of late from the perspectives of the home front and the men in the ranks. Because so many people in mid-nineteenth-century America were literate, and because so much of what they wrote about the war has been preserved, the Civil War is the first major armed conflict in human history in which we can know and understand a considerable amount about the ordinary people involved. In this book, Edmund J. Raus, Jr., adds to that understanding.

The object of his attention is the community of Cortland, New York, a small, not so prosperous, upstate town west of the Appalachians, located within a county of the same name inhabited in 1860 by 26,000 people. They were a highly homogeneous lot—white, mostly Methodists and Baptists, overwhelmingly Republicans. Only five percent of residents had been born outside the United States. Furthermore, they shared most of the same myths and opinions about their country and the reasons for trouble with the South. When war came they vociferously responded with bombastic speeches, mass meetings, and torchlight parades, and almost spontaneously out of the commotion arose the "Cortland Volunteers," an infantry company that soon became part of the Twenty-third Regiment of New York Volunteers. The average age of its members was twenty-two. Most were unmarried farm boys who had attended school and church together; they were more like

a hometown athletic team than a military force. The town made a great fuss over them, and before they departed for Elmira in late May, local women made them a distinctive flag to carry southward into battle.

Those Cortland volunteers enlisted for a two-year stint, during which they witnessed and experienced more than their fair share of hardship and bloodshed. They were in Washington, D.C., when news of the humiliation at Manassas Junction arrived, and after that they endured a bitter succession of setbacks and defeats at Second Bull Run, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. Throughout most of their service they were under the stern command of Brigadier General Marsena Rudolph Patrick, a crusty professional officer with a voice like thunder, who was perpetually dissatisfied with their slovenly, undisciplined ways and struggled to transform them into soldiers. He never succeeded in bringing them up to his own expectations and little affection developed between him and the men in the ranks before they were finally sent home in May of 1863.

This is a well-written narrative, which often bursts forth into vivid passages of descriptive imagery. There is much about weapons and food and bone-weary marching; about the anticipated adventures of young men away from home for the first time; about homesickness, the monotony of military life, and the terror and exhilaration felt on smoking fields that trembled with the sounds of war. Also, a good deal is revealed concerning soldiers' conflicted attitudes about slavery and race, as well as their difficulties in readjusting to civilian life.

The people whose story Raus retells had a decidedly romantic view of themselves and the war, and one cannot read this account without being struck by the theatrical character of their wartime experience. Especially when George McClellan was in charge, but throughout the entire conflict, it seemed as if everyone played assigned roles, making the proper gestures and uttering prescribed lines, often while bands played martial music in the background. There was a remarkable sameness to the comments the soldiers wrote in their letters; sounding almost like clichés from a kind of "group think" that fictionalized the war even while it was occurring. But perhaps all the ritual and role playing and dramatic dialogue were necessary to enable ordinary people to endure the tragedy and grief the war made all too real.

If the book has a fault it comes from the unfortunate fact that the Cortland Volunteers become almost lost amidst the immense conflict that seemed to swallow them up. Their story all but vanishes as Raus describes the movements of vast armies and the clashing of titanic forces, and even when the Twenty-third New York is on the scene, there is little detail about what it did. Every so often Raus's ancestor, George Edgcomb, pops up for what amounts to only a cameo appearance but we never get to know him or any of the other men from Cortland, either as individuals or as a distinctive group. Also, not nearly enough is said about the impact the war had on the people back home or the development of their

community. Nevertheless, This is a well-crafted book that can deepen our empathy and enhances our understanding of ordinary northern men who became soldiers in the Civil War.

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CHERYL A. WELLS. *Civil War Time: Temporality and Identity in America, 1861–1865*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 195. \$39.95.

Extending the work of her mentor, Mark M. Smith, Cheryl A. Wells offers an intriguing analysis of the ways in which the Civil War warped Americans' experience of time. According to Wells, the life rhythms of antebellum Americans were driven by four overlapping tempos: "natural time" (the weather and the seasons); "God time" (the Sabbath); "clock time" (daily work routines); and "personal time" (the need for sleep and the desire for leisure). All were disrupted by "battle time," the tendency of the Civil War to pace the lives not only of soldiers but also of hospital workers, prisoners, and civilians caught in the crossfire. This disruption was only temporary, however. The war, Wells contends, threw Americans back on a tempo akin to the premodern task system, but, after Appomattox, people again looked to their watches to determine the pulse of their lives.

Wells's book is split into two parts. The first examines the role of timeliness (or rather the lack of it) in two major military engagements: First Manassas and Gettysburg. At Manassas, Irvin McDowell's offensive was, according to William Tecumseh Sherman, "one of the best planned . . . and one of the worst fought" (p. 23). It required a kind of discipline his troops did not have: an ability to stay on schedule. Wells nicely multiplies her examples. The federals moved with a slowness that was almost farcical. They were green volunteers, she notes, soldiering on their own time; and, in the case of those who fell out to pick blackberries, they took their own sweet time getting into position.

At Gettysburg, by contrast, it was the Confederates who could not beat the clock. As Wells sees it, Lee's leadership was marred by a consistent failure to discipline himself and his subordinates to clock time. On day two, especially, his battle plan required simultaneous action, but he told his commanders, imprecisely, to attack "at dawn" or "in the morning." Civil War historians may quarrel with Wells in this section. The problem on day two was not that General James Longstreet failed to attack precisely at, say, 5:00 a.m. but that he attacked closer to 5:00 p.m., which, in fairness to Lee, was "morning" only in China. Moreover, as Wells herself has established, timepieces were untrustworthy and local time was inconsistent. What better way to coordinate simultaneous attacks than to tell corps A to attack when it learned that corps B had engaged? Finally, telling a man to attack "in the morning" is no vaguer than telling him, as Lee told Ewell, to attack if it was

"practicable." No doubt, Lee should have been more precise. But his fuzzy clockwork and willingness to delegate had worked at Chancellorsville, where he divided his army twice and reunited it in the middle of a thicket. Granting that timeliness occasionally spelled the difference between victory and defeat (that is to say, granting the obvious), the bigger problem at Gettysburg was that—without Stonewall Jackson, without Jeb Stuart for two days, working with new corps commanders—Lee made some questionable calls, none more grievous than sending Johnston Pettigrew and George Pickett into a deathtrap that would probably have been a disaster at any time.

Wells is on surer footing in her treatment of the disruptions to the town of Gettysburg itself. Shelling shut down newspaper offices, banks, and businesses; the town went dark after the gas company skedaddled. People cringed in their cellars during the day and slept restlessly at night. They did not sleep at all after the wounded poured in, as they required round-the-clock care and feeding.

Wells's discussion of the town of Gettysburg sets up the second part of the book, which focuses on how "battle time" regulated the life rhythms of those not on the battlefield. In camp, inclement weather and constant marching made it impossible for soldiers to settle into reliable patterns of worship, letter writing, or even drill. In hospitals, the arrival and needs of the wounded superseded the clock routines imposed by men on female nurses. In prison, the purpose was not to rehabilitate men but to contain them; thus time fell heavy on soldiers who could only wait for the tide of war to swell their numbers or make possible their exchange. In all cases, "battle time" trumped "God time," "clock time," and "personal time."

Wells's larger goal is laudable: she wants her readers to see the past in four dimensions. But occasionally she struggles to achieve that goal with semantics rather than insight. Certainly we gain little clarity by calling Daniel Sickles's Peach Orchard caper a "breach of temporal authority" (p. 43). Moreover it is not always clear to what great historiographical question Wells's work is directed. It seems in keeping with the current quest to recover how the past looked, sounded, smelled, tasted, and felt. Such things are important. But the real trick is to recover not the objective truth but the subjective experience, which is to say the linguistic practices, laid bare by texts, that constructed a now-dead but once thriving "reality." When it comes to smell, for instance, a rose is a rose is a rose. What changes is how human beings react to, reimagine, or signify that smell. Time is the same. It drags in jail. It gets lost in the fog of war. It has always been thus. Wells is at her best when she is most attentive to how people talked about how they experienced time over time.

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CHARLES W. SANDERS, JR. *While in the Hands of the Enemy: Military Prisons of the Civil War.* (Conflicting Worlds: New Dimensions of the American Civil War.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 390. \$44.95.

The historiography of the American Civil War has varied since the end of the conflict. From the self-serving autobiographies of the nineteenth century to critical analysis in the twentieth, historians have covered the conflict in detail. Few undiscovered areas of the war remain for rigorous academic studies. Charles W. Sanders, Jr., has discovered one of the lightly researched areas and presents an excellent and disturbing picture of an often ignored, but crucial, facet of the conflict.

Sanders articulate his thesis clearly and adroitly, blaming equally the Federal and Confederate governments for the misery and death that has become the legacy of the war's military prison system. For the Federals, issues over political recognition of the Confederacy, internal dissention over punishing prisoners for disloyalty, and, the later decision to end the parole system all played a part in the deaths of thousands of prisoners under their control. While some of the Confederates' issues duplicated those of the Union, the added problems of caring for tens of thousands of unplanned and unwanted prisoners of war in an economy that was rapidly collapsing added to the death toll.

The author pulls few punches in his well-researched attacks. For the Union, Abraham Lincoln's refusal officially to recognize captured Confederates as prisoners of war set the general tenor of the Federal policy for the rest of the war. Captured "rebels" were placed in overcrowded, hastily constructed barracks, with little regard to sanitation or the basics of survival. Jefferson Davis's government was no better, threatening to execute captured Federal officers, black troops, or any others they targeted to force the Federals to meet their political demands. Early in the war, the exchange cartel between the warring parties, contends Sanders, kept the death rate in the camps relatively low. When the exchange system broke down in 1863, neither side planned or expected the increased numbers of long-term prisoners. Politically, neither Federal nor Confederate governments could admit that the conflict would continue for some time, hence they established only "temporary" prison camps. The result was misery on a gigantic scale, as ramshackle camps across both North and South filled with unhealthy, ill-fed, and poorly clothed prisoners. Sanders examines not only the infamous camps at Elmira and Andersonville but the large number of smaller camps spread across both Federal and Confederate territory that duplicated the situation in the large camps.

Lastly, Sanders does an excellent job in showing how historians of the conflict have unintentionally perpetrated the traditional excuses given by both sides: that the Confederates themselves were starving by 1865, justifying the starvation of Federal prisoners, and that the benevolent Lincoln had no idea of the poor conditions

of the Union camps. Instead, he presents a series of well-constructed arguments demonstrating how the Confederates surrendered stockpiles of food, medicine, and blankets mere miles from the largest camps, and how Lincoln, who spent days sitting in the War Department's telegraph office, could not have been unaware of the extent of the prisoners' plight from the myriad of messages sent from camp commanders discussing disease, deaths, and sanitation.

The author covers the subject extremely well, with only a few limitations. He does not address the issue of political prisoners or the problems that arose from captured irregulars. While it does not detract from his work, it would have presented an interesting variety of cases outside of the traditional military prisoner of war system. Another minor issue is Sanders's focus on the camps built during the war and not the use, at least by the Federals, of existing state penitentiaries and local jails to hold prisoners. In this respect, the focus on non-traditional methods of holding captured soldiers could have presented a wider picture of the prisoner system.

The book is not an easy read. This is not to disparage Sanders's spotless prose and outstanding research. Page after page of professional incompetence and often purposeful maltreatment of prisoners by both Federal and Confederate civilian and military leaders, with prisoners starving in the wealthy North or freezing to death in the "sunny South," cast a distinct pallor on the work. For this very reason alone, it should be seriously studied by professional historians of the era, and required reading for the large community of often overly romantic students of the Civil War.

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MICHAEL WILLIAM PFAU. *The Political Style of Conspiracy: Chase, Sumner, and Lincoln.* (Rhetoric and Public Affairs Series.) East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 2005. Pp. vii, 248. \$59.95.

Michael William Pfau's book is not really a historical work. Rather, it is a book written by, and apparently for, students of communications studies, and particularly of conspiracies. This is a field with its own theories, language, and controversies that can be of importance to historians only in as much as it affects consideration of the influence of the three opponents of slavery mentioned in the book's title.

Pfau distinguishes the antislavery conspiracy theories of his subjects from those of William Lloyd Garrison, who, "eschewing politics . . . opted for the withdrawal from the tragic secular world in favor of a brighter millennium or a jihad that would forever end the blight of slavery" (p. 156). Thus, as he suggests, Garrison fit more completely Richard Hofstadter's idea of the paranoid style at the fringe of politics. Salmon Chase, Charles Sumner, and Abraham Lincoln, however, were more positive. Inasmuch as they referred to a slave power conspiracy, they did so for political purposes. And they proved that conspiracy rhetoric was not nec-

essarily confined to the political fringe. After all, they eventually created the Republican Party, which, far from constituting a fringe organization, soon became the second major party in the country. Moreover, while Chase and Sumner were still certain of the existence of a slave power conspiracy, Lincoln was more cautious and merely mentioned its probability.

To make his points, the author concentrates on two of Chase's speeches, the "Address of the Southern and Western Liberty Convention" at Cincinnati in 1845, and the "Appeal of the Independent Democrats" in 1854; Sumner's "Crime against Kansas speech" in 1856, and Lincoln's "House Divided against Itself" speech in 1856. The detailed examination of these orations is enlightening. Pfau views Chase's texts primarily as efforts for his own political advancement and for the establishment of antislavery as a main party issue, a goal he achieved. Sumner, too, is seen as using the conspiracy approach to induce Whigs to join the Free Soilers, and the account of his contribution is particularly interesting, because, as the author avers, the aftereffect of the "Crime against Kansas" speech, the bludgeoning of the speaker, has received much more attention than the content of the speech itself. Lincoln's "House Divided against Itself" speech has been examined many times, but Pfau looks at it from a different point of view. Far from condemning the orator's use of conspiracy, as others have done, he posits it within his consideration of conspiracy theories, and in Lincoln's case, his political efforts as a convinced Whig.

What makes reading this book difficult is the constant use of specialized and, to most non-rhetoricians, unknown expressions. For example, in his stress on the importance of conspiracy rhetoric, Pfau frequently uses the term "rhetor" instead of orator, "hermeneutic" for interpretive, and words like "emplotment" that cannot be found even in unabridged dictionaries. This tendency seriously interferes with his writing style.

The ideas of advocates of conspiracies deserve full study, but it would have been more interesting had the author concentrated on such examples as the many theories connected with the assassinations of Lincoln and John F. Kennedy. These never seem to stop, no matter how much evidence against them may be unearthed. Very often, those believing in one right-wing conspiracy end up believing in a left-wing one as well. This, however, is not the focus of Pfau's work. He shows that even in the present age of pluralism, political conspiracy theories can still flourish, especially with the emphasis on the evils of concentration of powers, to say nothing of the reversal of the election of 2000. Because these are hardly fringe movements, they owe a lot to the rhetoric introduced by Chase, Sumner, and Lincoln.

Considering its language and arguments, as already mentioned, this book is really mostly for rhetoricians. Historians will have trouble absorbing it.

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JOHN M. COSKI. *The Confederate Battle Flag: America's Most Embattled Emblem*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 2005. Pp. xi, 401. \$29.95.

Few emblems in history have elicited more passionate responses, both positive and negative, than has the Confederate battle flag. Its supporters uphold the flag as a symbol of heritage, heroism, and southern history. Its detractors regard the flag as divisive, racist, and argue that at best, it should only be displayed in a museum. The battle flag is enigmatic, its history has been clouded by political debate, and it is often referred to, erroneously, as the "Stars and Bars." John M. Coski's analysis of the flag's history, its uses, and its various meanings, therefore, is both welcome and needed.

Coski's book examines the flag from its creation during the Civil War up to the present day. The book is divided into three sections that are both thematic and chronological. Part one examines the Confederate flag from the Civil War through World War II, during which time it established itself as a symbol of southern popular culture and was rarely criticized. Part two, entitled "Rebel Flag," traces the development of the flag as a symbol of violence and racism from the 1950s through the early 1970s, when the flag was taken up by rebellious youth and became the emblem of massive resistance to the civil rights movement. In the final portion of the book, Coski surveys the period since the 1970s, during which time the Confederate flag was front and center of what he calls "flag wars."

What became known as *the* Confederate flag with the blue St. Andrew's cross emblazoned on a red background almost never saw the light of day. The design by South Carolinian William Porcher Miles, who opposed any likeness to the "Stars and Stripes," was not taken seriously by political leaders, who likened the cross to a "pair of suspenders" (p. 6). The Battle of Manassas changed that. Some soldiers lost their lives at that battle because of confusion over flags. Soldiers followed state and military unit flags, and, as General P. T. Beauregard observed, there needed to be a single battle flag that all soldiers recognized. In fact, Beauregard is credited with reviving Miles's design and attempting to standardize its use throughout the Confederate army. By 1863, the battle flag with the St. Andrew's cross had become the soldier's flag and the flag of the southern nation.

Following the war the Confederate battle flag became the flag used to honor and commemorate the common Confederate soldier. In the immediate aftermath of the war, display of the battle flag was not officially permitted by Federal troops in the region. However, after those troops had left the South and southern legislatures returned former Confederates to power, the region entered into a period of celebration and commemoration of the Confederacy and its heroes known as the "Lost Cause." At monument unveilings, veterans' reunions, and during Memorial Day rituals, the battle flag was prominently featured. During the 1890s, when the region entered into one of its darkest

periods of racial violence and set about to completely disfranchise black men, the Confederate battle flag emerged as the "White man's" flag; indeed, Mississippi incorporated it into its state flag.

Throughout these celebrations of southern whiteness and Confederate valor, the United States flag, the Stars and Stripes, flew alongside the battle flag. Yet white southerners saw no conflict in the values of southern nationalism and their U.S. citizenship. Instead, they regarded the motives of the Confederacy to preserve states' rights as patriotic, even though one of those rights was the institution of slavery. In the early twentieth century and leading up to World War II, the rest of the nation became complicit in its support of the Lost Cause version of the Civil War. The Confederate battle flag could be found promoting consumer culture in national magazines, and the majority of battle flags produced for southern celebrations were made by northern manufacturers. Moreover, in their desire for national reconciliation, northerners turned a blind eye not only to the Confederate battle flag but to what it represented.

It was during the late 1940s, and into the 1950s and 1960s that the flag truly came to embody the spirit of rebellion, but this time against the progress of black civil rights. The flag became a symbol of the Dixiecrats of 1948, and part of southern football culture. This was also the era when the Ku Klux Klan took up the flag and it became the symbol of massive resistance. The images of rebellious youth waving flags and screaming at black citizens, and of Klan cross burnings surrounded by battle flags, forever changed its meaning. It had become an emblem that, according to civil rights leaders, "white people intended as a symbol of racism" (p. 135).

Since the early 1970s, the Confederate battle flag has been at the heart of what Coski refers to as "flag wars." These have often occurred in public schools and on college campuses and, more recently, have been the subject of controversy regarding southern state flags. In the case of public education, whether secondary or college-level, school officials have had to recast the image of their institutions, updating a Rebel mascot who waves the flag, for example, or prohibiting use of the flag on clothing because of its inflammatory meaning for African Americans. Finally, there are the flag wars over state flags in which the Confederate battle flag has been incorporated or officially flown on state grounds. As Coski explains, the results have been mixed.

This is an important work because it clears up many misconceptions about the flag. It is also a valuable cultural history of the battle flag and of the South since the Civil War. Readers will find some parts repetitious, yet Coski is to be commended for helping us understand why and how the Confederate battle flag has become a symbol that is both revered and vilified.

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DARREL E. BIGHAM. *On Jordan's Banks: Emancipation and Its Aftermath in the Ohio River Valley*. (Ohio River Valley Series.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 2006. Pp. x, 428. \$45.00.

The Lower Ohio River Valley is rarely listed among the United States' distinctive regions. Darrel E. Bigham's careful study of African American life between 1860 and 1880, however, subtly reminds scholars that the Lower Ohio is important. Bigham's Lower Ohio region is a distinctive borderland between north and south, rural and urban, and black and white. Political boundaries do matter within the greater historical landscape: the river was an important boundary, but the fact that the north bank was composed of free states while the south bank was lined by Kentucky, a slave state, made a difference for the region's African Americans and established cultural parameters that affected their lives and institutions long after emancipation.

Bigham's geographical focus extends from the Illinois river town of Cairo on the Mississippi River to the Kentucky town of Ashland, nestled in the foothills of Appalachia. It was and is a largely rural region, but it contains such urban centers as Cincinnati, Louisville, and Paducah. Thus, Bigham's analysis will be useful to scholars not only of American regions but those of midwestern and Upper South cities.

Bigham begins with a brief assertion of the Ohio River Valley as a region, a case that would be much more persuasive had he explored more of the institutional interactions between African Americans on the north and south sides. Only around Cincinnati do cultural, economic, and social exchanges between African Americans in Covington, Newport, and Cincinnati reach critical mass; certainly the Queen City's great bridge served as a facilitator. One wishes that Bigham had explored other bridges—either actual steel structures or more nebulous human links—between the two sides of the river.

The narrative consists of three large sections: before the Civil War, the war's impact, and the postwar years to circa 1880. Using existing scholarship about the pre-war era, Bigham locates one persistent theme: north-bank African Americans had more opportunities and a better life than those in Kentucky, but no matter their residence, blacks in the Lower Ohio daily faced racism and hostility. Only if they remained in their "place," meaning on the physical and cultural margins, would whites tolerate them. African Americans found those spaces and then made viable, growing communities, a testament to the commitment, ingenuity, and courage black citizens brought to everyday challenges and opportunities.

Bigham next discusses African American life during the Civil War, a narrative that by itself is an important contribution, especially to existing studies of the Civil War and the end of slavery in Kentucky. Blacks were active participants in all phases of the war and emancipation, and Bigham rightfully points out that history is not enough told, nor understood, in the region.

Eight of the book's twelve chapters focus on the post-war years, where Bigham explores differences in demographic and residential patterns, political rights, occupations, family structure, institution building, and education. Like Eric Foner's studies on Reconstruction, Bigham finds that rebuilding and establishing families were among the first actions taken by African Americans, but close behind came the establishment of churches and schools. Bigham also gives attention to the role of fraternal lodges and societies, although his analysis of these very important groups is largely limited to the urban, male organizations. The clarity of his narrative in these wide-ranging chapters would be enhanced by organizing this plethora of activity under the theme of institution building. Creating and nurturing these necessary community building blocks proved invaluable to racial identity and cohesion as Jim Crow segregation raised its ugly head in the late nineteenth century.

This book contributes significantly to African American history in the Upper South and the adjacent northern states of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio from the Civil War to the onset of Jim Crow. Bigham coaxes insightful socioeconomic patterns out of raw census data and tax records; he consults a wide range of secondary sources to inform the often location-specific evidence from counties along both sides of the river. African American voices are missing—were there not any extant slave narratives from the Kentucky side or from those who passed through the region during the 1860s and 1870s?—but his careful use of local government records and newspapers underscores that blacks in the Lower Ohio were actors, and important ones at that, in the transformation of this river region in the mid-nineteenth century. Their legacies, as Bigham correctly remind us, continued to shape the region long after they conquered “enormous odds” and created “a viable way of life” on both banks of the Ohio (p. 301).

CARROLL VAN WEST

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CHRISTOPHER ROBERT REED. *Black Chicago's First Century: Volume 1, 1833–1900*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 582. \$49.95.

During the nineteenth century, Chicago grew from a frontier trading post to become America's second city. Its growth was shaped by the hard work of an ethnically diverse population struggling to deal with the complexities of urbanization even as they sought to find their footing on new ground. That story, writ large, is similar to the one Christopher Robert Reed reconstructs in this book. But the devil, as they say, is in the details. The difference, as Reed argues, is that although African Americans had the oldest claim on the settlement of Chicago, their quest to attain first-class status took much longer to achieve than that of most other groups.

Reed begins his narrative with the first permanent settlement of Chicago, established in the late 1770s by Jean-Baptiste Pointe Du Sable of African ancestry. A

black presence emerged again around 1833, when fugitives and free blacks sought “freedom from slavery and racial subordination” (p. 43) in the “City of Refuge.” An important terminus on the Underground Railroad, Chicago “in contrast to the East, afforded opportunities unknown in public education to black New Yorkers, Bostonians, and Philadelphians up to 1850” (p. 92). The small black population—only 323 in 1850—lived “side by side” with white ethnics. “Both work and worship and to some extent, play, brought many of them into face to face contacts with their white neighbors” (p. 51). Unlike other cities in the North where “whites rioted against the presence of African Americans as either refugees or workers,” black and white Chicagoans “rioted together against slave catching” after passage of the Fugitive Slave Act (p. 98). As the population grew during the 1850s, however, so did racial animosity. By the end of the 1850s, separate schools were mandated for African American children (pp. 92, 135). Throughout the antebellum period opportunities were circumscribed by the Illinois Black Laws of 1845, which denied blacks the right to vote, serve on juries, and testify in court against whites (p. 94).

After the Civil War, as Chicago's black population swelled, a leadership class emerged around civil rights struggles such as gaining repeal of the school segregation law and the Illinois Black Laws, and black Chicago “entered its freedom phase with momentous signs of demographic change and economic progress” (p. 171). Reed has stitched together significant portions of black life during the Gilded Age, opening a window on how the “refined,” the “respected,” and the “riffraff” (p. 267) made a living and a life economically and socially. We learn that on one occasion the “Knights of Labor stretched out their hands in workers' fraternity” (pp. 250–251) to include black waiters in an alliance with white waiters during a strike in 1890. To keep morale high, at least one black church held union meetings. He shows how the development of associational life provided a safety net in time of need. Reed utilizes journals, newspapers, letters, and the Federal Pension Records of black Chicago soldiers to document these activities. In addition to prominent members of the elite, we gain an understanding of nineteenth-century life for washerwomen, Pullman porters, firemen, policemen, barbers, saloonkeepers, undertakers, and caterers as well as radical activist Lucy Parsons, the African American widow of Albert Parsons, one of the Haymarket martyrs. His social survey, although occasionally repetitious, is amazingly inclusive.

Reed ends his encyclopedic survey with a look at black participation in the World's Columbian Exposition in 1893 and the Spanish-American War in 1898, both “epochal” events for black Chicago's future (p. 435). He shows that African Americans were “in and at” (p. 434) the world's fair, “as workers, patrons, lecturers, performers, artists, and visitors despite a widespread historical misperception suggesting their exclusion” (p. 338). In addition, fighting on the front lines in 1898—in the only unit with an African American commanding

officer—enabled black Chicagoans to “lay a firmer claim to manhood and citizen rights” (p. 435). Both events support Reed’s argument that “institutional racial consciousness” fostered community solidarity at the end of the century, encouraging a “sense of independence from white direction” while laying the groundwork for “the realization of the dream of a Black Metropolis” in the future (p. 435). Left unanswered is whether the dream of a black metropolis is the goal or the means to another end.

Reed’s exploration of nineteenth-century black progress in Chicago helps us better understand the social and economic underpinnings that shaped the well-documented rise of the black metropolis of the twentieth century. Focusing on black community formation, Reed’s narrative, replete with biographical vignettes, allows insight into the interior lives of African Americans from every background. But while the portrayals put a human face on the process of community building, they also reveal a weakness. Too often, important details seem to float above the text; these need to be anchored to a larger framework. As it is, the reader is left to connect the parts to the whole, running the risk that Reed’s valuable insights will be lost in the process.

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R. ALTON LEE. *Farmers vs. Wage Earners: Organized Labor in Kansas, 1860–1960*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 340. \$55.00.

Scholarly studies of labor history by state are rare, and those focused on predominantly agrarian states are rarer still. Historians tend to refrain from writing such works for legitimate reasons, as these types of studies can constrain themes in labor history by abiding by seemingly artificial political boundaries. With trades, industries, professions, and economic systems transcending state lines, how can a history of labor in one state illuminate the history of the labor movement or that of wage workers in the United States generally? R. Alton Lee’s valuable book addresses that question, although perhaps not overtly. Lee is interested in analyzing the important contributions that Kansas workers made for the cause of economic justice for themselves, their families, and for future working people in the state. His ability, however, to place the struggles of Kansas workers in a national labor movement and working-class context provides useful insight into the history of labor at the local and regional level. Through the prism of a century of major trends in wage workers’ experiences in Kansas, Lee is able to treat the successes and failures of the labor movement outside of the customary terrain that historians tend to traverse, revealing the local conditions that aided the advance of labor’s interests and those elements that thwarted labor’s goals. Therefore, his study should be viewed more in conjunction with labor history surveys written by such scholars as Steve Babson, Robert Zieger, and Jeremy

Brecher rather than more narrowly focused monographs.

Predominately agrarian Kansas did economically diversify overtime as industrialization took hold in the late nineteenth century, resulting in a growing unskilled wage workforce. During the same time period, railroad companies expanded their lines across the state, employing thousands more wage laborers. Eventually, Kansas would develop several key industrial sectors in mining, oil and natural gas, meat packing, automobiles, and aviation, enticing young men and women off the farm and newcomers to the state for industrial employment. Throughout his book, Lee deftly manages the state’s economic changes and the struggles of its workers to carve out some modicum of control in the workplace, safety, living wages, and other forms of labor compensation. Moreover, by connecting these types of changes and struggles to larger national trends and events, Lee reveals a dynamic interplay between the macro and micro dimensions of American labor history during its most crucial decades.

Lee is usually successful in his examination of the influence national movements had on local conditions. With the Knights of Labor and the Populists, Lee skillfully demonstrates how their challenge to industrial capitalism played itself out in the “Sunflower” state. Particularly insightful is Lee’s focus on the political impact that the Populists had on governmental policies and law in Kansas. The Populists left a legacy of reforms in the interests of working people in the state through improved mine safety, challenges to child labor, and advances in the eight-hour day movement. Unfortunately, less successful is his examination of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in Kansas. Hampering Lee’s analysis is his view that farm labor was not an integral part of the history of wage earners in the state. I fundamentally disagree with him on this point; wage labor is wage labor regardless of whether it takes place on a farm or in a factory. Although Lee tries to chart the history of the IWW in the state, by neglecting to investigate farm labor fully, his analysis comes up short. However, this is a minor flaw in an otherwise fine book, for Lee quickly recovers in a subsequent chapter with a dramatic treatment of a showdown in the coal industry between Governor Henry J. Allen and District 14 president Alexander Howat of the United Mine Workers.

In the end, it is with regard to the economic, social, and political changes in Kansas as the twentieth century wore on that the book is most astute as a regional study of national trends. Lee expertly weaves the history of the Great Depression and New Deal reforms in terms of significant effects on working-class life and on changing governmental policies in Kansas. Even though women and African American workers play a small role in his early examination of the state’s labor history, his incorporation of their economic experiences and agency during the strike-prone 1930s and the plethora of wartime employment more than makes up for the earlier deficiency. Probably the most important chapter

in Lee's study is "Farmer against Laborer," in which the author deals with a major problem in twentieth-century labor history that carries over into the current century: the failure of the movement to build upon or even advance its role in the American economy after the immediate postwar period. Although this is a national issue, Lee explains how it has played out in a largely agrarian state with a voting constituency that truly did not understand or perhaps even care to understand the necessity of economic democracy in the workplace.

GREG HALL

Western Illinois University

RICHARD J. ORSI. *Sunset Limited: The Southern Pacific Railroad and the Development of the American West, 1850–1930*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2005. Pp. xxii, 615. \$29.95.

Richard J. Orsi's book is the story of the Southern Pacific Railroad's substantial efforts to promote agriculture, agricultural land ownership, water resources, renewable forestry, and conservation in the West, particularly in California. The title derives from the name of its famous passenger train, the *Sunset Limited*, which ran from San Francisco to New Orleans by way of Los Angeles, El Paso, San Antonio, and Houston.

Orsi suggests that most of our impressions of the Southern Pacific were shaped by Frank Norris's 1901 novel *The Octopus*, which portrayed it as a soulless evil bent on keeping the West in bondage. The Southern Pacific made plenty of public and private enemies in whose interest it was to perpetuate that image. But we always knew California became a desirable destination for settlers after the railroad was built, when it was supposedly at its pinnacle of dastardliness. We always knew California became an economic success because of the markets the railroad opened.

The railroad's owners perceived early that the mineral traffic it originally hauled was going to give out; then what would it do? It would develop agriculture. William H. Mills, its chief land agent from 1883 to 1907, directed the sale of railroad land in small lots as soon as proper water and transportation infrastructure were in place. The railroad maintained small plots at its desert stations to demonstrate the fig, grape, melon, date, alfalfa, and winter vegetable crops that could be grown on the desert with irrigation. Mills directed the railroad's promotion of agriculture with farm demonstration trains, teaming first with the California College of Agriculture and then with other land grant institutions. Before there were public agencies to do so, the railroad maintained weather stations and monitored soil moisture for its own needs but passed this information on to farmers for whom it was invaluable. Southern Pacific helped market crops by promoting California produce in the East and in Europe, usually sponsoring a more extensive presence at world's fairs than the state of California itself. It invested heavily in equipment to deliver these crops, first in unrefrigerated cars running at passenger train speeds and then in in-

sulated refrigerator cars which required icing facilities across the country. By the 1920s, hundreds of refrigerator cars a day were dispatched eastward filled with cantaloupes and oranges, among other things, dramatically changing the American diet by making these once exotic treats affordable.

In an age when there were no public bodies to provide water, the railroad found its own because steam locomotives needed a lot. It was the railroad that searched for and found artesian wells that made agriculture in the San Joaquin Valley possible. Eventually it would get out of the water business, but it built the original infrastructure for irrigation. Most famously, it took over the failed California Development Company after its flimsy sluice gates broke and the Colorado River threatened to flood the below-sea-level Imperial Valley. The railroad built the levees that rescued the valley from being reclaimed by the Gulf of California. It then improved and expanded irrigation in the valley before turning it over to a public body to become the largest and most successful irrigation project in the world.

The Southern Pacific had mixed motives to promote conservation in general. Its rail lines cut a swath of denuded land because it did not want its trains engulfed by forest fires, but it also pioneered fighting forest fires with tanker trains. It provided markets for timber and so was the handmaiden of logging that devastated the forest, but it eventually came to work with the National Forest Service to reforest the land and plan for sustainable timbering. It promoted western natural beauty as an attraction for tourists to fill its passenger trains. Its imprint of resorts and golf courses is still visible along the Pacific coast, where it built its famous Coast Line without benefit of land grants primarily as a passenger carrier. It teamed with John Muir and the Sierra Club to lobby for the creation of Yosemite National Park.

This is not a corporate history of the Southern Pacific, and Orsi does not intend it as a hagiography. The railroad was a private enterprise accountable mostly to itself and acted in its own interest as it saw that interest. That should surprise no one. What we learn from Orsi's work is that the railroad's interest often coincided with a broad public interest and long-range planning for the wise use of land and resources. He documents the positive contributions of a mighty corporate presence. This is an important book, well written and extensively documented, a work of profound revisionism for western history, agricultural history, natural history, and business history.

RICHARD SAUNDERS, JR.
Clemson University

ANDREW C. ISENBERG. *Mining California: An Ecological History*. New York: Hill and Wang. 2005. Pp. 242. \$27.00.

Andrew C. Isenberg's book consists of five case studies of the relationship between industry and the environ-

ment in nineteenth-century California. The first chapter looks at the impact of hydraulic mining on the rivers, farms, and towns of the Sacramento Valley from the 1850s into the 1880s. Mines in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada polluted rivers, blanketed farms with silt, choked the channels of the Sacramento River and its tributaries with debris, and threatened Marysville and Sacramento with floods. Chapter two discusses Sacramento's efforts at levee building and flood control during the 1850s and 1860s. The first levee was erected following the great flood of 1850. Chapter three examines the logging industry in the coastal redwood forests around Humboldt Bay, in far northern California, during the 1850s through the 1880s. Chapter four focuses on cattle ranching in southern California and the impact of drought on its rapid decline, particularly in the middle of the 1860s. The final chapter explores one of the most famous white-Indian conflicts in the West, the Modoc War of 1872–1873, which occurred near the border of California and Oregon. Isenberg considers it part of a transnational process of “cultural interaction” that resembled the enclosure movement in England.

The book proclaims that “in their exploitation of natural resources, California and the West exemplified industrializing America” (p. 16). Even cattle ranching and wheat farming took on the trappings of the new industrial order as ranches became “vast estates staffed by wage laborers” or “industrial cowboys” (pp. 102, 129). Capitalism in nineteenth-century California, according to Isenberg, has been misunderstood. While historians of the West generally portray the frontier as a place of plunder, where short-term profits took precedence over long-term planning, from the beginning capitalists in the Golden State were more interested in making “the extraction of resources regular and predictable” than in securing the largest gain in the shortest time (pp. 19–20, 51).

Each of the chapters is well written and instructive, and it is useful to have these important stories gathered under one cover. But taken as a whole, the book falls short of the originality and thoughtfulness of Isenberg's widely praised *The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History* (2000). As a synthesis, too much of the secondary literature has been ignored or neglected, too many themes are undeveloped, and too many interpretations are forced. For example, while the first two chapters are devoted to hydraulic mining and flood control, neither the text nor the bibliography mention the leading history of water in California, Norris Hundley's *The Great Thirst: California and Water, 1770s–1990s* (2001), or the most significant study of flood control in the Sacramento Valley, Robert Kelley's *Battling the Inland Sea: American Political Culture, Public Policy, and the Sacramento Valley, 1850–1986* (1989). Similar criticisms can be made of the other chapters.

The book is also filled with erroneous facts and unsubstantiated assertions. For example, the land grant to John Sutter that contained Sacramento and much of the Sacramento Valley was made in 1841, not 1838 (p. 53). Indeed, Sutter did not arrive in California until 1839.

Moreover, the first levee constructed in Sacramento in 1850 was not a popular policy that legitimized the city's government, as the author claims (pp. 68, 74). Quite to the contrary, the taxes needed to pay for the embankment fell heavily on improved property downtown, and those taxes were opposed by many of the city's businessmen. The levee system became a major source of contention in city politics, not a source of unity. And the claim that southern California's Mexican land claims were essentially settled by the Land Commission that sat between 1852 and 1856 (pp. 105–106) misses the well-known fact that most Mexican claims were also reviewed by the federal district courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, the adjudication of titles lasted for decades after the Land Commission disbanded, and the legal controversy over the survey of grants after they had been approved by the courts was as protracted as the conflict over the titles themselves. Equally important, many of the book's provocative themes and arguments are stated but poorly developed. Chapter four, “Gambling on the Grassland: Kinship, Capital, and Ecology in Southern California,” explores neither kinship nor capital at any length. Similarly, while the book is subtitled “an ecological history,” it focuses far more on industry than ecology. Finally, the assertion that capitalism in California was a search for order and a rational and sustainable economy, rather than the instrument of plunder, seems contradicted by much of the evidence presented in the chapters on hydraulic mining and lumbering.

This book promises more than it delivers, in part because so much is known about the environment and economy of the Golden State. From Frank Norris's *The Octopus* (1901), to Carey McWilliams's *Factories in the Fields* (1939), to Raymond Dasman's *The Destruction of California* (1965)—none of which is listed in the bibliography—writers and historians have pointed out that the Gold Rush, Mexican land grants, the state's relative isolation and other features of its early history resulted in a highly urbanized population and a highly industrialized economy. Four decades have passed since Dasman published his classic work, and many scholars have further enriched our understanding of California's history and ecology. Any synthesis that fails to consider so much of this rich literature is bound to be disappointing.

DONALD J. PISANI
University of Oklahoma

DYDIA DELYSER. *Ramona Memories: Tourism and the Shaping of Southern California*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press in cooperation with the Center for American Places, Santa Fe, N. Mex. 2005. Pp. xxiii, 256. Cloth \$56.95, paper \$18.95.

In 1884, Helen Hunt Jackson published *Ramona*, a novel that became an instant and enduring bestseller with its romantic portrayal of a young mixed-blood Native American heroine and her Indian lover. Already a successful writer of poetry, sentimental fiction, domes-

tic advice books, and travel narratives, Jackson changed gears late in her career to focus on the forcible dispossession of indigenous peoples from their homelands. After trying her hand at political tracts and letters to the editor, she returned to fiction, crafting a melodramatic story of the orphan Ramona, ward to the sinister Señora Moreno, who has kept the girl's racial heritage from her. Ramona elopes with the Indian hero Alessandro, and the two flee from the brutal encroachments of white settlers before coming to a tragic end.

Ramona has remained in print, and popular, since its initial publication; it has spawned several film versions and countless "Ramona" trinkets and products. It did not, however, begin receiving sustained academic attention until the 1980s, when the Modoc author Michael Dorris issued a new paperback edition through Signet Classics. Since then, scholars have written a great deal about Jackson's life and commitment to Native American issues; about the novel's impact on United States Indian policy; and about its construction of gender, nation, and ethnicity. But while *Ramona* fans have long known of one of the book's biggest legacies—the creation of a southern California tourist industry—no one has yet written a comprehensive study of the numerous places and people that have been enthusiastically sought out and invested with meaning as those of the "real" Ramona. Dydia DeLyser's book thus fills a critical gap, not only in scholarship on *Ramona*, but in the histories of American regionalism and tourism more generally.

As DeLyser explains, the publication of *Ramona* converged neatly with a range of forces—the immense popularity of regional fiction, a national push toward more domestic tourism, the expansion of railroads into the West, and a surge in California boosterism and real estate development—that helped create the conditions for a Ramona craze. Readers (including some ironic and famous ones, like General Custer's widow) flocked to southern California in hopes of meeting the prototypes for Jackson's characters, visiting several locations that were ostensibly the settings for the novel's events.

DeLyser organizes her study around several locations: the two large estates—Rancho Camulos in Ventura County, and Rancho Guajome in San Diego County—that have historically vied for the distinction of being "Ramona's home"; the Estudillo adobe in Old Town San Diego, which promoted itself as "Ramona's Marriage Place"; and the shorter-lived attraction of "Ramona's Birthplace," a tiny house located near the Mission San Gabriel. Additional chapters discuss some of the women who were either marketed, or marketed themselves, as "the real Ramona"; and the popular Ramona Pageant, which began in the town of Hemet, California, in 1923 and continues to this day. In all of these, DeLyser examines the intermingling of fact and fiction to show how "the practices of tourists . . . literally helped shape southern California's landscape and, along with it, social memory in the region" (p. 182).

Up until this point, many professional historians (for example, Mike Davis, Carey McWilliams, and Kevin

Starr) have disparaged such sites, and the people who went to them, as participating in the creation of a "fantasy" heritage, one in which a picturesque landscape dotted with crumbling missions allows Americans to mourn the "inevitable" passing of indigenous people, as well as the demise of the haughty Californios who first colonized Native lands. DeLyser's book clearly wants to counter these arguments, but it does not really engage them directly; it tends to assert that various tourist sites became "meaningful" for people without articulating precisely what those meanings might be. Readers looking for fresh interpretations of the cultural work of late nineteenth-century tourism, or for new investigations of the construction of the American West, may find themselves disappointed. But readers looking for an abundance of new information about *Ramona* and about some of the locations to which Jackson's fans have traveled will not be. DeLyser's research is scrupulous; she has combed through local archives, postcard collections, old newspaper clippings, and sheet music. And she has worked closely with the local historians and librarians who have for so long been careful stewards of Jackson's legacy. In lucid and engaging prose, with a host of fascinating images, the book offers a unique compendium of stories and images of personalities and material culture spawned by this important nineteenth-century novel.

SIOBHAN SENIER

University of New Hampshire

TOMAS JAEHN. *Germans in the Southwest, 1850–1920*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 242. \$24.95.

A skeptical reader opening Tomas Jaehn's study of Germans in New Mexico might wonder what of significance it could possibly tell us, either about Germans or New Mexico. The territory's German immigrants, numbering just above a thousand in 1900, formed a very small group. How could they speak to the experience of most German Americans, who were concentrated in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic regions, or to the nature of ethnicity in the Southwest, shaped as it was by conflict among Indians, native-born Hispanos, and arriving Anglo-Americans?

Yet precisely because of its combination of regional setting and ethnic group, this book illuminates larger historical processes, from the ways a region can shape ethnic identity to the emergence of "Anglos." If Jaehn does not always pursue such matters as far as one might wish, his concise, painstakingly researched monograph lays important groundwork for further investigation of them.

Jaehn examines the German experience of settlement and acculturation from the American conquest of the 1840s to the aftermath of statehood in the 1910s. Despite a constricted source base—New Mexico had no German-language newspaper during this period—Jaehn has ferreted out a wide range of sources, including census returns, individuals' papers, and oral histo-

ries. His opening chapter explores the images of New Mexico that German-language fiction and travel writing offered to readers and potential immigrants. This literature, which largely ignored the territory's Hispanic majority, purveyed a romanticized view with little to encourage German immigration.

Chapter two employs census data to create a statistical profile of German immigrants and their children between 1850 and 1920. Jaehn provides a detailed account of occupational structure, portraying a German workforce dominated by skilled workers and merchants. Perhaps most intriguing is his analysis of marriage patterns. In the territory's early decades, German men frequently married Hispanic women; up to two-thirds of German grooms chose Hispanic brides. Such marriages fell off after 1880, however, so that by 1910, only seven percent of all Germans took a Hispanic spouse. Jaehn argues that such figures suggest immigrant German men in the early years "internalized the Hispanic culture rather than becoming acculturated to the Anglo-American culture" (p. 33). The chapter's quantitative analyses are marred only by a lack of information about their methodology. From his text and charts, one can gather that Jaehn, rather than resort to sampling, has counted every German in the surviving federal manuscript censuses for New Mexico from 1850 to 1920. This approach, however, should have been spelled out.

Subsequent chapters depict a population of first and second-generation German immigrants that was politically apathetic yet largely successful economically—in fact, that helped to bring extractive capitalism to New Mexico. This narrative leads into the book's most interesting chapter, which argues that the territory's Germans did not establish formal ethnic institutions until the 1870s and after. Only then did they found the social clubs, singing groups, and other associations that had already become a hallmark of the German Midwest and Mid-Atlantic. Jaehn ties this development to the large-scale influx of Anglo-American settlers, especially with the arrival of the railroad by the 1880s. Drawing on Frederick Luebke's work on the Midwest, Jaehn argues that such ethnic organizing was in part a defensive reaction to Anglo-American pressures for cultural conformity. Before the 1870s, Germans did not create ethnic associations because—and this is Jaehn's most intriguing argument—the territory's Hispanic culture meant they did not have to. Indeed, the "existing social and cultural order of New Mexico Hispanics paralleled German societal values" (p. 111) in everything from town design to public sociability, offering German newcomers far more cultural freedom than Anglo America did. Germans seeking economic advantage abandoned that freedom in the late nineteenth century when they gravitated toward new Anglo-American settlements. There, they felt compelled to build ethnic defenses against Anglo-Americanization.

These findings are important. They demonstrate the impact of regional distinctiveness on ethnicity, for the trajectory Jaehn describes—from a kind of assimilation

to ethnic community-building—is the reverse of that traced by historians of the German Midwest and Mid-Atlantic. At the same time, Jaehn charts an increasing social integration among Germans and Anglo-Americans. By the early twentieth century, and despite their new institutions and an anti-German backlash during World War I, Germans had become "part of the majority Anglo culture" (p. 137). One wishes Jaehn had explored that process further, for it could provide a unique window onto the construction of "Anglo" as a southwestern category. Here, he could have engaged an emerging literature on identity formation in New Mexico, including recent work by Charles Montgomery and John Nieto-Phillips on the rise of a "Spanish-American" identity. Such wishes, however, testify to the richness of Jaehn's book. It deserves a wide audience among scholars interested in ethnicity, region, and the interplay between them.

RUSSELL A. KAZAL
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KATHERINE G. AIKEN. *Idaho's Bunker Hill: The Rise and Fall of a Great Mining Company, 1885–1981*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2005. Pp. xix, 284. \$29.95.

This study is a multifaceted account of the rise and fall of the Bunker Hill mining company, skillfully combining business, labor, and environmental history. As legend has it, the original Bunker Hill mining claim was discovered in 1885, thanks to prospector Noah Kellogg's donkey, who inadvertently led him to a rich vein of silver and lead. After a rousing court battle over competing claims, the Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining and Concentrating Company was incorporated in 1887. It quickly attracted investors, including William Crocker of California and Cyrus McCormick of Chicago. Under the leadership of engineers Frederick Bradley and Stanley Easton, the company became the leading firm in the Coeur d'Alene mining field of northern Idaho and a national leader in lead, zinc, and silver production. By the 1950s, Bunker Hill attained full vertical integration and boasted the biggest lead smelter in the world. After a Texas-based energy corporation bought Bunker Hill as part of a hostile takeover in 1968, a combination of competitive pressures, falling metals prices, and ongoing environmental lawsuits led to the final closing of the mine and smelter complex in 1981.

Facing deskilling, downward pressure on wages, and dangerous and unhealthy working conditions, Bunker Hill's largely Irish American workers organized under the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) starting in the 1890s and took part in the 1899 strike that saw the Bunker Hill mill dynamited and striking workers placed in stockades. Bunker Hill managers sought to stave off further union activity with a combination of blacklists, spying, and welfare measures—including a company union and questionable medical treatments for lead poisoning. It was not until World War II that the

smelter and mine were fully organized by the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (Mine-Mill). Women began to enter the company workforce and assume leadership roles in the union, despite resentment from male coworkers and managers alike. In the postwar period, Mine-Mill fought against a fierce red-baiting campaign, and, in the course of the 1960 strike, it lost out to a conservative company union that eventually merged with Mine-Mill's rival, the United Steel Workers of America.

Although the book devotes substantial attention to labor, it is essentially a business history, drawing extensively on newly available company records to tell the story of Bunker Hill from the perspective of its owners and managers. In the early years, Bradley and Easton faced a raft of challenges to making Bunker Hill profitable: competing mining claims, the need for a secure and cheap means of smelting ore and for adequate supplies of electricity, inadequate tariffs to restrict imports of lower priced lead, and, of course, growing labor costs. Katherine G. Aiken is impressed with the results: "the two mining engineers are first-rate examples of the application of scientific methods to industry" (p. 71). Bunker Hill also confronted a mounting series of lawsuits from area farmers and town residents, who claimed that mill runoff and smelter smoke were hazardous to their lives and livelihoods. For decades, Bradley, Easton, and their successors responded by stonewalling and settling out of court when necessary. The issue intensified when a 1973 fire in a pollution control facility drastically raised lead levels in the community, leading to more lawsuits and the involvement of the newly formed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The conflict among the company, state officials, the EPA, Bunker Hill workers, and town residents over how to solve this problem is perhaps the most compelling part of Aiken's book.

In its treatment of environmental issues and its inclusion of women and gender identity, this volume certainly qualifies as "new western history." In comparison with Carlos Schwantes's overtly pro-company *Vision and Enterprise: Exploring the History of Phelps Dodge Corporation* (2000), Aiken provides a more objective and less romantic account. And yet Aiken's story would be enriched by a closer look at working-class community life such as Laurie Mercier's *Anaconda: Labor, Community and Culture* and *Montana's Smelter City* (2001) offers. Beyond a brief discussion of nativism and Irish workers, along with fleeting references in company records to "dagoes" and importing labor from San Francisco, for instance, there is precious little on the ethnic makeup of the workforce or the town. Moreover, why did the company's anti-big government rhetoric against tougher EPA standards make a stronger appeal than the workers' environmental and health concerns? The repeated claim that the resentment of outsiders, a theme of the older western history, "resonated" with Kellogg residents needs further support. Finally, the sharp irony of the Bunker Hill name—a pillar of the capitalist establishment named for a revolutionary bat-

tle combating rebellious workers—is surprisingly ignored by the author. All in all, however, this is a valuable examination of a major player in the history of western mining.

CARL R. WEINBERG
DePauw University

MICHAEL D. CLARK. *The American Discovery of Tradition, 1865–1942*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2005. Pp. ix, 268. \$44.95.

As intellectual historians continue to examine historical consciousness in post-Civil War U.S. culture, Michael D. Clark's book provides a high standard of erudition, eloquence, and complexity regarding the surprising staying power of the past within American modernity. The study opens by distinguishing tradition from its allied concepts. "Antimodernism," T. J. Jackson Lears's term for the *fin de siècle* reflex against bourgeois reason and refinement, is both broader than tradition and more concerned with reclaiming intense authentic experience than with calibrating the present with preestablished beliefs and processes; heritage, far more than tradition, involves a therapeutic effort to recreate the past in celebration and confirmation of a certain individual or group identity; and custom transmits workaday types of behavior or practice. Tradition, by sociologist Edward A. Ross's definition, is a "way of thinking or believing." Tradition, for Clark, turns on a psychology, a state of mind open to enriching life with active appreciation of the past.

Clark pursues this conceptualization of tradition through the work of five U.S. intellectuals born between the 1840s and 1860s. John Fiske oriented his eclectic philosophy and popular histories around an ethnocentric commitment to the democratic ethos of Anglo-American New England; the town meeting and the federalist political system, in particular, extended Teutonic institutions into new space and time—a dynamic that would spread further through U.S. empire. In contrast, Virginia historians Philip Alexander Bruce and Lyon Gardiner Tyler saw the Old Dominion as the truest extension of English liberty; and, eager to honor the state's "Americanness," the two writers glossed over secession while heralding Robert E. Lee as a national hero and the embodiment of the cavalier ideal. Architect and author Ralph Adams Cram fixed upon medieval art and architecture in construing a modernist sensibility. Gothic architecture should be appreciated not only for its spiritual and aesthetic accomplishment, he urged, but also for its manifestation of true democracy: a social system whose vitality is to be contrasted with the "reign of mediocrity" found in the contemporary United States' flattening compulsion toward majority rule and universal suffrage. As reactionary conservatism does run through these figures' worldviews, Clark criticizes the implications of their embrace of tradition while also cultivating objective appreciation for their good faith effort to study the past and offer it up as a living basis for progress and fulfillment.

Clark's most accomplished chapter focuses on the University of Michigan social scientist Charles H. Cooley. An underappreciated pioneer of U.S. sociology, Cooley valued tradition far more than Lester Ward, Ross, Franklin Henry Giddings, or his other progressive colleagues. Tradition fed the "social self," Cooley's term for bridging the putative divide between the individual and society or, as he referred to it, the "I and We." As a student of John Dewey, Cooley believed that the self meant nothing apart from community and a multiplicity of social relations. Cooley developed an instrumental appreciation of tradition. It buffered individuals from atavistic traits of "immediate human nature." Tradition sustained the "primary groups" of family and locality, which, in turn, provided the foundation for social consciousness. Tradition, for Cooley, "played a doubly pragmatic role," as Clark elaborates: having first emerged to "meet practical needs, it continued to provide resources for solving practical problems and constructing a better society; and when so employed it pointed beyond itself to enduring and even transcendent verities which made the universe 'work'" (p. 203).

Among the virtues of Clark's book is his practice of setting intellectual biography within wide and important circles of discourse and culture: professional and popular history, New England and New South regionalism, Gothic architecture, art criticism, modernism, neo-medievalism, Anglo-Catholicism, community studies, and cross-Atlantic academic sociology are all covered with intelligent summary and analysis. Clark pays attention to Charles Darwin and evolutionary theory, although the interface between this massive dimension of historicist thought and tradition in modern America warrants further study. A real strength of the work is Clark's psychologically adept profiles of the five mid-level intellectuals. There is little idiosyncrasy in Clark's specificity, however. And placed carefully around the edges of the discussion is Clark's own commitment to a type of tradition centered "not on a narrowness of sympathy or fear of novelty but on a sense of the accumulating plenitude of human experience and of the connectedness of the peoples and generations from whose lives that experience arises" (p. 24). Clark identifies closely with Cooley's instrumentalism. In fact, a pragmatist sensibility emerges in his book's conclusion. Acknowledging postmodern dissolution of the Enlightenment's opposition of reason to tradition, Clark cites the philosopher Richard Rorty's contention that ethnocentricity can never be fully transcended. Knowledge, truth, and progressive ideals are products of particular historical context; the better we understand from whence they came the more effectively we can decide on their value today.

JOHN PETTEGREW
Lehigh University

JOYCE W. WARREN. *Women, Money, and the Law: Nineteenth-Century Fiction, Gender, and the Courts*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 373. \$44.95.

Joyce W. Warren's goal in this ambitious book is to complicate our understanding of the notorious dependence of nineteenth-century American women by demonstrating a very different reality. Although Warren concedes that scholars have been rethinking the cult of domesticity and the gendered separation of spheres for some time, she insists that they have not realized the extent to which women were engaged in economic pursuits. Despite the rhetorical separation of spheres and all the proscriptions reducing women to utter subjection, a significant portion, including middle-class women, argues Warren, earned their own money or were directly involved in monetary pursuits.

How does she advance this argument? By drawing on a stunning array of sources, which include the discarded records of the New York Supreme Court, rescued by Leo Hershkowitz and donated to Hofstra University. These records come from a New York City court of original jurisdiction where all sorts of civil and largely economic matters were adjudicated, where women regularly appeared as plaintiffs and defendants, and where divorce suits were tried. Claiming to have read more than 2,500 of these uncatalogued cases running from 1845 to 1875 and paralleling the married women's property acts, Warren interweaves them with a variety of nonlegal sources. After devoting one chapter to a single divorce case, she juxtaposes chapters based on a larger sampling of legal records with those devoted to female novelists and feminist reformers. At the core of her analysis is a series of stories, both legal and fictional, that collectively provide a counternarrative to "the dominant discourse."

The promise of this approach, which owes much to the burgeoning law and literature movement, is best realized in a chapter that compares the thematic concerns of five female novelists with the five male writers taken up by F. O. Matthiessen in *American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman* (1941). When Warren sets Susan Warner, E.D.E.N. Southworth, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Maria Cummins, and Fanny Fern against the likes of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, or Walt Whitman, she finds a gritty realism in the women in contrast to a soaring idealism in the men. It was those "scribbling women," she claims, those sentimental novelists whose success Nathaniel Hawthorne famously envied and disparaged, who truly understood the economic tensions and profound failings of American democracy. In their concern with economic survival, the female authors not only subverted the cult of dependency but also set the stage for American realism, a genre literary critics traditionally locate later in the century.

Readers familiar with these popular novelists may quibble with some of Warren's claims, as in her reading of the marital reconciliation at the conclusion of Southworth's *The Deserted Wife* (1850) or her assertion that economics is the overarching feature of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1852), but her redefinition of sentimental fiction as proto-realism is intriguing. Welcome, too, is her chapter on works by African American writers (includ-

ing the recently discovered *Bondswoman's Narrative*), in which Warren demonstrates how female authors of color focused on economic challenges with a far greater intensity and a far more acute grasp of reality than their illustrious white male counterparts.

While the strength of this books lies in Warren's analysis of female writers, her treatment of the court records is unsatisfying. As she notes, court cases can yield particularities, and in so doing, permit us to see how real women maneuvered within legal and economic constraints. Yet because Warren never deals with her cases systematically other than to divide them into women as plaintiffs, women as defendants, and women in divorces, the reader is left with the sense that her narratives were cherry-picked to support her thesis. Yes, it is worth knowing that a woman would haggle over her physician's fee during childbirth or foreclose aggressively on an overdue mortgage, but with so many stories, there is little coherence, and it is impossible to draw any general conclusions. Warren seems unfamiliar with the scholarly models for addressing women in court records more methodically, and missing also from her citations are some of the most elegant models for legal storytelling. Michael Grossberg's braided narrative in *A Judgment for Solomon: The D'Hauteville Case and Legal Experience in Antebellum America* (1996) is a striking omission from a book that deals extensively with divorce.

Warren's designation of her female novelists as the true critics of democratic culture who embodied the vanguard of American realism will interest and provoke literary scholars, but there is little that is new here for historians. In the end, the most serious problem may be analytical. Warren never reframes the cult of domesticity; she simply outlines its sway in public discourse and then tells us hundreds of stories that belie it.

NORMA BASCH,
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Rutgers University

MARTHA GARDNER. *The Qualities of a Citizen: Women, Immigration, and Citizenship, 1870–1965*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 271. \$35.00.

In this book, Martha Gardner begins with the premise that gender and race were centrally important to how U.S. immigration and naturalization laws were applied to women from 1870 to 1965. While many historians before Gardner have made similar arguments, her study stands out in its comprehensive analysis of both gender and race across a broad range of immigration policies and immigrant groups.

Gardner's primary argument is threefold. First, she argues that immigration and naturalization laws created a "system of belonging and not belonging" (p. 3). Where immigrant women fit within this system was defined by their work, sexuality, roles in the family, and race. Second, Gardner points out that immigration and naturalization laws played different but complementary roles that reinforced each other. Immigration laws that

determined not only who could enter but under what conditions, when, and where "protected a racially and sexually segmented labor force and tied women's role in the nation to their domestic responsibilities in the American home" (p. 3). Naturalization laws defined the "civic rights of aliens, immigrants, residents, and nationals," and in doing so, they "tied race and gender to shifting understandings of the significance of moral character, family responsibility, and personal independence to citizenship" (p. 3). Third, Gardner emphasizes that immigrants, returning citizens, and would-be Americans contested the law, "flexed" it when they could, and "broke it when they felt they must" in order to enter the country or become members of the nation. U.S. ports of entry were sites of contestation where the meanings and application of immigration law were challenged and reinterpreted by a number of interested parties, including women immigrants, immigration officials, federal judges, and social service providers.

The book is organized into three main sections. Part one, "Wives, Mothers, and Maids," examines the gendering of women immigrants in U.S. immigration policy from the 1870s to the 1920s. In this era of derivative citizenship, the admissibility of women immigrants was increasingly measured by racialized and sexualized understandings that equated marriage with morality (and admissibility) vs. independence with welfare (and exclusion). Part two, "Citizens, Resident, and Non-Americans," considers how the formal recognition of women's independent citizenship in the 1920s affected women immigrants and native-born women of color. Gardner demonstrates that this period, which saw the "expansion of suffrage and citizenship rights for some women was [also] marked as firmly by the increased exclusion and restriction of others" (p. 139). Asian American and nonwhite (or nonblack) women who married men ineligible for citizenship, for example, lost their own U.S. citizenship status under the Cable Act of 1922. Those whose marriages ended could not regain their citizenship if they themselves were racially ineligible for citizenship. Part three, "Marriage, Family, and the Law," suggests that post-World War II reforms in immigration law laid the foundation for a new gender system in immigration. Family reunification was celebrated while gays, lesbians, and children born out of wedlock were excluded.

Drawing upon an impressive and extremely rich body of sources, including immigration files, court cases, oral histories, and social welfare organization records, Gardner pulls together numerous strands of immigration history that have previously been treated separately. She connects the history of exclusion and restriction of Asian women labeled as prostitutes in the 1870s with Latina and European women charged with being likely public charges in the 1900s, mixed-race racial outsiders in the 1920s, and gay men and lesbians in the 1950s and 1960s. Another significant strength of the book is its attention to both immigration and naturalization laws and their effects on immigrant women.

The sheer breadth of the book is staggering. But it is

also this breadth that contributes to a weakness. There is at times a lack of coherence in how everything relates, both in terms of the various policies affecting multiple groups at the same time as well as how earlier policies and their attendant racialized and sexualized systems relate to later developments in immigration and naturalization law. Regional and local contexts in immigration are also glossed over in an attempt to connect the analysis within a national and comparative ethnic framework. For example, Gardner's rich sources allow us to catch glimpses of immigration law at work around the country: San Francisco, New York, the U.S.-Mexico border, Honolulu. But while we know that each one of these sites is steeped in unique regional racial landscapes and histories, we unfortunately learn little about these particularities.

Still, the book remains a most impressive piece of scholarship. As I write this review, federal and state politicians are mired in the latest immigration debate. Gardner's work reminds us that while sex and race differentials have been erased in immigration law, they still matter greatly. And as we chart a future course for our nation, this "history of the effort to belong" will be an important guide (p. 8).

ERIKA LEE
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BRIAN DONOVAN. *White Slave Crusades: Race, Gender, and Anti-Vice Activism*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2006. Pp. x, 186. \$30.00.

This book examines the numerous and varied white slavery claims of 1887–1917 for the purpose of seeing how the variations in those stories contributed to the changing meanings of race and gender. Written by a sociologist, the text is remarkably free of jargon. It fits most easily under the rubric of intellectual history.

Brian Donovan describes the white slavery discourse with its variations on the respective roles of individual morality, low wages, physical coercion, and trickery as causes of American female prostitution. He then analyzes the significance of those positions for race and gender issues of the day. Donovan looks closely at the specific genre of "white slavery narratives," but he also analyzes speeches, interviews, and other writing, and covers all the major reformers—Frances Willard, Katharine Bushnell, William T. Stead, George Kibbe Turner, Ernest Bell, Jane Addams, Clifford G. Roe, James Bronson Reynolds, and Donaldina Cameron—as well as lesser players. Always, however, the deeper point is to go beyond the level of prostitution and reform to look at the impact of the discourse on race and gender. Donovan writes that "white slavery narratives and anti-vice activism performed the ideological work necessary for gender and racial formation . . . Crusades against white slavery helped build racial hierarchies by emphasizing moral and sexual differences between Anglo-Saxons or native-born whites on one hand and new European immigrants, Chinese, and African Americans on the other" (p. 129).

A major conceptual difficulty here, and one that inures in almost all intellectual history, is that Donovan examines a very small and elite group of reformers. That is not a matter of criticism. The nine individuals listed above, plus a handful of others, originated all the serious thought about prostitution in the Progressive era. One has to look to them. However, the ideas of an elite few may or may not have congruency with the thoughts of the American masses, who, in the last analysis, fashion the hegemonic racial views and gender roles. Perhaps a better way to study the impact of varying ideas would be to look at newspaper editorials of the period, not just *The New York Times*, but small-town papers as well. The reformers had markedly different ideas about prostitution and its relation to morality, economics, or force, and from those causal factors to notions about race and gender. Which were most frequently and favorably commended, which were most frequently criticized? That approach would be absolutely inapposite today, when public opinion is formed by more disparate sources ranging from television channels to computer blogs. Yet in the Progressive period the masses still read newspapers and to a large extent relied on editorials in local newspapers for their opinions.

One of the most interesting aspects of Donovan's work is his treatment of the "moral panic" theory advanced by some historians to explain the very general public concern, ca. 1907–1912, amounting almost to hysteria, over alleged coercive prostitution and enslaved conditions. The "moral panic" theory, best advanced by Mark Thomas Connelly, is that white slavery hysteria was caused by Progressive-era angst over rampant urbanization and the decline of the small town, increasing immigration by a new set of southern and eastern Europeans thought to be inassimilable, and the changing roles of women, especially their unchaperoned movement to the cities. It is only fair to say that Donovan correctly notes that this reviewer is one of the proponents of the "moral panic" theory (pp. 151–152, n. 19).

Donovan rejects this. "The crusades against white slavery cannot be viewed solely as an outcry against perceived urban ills, and likewise, white slavery narratives were more than a form of lurid entertainment or creative expression" (p. 133). In explaining why the "moral panic" approach should be rejected, Donovan retreats into sociological jargon. Immediately following a statement that too much scholarship "clings" to a theory that the "white slave crusades merely index something deeper and realer," he writes: "Just as we should view gender and racial group-making as linked processes, we should adopt a dialectical view of meaning-making and structure. As others have previously noted, the theoretical opposition between structure and culture is no longer useful or sustainable" (p. 133, citing sociological references).

Judging from the text itself, it seems that Donovan advances a single primary reason to reject the "white slavery" panic as merely responsive to larger social

pressures. It is that the reformers intended their remarks about prostitution to establish racial and gender norms, that this was deliberate manipulation: "reformers used white slavery narratives to shape the meaning of race and gender" (p. 16) and "Reformers used white slavery stories to make arguments about the moral character and proper distance between racial groups" (p. 129). That seems almost an insult to these people. Although necessarily informed by the racial and gender attitudes of their day, reformers, however misguided their views, were either out for publicity or sincerely concerned about prostitution, or both. To claim that they had hidden agendas outside the obvious requires more evidence than to point out that the implications of their discourse touched on race and gender.

Donovan's book is most helpful as a concise treatment, in one volume, of the differing approaches toward prostitution of the major reformers of the Progressive era. Secondarily it is useful for its analysis of the implications of these viewpoints on issues of gender and race. Beyond those two points, it is a bit speculative.

DAVID J. LANGUM, SR.
Samford University

SARAH W. TRACY. *Alcoholism in America: From Reconstruction to Prohibition*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2005. Pp. xxiii, 357. \$48.00.

Historians of alcohol and temperance have eagerly awaited the publication of Sarah W. Tracy's monograph on the medical treatment of alcoholic inebriety in its heyday between 1870 and 1920. While the book is based on Tracy's 1992 dissertation, it has benefited from substantial additional archival research and rewriting. The result is a meticulous and smart consideration of the significance of physicians' attempts to define excessive drinking as primarily a medical problem, and to develop inebriate asylums to treat it.

Fundamentally, this is a story of the failed attempt of a profession to coopt a social problem. With the rise of the temperance movement in the early nineteenth century, reformers had constructed homes in which inebriates could learn to live sober lives, benefiting from the fellowship of their fellow sufferers and the supervision and support of the reform minded. In the late nineteenth century, medical professionals, convinced that excessive drinking was a disease rather than merely a vice, dedicated themselves to establishing physician-run institutions to treat it under medical principles. They succeeded in opening many private asylums, and in convincing New York City, Connecticut, Minnesota, Iowa, and Massachusetts to establish publicly funded ones. Although these institutions differed from one to another, and changed significantly over time, they tended to require lengthy residence, during which inmates would rebuild their besotted manhood by performing outdoor manual labor, developing healthy leisure activities and a regular daily routine, practicing some form of religious observance, and interacting

closely with upright models of successful manhood like the asylum superintendent.

Even before federal prohibition sounded the death knell for these inebriate asylums less than half a century later, however, the authority that asylum physicians sought had largely eluded them. Partly, this was internal to the medical establishment itself: unable to come to a consensus on causes, symptoms, or treatment of inebriety, and, most devastatingly, unable to develop effective treatments, advocates of a medical view of inebriety made themselves vulnerable to competition from nonphysicians like female temperance reformers and entrepreneurs offering proprietary cures. Drinkers themselves, who demanded control over the length and conditions of their asylum stay as soon as they sobered up; their families, employers, and friends, who took an active interest in their cure and timely release; and politicians, who had their own ideas about how the asylums should be run and who were reluctant to provide public funds for them without evidence of their effectiveness all chiseled away at physicians' authority.

Tracy's book succeeds in the difficult task of integrating social history and the history of medicine. She has uncovered negotiations among physicians and inebriates, their families, and legislators, showing how such external pressures influenced medical theory and practice (p. 198). Although Tracy has some great examples of her physicians' frequent and vehement attempts to differentiate themselves from laypeople like "temperance ladies" (p. 79) and "quacks," she argues that medical professionals' theories and practices were not as different from those of laymen as has often been thought. Rather, medical approaches to inebriety were continuous with and complementary to moral and penal approaches. Referring to the progression from morally oriented "homes" for drinkers to physician-directed "asylums," Tracy argues, "Often . . . the changes taking place in treatment were more a matter of putting old wine in new bottles, of repackaging or emphasizing different elements of a fairly standard, holistic approach to reforming the inebriate" (p. 94).

Structurally, this book is an institutional history, with all of the benefits and challenges that this implies. Although it begins with two chapters providing a broader intellectual and cultural context for the asylums and ends with a lengthy chapter on inebriates' own responses to the medicalization of their drinking, the bulk of the book focuses on the evolution of the inebriate asylums themselves. Tracy has carefully mined institutional, legislative, and other sources for information on the politics, financial challenges, personnel issues, and scandals that shaped the asylums. Her reconstruction of the day-to-day life of the asylums, the hopes of and dilemmas faced by asylum superintendents, and the experiences of patients is impressive. At the same time, the details of the institutional histories sometimes divert the narrative from its larger arguments. The book also could have benefited from a somewhat richer contextualization. Tracy avoids discussion of the theoretical work on asylums, and although she evokes Progress-

sivism, she does not explore the potentially fascinating ways in which her story runs against the grain of conventional accounts of that movement.

Tracy's history of the inebriate asylum is an important contribution to the field of alcohol and temperance history. It should also gain the attention of those interested in the professionalization of medicine during these crucial decades: considering asylum superintendents' efforts to cement their authority as an unusual case of the failure of professional expansion gives a new angle from which to consider what made other professional claims so effective.

ELAINE FRANTZ PARSONS
Duquesne University

DANIEL ELI BURNSTEIN. *Next to Godliness: Confronting Dirt and Despair in Progressive Era New York City*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2006. Pp. x, 200. \$38.00.

In this slim, tightly written book, Daniel Eli Burnstein explores the Progressive-era reform philosophy that linked cleanliness, health, and morality. Using New York City's turn-of-the-century efforts to clean its streets as a case study, Burnstein argues that "progressives fashioned a comprehensive social vision that applied to practically all social problems" (p. 3). Contrary to many recent works concerning middle-class Progressive Era reformers, he makes the case that a seemingly conservative philosophy of uplift through environmental and moral improvement actually served to strengthen the social reform movement and, apparently, appreciably improved the lives of New York's teeming immigrant millions. In Burnstein's depiction, Progressive-era reformers may have had a "tendency toward paternalism and ethnocentrism" (p. 68), but their expansive view of government's obligation to take responsibility for the urban environment, public health, and the morality of an increasingly immigrant population made them admirable citizens.

The book consists of a brief introduction (perhaps overly brief, given the near absence of historiographical considerations), a brief conclusion, and four topical chapters that hang together mostly because of Burnstein's tight and frequently rearticulated thesis. The connections among the chapters seem all the more tenuous because the logic behind their order is not obvious. The first chapter describes the garbage workers' strike of 1907 in a clear, engaging narrative. Burnstein concludes that the "public's panicky reactions to the odors and filth of the garbage strike" (p. 15) revealed the ongoing relevance of an older public health philosophy that linked foul smells with disease and the strength of the connections between cleanliness and decency. However, the book's broader themes become clearer in the second chapter concerning the work of George E. Waring, Jr., who famously guided the city's Department of Street Cleaning in the late 1890s. Burnstein quickly and effectively tells Waring's story and then turns his attention to less well-known material, in-

cluding the development of new, restrictive policies concerning pushcarts.

Perhaps the best chapter concerns juvenile street cleaning leagues, started by Waring in 1895 and then continued by the Woman's Municipal League. The organization and operation of these leagues wonderfully illustrates Burnstein's themes. The reform philosophy's mingling of cleanliness, health, and morality is apparent, as is the centrality of women in urban reform and the importance of education to the broader reform mission. Through their work, Progressive women hoped to keep the streets clean and also to teach proper values to the children they employed, not through rote learning but through the children's independent realizations "that high levels of personal and civic sanitation would garner long-term benefits for themselves, their families, and the broader society" (pp. 120–121).

Much of the material in this book will be quite familiar to urban historians. Progressive-era sanitation is a surprisingly well-covered topic, and Burnstein has made ample use of Martin V. Melosi's recent *The Sanitary City: Urban Infrastructure in America from Colonial Times to the Present* (2000), Nancy Tomes's influential *The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women, and the Microbe in American Life* (1998), and John Duffy's seminal *The Sanitarians: A History of American Public Health* (1990), as well as many other important works. Burnstein might have given more credit to Paul Boyer's classic *Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820–1920* (1978), which so beautifully laid out how reformers connected urban environments to the morality of urban residents. All of this is to suggest that Burnstein's book nicely illustrates themes already well articulated in the literature of urban environmental history and Progressive-era reform but does little to stretch our understanding of these topics.

In his conclusion, Burnstein argues for the continuing utility of the Progressive-era reform philosophy. Its revival, he hopes, might broaden conservatives' ideas concerning social responsibility and remind us all of the moral foundations of an expanded governmental intervention in the urban environment. In making this claim, Burnstein clearly connects the immigrant youth of one hundred years ago with today's "rudderless children." Both, he implicitly argues, could benefit from the normative mission of middle-class reformers, who ask not "How can we help them?" but "How can we help them be more like us?" Burnstein also encourages readers to recognize that the distance between progressive and conservative philosophies is not nearly as great as many commentators claim. This message may have resonated in the Clinton era, when Burnstein first drafted this work, but today I suspect it might fall upon deaf ears.

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GWEN KAY. *Dying to be Beautiful: The Fight for Safe Cosmetics*. (Women, Gender, and Health.) Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 190. Cloth \$64.95, paper \$22.95, CD \$9.95.

From its catchy title to its concise epilogue, this book explores the fight for safe cosmetics in the United States leading up to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Gwen Kay lays the background by reviewing the original 1906 Food, Drink, and Drug legislation, its advocates, and its shortcomings, among which was the omission of cosmetics from Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation, not as an oversight but as one of many concessions the framers intended to rectify through amendment. During the 1920s and 1930s a phenomenal increase in cosmetic use, and its dangers, intensified the need for government supervision.

From 1933 to 1938, as the new bill wound its circuitous five-year course through the maze of congressional hearings, delays, and revisions, objections by the opposition paralleled those made in the early 1900s. At first opponents fought tooth and nail to prevent the bill from consideration. They claimed it lacked public support, would create a hardship on manufacturers and their employees, that the market would weed out dangerous products, and self-regulation was the best remedy. When it was evident that some version of the bill would pass, they attempted to emasculate it with compromises and amendments. After the act passed, some of the most pernicious offenders who tried to circumvent the law were prosecuted, but most manufacturers formed a loose coalition with the FDA and health providers to comply with the guidelines without court action.

Kay argues that in contrast to the fight for the 1906 law, which originated among local women consumers and catapulted into national concern and muckraking, the fight for safe cosmetics began with government officials, leaders of consumers' organizations, and public health providers, then crested with public support only when the popular press and radio broadcasts sensationalized injuries caused by depilatories and mascaras. Even then the primary advocates were those national organizations and agencies in a strong enough position to lobby for regulation. The consumer movement was "too small, too elite, and too localized to effect wholesale changes in business practice" (p. 59). Despite claims of national women's organizations that they represented the views of millions of consumers, the average American consumer was aware neither of the danger of dyes and caustics in cosmetics, nor that the FDA had no power to regulate them. It took a series of Consumers' Research exposes, augmented by FDA radio broadcasts and its "Chamber of Horrors" at the 1933 Chicago World Fair, to focus public attention on dangers lurking in mascaras, depilatories, face powders, cold creams, and dozens of other beauty products.

The book is compact and carefully documented. Particularly impressive is its portrayal of the determination of bureaucrats Walter Campbell and Ruth deForest Lamb to protect consumers. However, the reader closes the volume with a sense that something is missing. The growing membership of Consumers' Research along with the popularity of its books, *100,000,000 Guinea Pigs* and *Skin Deep*; the vast appeal of the Chamber of

Horrors; the flood of queries and letters to the FDA; the unexpected interest in Congressional hearings: each suggests that the issue struck a chord. Beyond brief mention, however, none of these issues is amplified. What were women doing about the problem? Did the agendas of local women's clubs and consumers' groups indicate concern or activism? What motivated legislators to back the bill? Were there no consumer petitions, personal contacts, letters to legislators, or demonstrations? To what extent did the contents of the letters to the FDA reflect specific concern for cosmetic safety? Is it possible that reactivation of the Pure Food Committee and like organizations had been more in response to grass roots anxiety than to solicit support for the bill?

Perhaps the types of sources explain the vacuum. The book's premise rests heavily on a long list of secondary national sources at the expense of local primary sources. Because leaders of national women's organizations, bureaucrats, politicians, and publications had a vested interest in creating the impression that they were the ones protecting the general public and generating demand for safe products, relying too heavily on their rhetoric or the documents they produced tends to skew the study toward efforts of the elite and away from those of the public in general.

Yet, all in all, the arguments are well presented and compelling. By exploring a specific example of how concerned activists, regardless of who we think they were, contributed to national policy, Kay's book makes a substantial contribution toward helping us understand the complexities of social activism and the machinations of legislative processes during the New Deal era.

LORINE SWAINSTON GOODWIN
Independent scholar

CLEMENS P. WORK. *Darkest before Dawn: Sedition and Free Speech in the American West*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2005. Pp. x, 318. \$34.95.

When the U.S. Congress passed the Sedition Act of 1918, a vaguer but potentially more repressive law than the Espionage Act of 1917, it was enacting an almost exact replica of the sedition law adopted eleven weeks earlier by Montana (in the federal version two words were omitted and one changed). The state law was the culmination of an antiradical campaign that sought explicitly to limit free speech. Supporters of the Montana law claimed, among other things, that it showed the state government's resolute loyalty and that it relieved patriotic citizens of the need to take vigilante action against "slackers" and German sympathizers.

The patterns of suppression around World War I have been well studied by historians during the last forty years. The value of Clemens P. Work's book lies in the depth of local information it provides and the connections it makes between local anti-German or antiradical reaction and the regional and national temper. The German language and German culture were suspect everywhere, but constraints upon them in schools,

libraries, and churches went further in Montana than in other states. Political violence occurred in many parts of the United States, but Montana was especially unruly. Local politicians and journalists grouped into pro- and antiwar camps, as mining interests, organized labor, and anarchism fanned the flames. Representative Jeanette Rankin excepted, the state's delegation in the U.S. Congress led the call for a nationwide crackdown on sedition.

In many respects, then, the collisions between nativism and superpatriotism, on one hand, and free speech and dissent, on the other, during World War I were played out most vividly in Montana—according to Work, the state “was both a microcosm and a crucible of these tragic events” (p. 2). The U.S. Justice Department watched the legal and political maneuverings in Montana closely. While the state's only U.S. district judge and the U.S. district attorney, future senator Burton K. Wheeler, were reluctant to jail dissenters under the federal Espionage Act or Sedition Act, state officials readily made up for this by promiscuous application of their own version of the latter law. A number of individuals, many of them German immigrants, were sentenced to several years in prison for little more than what Work calls “emotional outburst[s]” (p. 208). He has developed a website, the Montana Sedition Project, examining the plight of those imprisoned for disloyal utterance (<http://www.seditionproject.net/>). On May 3, 2006, as a result of Work's book and further research by University of Montana law students, Governor Brian Schweitzer of Montana issued posthumous pardons to seventy-five men and three women convicted under the state sedition law.

Work (a professor of journalism) is interested in the ethical standards of sections of the press during World War I, as well as the treatment of editors, and the meaning of freedom of speech becomes a central theme of the book. The Montana experience is adeptly connected to the wider legal debate before and during the war, and subsequent judicial interpretation.

The violent background of western labor relations and the unionizing struggles of the Industrial Workers of the World and the Metal Mine Workers Union provide a vital context for the wartime repression. Montana was unrepresentative of the United States as a whole, in the sense that no state went quite as far in its limitation of free speech in this era. And yet, because Montana displayed so starkly the wartime reaction, the influence of big business in politics, and the polarization of public opinion in the West, it is impossible to ignore its history.

Work's well-illustrated narrative is engaging, although it is sometimes more judgmental and adjectival than necessary. His book conveys the humanity of those caught up the sedition mania, without losing sight of drier constitutional issues. This study is thus a welcome addition to scholarship on war and American society.

MARK ELLIS
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JOEL A. VILENSKY. *Dew of Death: The Story of Lewisite, America's World War I Weapon of Mass Destruction*. Assisted by PANDY R. SINISH. Foreword by RICHARD BUTLER. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2005. Pp. xxiii, 213. \$24.95.

If World War II was the war of the physicists, then World War I was the war of the chemists. The tremendous destructive power of long-range artillery shells accounted not only for the highest portion of the war's terrible and unprecedented death toll; it accounted, as well, for the predominant symbol of the western front: a deforested, cratered landscape dotted with pools of poisoned water. By war's end, those pools often were infiltrated by an insidious substance known as “mustard gas.” Mustard, so named because of its odor (it was unrelated to mustard seed), had been brought to the war by Germany in the summer of 1917. It followed in the grim tradition of chlorine and phosgene gases, also introduced during the Great War. But mustard was different: far more toxic than phosgene, it would—once vaporized—cling tenaciously to everything, and remain active for weeks. The gas masks that had worked well against mustard's predecessors offered little protection: soldiers now had to fear every step they took. Skin contact caused painful blisters; eye contact could lead to blindness (temporary or permanent); inhalation meant seared lungs, wretched coughing, vomiting, and even death. Within three weeks of the introduction of mustard, 14,000 British soldiers had become casualties to it (more gas casualties than in all of the previous year). Had the war lasted into 1919, an even more horrific chemical agent would likely have become known to the world: called “lewisite,” it was developed by the U.S. Army for the battlefields of Europe.

Joel A. Vilensky's interest in lewisite developed idiosyncratically from his work on a rare neurological disorder called Wilson's Disease, and its treatment with a compound known as British Anti-Lewisite (or BAL). Vilensky, who has a research interest in neurology, was preparing to give a paper on the first successful treatment of Wilson's Disease when it occurred to him that he had better ready an answer for the question, “What is lewisite?” Once he posed the question, Vilensky was drawn into a compelling story. Through energetic use of national and local archives, he pieced together a tale that sheds light not only on American scientific research during World War I, but also on the human and environmental costs of chemical weapons. The strength of this monograph is in the details its author has managed to unearth.

Winford Lee Lewis, a professor of chemistry at Northwestern University who served in the U.S. Gas Service (later Chemical Warfare Service, or CWS) during 1917 and 1918, developed the recipe for the toxic substance ultimately named for him. Working at facilities donated to the wartime government by Catholic University of America (CUA) in Washington, D.C., Lewis drew upon the work of Father Julius Nieuwland, a chemist who had earlier (during his doctoral research

at CUA) made himself very ill for several days by combining acetylene gas, arsenic trichloride, and aluminum chloride. In addition to the facilities at Catholic University, the CWS also operated the American University Experimental Station on the grounds of American University in Washington, D.C. Disturbing passages describe the primitive (indeed, all but nonexistent) safety and environmental standards at these facilities, and the high casualty rates among the researchers and workers. The legacy of these two facilities persists in heavily populated sectors of northwest Washington; indeed, as Vilensky points out, extremely high arsenic levels are common on American University property, and, even in 2001, prompted the relocating of the childcare center.

Once lewisite showed promise as a weapon, facilities for its production were established outside Cleveland, in Willoughby, Ohio. The CWS was so enthusiastic about the prospects for lewisite that it quickly readied the Willoughby facility (an abandoned auto factory) under the supervision of James Bryant Conant, a professor of chemistry who would later go on to become the president of Harvard University, and deeply involved in the development of the atomic bomb. But the war ended just as the facility was ready to swing into full-scale wartime production.

Only the first five chapters of the book concern themselves directly with the history of gas weapons in World War I. Vilensky goes on to examine the interwar history of lewisite, and BAL, the history of chemical weapons in World War II, and the serious environmental problems raised by lewisite and other chemical weapons in U.S. and international arsenals. He includes an examination of the sea dumping (off the U.S. coast) of tens of thousands of tons of lewisite, and an overview of lewisite production outside the United States. This interesting, eclectic book will appeal especially to those who study the history of science and environmental history.

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CHARLOTTE M. CANNING. *The Most American Thing in America: Circuit Chautauqua as Performance*. (Studies in Theatre History and Culture.) Iowa City: University of Iowa Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 268. \$34.95.

Charlotte M. Canning's book examines circuit Chautauqua using a performance perspective as an analytical framework to examine the transformation of the movement from its beginning in 1904 to its demise in the late 1920s. She also explains how circuit performances reflected and changed the local community, American values, and lifestyles. The author justifies the method of the book on the basis that traditional treatments have characterized the movement in terms of "education, politics, reform, and community building but rarely as performance" (p. 5).

The introduction presents assessments of the significance of circuit Chautauqua, especially in the rural

community. It also traces the development of the movement as an outgrowth of the late nineteenth-century New York Chautauqua Institute, lyceum operations, and the independent Chautauquas into the circuit Chautauqua bureau business. The first chapter examines the manner in which Chautauqua aligned itself with national issues and personal success through platform debates that involved the local community. The second chapter explores why and how Chautauqua dealt with race and gender issues from the standpoint of what topics were included and excluded. The third chapter considers the literal and symbolic aspects of how the Chautauqua tent "became a sign of Chautauqua moral and religious respectability" (p. 22). Chapters four and five focus on the performance aspects of Chautauqua in terms of oratory and theater. The last chapter, six, discusses the effects and legacies of Chautauqua.

The topical approach used by the author to examine the movement, however, is at times difficult to follow. A chronological development might allow the reader to better understand the interconnections between platform debates and oratory, the issues of race and gender, the moral and religious dimensions of community, and the overall significance of how performances were defined and redefined in Chautauqua advertising. Moreover, there is not a clear and concise definition of performance that is applied equally to the various aspects discussed in the book. The book examines the impact of performance—oratory and aspects of theater—primarily from a platform perspective. The selling of a community on hosting a Chautauqua and the subsequent setup also involved performance. Although she cites it, the author also overlooks the significance of John Gentile's *Cast of One: One-Person Shows from the Chautauqua Platform to the Broadway Stage* (1989), which does examine the significance of Chautauqua performance in reflecting and transforming rural America and carrying on the tradition of one-person performance.

Canning is to be praised for her use of primary source materials, of which many are drawn from the Redpath Collection housed at the University of Iowa. She also does a wonderful job of synthesizing a variety of interpretations pertaining to Chautauqua, platform performances, and their influences on shaping and transforming rural American values and perspectives. The inclusion of photographs assists the reader in visualizing the various aspects pertaining to Chautauqua and Chautauqua performance. A bibliography of sources is not included at the end of the book. For those interested in early twentieth-century American performance arts, this book is a must.

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TONY MICHELS. *A Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 335. \$27.95.

Tony Michels is intent on refocusing scholarly attention upon those articulate and committed Yiddish-speaking radicals who had their say and influence on New York's Jewish masses in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Writing in the spirit of Irving Howe—who, some thirty years ago, seemingly closed the book on the sagas of these dynamic champions of revolutionary thought, economic freedom, and social justice—Michels is out to remind historians not only of their impact on immigrant lives on the Lower East Side. But he also asserts that what New York Yiddish socialists had to say, beginning in the 1880s, still resonated with the children and grandchildren of these Jewish newcomers for “roughly” the next eighty years. Michels offers a thoughtful alternate voice to what he sees as an American Jewish narrative that speaks increasingly and exclusively of American Jews “making it” in this country, abandoning or “liberalizing” their radical past in their quest for economic mobility and social acculturation even as they struggled to redefine their ethnic identities.

Michels does exceedingly well in capturing the spirit of the vibrant street culture that these Marxists, anarchists, and Bundists—not to mention their varying splinter groups—engendered as they tried, often against one another, to raise the consciences of the working poor. He takes readers on a fascinating retrospective tour of protest rally venues, meeting places, and literary evenings and lectures that attracted thousands of eager listeners. Michels is able to tell this story of “socialism in the streets, parks and halls of New York” so well because he has mastered the nuances of the ideologically variegated Yiddish press and has done yeoman's work in harvesting “scrimpy sources” and ephemeral “scraps of information” on scores of long-forgotten groups and organizations. In masterfully advocating for a renewed appreciation of these radicals, Michels also alerts us to the impact New York socialists made on their counterparts in tsarist Russia. Living in America, free from government oppression, they were able to publish their pamphlets and newspapers with impunity—works that were often smuggled back to Eastern Europe. Moreover, Michels avers that the sage strategy that early Russian Jewish Bundists adopted, beginning in 1893–1897, to reach the Jewish working masses through Yiddish—and not through assimilationist Russian—was a technique first mastered by radical Jews in the streets of New York. But then again, as he points out, the Manhattan-based Jewish groups learned those marching orders from German American socialists with whom they initially interacted upon their arrival in the immigrants' hub.

But while Michels gives renewed voice to these dedicated dogmatists and shows for how long, and how strongly, they advocated their causes, did they ever really capture the enduring allegiances of the downtown Jewish masses? To the constant dismay of advocates who wanted much more from their hordes of listeners and readers, attendance at radical rallies and purchases of socialist journals and newspapers did not translate

into ongoing and persistent membership in unions or sustained electoral support for radical parties. This endemic apathy was not lost on some of the socialists themselves, who made tactical and even ideological adjustments in their messages to capture the Jewish mainstream, a point that Michels does not emphasize. In other words, even as Michels notes the satisfaction and vindication that Jewish socialists felt in 1914 when they elected one of their own, labor lawyer and activist Meyer London, to the United States Congress, he does not make enough of the concessions and accommodations pragmatic radical leaders made to American realities and to the ethnic and personal concerns of Jewish voters in order to capture the majority of their constituents' votes. Ultimately, it was the Progressive and reformist atmosphere of pre-World War I America that voters were comfortable buying into and not the pristine message of revolutionary ideology that led London to victory.

All told, even if the most hard-boiled immigrant activists, their children, and their later descendants always pledged allegiance to the vision of a society transformed through their efforts, those whom they endeavored to lead never came to possess a comparable “fire in their hearts.” Rather, the mass of attendees at radical rallies and the many who participated in labor unrest were an eclectic lot who picked and chose among what all Jewish movements—be they radical, religious, or Zionist—had to offer, so long as these commitments did not interfere with their ultimate goal of integration into the host society. In the end, it was the all-pervasive power of Americanization that proved to be the most dominant influence on the American Jewish population in the downtown quarter and beyond.

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WILLIAM MERRILL DECKER and EARL N. HARBERT, editors. *Henry Adams and the Need to Know*. (Studies in American History and Culture, number 8.) Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society with the University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville. 2005. Pp. xvi, 383. \$50.00.

The fourteen essays in this collection are the revised proceedings of a 2001 conference at the Massachusetts Historical Society. The volume has no discernible theme, though the editors have scrambled bravely for one. William Merrill Decker and Earl N. Harbert speak of “our need to know Adams,” to know “the relation of present to past,” and to know “the world as something other than ourselves” (p. vii). This is a broad and wise rubric, since it licenses anything that might take an adventurous essayist's fancy.

For the most part, the essays are arranged by when topics touched Adams's life, though the opening essay by Paul Bové starts matters off asymmetrically by looking at (what is claimed to be) Adams's intelligent view of American foreign policy in the 1890s, by way of contrast with the unintelligent policy that has followed Sep-

tember 11, 2001. Thereafter chronology rules. Among the earlier essays, Richard Samuelson writes on Adams's view of John Adams, though he perhaps turns the great-grandson into a more virtuous man than the evidence warrants, to earn Henry an apt place on the republican pedestal occupied by his ancestor. Ormond Seavey furnishes a careful assessment of the difficult relationship between Adams and Henry Cabot Lodge, especially noting their differing views of New England history. Leslie Butler examines Adams's ill-fated venture into reform politics and valuably stresses its partial origins in English politics, viewed during the Civil War and understood as part encouragement (the liberalism of John Stuart Mill), part discouragement (Tory oligarchy). By way of closing out the story before Adams's migration to Washington in 1877, Crosbie Smith and Ian Higginson consider Adams's cautious and anxious review in 1868 of the tenth edition of Charles Lyell's *Principles of Geology* (1830).

Curiously, only one essay, a rambling and dubious piece by Richard G. Androne on the 1881 biography of John Randolph, focuses resolutely on what Ernest Samuelson once designated Adams's middle years. This is curious, because there has been lately a higher interest in Adams's historical scholarship of the 1880s. This collection is more drawn to the late phase. Among these essays, I would single out Barry Maine's nicely judged study of Adams's response to the portraits of John Singer Sargent, with its intriguing suggestion that Sargent influenced the portraiture to be found in *The Education of Henry Adams* (1918), in that both saw character as the revelation of social type and both mistrusted intimacy. Although she takes on the hackneyed theme of how Adams as an autobiographer stands in the American tradition commenced by Benjamin Franklin, Joanne Jacobson is likewise illuminating, mostly by concentrating not on what preceded Adams but what followed him, even as far as Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman* (1949). Two of the three essays on Adams the traveler are a trifle less successful, that by Pierre Lagayette for reasons of opacity, that by Charles Vandersee for undertaking a perhaps too-speculative study of a book on the American West which Adams never wrote, or wrote only in epistolary fragments. John C. Orr on Adams in the South Seas is more acute, not least for stressing Adams's unacknowledged contradiction as someone who condemned the destructive impact of Western imperialism but who embodied Orientalist condescension.

Indeed, something of a theme, commenced by Orr, runs through two of the final three essays: that Adams was tentative about his intellectual radicalism. As Cindy Weinstein suggests, he wanted his women to be forceful but not too free, and, as J. C. Levenson concludes, Adams wanted his evolutionary theory to be only cautiously Darwinian, because natural selection offered only randomness and Adams preferred a dialogue between the random and the orderly. It is less easy to see a theme in Decker's essay on Adams as "a martyr to the disease of omniscience," or rather the theme only ap-

pears in the essay's final paragraph, where there are dark but elusive references to "the arrogating nature of 'mainstream' thought, the tendency of the day's conventional wisdom to legislate and give marching orders on the basis of falsehood supported by powerful interests," to "the corporate structure of academic life," to the "persistent presence of the bomb," and to "the ever more sophisticated ways by which rigid ideology generates plausible truth" (pp. 343–344). I think we are being told that Adams came to understand that omniscience and certainty are illusory and dangerous, and that the modern world is inhabited by many less prescient, but I am unsure whom Decker numbers among those many.

To evade being so numbered, I shall abjure the customary concluding remarks, intimating omniscience.

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DESMOND KING. *The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 229. \$29.95.

In this sweeping synthesis, Desmond King aims to re-interpret American nationalism by considering its relationship to the shifting ethnic and racial heterogeneity of the United States in the past century. His book highlights how public officials have responded to a question that remains crucial to American democracy: who belongs? That this question resounds so acutely in our political life today, as immigrants rally in the streets and a heated debate continues about the status (and the loyalties) of undocumented immigrants in America, helps to make King's book both timely and ultimately disappointing.

King argues that although American nationalism has rested on the notion of the United States as a one-people nation bound by an allegiance to individualism, this ideology contradicts the reality of racial and ethnic group-based identities and communities in America. King's overview chronicles the moments when nationality, identity, and citizenship came under scrutiny. From the 1890s to World War II, nationalism was driven by a commitment to assimilation (which sometimes enhanced group identity) and complicated by nativist beliefs in racial and ethnic hierarchies. Here King discusses efforts to Americanize immigrants and Native Americans, the problematic status of Filipinos and Puerto Ricans after the Spanish American war, eugenics and popular racial typologies, immigration policy restrictions, segregation, nationalism during both world wars, and Japanese internment. After 1945, group demands for rights accelerated, driven by grass roots movements and the United States' new role as defender of the free world. King's discussion here includes the Double V campaign and civil rights struggles; decolonization, the United Nations' role as a forum for human rights concerns and Cold War imperatives for domestic democratization; the abolition of exclusionary national

origins quotas; affirmative action and group demands for compensatory redress for past injustices.

Few readers will disagree with King's central argument: that a tension exists between the one-nation, one-people ideology and the group-based loyalties and demands so conspicuous in the past twenty-five years. Nor will many be surprised to learn that particular groups were once deemed incapable of assimilation or unworthy of integration. Excepting recent phenomenon such as the problems faced by Muslims in the United States, this book covers well-traveled terrain; in fact King has traversed some of it before in *Making Americans: Immigration, Race and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy* (2000). The relationship between democratization and desegregation, international influences and Cold War pressures is fresher, and has recently received attention from Jonathan Rosenberg and Mary Dudziak, among others.

Where King really wants to break new ground is his challenge to conventional treatments of U.S. nationalism. He argues that despite individualist ideals, group attachments have persisted and remain strong; the battles fought by minority groups for full inclusion have encouraged people to think of themselves in collective, not individualist, terms. No doubt the melting pot model is now an anachronism; moreover King is right to challenge David Hollinger and likeminded scholars who assumed that group identifications would dissolve as America evolved into a post-ethnic state. Beyond stressing the flaws in this teleology, however, King does not add considerably to our understanding of the politics of inclusion and exclusion. Surely many hyphenated Americans remain attached to group identities, but King does not question how extensively some groups have done so over others and why; nor does he consider the role that class plays in the retention or relinquishment of group consciousness. There is a perfunctory quality to this book as the narrative moves briskly through examples of group loyalties, missing opportunities to pursue more promising (and difficult) lines of inquiry. King does not probe, for example, the ways in which the claim to group victimization or distinctiveness became, for better or worse, a source of psychological, political, and/or economic empowerment in a litigious and identity-obsessed polity. There were once powerful pressures, incentives, and rewards for immigrants to assimilate; in recent years, the incentives and rewards for clinging to group identity multiplied, while the pressures to assimilate have arguably changed or eased (depending on the group). The individualist one-nation ideal may or may not be dead, but any interpretation of its demise needs to untangle the reasons and the extent with greater depth and balance. When King's overview gets to the mid-twentieth century, people of European origin (still the majority in the U.S. today) disappear, while Latinos, Asian Americans, and African Americans become predominant, a fact that makes it easy to forsake the assimilation model in the long march toward multiculturalism. How relevant the melting pot ideal ever was—to whom and

why—are questions King does not pursue. That first or second-generation Italian Americans now visit Ellis Island or trace their roots in family genealogies may speak more to baby boomers' penchant for identity consumption than any meaningful sense of ethnic difference.

This is a competent, cautious overview that reconstructs the moments when American nationalism confronted its diverse and oft-aggrieved minority groups, and it will be valuable to students unfamiliar with this history. But the book tells a story more than it explicates an interpretation, and readers expecting anything beyond a useful narrative chronicling the rise of multiculturalism may not be satisfied.

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MARTIN A. BERGER. *Sight Unseen: Whiteness and American Visual Culture*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 236. \$49.95.

In 1992, five years after her novel *Beloved* was published, Toni Morrison identified the term "American Africanism" as the range of opinions "Eurocentric learning" has formed about African peoples; she called for study of racism's impact on its perpetrators as well as its victims (*Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination*, [1992]). Martin A. Berger seeks to carry out this suggestion, even invoking Morrison at the beginning of his book, which urges the field of whiteness studies toward his conclusions that apparently race-neutral images reflect the collective racial assumptions of European Americans.

As a pioneer in a new field, Berger carefully outlines the theoretical basis for his approach. According to Berger, "images contain no inherent meanings . . . the meanings attributed to them are created solely by a society's shared investment in them" (p. 73). Thus he must seek both to describe the matrix of racial attitudes of the white culture that produced the nineteenth and early twentieth-century images he analyzes and to identify the similarly subjective attitudes of twenty-first-century critics, typically white, who have scrutinized these cultural artifacts.

The first chapter focuses on nineteenth-century genre paintings by William Sidney Mount and others. Berger seeks to interpret the "invisible discourses" of bygone cultures, finding them more revelatory than literal images. Going beyond the realm of the contextual art historian, Berger maintains that it is "imperative to visualize the discourses these artworks fail to depict" (p. 22). This reading of art works "against the grain of their visual evidence" is less concerned with the meaning of artifacts than with the production of meaning (p. 24). Although such pronouncements may sound startling, Berger makes a cogent case for the significance of racial attitudes in Mount's *Fair Exchange, No Robbery* (1865) and Nathaniel Hawthorne's short story "Feathertop: A Moralized Legend" (1852).

Berger's second chapter delves into the white gaze underlying nineteenth-century landscape photography, particularly Carleton Watkins's views of Yosemite. He compares the scenic obsessions of white men's photographs and maps with the very different emphasis of Native American maps. Although not ostensibly about race, these artifacts are enlightening: the more objective-appearing (to Western eyes) photographs and maps name only the most prominent, dominant features, while the apparently subjective indigenous maps attempt to name everything. The third chapter approaches Saracen-inspired architecture of the Gilded Age, particularly the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts, constructed 1872–1876. This temple of art pulled people off busy city streets into a transformative space populated with exotic Eastern sculptures. Thus the Quakers, Unitarians, and Protestants of Philadelphia viewed cultural artifacts in one of the whitest institutions in American society, housed in a building inspired by Jewish, Islamic, Catholic, and even Native American sources. It was possible during the Gilded Age to identify virtually any exotic culture as “other” by associating it with Middle Eastern architecture.

Berger's final chapter, a study of silent cinema, brings us to the early twentieth century. Here he examines the increasing fluidity of racial categories. Anyone, such as an Irish immigrant, who acted disorderly (thus “black”) was figuratively black. Behavior, rather than physiognomy, became the chief indicator of racial identity. Berger sees causal connections in the popularization of photography during an era emphasizing physiognomy and the subsequent popularization of cinema when the performance of actions produced racial identity. The methodology that enables him to study what is not present in an image also makes it possible to study an image that no longer exists, such as the silent film *New York Fire Department* (1896). Its known inclusion of Irish American firemen, whose “imperfect whiteness” had barred them from service a few decades earlier, reflects turn-of-the-century preoccupations of Tammany politicians, who doled out government jobs to the Irish immigrants whose votes kept them in office.

One of the most compelling sections of the book is Berger's examination of the ways in which the cultural position of railroads in the nineteenth century and the concomitant invention of “Standard Time” reflected white values. He studies the 1903 silent film *The Great Train Robbery* as an example of “imperfect whites” (bandits) disrupting “the progress of the quintessentially white train” (p. 157). Viewers identify with the bandits because their vantage point aligns with the criminals' via camera angles. This innovation actually reinforces notions of whiteness, Berger maintains; audiences could “slum” with disreputable “extrawhite” activities without jeopardizing their fundamental cultural orientation.

Berger weaves together seamlessly a series of intelligent, astute readings of visual images alongside literary and philosophical texts, and he perceptively anticipates and rebuts potential methodological objections.

Some of the causal links between idea and image are less convincing because they are unprovable assertions, floating freely amid variously interpreted images.

Throughout the book Berger wishes to say something about the present as well as about the past. Racial hierarchies have not become obsolete, he concludes, and most European Americans are blind to white bias. Racial progress has not progressed as far as many (white) Americans believe.

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ANNE ELIZABETH CARROLL. *Word, Image, and the New Negro: Representation and Identity in the Harlem Renaissance*. (Blacks in the Diaspora.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 275. \$45.00.

In the now extensive scholarship on the Harlem Renaissance, the question of representation has been an important if not always central intellectual concern. However, as the title of her book suggests, Anne Elizabeth Carroll makes representation the central problematic to be addressed. In particular, she is focused on how meaning results from the interplay of texts and the great variety of visual markers that fill these texts. The question of identity is intimately linked with the forms and conventions of representation. Carroll provides a fresh, exciting, and insightful perspective on how African Americans sought both to come to terms with and to change the ways they were understood—and misunderstood—in the first three decades of the twentieth century.

Although Carroll acknowledges that the identity concerns of African American intellectuals (the concept of a New Negro, for example) and the rhetorical and iconographic means to formulate these concerns were not exclusive to the twentieth century, she focuses on five key publications: *The Crisis* (1910–1927), *Opportunity* (1923–1925), *Survey Graphic* (1925), *The New Negro* (1925), and *Fire* (1926). For each, she calls attention to the visual elements (photographs, drawings, artifactual display, spatial considerations, configurations of line and type font, use of color, etc.) and then provides a close reading of the various ways visual and written texts work together “to communicate particular arguments about their subjects” (p. 33). She sees an underlying pattern, a shift in emphasis, that distinguishes one set of texts from the other and that is understood, collectively, to represent shifts in the strategy of African Americans to achieve social and political reform. Thus, the protests of W. E. B. Du Bois's *Crisis* gave way to the focus on achievement of Charles S. Johnson's *Opportunity*, which, in turn, gave way to the literary and cultural accomplishments featured in Alain Locke's editing of *Survey Graphic* and *The New Negro*. The final text, however, Wallace Thurman's *Fire*, represents a break with these forms of representation that closely linked race and identity to affect social change. For Thurman and his youthful contemporaries, Carroll argues, acts of representation and notions of identity were not limited

by pragmatic considerations of race and social policy. To account for these shifts in emphasis, Carroll pays only limited attention to factors external to her texts, placing greatest emphasis on the content of the texts themselves.

Carroll's close readings serve to guide our understanding, pointing out connections and juxtapositions we might otherwise miss. She also provides ongoing critical commentary regarding the limits of representation, often calling more attention to what is not there than to what is. Thus, in writing of *The New Negro*, she notes that "such defining projects also have drawbacks, particularly because asserting a collective identity that is unified and unifying can be exclusionary and limiting and can set up new hierarchies of oppression and exclusion" (p. 161). Her commentary is both helpful and provocative. And yet, her interpretive presence calls attention to itself and in so doing raises questions that render her authoritative role somewhat problematic.

As noted, this work is primarily a reading of the internal, formal qualities of "finished texts." Thus, Carroll makes little effort to determine the role or intent of the several editors in the construction of their texts. But with such an effort, how might her critical readings have been different? In her discussion of Locke and *The New Negro*, for example, she links her reading of the periodical's identity claims with essays Locke accepted by the anthropologist Melville Herskovits and the art critic A. C. Barnes. What she seems unaware of, however, is that Locke was terribly disappointed by both essays and only published them because he was unable to replace them with other material. Their authors' point of view was not his—but to know this one has to do research external to the text itself. At the same time, and in contrast with the question of intention, Carroll drew upon the responses of hypothetical readers to help construct the meaning of the texts she discusses. Here, too, one must be cautious in accepting her findings. For example, it might be true to claim that the readers of James Weldon Johnson's "The Making of Harlem" fell "into the trap" that the logic and structure of his text had itself committed. But perhaps these imagined readers avoided this trap. Who is to know? And should one read the text with either presumption in mind?

In her concluding remarks, Carroll calls attention to the importance of the Harlem Renaissance in understanding our own continuing need for and engagement with the "processes of representation and identity formation." Her book is a thoughtful and stimulating initiation into such a perspective.

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WILLIAM HOWLAND KENNEY. *Jazz on the River*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pp. x, 229. \$27.50.

The first master narrative of jazz was that it traveled "up the river" from New Orleans to Chicago on the backs of its first generation of stars: Louis Armstrong, George

"Pops" Foster, and Baby Dodds (among others). William Howland Kenney's *Chicago Jazz: A Cultural History, 1904–1930* (1993) is the definitive history of its arrival in that city's black and tan clubs, the primary site of social integration and white musicians' apprenticeship. His new book is the first academic overview of "riverboat jazz" (p. 39), an elusive, legendary aspect of the music's dissemination during the interwar period, that has always revolved around two men: Joseph Streckfus of Streckfus Steamers, Inc., and Fate Marable, his musical supervisor. Reimagining the riverine culture that connected New Orleans, Memphis, St. Louis, Davenport, and the Ohio River spur cities, Cincinnati and Pittsburgh, Kenney argues that the steamboats fed on feelings of nostalgia, romance, and segregation to produce a distinctive Upper South plantation complex—as codified in the musical *Show Boat* (1927)—that also heralded the social changes of black migration.

By the late nineteenth century, riverboats had long been eclipsed by railroads even in rural southern economies. Lacking in speed, organization, and safety, the flat-bottomed, wooden sternwheelers commonly burned to the ground from boiler explosions or were destroyed by ice. John Streckfus and his four sons brought efficient corporate organization to river traffic: the company's boats ran on schedule and bought up small, failing companies that granted them riverfront landings from St. Louis to St. Paul. Yet profits remained thin until the Streckfus family reenvisioned the steamboats as recreational vessels. Advance agents would book civic groups and women's clubs for mornings and afternoons, while ads promoted the "floating ballroom" (p. 22) for the ships' romantic evening cruises. Successful right through the Depression, Streckfus Steamers commissioned two stainless steel ships in the 1930s with huge art deco ballrooms equivalent to the Savoy Ballroom in New York.

Kenney employs Gaston Bachelard's theory of "the swan complex" to explain the reverie induced by the matrix of water, whiteness, languor, ethereality, upper-class fantasy, and a yearning for Victorian stability. Jackson Lears's antimodernism is a more apt framework; it was in response to bored young adults that jazz became the major commodity of the excursion boats. Joseph Streckfus could have hired "a sightreading commercial [white] dance band" but instead chose the "exotic thrill of southern black music" (p. 45), one that connected the nineteenth-century racial spectacle of black stevedores loading freight to the swing of work songs to its twentieth-century counterpart, the racial performance of the tuxedoed African American musical workers. It was a potent mix of modernism and antimodernism. The propulsive rhythmic drive of the jazz bands overpowered the loud ship's engines and created that sense of intoxication crucial to primitivism; yet on a typical cruise, passengers received a dance card for fourteen numbers, and every fourth dance had to be a waltz (p. 49).

The manager of this delicate social dynamic was Fate

Marable, a cocky, educated pianist able to pass for white. Marable was a habitu  of New Orleans nightlife during the period ragtime evolved into jazz, and he began hiring the cream of New Orleans musicians in 1919. Marable had a long-term contract, an unerring eye for musical talent, and a penchant for strict discipline; he rehearsed his musicians relentlessly, encouraged them to sight read, mustered them into union locals, and "taught them the exquisitely precise requirements of Jim Crow performance etiquette" (p. 38). For his white dance audiences, Marable tamped down the improvisation and polyphony of New Orleans jazz; he synthesized commercial arrangements, rhythmic drive, disciplined section playing, and timbral freedom into an early version of big band swing. The riverboats emerge here as a significant swing site and Marable as a national figure comparable to other "band pianists" in New York (Duke Ellington, Fletcher Henderson), Chicago (Earl Hines), and Kansas City (Count Basie, Mary Lou Williams). By enforcing "musical professionalism" (p. 37), Marable mentored two generations of African American musicians—including Jimmy Blanton, Gene Sedric, and Clark Terry—that became "heralds" of the black migration and "modernist troubadours" (p. 65). Here Kenney echoes Lewis Erenberg's claim that big band swing was "the music of the Black Migration."

There are several extended riffs tangential to the argument: on a false opposition between Armstrong and Bix Beiderbecke, on Pittsburgh's jazz scene, on race relations in Memphis. Yet Kenney's attention to local jazz scenes can be revelatory, as when he contrasts Davenport, Iowa, as a hub for white midwestern jazz musicians (e.g. Beiderbecke, Jess Stacy) with St. Louis, which attracted aspiring black jazz musicians. With an emergent black middle class and (relatively) progressive race relations, St. Louis gave birth to a school of trumpet playing that included Charlie Creath and Dewey Jackson, and later extended to Miles Davis. In the 1920s, Creath and Jackson were marquee draws for the steamboats of Jesse Johnson ("the black Streckfus") and forced Joseph Streckfus to open up his ships to African Americans.

Kenney cites the usual suspects in the steamboats' demise during the postwar era: cars, TV, rock'n'roll, air conditioning. The ships themselves exist today only as ghosts: *The President* was a casino moored in Davenport for ten years; *The Admiral* is "still tied up to the levee in St. Louis" (p. 171); *The Natchez* is a tourist attraction in New Orleans, complete with a small dixieland band. This book's contribution to business history and jazz history is in showing the resonance that songs such as Hoagy Carmichael's "Riverboat Shuffle" or Armstrong's "Dusky Stevedore" had for middle-class consumers encouraged by Streckfus Steamers to "cast off from the discipline, routine, and dominance of their landlocked parents and bosses" (p. 28) in order to wade in the waters of a progressive-yet-minstrelized musical stream.

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MARK SCHULTZ. *The Rural Face of White Supremacy: Beyond Jim Crow*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 305. \$42.00.

In *After Freedom: A Cultural Study in the Deep South* (1939), anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker wrote: "The arresting feature [of Southern race relations] is less the basic fact of segregation than the completeness and complexity of the interaction that takes place above it" (p. 14). Mark Schultz's richly textured portrait of race relations in early twentieth-century Hancock County, Georgia, offers new insights into the intimate and complex relationships that Powdermaker described. His ambitious study supplements documentary sources with more than 200 oral history interviews gathered over a sixteen-year period to explore interracial relationships in a planter-dominated, cotton-growing, piedmont region. Schultz makes no claims about the representative nature of Hancock County, although it was in some ways typical of cotton belt counties. Instead, Schultz makes an eloquent case for framing "all accounts of the South geographically and chronologically" (p. 8). He decries the tendency of some recent historians to homogenize the South, noting that such accounts might deliver scathing indictments of racial injustice but also serve to portray African Americans as impotent victims.

Schultz outlines the flexible and varied nature of interracial interaction in the social, economic, and political realms. Systematic segregation, universal black disfranchisement, and ritualized public lynchings were absent in Hancock County. Instead, white supremacy was enforced via personal relationships that allowed whites to exploit and abuse dependent African Americans even as they assisted in the "economic rise of a favorite tenant" or "live[d] openly with a black wife" (p. 6). While the planter elite did not permit any "class-wide" challenges to their power, they often tolerated high levels of resistance from individual African Americans. Again and again, Schultz uncovers examples of blacks (and some whites) who challenged white supremacy in surprising ways. For every black sharecropper who caved in to a white landowner's demands that he remove his children from school, there was a black tenant who insisted on providing an education for his or her children.

In Hancock county, various social rituals reinforced the limits imposed by white supremacy, but cross-racial intimacy existed nonetheless. Blacks and whites played baseball side by side, shared meals in black kitchens and in outdoor spaces, conversed informally at the local store, and even sometimes attended each other's church services. Some interracial couples lived together openly, and one wealthy white planter defied racial practice by taking his black grandson with him everywhere, including local restaurants where the boy ate at the same table as his grandfather.

Although most Hancock blacks were dependent landless tenants, a surprising number owned substantial farms, and the number of black landowners rose

steadily between 1900 and 1950. Schultz's meticulous examination of Hancock's tax digest revealed that hundreds of African Americans continued paying the poll tax well into the twentieth century, long after the white primary and the constitutional disfranchisement of 1908 supposedly removed blacks from the ranks of voters. Although Schultz admits that paying the poll tax did not necessarily indicate that blacks were voting, he found convincing oral history evidence that some blacks persisted in casting ballots.

Racial violence was not absent in Hancock, but Schultz found only one lynching and none of the ritualized mob actions that historian Grace Elizabeth Hale has characterized as "spectacle lynchings" (*Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the South, 1890-1940* [1998]). Schultz demonstrates that individuals committed most white-on-black violence. As with every other aspect of race relations in Hancock, Shultz found some unusual but effective examples of black resistance to white violence, most remarkably in the case of an armed African American family that successfully held off a white posse until the sheriff arrived to disperse the crowd.

Hancock's "culture of personalism" in race relations eroded during the New Deal and World War II periods. New economic opportunities outside the county, the mobility provided by the automobile, and the rise of a modern bureaucratic state all undermined white supremacy.

At no time does Shultz minimize or deny the presence of white supremacy and racial injustice in rural Hancock County. Yet his superb book provides readers with a fresh look at the complexity of southern life in the Jim Crow period. Not only is his work an important addition to work on urban race relations during the era of segregation, but he also gives us a thoughtful and richly textured reminder that beneath the facile generalizations we make about race relations in the South lie a thousand stories.

MELISSA WALKER
Converse College

ANDREW WIESE. *Places of Their Own: African American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century*. (Historical Studies of Urban America.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2004. Pp. xi, 411. \$37.50.

Until the 1960s, urban scholars and analysts focused largely on issues of the cities. Suburbs were viewed as the products of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century urbanization, when those who could afford to do so moved away from urban problems. Viewed primarily as the idyllic environments of a white upper middle class, the suburbs merited little scholarly interest. Suburban areas that did not fit this ideal model were dismissed as "fringes," "outskirts," or "small towns," thereby reinforcing the middle-class stereotype of suburbs and suburbanites.

Andrew Wiese's study of African American suburbs challenges these traditional definitions, arguing that

where the cultural norms of a community were at odds with the expectations of the analysts, the definitions trumped the reality, rendering both the suburbs and their residents invisible. As a result of this, the received wisdom on the black middle class in America has been flawed and diminished.

Wiese notes the role of the media in codifying the "Father Knows Best" or "Leave It to Beaver" model of suburbia in which all-white families—professional fathers, home-making mothers, and school-aged children—live in freestanding traditional houses on manicured lots. Wiese suggests a self-fulfilling prophecy in which that model has framed the research in urban/suburban scholarship. He argues that this stereotypical image not only belies the reality of the African American experience but also denies the role of suburbia in the development of a black middle class. His study documents the process of that development, which he divides into three distinct eras: from 1900 to 1940, from 1941 to 1960, and from 1960 through the civil rights years and beyond.

The first period incorporates the years of the great migration of southern blacks to the larger cities of the North and East. Noting that this period also witnessed a diffusion of many of those migrants to outlying areas around those cities, areas that meet the geographical, if not the sociological, definition of suburbs, Wiese argues that, for blacks as for whites, the process was one of upward, as well as outward, mobility.

He examines next the peak years of American suburbanization when the federal housing policies made home ownership accessible to veterans, including black veterans, of modest means. An intensification of racial bigotry—harassment by neighbors, bank redlining, and real estate blockbusting—limited access to many of the newer GI Bill subdivisions but opened older, close-in suburbs for redevelopment by African Americans and other minorities. In the process there was a distinct rise of a new black middle class of suburban homeowners.

In an analysis that examines African American suburbs and the suburban experience from regions as diverse as Dallas, Atlanta, Long Island, Ohio, and Michigan, Wiese details the varieties of suburbs inhabited by black Americans for most of the twentieth century. He argues that African Americans were denied not only access to many of the more affluent American suburbs but also recognition that they not only hungered for but attained "places of their own."

The book combines exacting scholarship with accessible narrative. It incorporates first-person accounts along with strong statistical support. Indeed, it is in this one area that the study disappoints. Wiese supports his key points with strong data about the black experience; unfortunately, he does not provide comparative data for whites of the same time and place. Given the disparities in numbers between the races, the lack of comparative data for whites makes it difficult to evaluate the implications for blacks.

This study of the experience of an underrepresented middle class expands our understanding of African

American history. Thus, the book is an important resource for those interested in black history, whether scholars, undergraduates, or general readers. Similarly, Wiese's examination of the African American experience of suburbia challenges the iconic view of the suburbs and suggests that reanalysis of nonurban areas inhabited by various demographic groups will enhance our common history. Although primarily a study of African American suburbs in the twentieth century, the book also works as a blueprint for examining other suburbs that do not conform to the stereotype. In so doing, it offers a major tool for reexamining and refining our theories of the American suburb and its residents.

BARBARA M. KELLY
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WILLIAM W. GIFFIN. *African Americans and the Color Line in Ohio, 1915–1930*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 2005. Pp. 312. Cloth \$49.95, CD \$9.95.

At first glance, a study of African Americans in a single state—Ohio—during a fifteen-year period might seem limited; actually this book is extremely ambitious. First, there is little that unifies the African American experience in Ohio, since the southern part of the state was strongly influenced by the slave culture of adjoining states, while the northern portion was affected first by its New England settlers and then later by major industrialization. Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati are strikingly different cities, each with its own black communities—and all three, plus many smaller locations, are discussed in great detail in William W. Giffin's work. Indeed because little statewide action or policy is discussed, Giffin's focus on Ohio seems to have developed more out of a desire to describe diverse experiences than one to show connections.

This particular time period, 1915–1930, is very important in terms of race relations. It witnessed the Great Migration; an onslaught of racial and nativist violence; the expansion and hardening of the color line in the north; and the beginnings of a major political realignment in the African American community. Although other historians, most notably Kenneth L. Kusmer (*A Ghetto Takes Shape: Black Cleveland, 1870–1930* [1976]), Kimberly Phillips (*Alabama North: African-American Migrants, Community and Working-Class Activism in Cleveland, 1915–1945* [1999]) and David Gerber (*Black Ohio and the Color Line, 1860–1915* [1976]), have looked at these events in portions of Ohio or for portions of the time period, Giffin attempts to illustrate the wide variety of experiences statewide during a crucial historical period.

In order to encapsulate so much variety into one fairly brief study, Giffin does two important things: he synthesizes a number of local, regional, and national studies of African American history, and he supplements this with local examples drawn from newspapers and archival collections. The resulting book is literally full of interesting stories of African American life, voluntary action, and political involvement. Readers can

find reports of incidents of racial violence, information on the founding of various benevolent groups, economic history, housing and migration data, and much more. We hear the voices of many individuals, and Giffin is clear that the people he discusses were historical actors rather than the victims of historical trends. He is also clear that this is a “local history” story: leadership and organization in the African American community came from within the local community, not from outside it. As a result, this is primarily a book about people and their life experiences.

The great weakness of this work, however, derives from its wealth of actors and local details. At times it is very difficult to find a narrative voice. Although the book is broken into two chronological sections (1915–1920 and the 1920s) and each section is split into several topical chapters, it lacks a clear and compelling argument holding the work together. With so much information and so little analysis, the reader gains some understanding of the evolution of a racial divide in the state and the development of race-based organizations and institutions but in the end is left trying to fit all the details together.

The book's introduction and conclusion offer a wealth of potential theses. Giffin argues, among other things, for the historical reality of northern Jim Crow; the regional differences in the black experience; the role of racial intolerance in shaping patterns of urbanization; the impact of gender on racial experience; the importance of music to race relations; and the importance of this period to the African American shift from Republican to Democratic politics. With so many interesting and important themes, few stand out and some, like consideration of the impact of gender on the African American experience, are introduced for the first time in the very last pages of the work. It seems that while Giffin's research was exhaustive—the culmination of decades of research on related topics—his comprehensive coverage, along with his writing style and the need for a bit more editing, may leave readers struggling for clarity. Nonetheless this work contains a great wealth of valuable information to historians studying the twentieth-century United States, race relations, urbanization, or Ohio.

LAURA TUENNERMAN-KAPLAN
California University of Pennsylvania

DOUGLAS FLAMMING. *Bound for Freedom: Black Los Angeles in Jim Crow America*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press with the George Gund Foundation Imprint in African American Studies. 2005. Pp. xviii, 467. \$29.95.

Douglas Flammings's book tells a story of the African American community of Los Angeles in the half century before World War II. In so doing, it explores the theme of freedom in America and what it means to be free. The book succeeds as a lucid history that will be a useful introduction for casual readers and scholars exploring

the Afro-Angeleno community and the roots of a civil rights movement in California.

Flamming organizes his work around a handful of personalities and uses them to represent the broader community. He observes the important institutions: churches, women's clubs, Los Angeles Urban League and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) branches, and "race" newspapers. The threads come together in Flamming's main character, Charlotta Bass. Bass arrived in 1910 (for a "two-year health-recuperation stay") and remained until her death in 1969 (except for sojourns, including to the Soviet Union). As publisher of the *California Eagle*, she developed into the most prominent community "booster" and leading advocate for civil rights. Through Bass, Flamming traces the arc of black Los Angeles, from a small community (about 7,500 in 1910) full of hope for freedom and opportunity, to a substantial community (more than 60,000 in 1940) that had faced off racial prejudice and was about to be transformed forever by the Great Migration of World War II, its population more than tripling by 1950.

The guiding principle of black Los Angeles was the "Western Ideal," a belief that California embodied a land of opportunity where skin color did not matter. According to Flamming, Afro-Angelenos held that the "Western Ideal" was "diametrically opposed to Jim Crow" (p. 55) and believed their freedom "hinged on the promise of the region itself. If only the South would leave the West alone" (p. 58). This image of Los Angeles, Flamming suggests, established an environment wherein blacks could move and advance as freely as American citizens of any race or ethnicity. This freedom, in turn, resulted in a high level of community and race pride, reflected in the black newspapers and the parades and cotillions of local organizations. But it was a party in a cage. The black community had boundaries: symbolic and actual limits, containing their freedom. Eliminating those limitations became a central focus of life in black Los Angeles. "As a group," Flamming contends, "they [struggled] to get free and stay free" (p. 3). As the black community grew, however, and as more white "southerners" moved into the region, particularly during the Depression when the Okies arrived, it became harder and harder to "stay free." At that point, the community "seldom touted the Western Ideal," turning instead to a political movement—New Deal Liberalism (pp. 308–311). The activists then transformed the politics of liberalism itself, "[putting] racial liberalism on the Democratic table and [making] sure it stayed there" (pp. 372–373).

This is a fine and thought-provoking book, but it is not without flaws. The author acknowledges changes in the community, but his focus does not veer far from his lead players. Flamming's research in memoirs, oral histories, NAACP branch files, and the *California Eagle*, is thorough, but the sources may distort reality by suggesting a uniformity of views that may not have existed. It is hard to be sure whether personalities such as Bass represent anything other than their own segment of a

more complex black community. At times, the book's analysis becomes muddled. Themes raised in the introduction tend to get lost in the glow of *California Eagle* boosterism. Flamming avoids analysis of the critical question of just how real the "Western Ideal" was. Were race relations in California different from the rest of the country, only to become similar as more "southerners" moved in? At most times, Flamming accepts the claim of western exceptionalism. But then he observes that racial discrimination was not "simply a southern import. It came at black Angelenos from all corners of the city, from all types of people" (p. 175). These are complex issues, and evidence is often contradictory. We may forgive Flamming's occasional foggy, but the book leaves so much to inference that one wonders where to divide a reading from the telling. Despite these criticisms, this book remains an essential starting point for any analysis of race relations in Los Angeles.

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TOM SITTON. *Los Angeles Transformed: Fletcher Bowron's Urban Reform Revival, 1938–1953*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 256. \$32.50.

Making good use of the Fletcher Bowron papers available at the Henry Huntington Library, Tom Sitton tells the story of an important mayor in a large American city. Elected to clean up city politics in 1938, Bowron presided over his metropolis's growth during and immediately after World War II, before losing power in 1953. Bowron's administration, Sitton argues, "transformed Los Angeles," with the city's government, economy, infrastructure, and race relations reaching maturity during Bowron's years as mayor (p. xi). Sometimes pictured as a selfless reformer, Bowron was, Sitton demonstrates, more complex. He won election, and long remained in power, by putting together and maintaining a shifting coalition of workers, businessmen, Protestant clergy, and liberals of various stripes.

Sitton begins by surveying urban reform in California from the 1890s into the 1930s, examining growing corruption in the Los Angeles government, and describing the convergence of the political groups favoring Bowron, a respected superior court judge, as a reform mayor. After winning election in a landslide, Bowron largely succeeded in cleaning up and modernizing city government, especially by cracking down on corruption and anti-union activities of the police force. During World War II, Bowron pursued economic development activities, while trying, with increasing difficulty, "to steer a middle course between capital and labor" (p. 56). Race relations suffered, as Bowron emerged as a leader in the movement to intern Japanese Americans and sided with the police against young Chicanos in his city's zoot suit riots. With the coming of peace, Bowron moved closer to business, breaking with the Left and labor. Even so, Bowron worked hard for public housing

at the same time that he joined an anticommunist crusade. In fact, Bowron's ardent work for public housing, well documented by Sitton, will be one of the topics of most interest to many readers of this volume. Bereft of much business support, mainly because of his backing of public housing, Bowron was rejected by voters in 1953. By then, however, Sitton concludes, Bowron's "urban reform crusade was complete: the city's stability was assured through his management of civic affairs, integrity was restored, and a restrained urban vision was initiated" (p. 191). Still, as Sitton also observes, "Bowron's efforts to manage growth and keep order in the city as it grew by leaps and bounds fell far short of what might have been accomplished by a more visionary leader, who could have made important contributions to race relations, social well-being, and more orderly development" (p. 199). Bowron's legacy was indeed a mixed one.

This book accomplishes a great deal but promises more than it delivers. Sitton tells the stories of each primary and general election in Los Angeles between 1938 and 1953 in considerable detail, no mean feat, and delineates well how changes in the city's political landscape were related to alterations at the state and national levels—especially the rise of anticommunism. Anyone wanting a blow-by-blow account of politics in Los Angeles during the mid-twentieth century should consult Sitton's book. Numerous, well-chosen photographs grace the text, illustrating Bowron's political career. While carefully describing city politics, this study does not, however, relate those politics closely enough to the massive social and economic changes that were radically altering Los Angeles. In slighting those connections, Sitton sometimes misses opportunities to connect his findings to those of other scholars, occasionally leaving his work a study in lost opportunities. For instance, Sitton might have addressed much more fully the issue of the importance, or lack of importance, of World War II in stimulating the development of western cities, a debate raised by such historians as Gerald Nash and Roger Lotchin. In addition, Sitton underplays urban planning efforts and urban space design in Los Angeles, topics examined by such scholars as Richard Longstreth, Greg Hise, and William Deverell. Sitton goes farther in linking his findings about Bowron as a politician to those of urban historian Carl Abbott about neo-progressive politicians in Western cities. This book first and foremost a study in politics in one city, told, too often for my taste, in semi-isolation from important urban issues.

MANSEL G. BLACKFORD
Ohio State University

BRYANT SIMON. *Boardwalk of Dreams: Atlantic City and the Fate of Urban America*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 285. \$35.00.

Bryant Simon has added a somewhat grandiose subtitle to his book on Atlantic City, New Jersey, thus declaring his intention not only to narrate the story of this famous

site but also to make it a metaphor for the U.S. urban crisis of the twentieth century. Atlantic City, a resort town that never exceeded 70,000 residents, might seem like a strange choice to represent all of urban America, but Simon actually succeeds quite well in making this case.

In the midst of the Depression, more than ten million people visited Atlantic City every year. Simon beautifully describes their social interactions on the Boardwalk, and in the massive hotel lobbies, downtown movie palaces, and smoke-filled nightclubs. In these public and semi-public spaces, unrelated Americans seemed to be magically transformed from an unruly mob into a good-natured crowd. Simon singles out Atlantic City's famous rolling chairs, pushed by African American men, as the iconic image of the resort. He interprets this vacation ritual as a widely shared and easily consumed fantasy of racial dominance, conspicuous consumption, and social climbing.

Of older northeastern resorts, Atlantic City was unusual in its relatively high percentage of year-round African American residents. For dark-skinned people, the resort provided a multitude of unskilled service jobs and an environment better than Jim Crow Virginia and North Carolina. However, Atlantic City remained a segregated town well into the 1960s, and African Americans who did not know their place, figuratively or literally, came in for a great deal of harassment.

Against this backdrop, Simon warns the reader numerous times to avoid a nostalgic vision of old-time democratic public spaces. He particularly chides new urbanist architects for supposedly overromanticizing the past. Simon states, "the public spaces of the past—the world of the Boardwalk, the rolling chair, downtown department stores, and tight-knit neighborhoods—was never about democracy; it was about exclusion. Moving up required stepping over others" (p. 13).

By the 1970s, Atlantic City had become a crime-ridden urban wasteland. Simon points to the usual suspects: air conditioning, jet planes, changes in vacation style, lack of investment, backyard swimming pools, and television. However, he sees the resort's decline as primarily a result of the white flight "that swept the middle class from the cities to the suburbs, from the downtown movie palaces to the drive-ins, and from urban amusement parks to the tightly controlled worlds of Disneyland and its imitators" (p. 112). After the civil rights movement, African Americans could no longer be kept out of tourist areas in Atlantic City. As a result, fearful vacationers rearranged their itineraries to visit less threatening places. At the same time, the white ethnic residents of Atlantic City fled into the New Jersey suburbs.

The last half of the book chronicles several futile efforts to revive Atlantic City's popularity. The Democratic National Convention of 1964 merely proclaimed the resort's collapse to the entire nation. The Miss America contest drifted into controversy and then obscurity. Ill-advised attempts at urban renewal left enormous vacant lots throughout the city. Even Atlantic

City's adoption of casino gambling in the late 1970s failed to help. The casinos have created more than 40,000 jobs and billions of dollars in tax revenue yet the city itself has not prospered. Although more than thirty million people visit Atlantic City each year, they rarely venture away from the confines of the casinos. Atlantic City still lacks the simplest amenities of urban life: stores, supermarkets, movie theaters, safe streets. Simon insists his story should not be read as a declension narrative but it is hard to interpret it any other way. The author depressingly concludes that, "in many ways, the city as a place to live is now worse than ever" (p. 9).

This book narrates a characteristic story of urban decay—white flight, corrupt city government, failed urban renewal, and rapacious developers—for an uncharacteristic city. Because Simon dismisses the 40,000 people who work for Atlantic City's casinos as suburban wannabees, the story lacks even the semblance of an upbeat ending. Only a short epilogue about the influx of new immigrants offers any hope for the city.

This is a very fine book. The prose is excellent, the thesis is clear, and the evidence is well marshaled. Simon is extremely knowledgeable of the secondary sources and makes particularly good use of interviews with visitors and natives. References to popular culture (e.g. Bruce Springsteen, "The King of Marvin Gardens") enliven the narrative. The discussion of Atlantic City's history as a gay resort is particularly fascinating.

The recent death of Jane Jacobs inadvertently casts a large shadow over this book. Simon seems to share her belief that cities are organic creations that work best when they stay farthest from the schemes of urban designers. This book would certainly interest anyone with an interest in popular culture, but it would also be quite useful as a text in an urban studies class.

JON STERNGASS

ERIC SMOODIN. *Regarding Frank Capra: Audience, Celebrity, and American Film Studies, 1930–1960*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2004. Pp. xii, 301. \$22.95.

Eric Smoodin's excellent study of the many ways the films of director Frank Capra were perceived by audiences is important not only because it extends the contemporary project to understand film reception but also because it is sensitive to the ways the mass audience was partially shaped by historical contexts and discourses. Here the audience is incredibly diverse, and people put Capra's films to pedagogical, patriotic, and entertainment uses. Whatever the intent of Hollywood studios or creative directors, the ultimate reception of films was subject to all kinds of interests and reactions. Still, there was a commonly held view in the 1930s and 1940s that a Capra film was more likely to engage central political issues of the times in ways that other films did not. Capra's popularity, in part, stemmed from a desire for political relevancy among members of his audience and an appreciation of his efforts to move film beyond mere escapism. It is clear from Smoodin's book that Capra

wanted to fill that need and that he and his audience helped to shape each other.

Smoodin's probes of the disparate audience are incisive. He is able to show that many individuals and groups jumped into the business of trying to interpret films. The State Department worried about the image of Americans conveyed by movies overseas. Theater managers looked for aspects of a film that they could use to promote local interest and attendance. In the 1930s an emerging film educational movement in schools saw movies as a way to further progressive political ideas and inform classroom discussion. Thus, teachers began to use films as they would literature to instruct and, at the same time, further progressive political aims such as anti-war sentiment, racial tolerance, and social justice. Smoodin sees this pedagogical effort based in the desires of a "popular front sensibility." In fact, when a Capra film strayed too far in the direction of entertainment or escapism—such as *It Happened One Night* (1934)—it could be criticized for failing to confront social problems. However, fan letters suggest that when the director offered stories that engaged important political issues of his times, many viewers responded approvingly. Such was the case with the effort Capra made to promote patriotic faith in America during the Depression-era by showing that greedy capitalists and unjust officials in Washington could be overcome by democratically minded citizens. Letters to the director regarding *Mr. Deeds Goes to Town* (1936) and *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* (1939) demonstrate that at least some moviegoers appreciated films that suggested more hopeful outcomes from the turbulence of domestic politics and from the lessons of American history. In the 1930s Capra became a star and an instrument of corporate success and still managed to sustain a reputation for empathy with common people and their fondest dreams for a society that would work for all.

Interestingly Smoodin shows that the experience of creating a mass audience and discourses between producers and various audience sectors had distinct implications for American mobilization to fight World War II. Many officials thought that movies could directly influence popular opinion. Government leaders even sought out Capra because of his reputation for promoting patriotic ideals and winning popular approval and recruited him to produce the "Why We Fight" series. In Smoodin's estimation Capra became a key figure in the merger of civilian and military cultures in the early 1940s. He notes that the series, especially after 1945, became something of a "signifier of selfless patriotic activity." Smoodin contributes to overall scholarly understanding by explaining how nationalist discourse was not only part of the reason Capra became successful but part of the discussion that permeated movie reception and celebrity formation at the time. Capra's efforts to explain to military personnel why Americans had to fight the war were, therefore, not a sudden turn to patriotic duty but an extension of his prewar work. But they were also a departure from some of the progressive

and anticapitalist features of his earlier films. Now the goal was not to change America but to defend it from outside enemies. Did the series accomplish its goals? Smoodin's look at GI responses to the series suggest that whether or not men saw the films, most still preferred domestic to overseas assignments after basic training.

The full political import of Capra's films is not to be found here, despite the richness of the author's analysis. And the evidence of audience response is sometimes fragmentary—an inevitable problem. Yet, the net gain in learning about the multifaceted nature of the audience and its influence on Capra's career is substantial.

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HAIDEE WASSON. *Museum Movies: The Museum of Modern Art and the Birth of Art Cinema*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 314. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$24.95.

The impetus of the Film Library of New York's Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) has been essential to the serious study of film as art, historic document, and educational medium in the United States. Haidee Wasson's history of MoMA Film Library's formation in 1935 and early impact on cinema studies deftly combines analysis of museum formation, philanthropic and curatorial practices, and the shaping of cultural ideas about the importance of motion pictures in modern life. Wasson asks how motion pictures moved from becoming simply entertainment to objects of study in the canon of "modern art." How did viewers' increased access to old American films and European cinema change the way they understood motion pictures?

A chief impediment to serious film study in the United States was lack of access; after playing in commercial theaters, films became largely unavailable. There was no national film institute as in London, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow, and few retrospective screenings; thirty-five millimeter nitrate film stock was flammable, and projectors and film rental were prohibitively expensive for schools and clubs. The new sixteen-millimeter format (promoted by MoMA's film lending library) helped make film use practical for schools, universities, clubs, and film societies.

Wasson traces the first four years of the Film Library's development, as MoMA's first director Alfred Barr (former Wellesley art historian) and founding film curators Iris Barry and John Abbott negotiated early collecting and exhibition strategies, struggling to meet the demands of various masters (Abby Rockefeller, Jock Whitney and the MoMA Museum Board, the Rockefeller Foundation, which provided the bulk of funding, and the art intelligentsia), to create the first American institution devoted to saving film and spreading informed cinema appreciation. Barry and Abbott received shockingly little assistance from the movie industry itself. Wasson argues that exhibitors' fears of

competition from European films and Hollywood's capitalist focus on the present and neglect of its past made the very idea of valuing old films foreign to the industry.

In the mid-1930s, MoMA's curators succeeded in gaining institutional and popular support by defining film as irreplaceable artifacts of American and world history and as invaluable educational tools rather than by classifying cinema as "Art." Wasson places the Film Library's development in the context of competing efforts to regulate film audiences or use film for educational purposes (from the Payne Fund Studies, to Hollywood's Film Production Code of censorship, to the spread of film appreciation movements in high schools). The Film Library also contributed to Depression-era attempts to define distinctly American contributions to arts and culture (as seen in the rise of American Studies as an academic discipline and the founding of Colonial Williamsburg).

This is a history of museology and the construction of curatorial practices, analyzing how the idea of "modern art" spread from academics and wealthy collectors, to museums and their institutional practices, to wider public acceptance. It is also a tale of elites "poaching" working-class culture, taking the popular entertainment of the masses and reifying it as "art cinema." The Film Library played a major role in creating "cinema history," from Barry's curatorial practices of dating and describing films as they would other art objects, to coalescing a "canon" of film history that featured the essential Americanness of the first twentieth-century art form, to a focus on great directors-as-artists (later to be called auteurs) of European and American cinema.

The book piques interest to learn more about the centrality of pioneering women's efforts to the development of early film study. Cinema studies soon became a masculine-dominated area with emphasis on male auteurs, influential male film critics, and academic scholars. How did MoMA choose to canonize D. W. Griffith and others? Wasson notes that the director initially refused offers to contribute, yet states that *Birth of a Nation* (1915) and *Intolerance* (1916) would become MoMA's most significant holdings. What films did curators select as "historic" and valuable, and why? The reader longs for more details of a history that is acknowledged to be lost.

Wasson argues that MoMA created a new kind of moviegoing practice outside the commercial mainstream, in which patrons studiously contemplated the screen image in hushed, intimate auditoriums—one similar to conditions film theoreticians in the 1950s would place on film spectatorship. Wasson tantalizingly argues, however, that MoMA's early audiences did *not* behave so "appropriately," hooting at love scenes and cheering violent death scenes and commenting loudly to one another. Barry maintained a permanent seat in her theater with intercom buttons to warn patrons of their misbehavior and threatened to stop screenings if they persisted. I wish the author could have told us more about these viewers. Ironically, Barry and MoMA may have created the first "modern" critical film audi-

ences as reception scholars now study them, knowledgeable viewers actively making sense of, and asserting their say over, films rather than “passively” watching the screen.

KATHRYN FULLER-SEELEY
Georgia State University

HELEN LANGA. *Radical Art: Printmaking and the Left in 1930s New York*. (Ahmanson-Murphy Fine Arts Imprint.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press with the Ahmanson Foundation. 2004. Pp. viii, 342. \$55.00.

Helen Langa has written a useful book about a neglected part of America's visual culture of the 1930s. In this careful examination of left-wing graphic arts, she does not reach dramatic new conclusions about the Depression or its social art but does offer a solid correction to the common misapprehension that this art was either howling social protest or leftist propaganda. By considering the prints of the decade, she has demonstrated that Depression artists undertook complex explorations as they grappled with quite dynamic definitions of race, gender, and class. She is determined to take the decade on its own terms, and so she uses the label “social viewpoint” art for the genre that is now more widely known as social realism.

Langa's basic architecture is topical. Large chapters are devoted to subjects such as style, or social injustice, or antifascism. In the chapter on labor images, for example, the treatment is broken down into sections according to topic: images dealing with unemployment, strikes, or the mining, textile, construction, and steel industries. But inside such chapters, Langa does set graphic artists within the changing contexts of the times, giving particular attention to their adaptations to and reflections of the Communist Party's fluctuating interests. Lynching was a more common subject in the early 1930s (particularly following the Scottsboro events), while fascism and antisemitism were more prevalent in the later part of the decade. Black-and-white imagery also fit the times, whether in the expression of Langa's graphic artists or the decade's more widely known documentary photographers. It is not only that the depressed tonal scale somehow fit a depressed era, but also that black-and-white's inherent abstracting qualities allowed plenty of room for artists determined to express themselves on the decade's political and social issues. Langa's artists were quite innovative, going far beyond cartooning to experiment with foreshortening and fractured visual planes.

There are plenty of nuanced points throughout this book. Langa's graphic artists, for instance, had an easy time depicting heroism in their images of the building trades but were more inclined to themes of oppression when they pictured the garment trades. When they took up antifascism, they were being not only altruistic in their condemnation of an obvious evil but also self-serving, as these same images also extolled the virtues of artistic freedom. Her focus is on artists who worked

within New York City, which is reasonable, given that New York was emerging as the nation's cultural capital, that it was the site of the largest federal graphic arts project, and that it was home not only to many radicals but also to radical organizations such as the Art Union and Artists' Congress. Although she concentrates on fourteen principal artists, she provides useful short biographies of fifty-two associated individuals. Well illustrated with 100-plus images, this is one of the best representations of 1930s prints that we have.

Although she is comprehensive, Langa covers material quickly. Key images and individuals could use more extensive treatment to bring them to life; the thorough catalog at times wins out over the more prolonged analysis. Her art is of a period, and she describes it as coming to an end with the Depression's conclusion: communist dreams were difficult to maintain after the Hitler-Stalin pact, and race, class and gender inequities proved to be exhausting battle grounds. But it is also true that World War II offered plenty of official outlets for themes that had preoccupied these social artists in the 1930s. Antifascism was now the official cause, and there was plenty of room for graphic artists in the various wartime propaganda agencies.

This will be a very useful book for scholars seeking to broaden their understanding of this dynamic decade. It will also be a natural choice for graduate and undergraduate seminars devoted to the historiography of the Depression's visual arts.

DAVID P. PEELER
United States Naval Academy

PAUL A. C. KOISTINEN. *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940–1945*. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2004. Pp. xiii, 657. \$49.95.

On October 6, 1942, the War Planning Board met to consider the ability of the American economy to meet the military's requirements for fighting World War II. It was a long, tense affair. The army and the war department had steadfastly refused to revise their estimates of needs, despite increasing evidence—nearly all of it supplied by academic specialists and civilian experts—that meeting the military's figures would result in substantial economic dislocations and overall impairment of production, if meeting them were possible at all. General Brehon B. Somervell, responsible for the army's demands, repeated his charge that to do anything less was a disservice to the men in uniform. A thoroughly disgusted Leon Henderson, veteran of the New Deal and still-hopeful reformer, blasted Somervell's “repeated obstinacy, overbearing manner, and ignorance of production problems” (p. 312). He then suggested that if the American military chiefs could not fight the war on the then-colossal sum of \$90 billion, they should be replaced by officers who could. Silence ensued.

Paul A. C. Koistinen's study of America's mobilization effort during World War II is meticulously re-

searched, well organized, and highly detailed. If it were simply these things, it would be a magnificent contribution to a richly studied period. But it is a great deal more. Koistinen traces, with understated but riveting thoroughness, the recovery of the power of big business in twentieth-century America and its fateful alliance with a virtually unrestrained, authoritarian American military. This alliance was simply inconceivable without World War II, which proved to be an unmitigated blessing for American conservatives.

America's mobilization effort did not start out that way. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's first incarnation of a coordinating agency, the National Defense Advisory Council established in the summer of 1940, carefully included representatives from organized labor (Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers) and consumers (political scientist Harriett Elliott of the University of North Carolina). Critically, Roosevelt himself declined to chair the council, instead selecting Donald Nelson of Sears, Roebuck. Just as critically, Roosevelt brought Republicans Henry Stimson and Frank Knox into his cabinet as secretaries of war and the navy.

Stimson's appointment was pivotal. Accurately described by Koistinen as an ultra-elitist, Stimson also was a superior administrator and bureaucratic infighter who brought in dedicated assistants such as Harvey Bundy, Robert Lovett, and John McCloy and galvanized the army into dominating (indeed fairly overwhelming) the mobilization process with a plethora of plans, numbers, staffwork, and attention, much of the last two from "dollar-a-year men" brought in from large corporations. This combination won swift victories. When Hillman and Henderson tried to deny government defense contracts to employers who had willfully violated the National Labor Relations Act, such as Ford, they lost. The National Defense Advisory Council itself was dissolved after Roosevelt's re-election in favor of the much more exclusive (that is, much more military-big business) Office of Production Management (OPM), although Hillman retained a posting in the new body at Roosevelt's behest.

Hillman, however, would be gone shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack. Isolated in OPM, he was further paralyzed by divisions within labor, most famously the bitter feud between the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Neither liked Hillman; the AFL regarded him as a maverick, the CIO as a tool of Roosevelt. The CIO's leader, John Lewis, had particularly acrimonious relations with Roosevelt throughout the war, with the effect, fair or not, that many Americans considered the home front mobilization successes purely business-born while regarding labor unions as havens for selfishness and thuggery. Stimson, on occasion brought to tears by his inability to conscript labor or use bayonets to bring strikers to heel (although bayonets were deployed to intimidate strikers at the North American Aviation plant in 1941), nevertheless was able to secure contract awards, plant expansions, and new plant lo-

cations without labor's input. Later in the war, Stimson and Somervell also successfully resisted reconversion to peacetime production so long as any military contracts were outstanding, regardless of the consequences for civilian product needs or employment. It was fortunate that the American economy was so large; severe civilian shortages might otherwise have resulted. Even war production might have suffered if the army-business combination had had its way all the time. Successful production of synthetic rubber was only possible after farmers, with the help of Congress, overrode big oil's plans and insisted that grain-derived alcohol be used as well.

Koistinen delivers these judgments, and many others, with almost clinical detachment. His depiction of how Washington worked is all the more persuasive because he does not preach but instead provides the details of his story. He concludes that Roosevelt and the country got what they wanted in the results, in fact real triumphs, of the American mobilization effort. But his account often compels the reader to ask whether, in the end, the cost to democracy was quite worth it.

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RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL, editor. *Harry's Farewell: Interpreting and Teaching the Truman Presidency*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2004. Pp. xv, 381. \$44.95.

This book is a collection of essays on the Truman administration by college and high school teachers. Apparently their starting point was Harry S Truman's farewell address. The contributors published a book intended to teach students how to study the Truman presidency, but rather than set an example of objectivity, some chose to espouse particularistic and non-objective viewpoints.

Carol Anderson reviews Truman's desegregation of the armed services, integration of the federal bureaucracy, and insistence on a civil rights plank for the 1948 Democratic platform, but she fails to consider his antisegregationist record when he served as executive of Jackson County, Missouri, and senator from Missouri, as well as his personal relationships with Jews, Catholics, and blacks. She observes that while Truman said that he wanted to see all Americans enjoy constitutional rights of "freedom and equality" and "when I say all Americans I mean all Americans," Anderson insists that he was bound to fail since he relied on J. Edgar Hoover to investigate civil rights violations, and Hoover "had an intense disdain for civil rights and Blacks." Anderson claims that racial discrimination continued as the federal government spent some \$120 billion for new housing from 1934 to 1962, while less than one percent of federal loans went to African Americans. But what were the figures during Truman's administration? Anderson also fails to mention that Congress rejected Truman's civil rights program as it rejected most of his reform legislation, including medicare.

In "A Very Dangerous Course, Harry S Truman and the Red Scare," Ellen Schrecker claims that Truman's 1947 loyalty program paved the way for McCarthyism. "The Hollywood Ten, the Alger Hiss case, the Rosenberg trial took place during Truman's administration." The assumption is that he was responsible or that he could have prevented these things. While she admits that Truman recognized the McCarthyites and McCarrans as dangerous to American democracy, Schrecker maintains that he did little, if anything, to stop them. Truman vetoed the McCarran Act, but Congress overrode his veto. Schrecker fails to explain why Truman could not effectively combat the Red Scare. Had America surrendered to right-wing totalitarianism?

Rachel Ida Buff's essay, "Harry Truman, Immigration, and Ethnicity at an Imperial Moment," insists that Truman's immigration policy was a surrender to racism and that his international relations were likewise racist. She believes that Truman's decision to drop the atom bomb on Japan was influenced by "racial ideas of the Japanese as less than human" (p. 281). Would it have been less racist if atomic bombs had been dropped on Berlin? Buff also claims that "radiation testing was done over working-class communities in Minneapolis and East St. Louis during the 1950's," and that those tests were conducted in poor and minority neighborhoods whose people had little savvy about "political protest." How was this testing done, and when? How was radiation limited to highly selective spots of Minneapolis and St. Louis? How many people were affected? Did Truman give the order to conduct such tests? What connection was there between those tests and Truman's efforts to change the discriminatory immigration regulations dating back to the nineteenth century? Buff fails to deal with such questions, and she insists that Truman was "ambivalent" toward racial inequality in America. But he was much more of a fighter for equality and civil rights in America than the several presidents who preceded him or Dwight D. Eisenhower, who succeeded him. He vetoed the McCarran Act that continued discriminatory policies against immigrant groups including those of Asian origins. Buff claims that Truman advocated such reforms only because they suited his anticommunist Cold War policies.

A book of "studies" on Truman or any other president might be useful if the editor presented at least two contrasting viewpoints on any particular issue. Moreover, the editor should make sure the various writers stick to the facts and to their own areas of expertise. Several contributors to this volume did not meet those standards.

There is an attempt to provide a balanced point of view by Alonzo L. Hamby. He observes that "in his weaknesses as well as strengths Harry Truman was a prototypical representative of American democracy," and that the Cold War was not engineered by Truman: it was the "result of an altogether merited response by largely free societies to an expansionist Stalinist totalitarianism." In response to those who claim that Truman needlessly used atomic bombs against Japan,

Hamby points out that Japan was unwilling to surrender until the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Russia entered the war against Japan.

This book is useful in that it illustrates how, at times, bias prevails among some students of history. Historical conference participants should park their axes outside the doors of their meetings; certainly they should be more judicious and careful when writing "analytical" essays. I believe they expect as much from their own students.

HERBERT M. DRUKS
Brooklyn College

RICHARD T. ARNDT. *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, Inc. 2005. Pp. xxi, 602. \$45.00.

A mixture of memoir, history, and advocacy, this book examines U.S. cultural diplomacy from its beginnings in World War I to the present. Richard T. Arndt spent most of his life involved in cultural exchange, including a twenty-four-year career with the United States Information Agency (USIA). He draws from his own experiences and acquaintances and also references a wide range of scholarly literature. His lengthy and well-written book examines the people, programs, ideas, and debates that have shaped U.S. cultural diplomacy.

At the outset, Arndt states that he is not naïve about U. S. clandestine programs or the ugly underside of American hegemony, but that he intends to emphasize what might be the genuine achievements of enlightened cultural exchange. The decline of cultural diplomacy over the past four decades, he suggests, has passed so unnoticed that the nation feels only bewilderment at the anti-Americanism around the globe. Americans, he insists, are now in peril because of their lack of intellectual engagement with the rest of the world.

Arndt explains the animating ideal behind cultural diplomacy as it was initially imagined by people such as Sumner Welles in the 1930s, Archibald McLeish during World War II, and J. William Fulbright in the postwar era: a two-way, educational and intellectual exchange that aimed, over the long term, to improve understanding among peoples. He then recounts how national emergencies dealt repeated blows to this ideal, and how it lost out in bureaucratic struggles to impatient public relations and advertising people who favored one-way "information" or propaganda. Nelson Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs, the Office of War Information, the postwar Campaign of Truth, and the USIA all gave priority to unidirectional "information" over cultural exchange. And the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) secret financing of many cultural programs during the Cold War prompted distrust of cultural officers and initiatives. Moreover, Congressional critics, suspicious of spending money for internationalist causes and doubting the worth of high culture, proved impatient (and tightfisted) with cultural diplomacy, especially as Fulbright's influence waned.

Within this larger narrative about the contests between advocates of "cultural" versus "informational" diplomacy (a contest in which Arndt is a clear partisan of the first), the author embeds detailed histories of a wide variety of both private and governmental cultural exchange programs. He includes vignettes of the often improvised work of cultural diplomats in field offices at so-called "points of contact," insider accounts of bureaucratic politics, astute biographical sketches, and telling personal stories. He pauses to provide histories of the cultural policies of the U.S. occupation governments in Germany and Japan; Cold War trade fairs; the changing architecture of U.S. embassies and overseas libraries; language instruction and book programs; CIA funding of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the National Student Association, and other organizations; the Fulbright program; the Peace Corps; art and performance funding in the 1960s; the inept reorganization under Jimmy Carter that all but extinguished the "cultural" vision; and the final demise of the USIA. He details the funding and approach of each presidential administration from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush, rushing through the last two decades of decline. No other book has, or is likely to have, comparable scope and detail.

Throughout this sweeping account, Arndt argues that, slowly, U. S. policy has shifted from projecting a confident, friendly society that embraces open exchanges to projecting a fearful, imperial, and insular country that values cultural contact only as manipulation. The book piles up accounts of lost opportunities and of lonely attempts, especially in field offices, to keep the faith regardless of impediments.

In a book on cultural diplomacy, one might wish for more reflection on popular culture. Arndt's book sees cultural diplomacy as high intellectual exchange among elites, and he presents the enterprise as an extension of the arts and learning of academic life. Yet the spread of U.S. popular music, consumerism, and lifestyle fashions has been a major component of the last half-century's globalization and was certainly more than an offshoot of some public-relations offensive. What constitutes culture, and especially "American culture," is not discussed in any depth. Perhaps Arndt's almost automatic equation of "cultural diplomacy" with cultural exchange among elites implicitly suggests why its advocates have so often felt embattled.

Asking Arndt to take up even broader issues and debates in this 600-page book, however, would be unfair. He has provided an essential and encyclopedic resource for anyone interested in the past and future of cultural diplomacy. The book appears to be the product of a lifetime of work and of research, and it is passionately and eloquently written.

Arndt assumes that friendship, intelligent interaction, and open cultural curiosity should be seen as marks of national and personal strength, not weakness. He presents an extended plea to Americans to reverse "the sharp rise in foreign non-understanding [which] has become a national nightmare." Enlightened cul-

tural exchange, he concludes, costs very little, once paid dividends, and should be brought back to life.

EMILY S. ROSENBERG
Macalester College

JUDITH SEALANDER. *The Failed Century of the Child: Governing America's Young in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2003. Pp. x, 374. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$28.00.

Judith Sealander's book is an awe-inspiring synthesis of research on state responses to child welfare in the twentieth century. Often challenging conventional wisdom, the book offers a dauntingly original take on many child welfare policies. As a historical account of child welfare policy in the twentieth century it is superb. But Sealander is more ambitious than many historians. She is deeply critical of many policies and wields the methodological tools of the social scientist and policy analyst in addition to the historian as she makes her way through the past. Hers is a work that is meant to be of use.

The scope of this book makes it enormously useful for both scholarship and teaching. The text includes chapters devoted to child labor, poverty, child abuse, education, juvenile justice, health care, and education. The individual chapters traverse a range of twentieth-century policies for dealing with these issues right up until the end of the century. For each topic, she focuses on several key policies, their ambitions, unintended consequences, contradictions, failures, and successes. The result is that each chapter leaves the reader with a distinctive message about the lessons to be taken away from the stories of failed, or in some rarer examples successful, public policies.

One has to admire Sealander's gutsiness in taking on a number of sacred cows. At times, though, she teeters on the edge of being unduly adversarial, as for instance in her attack on Head Start. She chides politicians for heeding the hype touting Head Start's ability to raise children's IQs and bolster academic achievement, disregarding later evidence indicating that there were few if any long-term effects on the adult outcomes of participants. This critique of Head Start is fairly commonplace, but Sealander is too dismissive of more recent and qualified research, which identifies some long-term health and other benefits to the children and parents who participated in the program.

By contrast, Sealander idealizes, seemingly with good reason, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) as a model youth employment program in comparison with the miserable failure of the 1960s War on Poverty initiative, the Job Corps. In operation from 1933 to 1942, the CCC employed almost three million youth. Sealander applauds the clear goals of the program: conservation, unemployment relief, and military preparedness. Research reveals that CCC participants, most of them poorly educated and all of them poor, had higher than average incomes as adults. Sealander juxtaposes the "lessons learned" from the CCC with the "lessons

ignored" by the Job Corps. Yet Sealander fails to take seriously the shortcomings of the CCC. Females were excluded, black participation was limited, and transient youth were largely unable to participate because they did not live with families who were on relief. Still, Sealander's pointed critique of the Jobs Corps in contrast to the CCC is informative and bracing.

In her discussion of child abuse, Sealander remonstrates with politicians for avoiding controversy by repeating the premise that "child abuse knew no boundaries" (p. 73), ignoring research demonstrating that poverty and race were correlated with higher levels of abuse. Claims about the impact of child abuse on the victims' adult lives were overstated. Reporting measures cast such a wide net that the child welfare system was overwhelmed and failed to catch serious child abusers as they sifted through the morass of unfounded accusations. The aims of new policies to deal with child abuse were noble, but the unintended consequences contributed to a child welfare system in which many children languish.

Perhaps even more striking is Sealander's analysis of special education. Although recognizing the important step that legislation for children with disabilities made to improve their educational opportunities, she charts the rising litigiousness it generated and the economic consequences for struggling school districts. In the end, she bravely articulates an unpopular position: "As the disability rights movement became a potent political lobby, it skewed education policy in an unfair way" (p. 209).

The end of the book features the success of the vaccination movement, which saved lives and prevented lifelong disabilities from infectious diseases. Controversy surrounded the decision to enforce mandatory immunizations for school children, especially in those rare cases where a child was made severely ill or died from the vaccinations. Nonetheless, the relatively unambiguous nature of the program enabled it to succeed where other programs for children failed.

Sealander's book is one of the finest works of historical scholarship in the service of public policy that I have read. One could recommend that policy makers read this book for the lessons it might teach them about failed and successful child welfare policies. Yet, based on Sealander's account of the tendency of policy makers to stake out popular positions and to quickly advance solutions that are not supported by research, that is unlikely to happen.

JULIA GRANT
Michigan State University

MELANIE DAWSON. *Laboring to Play: Home Entertainment and the Spectacle of Middle-Class Cultural Life, 1850–1920*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 2005. Pp. x, 257. \$39.75.

Commemorative recitations, tableaux vivants, theatricals, and charades are just some of the home entertainments that appear in Melanie Dawson's book, which

explores how these leisure forms changed over roughly seventy years and examines the larger relationship of play to the development and critique of middling lifestyles. Home entertainments, Dawson argues, occupied a particularly important and unique position in nineteenth-century American cultural life because they "reflected the interests of an increasingly affluent population of middling Americans, a group confronted with genteel expectations, preoccupied with social status, and driven by a desire for professional accomplishment" (p. 1).

The first half of the book deals with the emergence of home entertainment guides in the mid-nineteenth century as the middle class was struggling to find what Dawson describes as "an authentic means of inhabiting a genteel social world" (p. 5). These guides were not altogether at odds with the etiquette books of the period, but they nonetheless compelled participants to question the authenticity of genteel interaction or even act out against social pretentiousness. Along the way, the guides stressed individual abilities, supported the idea that participants could shape their own lives, and promoted and honed the competitive skills that would lead to social success. Indeed, home entertainments, Dawson argues, promoted the development of skilled social work that could translate into success and class status once the game had finished.

By the turn of the century, Dawson argues, "references to entertaining and skilled play frequently appear in tales of defeat rather than triumph" (p. 130). During the period from the 1880s through the century's turn, narratives of material self-definition began to dominate, and late nineteenth and turn-of-the-century fiction was much less likely to feature stories of middling types who experience success because of their dynamic skills than in previous years. These turn-of-the-century entertainment forms stood in sharp contrast to the mid-century examples that emphasized the transformative power of personal abilities and the importance of a skills-based culture.

The century's turn coincided with a generational crisis. New entertainment forms promoted values and interests that contrasted with parental ideas about leisure, and entertainment guide publishers attempted to respond to the crisis by reviving games from the past and by introducing new ones. The new games encouraged participants to engage in social rituals like community pageants and other activities that favored heavily guided social interaction and emphasized communal identities. This perceived generational divide, the changes in entertainment that accompanied it, and what Dawson refers to as the "narratives meant to evoke respectful allegiance to simplified visions of the relation between self and society" (p. 183) offer a different interpretation of the modern youthful rebellion long associated with a reaction to Victorian notions of propriety.

Dawson's argument would fare better if the broader historical context surrounding home entertainment guides was more developed, and if she connected the

games she analyzes to the larger development of leisure during this time. This is particularly evident in the latter half of the book when she discusses the changes affecting entertainment forms, the increased emphasis on communal forms of play, and the rise of a generational divide. The crisis she describes comes to life in her discussion about the debates taking shape in entertainment guides and the other sources she uses, but there is no sustained discussion of the impact of the rise of commercial leisure and other mass entertainments, how those forms of leisure increasingly competed with older forms of play, and how they challenged and/or reinforced ideas about individualism and community. For example, at points Dawson makes use of immigrant pageants and other community leisure pursuits to emphasize the important shift toward communal activities, but the reader gets no sense of the immigrant lives she is drawing upon and how such people understood the forms of community play Dawson is discussing.

At the same time, this book thoroughly explores the games people played and their importance to middle-class cultural life. Relying primarily on entertainment guides and fiction from the period, Dawson meticulously analyzes the subtle changes surrounding leisure forms and what those changes tell us about class status and women's roles at a time of dramatic change and instability. Her analysis is detailed and thoughtful, including chapters on the imperial motifs of entertainment guides and on the bizarre or grotesque, which offer another way to think about the anxieties of the period and the boundaries surrounding genteel life. Historians of middle-class cultural life will undoubtedly find this work useful and appreciate its insights into home entertainment during the mid to late nineteenth century.

RANDY D. MCBEE
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JUDITH E. SMITH. *Visions of Belonging: Family Stories, Popular Culture, and Postwar Democracy, 1940–1960*. (Popular Cultures, Everyday Lives.) New York: Columbia University Press. 2004. Pp. xiv, 444. \$39.50.

Judith E. Smith's sprawling new book ends with an analysis of the transformative political possibilities, yet limited effect, of Lorraine Hansberry's 1959 play, *A Raisin in the Sun*. *Raisin*, Smith argues, broke new ground by representing members of a black family as ordinary Americans, and by using their fight against racial discrimination as a metaphor for the larger struggle of blacks against white supremacy. Yet most white critics instead viewed the play as a soap opera, with the black family representing any poor family striving to improve itself. The potential radicalism of *Raisin*, in both the stage version and later as a movie (1961), were contained by audiences and critics who viewed it as a story of pluralistic, multi-ethnic, upward mobility rather than as a critique of racial exclusion and an argument for the necessity of expanded citizenship in postwar America.

The vast gulf between authorial intent and the public

reception of a work like *Raisin*, is one of the key themes that runs throughout Smith's book, which traces "the ways in which popular stories of 'ordinary' families provided a forum for competing conceptions of American democracy" (p. 3) from 1940 to 1960. In an interdisciplinary work that brings together historical research, literary criticism, and film analysis, Smith focuses on a wide array of novels, plays, television, and movies from the 1940s and 1950s that represented ordinary families. She explores how these stories could have political significance by defining which families were recognized as ordinary and thus deserving of public respect.

Smith identifies three major types of "ordinary family" stories that authors employed to raise questions about the boundaries of American democracy and citizenship. "Looking Back" stories—such as the novel and later movie, *A Tree Grows in Brooklyn*—presented working-class immigrant families as prototypical Americans who were central to the survival of the nation. During wartime, these stories helped to expand American citizenship to include whites of all ethnic backgrounds. "Trading Places" stories, such as *Lost Boundaries*, *Pinky*, or *Gentlemen's Agreement*, took the fight for expanded citizenship further in the postwar period by arguing that "ordinary citizens" should also include racial outsiders. "Trading Places" works invited the audience to identify with a marginalized character in an effort to show a universal humanism that transcended race. "Everyman" stories, such as *Marty* or *Death of a Salesman*, turned to stories of ordinary, working-class individuals whose disappointments raised questions about class mobility and the emphasis on consumerism as the United States entered the Cold War.

In each case, however, the potential power of the critique embedded in these forms was stunted. "Looking Back" stories, while successfully positing working-class white ethnics as ordinary Americans, simultaneously upheld racial boundaries and communicated a nostalgic version of the immigrant past that emphasized the importance of hard work and downplayed the role of collective protest. "Trading Places" stories did not successfully challenge racial categories, and in their simplistic search for an ideal, universal victim of racial discrimination, they showed only the most general evils of prejudice and rarely confronted the realities of power. "Everyman" stories represented the "ordinary" as unmarked white middle class or as white ethnic, making it harder for blacks to become visible in artistic representations. The social critique of these stories was quickly lost, Smith argues. Instead, they served to reinforce conventional boundaries of American nationality and masculinity.

This book brings together an exceptionally rich array of sources to locate each work historically, to show how works changed as they moved from book to stage to screen, and to explore the audience's response to each work. Smith, however, is somewhat less successful in crafting an overarching argument. Detail sometimes overwhelms her larger thesis about what these works, and their reception, demonstrate about the nature of

postwar American democracy and citizenship. The book lacks a conclusion, which might have enabled Smith to highlight her main themes and to explore more fully what she views as the impact of this body of work. The initial focus on families is somewhat compromised by Smith's decision to discuss works that situate their narratives largely in the public world of men. Although Smith does make some attempts to compare the representations of race and citizenship in films like *Home of the Brave*, set in the military, with those set in more domestic spheres, this theme is never fully developed. Nevertheless, Smith has written an important book that will serve as a great resource for historians of American postwar culture and politics.

RENEE ROMANO
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LEEROM MEDOVOI. *Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins of Identity*. (New Americanists Series.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. Pp. ix, 387. \$23.95.

For most historians, the "other 1950s" has become "the 1950s." Instead of the harmony and homogeneity of a "happy days" decade, they now see anxiety, dissent, and diversity. Leerom Medovoi examines the contested terrain of the postwar period as the inaugural moment of the concept of identity, defined as psychopolitical sovereignty for individuals and groups. With adolescence as the staging ground for identity formation, he argues, 1950s rebels struggled against the regulatory norms of Fordist suburban life and exposed "adjustment" to "organizational manhood" as an absurdity. Although identity discourse in the 1950s was ideologically compromised, it was not simply "a ruse of power or counterfeit resistance" (p. 328) but a productive authorization of strategies for resistance. The rebel of the 1950s, Medovoi concludes, prepared the way for the "identity politics" of the 1960s and 1970s.

Medovoi begins with Erik Erikson's *Childhood and Society* (1950), which provided the definition of "identity" that was adopted across the social sciences. He then traces "identitarianization" in popular culture texts of the decade, emphasizing the role of the "bad boy" in the nation's "counterimaginary." Contrasting the spirit of a young America in revolutionary action with the play-it-safe, other-directed suburbanite, the 1950s rebel "identified" with the aspirations for freedom and autonomy of the rapidly decolonizing nations of the Third World.

J. D. Salinger's *The Catcher in the Rye* (1951), Medovoi asserts, delineated the contradiction between the representative figure and the dominant national character. Adults took Holden Caulfield for a madman because he declined to be a mass man. Liberal critics of the book suggested that Holden would have to "mature" if he was to make it in contemporary America. And yet, they found his "immaturity" especially appealing. This contradictory space, Medovoi believes, provided the potential for combining cultural democracy and critical nonconformity. Rock 'n' roll also allowed

teenagers to see themselves as at once inside and apart from postwar values. The music associated suburbia with the standardization of factories and schools and defined spaces within suburbia—cars, concerts, and juke joints—as zones of escape.

The films *Blackboard Jungle* (1955), *King Creole* (1958), and *Rebel without a Cause* (1955) also offered "particularly radical possibilities for youth rebellion" (p. 209). As did the Beats. Although their politics was double-edged as well, the Beats, according to Medovoi, represented—and in some instances fulfilled—the inner possibilities of their generation. In *On The Road* (1957), he acknowledges, Jack Kerouac had doubts about the sustainability of fraternal bonds. But in John Clellon Holmes's novel *Go* (1952), a defeated group becomes defiant. This desire for a gendered collectivity of rebels, Medovoi emphasizes, would be picked up by women and gays.

Medovoi does not explain the criteria he used in selecting the texts analyzed in this book. Does the popularity of novels, films, and songs suggest something about the appeal of oppositional readings in them? If so, why give as much space to *Girls Town* (1959) and *Go*, which came and went, as to blockbusters *The Catcher in the Rye* and *Blackboard Jungle*? Should Medovoi privilege texts that were explicitly oppositional and those that gave sustained attention to "identitarian" themes? Are there many other 1950s texts that offer "particularly radical possibilities"?

Similar questions surround Medovoi's close—and often imaginative—readings of the texts themselves. Is there evidence, for example, that tomboy narratives "instilled utopian fantasies about egalitarian heterosociality" in 1950s audiences, or that they "indicate powerful utopian longings" (p. 312)? When Mr. Dadier asks, in *Blackboard Jungle*, whether it is right to dislike a person because he is different, is he expressing a nascent multiculturalism or repeating integrationist rhetoric about membership in the family of man, despite epidermal dissimilarities? Did anyone in the 1950s endorse a reading that *Blackboard Jungle* "permits," in which Dadier "cynically exploits racism" (p. 154) to divide the students? Audience response is difficult to measure, of course, but Medovoi implies that it matters. An oppositional gay reading of *Blackboard Jungle*, he claims, remained in the celluloid closet, but in the character of Plato, *Rebel without a Cause* invited one. How does he know?

Given the straitjackets of Cold War containment and the Fordist economy, Medovoi suggests, an oppositional politics of identity "needed to be produced" (p. 224). But it could become viable only when texts "and the popular responses to them made it plausible that young Americans *wished* they measured up, or at any rate would *wish* it if only they began to recognize their shared coming of age in the postwar historical moment" (p. 224). Insufficiently immersed in those popular responses to assuage historians' anxiety of influence, this book does not adequately explain how oppositional their response actually was; nor does it make a com-

elling case that the "identitarianism" of the 1950s paved the way for "identity politics" in the 1960s and 1970s.

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DAVID MCCARTHY. *H. C. Westermann at War: Art and Manhood in Cold War America*. Newark: University of Delaware Press. 2005. Pp. 171. \$65.00.

This is an appreciative study of a mid-twentieth-century American painter, collage maker, and sculptor who so far has been little known beyond artistic circles. H. C. Westermann awaits a full-scale biography; David McCarthy's book is not one, nor does it claim to be. Instead, McCarthy's work is a study in some depth of just one theme: the artistic significance of the fact that his subject was a combat marine in World War II and Korea. McCarthy convincingly demonstrates that "the experience of war stands at the heart of H.C. Westermann's art" (p. 15).

A study of the visual arts should include ample illustrations, and with 112 of them over 137 pages of text, this one meets the requirement. McCarthy shows his own keen eye and fertile imagination in numerous interpretations of Westermann's work, making it no surprise that he is an art historian, the author of previous books on Pop Art and the nude in American painting. If not essentially the gendered analysis that its subtitle seems to promise, the book is more than art history narrowly conceived. For broad, probing treatments of mid-century American manhood, including masculinity's link to visual arts, one should look to works by the likes of James Gilbert, Christina S. Jarvis, K. A. Cuordileone, and Patricia Vettel-Becker. But McCarthy's book has strengths of its own, and they are considerable.

McCarthy does tease the reader with some of the gendered interpretation to which the book's full title points, but only in his first of five chapters, a provocative analysis of Westermann entitled "A Soldier and a Man." Here McCarthy sees Westermann—fond of posing shirtless for photographs in the 1950s, displaying his several tattoos—as a postwar American tough guy, brother to Jackson Pollock and Norman Mailer. It was not only his shirtlessness, as well as his wartime court martial (for deserting his post, drunkenness on duty, and striking a military policeman) that made Westermann a male not to be confused with the man in the gray flannel suit. Westermann also possessed a profound affection for his craft, including a respect for the tools of his trade, that recalled an earlier, distinctly working-class style of manhood, something McCarthy astutely notes yet does not explore at length. While he prized physical strength enough to keep workout weights in his studio, Westermann was hardly a posturing boor like Mailer; Westermann's "machismo," McCarthy argues, "was significantly tempered by a profoundly felt defenselessness" (p. 20). If Westermann was not as singular in being an alienated veteran who felt defenseless

in postwar America as McCarthy appears to believe (Lenny Bruce is but one example of a veteran whose years in uniform contributed greatly to his alienation from mainstream culture), McCarthy's characterization of his subject as bitterly at odds with militarism is nonetheless convincing.

Attention to gender largely ends with the first chapter, as McCarthy shifts (and to some extent narrows) his focus to the art that Westermann produced from the 1940s through the 1970s. Although one might wish for at least some attention to the nature and extent of Westermann's audience, McCarthy's focus on the art itself is enlightening, often moving. McCarthy's obvious respect for Westermann's work, for both its technical proficiency as well as its moral weight, seems well founded. He explicates effectively the consistent antiwar theme in this art, interpreting the artist's brutally graphic depictions of warfare's carnage as an appreciation born of direct exposure. McCarthy's is thus one more book that challenges the characterization of World War II as the "good war" fondly recalled.

McCarthy explicitly recognizes the historical context in which this art was produced (if not the audience that received it) and makes clever connections to an eclectic mix of other artists with concerns analogous to Westermann's. Mostly as asides, McCarthy links Westermann to many others, from Herman Melville to sculptor Ed Kienholz, Westermann's contemporary, even seeing Westermann's "savage, skeptical, and ironic" voice (p. 17) as part of the sweeping cultural change that journalist Tom Englehardt has termed "the end of victory culture." Albeit too briefly, McCarthy notes that in the era of Levittown, when the suburban ranch house represented for many Americans the ultimate realization of the national dream, house-like structures commonly appeared in Westermann's antiwar sculptures, creations that were hardly reassuring but instead used "architecture to evoke powerlessness, fear, madness, and death" (p. 83).

McCarthy knows Westermann's work impressively well, introducing readers to someone about whom many will want to learn more. Some will wish for a bit more perspective than this book provides, for more analysis of Westermann's audience and of his relative importance, but this is a work whose own seriousness of purpose matches that of its subject.

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HUNTER CROWTHER-HEYCK. *Herbert A. Simon: The Bounds of Reason in Modern America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 420. \$49.95

Toward the end of this remarkably informed study, its author noted his initial desire to explore the rapid transformation of postwar American social science. In his selection of Herbert A. Simon, Hunter Crowther-Heyck chose an individual who exemplified the period through his interdisciplinary study of decision making

and problem solving in the behavioral sciences. While Simon won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on decision making in organizations, he was a true polymath whose writings ranged across the fields of political science, public administration, mathematical economics, cybernetics, behavioral and Gestalt psychology, and computer science.

Simon entered the University of Chicago as a seventeen-year-old wunderkind. There, he came under the tutelage of Charles Merriam, the leading political scientist of the day, as well as the logical positivist Rudolf Carnap and the mathematical economist Henry Schultz. Moving on to graduate school in political science, he began working for the International City Managers Association. Simon sought to apply his "quasi-religious" devotion to science and exactitude to administrative questions as his first step toward a science of choice. Yet, for all his commitment to rationality, objectivity, and expertise, Simon quite early developed the concept of "bounded rationality." Rationality itself had limits; for example, membership in administrative organizations influenced decisions. And the public was even more limited. Simon became infuriated when voters overwhelmingly turned down his plan for municipal consolidation of localities in the San Francisco area. Rather than accepting alternative explanations, Simon attributed their decision to inadequate information. Simon could never accept an honest refusal to accept his opinion. Despite Simon's claims to equal commitment to expertise and democracy, he quickly sacrificed his earlier democratic values to a faith in scientific experts.

This point brings up an unavoidable problem with the book. Simon was almost completely an intellectual. His autobiography barely mentions his family, but it covers his academic work in great detail. While Crowther-Heyck does a superb job of placing Simon within his various intellectual contexts, little personal background exists, despite Crowther-Heyck's access to Simon's voluminous papers, the autobiography, and several interviews with Simon. One of Simon's later adages was that humans were just machines; clearly he perceived himself—happily—as a machine for thinking.

In 1949, at the age of thirty-three, Simon joined Carnegie Institute of Technology (later Carnegie Mellon University, or CMU) as one of its two graduate administrators. He chose Mellon as a place that he could mold in his own image and remained there the rest of his career, becoming a trustee for life in 1972. Developing an interdisciplinary research institute around the mathematical, behavioral-functional study of decision making in the social sciences, Simon positioned CMU well in the 1950s battles for research funding. Through his earlier participation in mathematical research groups, Simon became a key figure in the Ford Foundation, the National Institute of Mental Health, and especially military think tanks such as the Rand Corporation and the Office of Naval Research. A superb committee game player, he used his insider status to bring home an inordinate number of grants. Back at CMU, he used the

same skills to eliminate administrators and faculty who did not accept his vision of the new social science.

As his intellectual quest continued, Simon turned to psychology, especially Gestalt, as a way to develop models for decision making. Immersion in psychology and his early experience with the first digital computers of the 1950s led Simon to a fascination with problem solving. Simultaneously, his interest in sciences of choice like economics switched into the sciences of control like psychology. Convinced that computers allowed the construction of formal models of how humans solve problems, he spoke of humans as machines like all other systems. Yet what he compared to humans was the program and not the machine itself. As Crowther-Heyck concludes, Simon may not have been a humanist, but he was a humane mechanist.

While Simon's passions have not presented quite the legacy he surely envisioned for himself, his "monomaniacal" (Simon's word) quest for a unified, if abstract, vision of the core of social science is a remarkable achievement. If nothing else, his ability to master so many fields was amazing. Yet, his unwillingness to recognize his own "bounds of rationality" in his work reflected the unquestioning self-satisfaction of so much postwar behavioral science. In his own capacity to comprehend, analyze, and respect Simon's wide-ranging and difficult work without wholly succumbing to its appeal, Crowther-Heyck provides one of the most important secondary works on postwar social science in America.

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JERRY GERSHENHORN. *Melville J. Herskovits and the Racial Politics of Knowledge*. (Critical Studies in the History of Anthropology.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2004. Pp. xvii, 338. \$65.00.

Jerry Gershenhorn has written an important and useful, if somewhat disappointing, book. Well researched and packed with detail, it is a valuable source not only for scholars of Herskovits and his work but for scholars of several modern disciplines and their history. Because Herskovits stood at the nexus of so many crucial social, political, and academic debates, he represents an ideal figure for a biography that reads subject through period as well as period through subject.

Gershenhorn does an excellent job of the former. In seven theme-based chapters, he presents a nearly exhaustive discussion of Herskovits's professional life and his profound influence on the development of "Negro studies." Herskovits was one of the earliest proponents of the idea of African "survivals" in African American cultures, an equally early advocate for "cultural relativism," an interdisciplinarian *avant la lettre*, the author of the extraordinarily influential *The Myth of the Negro Past* (1941), the first anthropology professor at Northwestern University, the founder of one of the first major African studies programs, and an outspoken critic of

postwar U.S. policy toward Africa. Most important, Herskovits "helped usher in a world in which African peoples would be accorded the dignity they deserved" (p. 231).

In seeking to explain his subject's sustained commitment to African studies, Gershenhorn gestures toward Herskovits's personal life. Born in 1895, Herskovits was the son of Jewish immigrants who established an "assimilationist" family life in Protestant "small-town America" (pp. 11–12). Because he grew up "constantly faced with questions about his identity and his place in American society" (pp. 12–13), Gershenhorn argues, Herskovits developed leftist politics as well as an interest in anthropology (pp. 13, 15). Gershenhorn might have been better off leaving out such brief and ultimately unsatisfying explanations, given that he has written "an intellectual biography" (p. 3) in which it matters less that Herskovits was son, husband, and father than that he was a student of Franz Boas, "who trained most of the influential American cultural anthropologists of the early twentieth century" (p. 17).

By taking Herskovits as subject, Gershenhorn has also written a minibiography of a discipline, and the book offers strong disciplinary and institutional history. Gershenhorn traces Herskovits's intricate rivalries and alliances with major historians, anthropologists, and sociologists, along with the disciplinary contours of those relationships. Carter Woodson and E. Franklin Frazier were foes; W. E. B. Du Bois was sometimes an ally, sometimes a foe. Equally strong is Gershenhorn's discussion of the racially interested agenda of private and public funding and research institutions, including the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations and the National Research Council. But he is quicker both to praise and to blame Herskovits than he is to critique the institutions that just as surely shaped anthropology as well as other modern disciplines and their "racial politics of knowledge."

Gershenhorn takes his subject to task for most of the troubling aspects of his professional politics. He points out Herskovits's untenable insistence on his own "objective" scholarship over and against the scholarship of those African Americans whom he viewed as "activists" or "uplifters," such as Woodson and Du Bois. Such academic-racial politics had important material consequences in that he "undercut efforts by black scholars to diminish their isolation from mainstream academe" (p. 126). However, there are some odd silences in the book. For instance, Gershenhorn notes that Zora Neale Hurston (another student of Boas), with her "distinctive motor behavior" (p. 66), inspired Herskovits to look to West Africa for sources of African American behavior and culture. That striking moment, unmentioned upon, merits censure, as does Herskovits's reliance on anthropometry, which Gershenhorn rightly notes reinforced a "biological conception of race" (p. 9). In the main, though, Gershenhorn offers a balanced and full picture of his subject as an academic.

Given the book's wealth of detail, it is disappointing to see it delivered in an awkward package. The writing

is often infelicitous, as in "Despite these valuable works, they do not add up to a fully integrated story" (p. 8). Such clunkiness at the sentence level is mirrored at levels of organization and method, with rich individual and institutional histories falling flat in the absence of a strong historiographical framework. Relying on blunt dichotomies to explain the significance of Herskovits's scholarship—Victorian versus modernist, universalist versus particularist, egalitarian versus conservative, activist versus objectivist—Gershenhorn is less effective as a reader of period through subject. He might have productively posed and answered more questions. Why has Herskovits been so rarely chosen as a subject by contemporary historians of social sciences or Africana studies? Where should we place his contributions amid larger modern and contemporary constructions of identity based on race and nation, particularly within academic disciplines? When its title promises "the racial politics of knowledge," a book should explore such questions more deeply.

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MURRAY FRIEDMAN. *The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. v, 303. \$29.00.

In the late 1960s, the countercultural excesses of the New Left alienated many Jewish Americans. The increasing ideological absolutism, violence, and antisemitism in the student and black movements made many Jews (and others), who had been disproportionately represented in progressive movements in the post-World War II period, reject this new breed of radicalism. Some even rethought their longstanding commitment to liberalism itself.

Murray Friedman, the author of several well-received studies including *The Utopian Dilemma: American Judaism and Public Policy* (1985) and *What Went Wrong: The Creation and Collapse of the Black-Jewish Alliance* (1995), argues in this posthumously published book that the reassessment of American politics and culture in the 1960s was the beginning of the neoconservative revolution, an intellectual and political movement "invented" by Jews who came, in the last decades of the twentieth century, to have extraordinary power in the shaping of American public policy.

Friedman's neoconservatives are Jewish men and women—former Trotskyists, socialists, or left liberals—who had begun to change in the 1960s and early 1970s when they were "mugged by the reality" of New Left radicalism, the debasement of moral standards, and the unintended consequences of liberal social policies. Many like Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer were associated with *Commentary*, an important and influential Jewish journal of mainstream opinion founded in 1945. *Commentary* had become, under the editorship of Podhoretz (beginning in 1960), a liberal periodical. But after the 1967 war in Israel, and

the antisemitism evident in the student and black liberation movements, the magazine increasingly took what came to be described, by 1976, as a "neoconservative" position: democratic anticommunist internationalism abroad; racial equality, but not affirmative action, at home; and, in general, the safety net of the welfare state, but not "group rights" at the expense of governmental "interference" with individual freedom and enterprise.

Many of the writers and editors, including Podhoretz, Glazer, and Daniel Bell were still New Deal Democrats trying to rescue their party from the "new leftist liberalism" they believed had infected it since the 1972 presidential campaign of George McGovern. And Jewish neoconservatism, as Friedman hints but fails to explore fully, was still not like the old conservatism espoused by non-Jews such as William F. Buckley or Russell Kirk, or indeed by Jews like Frank Meyer, Milton Friedman, or Will Herberg, who favored a wholly unregulated economic system and rejected "environmentalist" explanations for personal failure or antisocial behavior, insisting instead on the full responsibility of the individual actor. (Jewish conservatism, as Friedman shows is not an oxymoron; but he ignores Michael Staub's *Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish Liberalism in Postwar America* [2003], which demonstrates brilliantly that left-liberal progressivism, although often dominant, never held hegemonic sway in the Jewish community.)

Friedman is, however, less interested in analyzing current neoconservative ideas than showing how often and how influentially Jewish activists, intellectuals, and policy makers turn up in the history of modern, that is post-1960s—American conservatism (into which neoconservatism mostly morphed). As a group, Friedman's neoconservatives are best represented by Kristol, Podhoretz, and those Jews prominent in and around the administration of George W. Bush: Elliot Abrams, director of Middle Eastern Affairs at the National Security Council (and Podhoretz's son-in-law), Kenneth Edelman, member of the Committee on the Present Danger; Paul Wolfowitz, former deputy secretary of defense; and Richard Perle, former chairman of the Defense Policy Board (who along with Wolfowitz was a student of the so-called godfather of neoconservatism, Leo Strauss).

There are many problems here. The Jewishness of the dozens of neoconservatives trotted out by Friedman is rarely treated as a factor in their thinking or in their cultural outlook. And these Jews, whether defined simply by birth or social identity on the one hand, or by philosophical, ethical, and ethno-religious inclinations on the other, are (even as Friedman shows obliquely) vastly outnumbered by non-Jewish protagonists just as powerful in the shaping of neoconservatism and just as influential in the shaping of American public policy: James Q. Wilson, Michael Novak, Francis Fukuyama, Peter Berger, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Fred Barnes, and Bruce Bartlett do not nearly exhaust a very long list. And Albert Wohlstetter, a non-

Jewish intellectual figure equal to Strauss in the shaping of neoconservative thinking, indeed "the grand old man of the neoconservative hawks," is not mentioned by Friedman until page 156 and then never again.

Friedman too briefly addresses the tensions (which he minimizes) between the Christian right and Jewish neoconservatives. And by focusing almost exclusively on Jewish intellectuals, Friedman gives short shrift to the reinvigorated activism among mainstream Christians on issues such as sex education, pornography, evolution, and, especially, abortion, the politics of which is indispensable to understanding the rise of modern conservatism.

An even more glaring omission is the war on Iraq, the latest and seemingly riskiest manifestation of the "neoconservative revolution." Neoconservatives had always had doubts about ambitious social engineering, which they associated with unexpected and undesirable consequences, but they also believed in the potential moral uses of American power. By the end of 2001 and certainly by 2003, the belief that American interventionism could reshape the international community even in the Middle East had trumped neoconservative fears about social engineering. In 2002, Friedman said there was "continuity and serious thought" in neoconservative foreign policy, and that "guided by neoconservative advisers, the White House's new strategy gives the lie to the view held in some quarters of Bush as a dimwitted cowboy playing with military power he barely understands" (*The Forward*, December 13, 2002). But America's Iraq policy, and the neoconservatism that gave it birth, were imploding while Friedman was writing this book. He had therefore, it seems to me, an obligation to revisit the foreign policy implications of neoconservatism as well as to provide us with this useful, if imperfect, history of the movement.

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IRVINE H. ANDERSON. *Biblical Interpretation and Middle East Policy: The Promised Land, America, and Israel, 1917–2002*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2005. Pp. x, 187. \$39.95.

In 1992 both the U.S. House and Senate adopted a resolution "to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the reunification of Jerusalem." The vote in both houses was unanimous. That this resolution was condemned in the Arab and Muslim worlds comes as no surprise; that it caused some consternation in Israeli political circles is not as well known. Some Israeli strategists feared that it would further exacerbate tensions between Jews and Arabs in "United Jerusalem." In Irvine H. Anderson's fine new study on the influence of scriptural ideas on American foreign policy, we learn that Israel's supporters in Washington, D.C., are often more hawkish than Israeli politicians. (One can not imagine the Knesset passing a unanimous resolution on any issue, let alone a resolution affirming a reunifica-

tion that many of Israel's citizens experience and understand as an occupation.)

Anderson makes the case that U.S. policy in the Middle East has long been influenced by biblical understandings of history. He is careful to point out that the relationship between religious ideas and policy is indirect. Because of the Protestant orientation of the colonies and the early republic there is a "predisposition" to consider the state of Israel the rightful owner of what the Bible calls the Land of Israel. Considering childhood exposure to Bible readings or "Bible Stories," combined with a particular American Protestant fascination with the eschaton "it is not surprising that many, though certainly not all, Americans simply assume that it is right and proper for Jews to return to Palestine and create their own state there" (p. 103).

Anderson traces American fascination with the events of the End Time, among them the astounding success of the *Left Behind* books. Here he is synthesizing the work of earlier researchers, particularly Yaa-kov Ariel's *On Behalf of Israel* (1993). This End Time fascination was spread by the introduction of John Nelson Darby's ideas into the United States. Darby (1800–1882) developed what is now known as "dispensationalist millennialism." Anderson explains the theological background and its nuances, and he also gives us sociological information from opinion polls. A study by the National Opinion Research Center found that "forty-six percent of Americans believe that God promised the land to the Jews" (p. 19).

While this book's main focus is on U.S. policy toward Israel, we also get the all-important British background. Anderson reminds us that the author of the famed Balfour Declaration of 1917, the British foreign secretary, came from a Scottish home steeped in the Bible. He said of his education, "I was taught far more about the history of the Jews than about the history of my own people" (p. 61). Anderson presents considerable evidence pointing to the Biblical orientation of many Christian supporters of Zionism, but he emphasizes that the Biblical component is one of many factors explaining Zionism's success. In the case of the Balfour Declaration, which supported the creation of "a Jewish National Home" in Palestine, Britain's political and military self-interest were key factors in the government's decision to issue the statement. In the midst of World War I, powerful arguments were advanced that declaring support for the idea of a Jewish state would help the Allied cause. But, Anderson claims, the biblical background "created a mind-set that made it easier for those arguments to prevail" (p. 60). Here, too, Anderson is nuanced. Biblical background is an important factor but not the sole factor.

Anderson is equally nuanced in his discussion of President Harry S. Truman's 1948 decision to grant diplomatic recognition to the State of Israel. This recognition was granted over the objections of the State Department. Anderson notes that this decision "has been so well researched by historians it would appear almost redundant to bring it up again" (p. 75). But in this new

biblical context it is worth doing so. Two forces buffeted Truman. The State Department and the Defense Department thought that recognition of Israel would hurt America's standing in the world. The president's advisors and the developing Zionist lobby (with Jewish and Christian support) pushed for prompt recognition. Often forgotten in the explanations of why Truman said yes is "the underlying influence of Christian teaching about the Jews and the Holy Land" (p. 75).

This is a very timely book. Much of what Anderson has to say about past American actions and attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict can be fruitfully applied to consideration of the current and multiple Middle East crises.

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DAVID S. GUTTERMAN. *Prophetic Politics: Christian Social Movements and American Democracy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 222. \$34.95.

There is much ado about religion and American politics. Political scientist David S. Gutterman has written an engaging but somewhat limited study of the "prophetic" impulse as a window onto the relation between religion and politics. He compares Billy Sunday, Martin Luther King, Jr., Promise Keepers (PK), and Call to Renewal (CTR), focusing on their readings of Exodus. It is an intriguing project, yet there are questions about its distinctiveness and about Gutterman's attentiveness to the study of religion.

The central claim is that religious narratives shape sociopolitical positions, a commonplace observation that Gutterman embellishes by asserting "that this religiosity often takes on a prophetic cast" (p. 49). Such assertions, however, are also quite common in studies of American religion and politics (think of Perry Miller, Robert Bellah, and Sacvan Bercovitch) and they would benefit from a more precise articulation of the relation between religion and politics. While he adroitly ranges over political material (especially in his insightful use of Hannah Arendt and Paul Ricoeur), Gutterman's grasp of other subjects is sometimes shaky. He claims that his approach displaces "the common view of the status of religion in American political culture" (p. 3), yet the two conventional methods he names—jurisprudential/Constitutional or policy-oriented studies—scantly exemplify the range of understandings in either the academy or public life. Gutterman cites Alexis de Tocqueville as exemplifying a distinct "third mode of scholarship" (p. 3) that, in contrast to "a functional approach to American religiosity" (p. 8), underscores the importance of religion in American culture. Such functionalism may dominate political science, but this is far from the case in religious studies, history, or American studies, where the significance of religion is a given.

Beyond this, Gutterman provides good historical accounts of each movement (although the most recent scholarship is not always cited), yet his feel for the nuances of his case studies' religiosity could be strength-

ened. At times he invokes antiquated or contested categories: "mainstream Protestantism" (p. 52), "religious revivalism" (p. 2), or "culture wars" (p. 134). Further, while Exodus is clearly an important narrative, it is perplexing that Gutterman focuses relatively little on each group's Christology. One might usefully explore the centrality of Mark or Acts to CTR, or of Galatians to King, for example.

Gutterman pairs Sunday with King, focusing on their sermons and speeches. His readings are sharp and detailed, and his solid historiography sits alongside the work of David Chappell or Clifford Putney. The chapters on PK and CTR are well written but contain misunderstandings of each group's political orientations. Gutterman briefly outlines PK's declension narrative involving the breakdown of the "nuclear family"; but this begs for further comparative work, as he does not engage the 1970s architects of this narrative (e.g. Richard Viguier), nor does he make sufficient use of literature on gender and religion. He also mishandles some of PK's political complexities, asserting that PK "has a political vision, and proclaims a political theology" (p. 99) even as its members see "no reason for democratic politics" (p. 125). In fact, PK do not dismiss politics altogether; politics are simply seen as serving a different purpose than evangelism. In other words, the relations among oft-used terms like "politics," "democratic politics," and "political theology" are at times imprecisely articulated.

Gutterman also overstates CTR's comfort with democratic politics and insufficiently acknowledges Jim Wallis's long-standing ambivalence about political language. The relationship between Sojourners' exilic position and CTR's politics is far more complicated than Gutterman suggests. Further, his assertion elsewhere that PK and CTR draw energy "away from the public sphere" (p. 164) is just as misleading. These groups are uncomfortable with conventional political activity, but, as Gutterman surely knows, there are multiple public spheres in which political will is established.

Ultimately it is at times unclear what is gained in making these comparisons or if such analysis "enhances our understanding of the relationship between religious narratives and politics" (p. 92). What precisely is revealed in grouping these movements together, other than that political crisis invites prophetic criticism? Gutterman carefully unpacks the readings of shared Biblical texts, and he skillfully details contextual and interpretative differences. But one wishes he had gone beyond these descriptive endeavors to construct a more nuanced account of the relationship between religion and politics and, more importantly, of the specifically religious grounds of the activism he examines. While Gutterman can be theoretically deft—in exploring the relation between narrative and politics (p. 21) or garden/wilderness metaphors (p. 47)—he is not fully engaged with the literature on political religion, often citing unrepresentative figures like William Connolly or Stephen Carter. He is a sharp writer with an eye for interesting problems and material. I applaud his en-

gagement with important issues and also the ambition of his thinking. But his central categories require further explication, and this book speaks to the need for more conversations across disciplines.

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GAIL S. MURRAY, editor. *Throwing off the Cloak of Privilege: White Southern Women Activists in the Civil Rights Era*. Foreword by STANLEY HARROLD and RANDALL M. MILLER. (Southern Dissent.) Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2004. Pp. xiv, 250. \$59.95.

Gail S. Murray's edited collection constitutes a fine addition to the literature of the civil rights movement. The essays provide insight into how racial attitudes changed, into what commonalities there were among the white female activists who organized for racial justice in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, and, above all, into an ongoing debate about how and why, at certain points in American history, members of one group have dedicated much effort—and sometimes sacrifice—to advance the interests of members of another group.

Historians have analyzed the courage, indeed heroism, of African American abolitionists and civil rights activists, of workers who fought for unionization, of suffragists who endured hunger strikes to advance their cause. They have then attempted to explain the particular timing of such activism. But the reason why the activism occurred needs no extended explanation, because it is palpably obvious. When someone is an advocate for "the other," however, many explanations can come into play, some not at all flattering. To conjure up the various labels applied to white Garrisonian abolitionists, for example—"fanatics" or "status anxiety sufferers" come to mind—is to substantiate this point. Hence a collection of essays that addresses this set of issues head on is positioned to make an especially useful contribution.

Some of the essays deal with individuals—Anne Braden is the most prominent—and some with groups but all document behavior that risked at a minimum the social status of and at worst physical injury to the women or their loved ones. Braden was a leftist, but what the others had in common was most often their devotion to their churches or synagogues and/or their involvement in civic groups such as the League of Women Voters or the YWCA. What they accomplished when they decided to "throw off the cloak of privilege" was often quite substantial. Women in Little Rock organized on behalf of public schools when the desegregation of Central High in 1957 led to the closing of all four of the city's public high schools by state law. White women in various southern cities sought social contact with black women, so as to create more normal relations. Women organized public forums about race. As early as 1942 Dorothy Tilly organized fellow churchwomen in Georgia to boycott businesses owned by members of the Ku Klux Klan. It is a roll of honor.

By the same token, the authors are careful to point

out the instances in which their subjects may have lacked the insights into race that have become more common since the civil rights movement. They do not write uncritically, in other words. Moreover, a number of the essays deploy the concepts of feminist biography quite effectively, thereby also complicating the narratives.

It is impossible to discuss all of these strong pieces individually. Kathryn N. Nasstrom's contribution on Frances Freeborn Pauley is particularly striking, however, no doubt because it grew out of a long acquaintance between author and subject. Among other things, Pauley served as the executive director of the Georgia Council on Human Relations during a tense period in the 1960s and was on call by members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee when there was trouble, a brave undertaking for a sixty-year-old woman. As her biographer, Nasstrom has accumulated evidence of widespread sexism in the movement at the time. Yet Pauley herself, in autobiographical moments, very much downplayed sexism. Such a pronounced contrast furnishes Nasstrom the opportunity for a valuable discussion of the possible reasons for the disjunction.

Another memorable essay is that by Catherine Fosl on Anne Braden. Braden's life and career defy easy explanations. As Fosl says: "Braden is not representative of white southern women, not even of activists, and certainly not those of her own generation [she was born in 1924]. She made a more thorough break than most with the southern social conventions in which she was reared, and the socialism she embraced earned her fierce ostracism" (p. 103). Working closely with SNCC, Braden was labeled a "race traitor" as well as other unflattering epithets. Yet she has engaged in a lifelong commitment to opposing racism and a lifelong meditation on white privilege and the responsibilities it entails. Fosl's discussion of "whiteness" in probing Braden's decision making is right on target.

In this generally excellent collection, there is one notable lack: all of the women involved seem to have been upper class or at least upper middle class, and no explanation of this pattern is provided. One wishes that the authors or the editor had addressed class more directly and more forcefully, so that readers would have a better sense of why there was a dearth of working-class white women involved in the struggle. Otherwise, this is a book that fills in many gaps.

GLENN MATTHEWS
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ALBERT L. SAMUELS. *Is Separate Unequal? Black Colleges and the Challenge to Desegregation*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2005. Pp. x, 246. \$34.95.

For decades scholars have debated about the meaning of the famous *Brown* decision of 1954, in which the Supreme Court ruled that segregation in the public schools was unconstitutional. The Court held that separate educational facilities were "inherently unequal." It also suggested that the act of separation creates a

feeling of inferiority in those who are kept apart from the majority, thereby inflicting psychological damage. This book by Albert L. Samuels offers fresh insight into the topic of desegregation. Samuels traces subsequent rulings to show how interpretations of the *Brown* decision have played out over the last fifty odd years. In particular, he examines the impact on the historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), using Mississippi as a test case. And he raises probing questions. Are precedents in public elementary and secondary education really applicable to higher education, given that there are compulsory school attendance laws for the former while the latter is a voluntary matter that is freely chosen? Did the *Brown* decision imply that *all* situations of racial homogeneity are suspect, or only those mandated by state action? If "segregation" (interpreted as racial homogeneity or identifiability) in higher education is unconstitutional, does it follow that the HBCUs should be placed in the course of extinction as vestiges of the Jim Crow era that are no longer necessary? Samuels defends the HBCUs, noting that in 1990 such schools enrolled seventeen percent of the nation's African American college students but produced twenty-seven percent of black college graduates (p. 175). The HBCUs have a track record of succeeding with African American students where majority-white institutions often fail.

The premise that all racial homogeneity is "segregation," regardless of whether it is the result of a state mandate or is voluntarily chosen, might lead some to conclude that HBCUs are "segregated." If an all or mostly white school is segregated, then is not an all or mostly black school also segregated? In this climate the HBCUs have found themselves forced to justify their continued existence. One way to "desegregate" would be to merge the publicly funded HBCUs with neighboring traditionally white institutions. The goal here, following the logic of *Green v. School Board of New Kent County*, is to eliminate racially identifiable "white schools" and "black schools" in order to simply have "schools." From this perspective the HBCUs are suspect and need to prove that they are desegregating (not in the sense that they ever excluded whites and have ceased to do so, but in the sense that the racial composition of the HBCU now is mixed). In Mississippi, this has led historically black Jackson State University and Alcorn State University to agree to seek a student body in which at least ten percent of the students are nonblack ("other race") and to provide scholarships to attract nonblack students. In a sense, it is affirmative action (to achieve racial diversity in admissions) in reverse. The HBCUs do this to "prove" they are not segregated.

Samuels questions the liberal orthodoxy that all homogeneity or "segregation" is harmful. Those who equate racial homogeneity (for example, the school is ninety percent black or white or Latino) with "segregation" often fail to distinguish whether the homogeneity was imposed upon a population, or freely chosen, or resulted from factors such as the homogeneity of the

neighborhood. He challenges those who assume any institution that is mostly black must therefore be inferior, as if nothing good could possibly come from anything that is black. He tries to show that the HBCUs managed to become something positive and productive for African Americans in spite of being severely underfunded and in spite of the malicious intentions of white supremacists. He suggests the HBCUs should not be merged out of existence, for they represent a valuable resource and an alternative choice that should not be sacrificed on the altar of the colorblind society. There may be cultural differences among ethnic and racial groups that run against the universalist notion that one size fits all. The truly difficult question, however, in the post-*Brown* era, may be whether one can utilize public money to support a state university that is identifiable in a racial, ethnic, or cultural way as opposed to simply a state university.

WAYNE GLASKER
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CHRISTOPHER B. STRAIN. *Pure Fire: Self-Defense as Activism in the Civil Rights Era*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 254. \$19.95.

Combining brevity and comprehensiveness, this book will interest students, scholars, and general readers seeking an introduction to the growing historiography on the role of black self-defense in the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. Christopher B. Strain traces the evolving attitudes toward the use of violence among a wide array of black leaders and organizations, including Martin Luther King, Jr., Robert F. Williams, Malcolm X, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Deacons for Defense and Justice, the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, and the Black Panther Party. The author thoughtfully places these civil rights advocates and their activities within a larger cultural and social history of black armed defense dating back to the eighteenth century.

Examined from this broader historical perspective, black protective violence emerges as much more than a tactical ploy to secure basic civil rights. The right of self-defense, Strain argues, was itself a fundamental component of American citizenship, guaranteed under common law and the Constitution. The concentration of the powers of physical coercion into the hands of whites sustained the institutions of slavery and Jim Crow apartheid. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many black intellectuals and activists linked racial progress with the right of African Americans to defend themselves from white violence and physical repression. Everyday black men and women embraced self-protection as a strategy of resistance and survival. Most white Americans, however, were reluctant to sanction black claims to this basic civil right.

African Americans' longstanding endorsement of self-defense, Strain argues, bolsters the growing scholarly consensus that many historians have overstated African American support for nonviolent resistance prior

to 1965 and exaggerated the ideological gulf separating the advocates of nonviolence from their black critics. During the initial phases of the Montgomery bus boycott, King secured a gun to protect his family from white threats. As late as 1959, King argued that only highly disciplined activists could shoulder the moral demands of nonviolent protest, and he acknowledged the tactical advantages of defensive violence. Inspired in part by Williams's *Negroes with Guns* (1962), some activists in SNCC and the Congress of Racial Equality began distancing themselves from the imperatives of nonviolence as early as 1962. Long before Malcolm X's 1965 death, Strain suggests, the black leader's calls for "maximum physical retaliation" (p. 93) against white attacks had already "helped set the tone of protest and dictated theory and tactics from the periphery" (p. 96). As have other recent scholars, Strain rejects earlier claims positing a "clear dichotomy . . . between the pre-1965, non-violent movement and the post-1965, violent movement" (p. 3).

Much more significant, Strain argues, were a series of shifts in black thought regarding what constituted justifiable black violence. In 1965, members of the Deacons for Defense and Justice protected civil rights marchers from hostile whites in Bogalusa, Louisiana. Threatened by a white tough, one Deacon shot his attacker at close range. In word and deed that year, the Deacons began expanding the permissible methods of counter-violence to encompass "more organized, collective forms of armed self-defense" (p. 126) than personal protection. The leaders also came perilously close to embracing "aggressive" or "retaliatory" violence (p. 121). The attempt of black residents in the Watts district of Los Angeles, California, to protect their community from racist and intrusive law enforcement officials that year represented a continuation in this movement toward communal self-defense. The Black Panthers, Strain maintains, completed this trend toward revolutionary, collective violence by cloaking their naked aggression in the rhetoric of self-defense. The growing willingness of black activists to embrace offensive violence after 1965, Strain concludes, played a crucial role in alienating whites from the black freedom struggle. Civil rights activists could no longer convincingly maintain that their use of force embodied traditional American values or constituted the exercise of widely acknowledged civil rights.

This book represents a pathbreaking effort to address problems with which historians will grapple for decades. Strain is sensitive to the ways in which black men embraced self-defense as a means of claiming a manly identity as guardians of women and children. Yet his largely synthetic work ultimately serves as a reminder of how much there remains to be learned regarding the role of black women in physically protecting their families and themselves from white violence. Our knowledge of white attitudes toward black defensive violence remains similarly sparse. Comparative research on early twentieth-century race riots will almost certainly reveal that African Americans embraced collec-

tive self-defense long before the rise of the Deacons. Strain introduces but never fully develops some provocative ideas regarding the rhetorical elasticity of the phrase "self-defense" and its use to legitimize a wide range of behaviors, rhetorical stances, and racial programs. His book will prove an indispensable resource as scholars continue to explore these and other questions regarding the place of black defensive violence in American history.

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JEFFREY O. G. OGBAR. *Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity*. (Reconfiguring American Political History.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 258. \$45.00.

There are several important issues at work in Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar's book. One concerns the relationship between the civil rights movement in the South and the later, but sometimes overlapping, black power movement in northern and western cities. Ogbar's inclination is to attribute more lasting influence to the latter than to the former. A second issue concerns the relationship between the black power movement that emerged by the mid-1960s and the tradition of black nationalism, which both antedated and survived it. Here the crucial mediating organizations were the Nation of Islam (NOI) and the Black Panther Party (BPP). While Ogbar considers the former an authentic black nationalist organization, albeit with a specifically racial ideology, the BPP was actually a Marxist party of sorts. Yet, although it emphasized a "class" approach over racial-cultural analysis, its style and rhetoric often encouraged as much as it discouraged black consciousness. A third issue concerns the profound influence that the style and ethos of the BPP had on other expressions of "radical ethnic nationalism" (p. 138), particularly on the West Coast. Mexican Americans, Chinese and Japanese Americans, Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, and even white working-class Americans created organizations that owed much to the BPP's program and style. Finally, Ogbar takes up the complex relationship between black power, which focused on "inclusion while advocating autonomy and self-determination" (p. 2), and black popular culture. It would seem logical that black pride should have approved of popular expressions of black culture. Yet both the NOI and BPP sometimes spoke as though existing black popular culture was degenerate and decadent, a symptom of the brainwashing white America had inflicted on blacks and a diversion from the religious (NOI) or political (BPP) tasks ahead, if African Americans were to achieve liberation and autonomy.

To present these various but overlapping issues, Ogbar constructs an historical narrative of the emergence of black power fed by black nationalist currents and organizations, the success/failure of the civil rights movements, and the different social conditions in northern urban areas than in the South. His is a book that maps

a territory rather than arguing a strong thesis. Ogbar wants above all to call attention to the pervasive effects of black power and various nationalist organizations. His work reflects a recent trend to shift the focus of racial struggle between the 1950s and the 1970s from the civil rights movement in the South to a wider "freedom struggle" that encompassed the northern as well as southern, nationalist as well as integrationist, violent as well as nonviolent aspects of African American political culture.

As an introduction to the history of black power and black nationalism in mid-to-late twentieth century America, this book provides a valuable overview of the sources, central issues, and influences of those movements. But if one is looking for a more critical perspective on racial radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s, it leaves something to be desired. First, there is little or nothing on the influence of Negritude or Pan-Africanism on the emergence of black power in the 1960s. Second, the discussion of black popular and folk culture rarely moves beyond the descriptive level. It is not clear what Ogbar thinks of the nationalist view of black culture as the expression of a damaged and brainwashed people. He is certainly correct, even brave, to focus attention on this ambiguity in the nationalist perspective issue, but he does not work through the issue analytically. Third, Ogbar is rarely very critical of the black power phenomenon and the two seminal organizations he concentrates on. The whole BPP ethos had disturbing affinities with European and Third World authoritarian populist movements, and no organization was less democratically run than the NOI. Although he mentions the assassination of Malcolm X in passing, Ogbar never really explores what it reveals, if anything, about the NOI or what effects it had on the emergence of the black power movement. Similarly, though he briefly records the demise of the Panthers and the deterioration of Huey Newton, nothing very much is made of these things, except to blame the antiradical onslaught of the FBI. The latter was certainly a very real factor, but there were also internal factors that contributed to the failure of the BPP. Overall, this book often reads as though it were written in 1975 rather than three decades later insofar as it fails to scrutinize the claims made by the various black power and black nationalist organizations about their own goals and achievements. Ogbar sets forth a clear narrative of post-World War II black nationalism and black consciousness. But he fails to analyze the idea or reality of black power with much rigor.

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MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON. *Roots Too: White Ethnic Revival in Post-Civil Rights America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2006. Pp. 483. \$29.95.

According to Matthew Frye Jacobson, the "white ethnic revival" had a profound, and hitherto insufficiently appreciated, influence on American culture. It transformed the "syntax of nationality and belonging" (p. 6)

by making Ellis Island, rather than Plymouth Rock, the archetypal symbol of the making of the nation. The new "nation of immigrants" perspective did not, however, displace whiteness as the (unacknowledged) inner core of true Americanism. On the contrary, it has enshrined the image of the white European immigrant as prototypically American. That image, though purporting to exalt diversity, is in fact racially exclusionary. Ironically, as Jacobson puts it, the nation-of-immigrants trope "has largely become the central trope of gatekeeping itself" (p. 363). Moreover, the relatively late arrival of Ellis Island immigrants furnishes a pretext for their disclaiming involvement in the historic evil of slavery and other forms of racial injustice, and the mythologized "immigrant saga" (suffering, self-help, ultimate success) grounds their resistance to "special assistance" for racial minorities.

As the foregoing suggests, Jacobson's interpretation has much in common with the conventional liberal dismissal of the ethnic revival as a self-interested backlash against black demands for equity and power. Two features make it distinctive: one is the radical depth of his claim about the revival's effect on American national identity; the other is the impressive range of the influence he imputes to the revival and the wealth of evidence he marshals to document his argument.

Although not inattentive to changes over time, Jacobson tends to treat the period since the revival began around 1970 as a single unit, particularly in respect to the revival's effects. After sketching the thesis in a brief introduction, he devotes chapter one ("Hyphen Nation") to the development of the "new ethnicity," its sources in the civil rights movement and other phenomena of the late 1960s, the growth of parallel academic attention to ethnicity (historical, sociological, etc.), the explosion of interest in genealogy and "heritage," and accompanying expressions such as the *Roots* (1977) broadcast and, most notably, the Ellis Island Museum project, which Jacobson calls "Sanctifying Ellis Island." Then follow five thematically oriented chapters exploring, successively, the impact of the ethnic revival on: visual imagery and film, where *Rocky* (1976) is juxtaposed to the Bakke decision (1978) as exemplifying white victimization; literature, with special attention to Philip Roth's *Portnoy's Complaint* (1967) and Erica Jong's *Fear of Flying* (1973) as illustrative of Jewish grappling with issues of identity; social policy and politics, wherein it is shown that the revival reinforced conservatism; the New Left and multiculturalism, in which Jacobson argues that the left, as well as the right, bears some responsibility for creating "blameless white identity" (p. 24); and, finally, a long review of the ways in which feminism and ethnicity have "inflect[ed] each other" (p. 253). The last substantive chapter, entitled "Whose America (Who's America)?," is a kind of catch-all. It includes Michael Dukakis as a faux-ethnic candidate undone by phobic racism (Willie Horton); the Columbus quincentenary and New World genocide; the new immigration and accompanying nativism; and tensions within feminism created by the split between

whites (particularly Jews) and people of color or "Third World feminists."

Jacobson's scholarship is impressive in substance and gracefully presented. For historians who have fallen behind in cultural studies, his book will constitute a short course in, and guide to the literature of, many facets of that diffuse area. Yet covering so broad a canvas means that some matters are treated in a manner more allusive than systematic: the sources and volume of post-1965 immigration, for example, are covered in single, rather bland, paragraph (pp. 352–353). Even his review of the beginnings of the ethnic revival itself omits a good deal. True, Michael Novak's *Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (1972) is discussed at length. However, the work of Andrew M. Greeley, the sociologist most prominently associated with the revival, is passed over in silence; so also is that of Geno Baroni, a leading ethnic activist who held a subcabinet position in the Carter administration. Nor does Jacobson take note of the American Jewish Committee's role in promoting the ethnic revival as way of "depolarizing" racial tension, although both Arthur Mann, in *The One and the Many: Reflections on the American Identity* (1979), and Arthur A. Goren, in *The Politics and Public Culture of American Jews* (1999), stressed the importance of that initiative. The latter omission stands out because Jacobson gives extensive attention to the leading role played by Jews in several dimensions of his subject, as attested by upwards of eighty citations under the index heading "Jews and Jewishness."

Jacobson wants to contribute to "a more usable present (*sic*)" (p. 10). Judgments as to how well his provocative book succeeds in doing so will likely depend on whether the reader agrees that concentration on the pathologies of "whiteness" is the most effective way for our society to throw off the incubus of race.

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CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

KRISTIN RUGGIERO, editor. *The Jewish Diaspora in Latin America and the Caribbean: Fragments of Memory*. Portland, Oreg.: Sussex Academic Press. 2005. Pp. vii, 262. \$67.50.

One can trace the presence of Jews in Latin America back to the time when Christopher Columbus opened the New World for European colonization. In spite of the Spanish monarchs' concern with racial purity and religious orthodoxy in their colonial domains, Jews who had converted to Christianity, and who for some time secretly observed Jewish rituals and traditions, made their way there. However, the roots of modern Jewish life in Latin America are to be found after independence from Spain and Portugal was established by most countries during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Jews immigrated first from Morocco, later from Central and Western Europe, and finally from Eastern

Europe and the Middle East. Just as there were substantial differences among the newly created nations, so was the immigration of Jews unevenly distributed. At present there are close to 500,000 Jews living south of the Rio Grande, forming a vital part of the vibrant urban life in the most important cities on the continent. About half of them live in Argentina (about 230,000), while Brazil (130,000), Mexico (40,000), and Uruguay (30,000) also have sizable Jewish communities. Jews have acculturated in their respective countries of residence, and by the twenty-first century were predominantly second, third, and even fourth generation nationals. They have richly contributed not only to the economy and the professions, but also to their literature, art, music, and journalism. In turn, Jews have also attained positions of political prominence in almost every country in the region.

Editor Kristin Ruggiero has assembled thirteen essays by keen interpreters of the Jewish experience in Latin America, furthering the interdisciplinary exploration of four prominent themes in the history of the respective Jewries: memory, identity, antisemitism, and violence. The contributors' disciplines include history, anthropology, literature, sociology, and art, which underscores the multifaceted ways of describing Jewish life in Latin America. The volume is divided into four clusters of original essays, each inspired by important thematic in the experiences of those Jewries.

The first cluster, "Relocation and the Nazi Years," includes three articles evaluating the climate for admission of Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. Although these countries welcomed some Jews, many others could have been saved under more favorable overall conditions and with more positive governmental policies. In Mexico, the government's receptiveness allowed Anna Seghers to migrate from Germany. After the war she wrote her memoirs, which were praised for their representations of social and political repression. In Brazil Jew-hatred and philosemitism existed side by side. Jewish leaders were able to manipulate images of otherness in order to keep the country's doors open and thus save thousands of lives. In Argentina, the literary review *Sur*, founded by Victoria Ocampo, daughter of an established oligarchical family, and eliciting strong support from distinguished writers such as Jorge Luis Borges, expressed courageous philosemitism, thus carving for itself a unique place among Argentine intellectuals. *Sur* stood firm in its simultaneous opposition to the three pillars of the establishment: the government, the church, and the nationalists of the Argentine right. *Sur* continued to denounce antisemitism after World War II, and, during the Eichmann abduction and aftermath, not only endorsed the Israeli violation of Argentine sovereignty but harshly accused the administrations that gave refuge to Nazi criminals.

The second cluster, "Constructing Memory," includes three essays dealing with the recurrent theme of Argentine antisemitism. Racism and antisemitism in Argentina can be traced back to several incidents in the

nineteenth century. A major occurrence was the *Semana Trágica* (Tragic Week) of January 1919, when a labor strike developed into a pogrom in Buenos Aires. Raanan Rein analyzes the accusations of dual loyalty leveled against Argentinian Jews after Adolf Eichmann's capture in a Buenos Aires suburb, his subsequent trial in Israel, and his execution. In many ways these events became a unifying factor in the life of the Jewish community, stimulating self-defense and stronger links with Israel. Davis Sheinin's essay deals with the military dictatorship of 1976–1983 and the threat posed to Jews by its antisemitic doctrines and its determination to impose a Western Christian civilization. Finally, sociologist Beatriz Gurevich sheds light on the terrorist bombing of AMIA, the central Jewish institution in Buenos Aires, in 1994, a still unresolved incident. She proves the links with international terrorism, the Iran connection, the need to establish clearly the perpetrators in Argentina, and the role of President Carlos Saúl Menem and Judge Juan José Galeano in stonewalling the investigations. Interestingly, the official Jewish leadership was not adamant in challenging Galeano and the official policies. This was done by other groups of Jews, especially the Memoria Activa supporters.

The third cluster of essays, "Identity and Hybridity," includes personal memoirs and interpretations of memoirs by Cuban Jews now in the United States; the uncommon conditions among Jews in the island of Martinique, and the use of Yiddish in Mexico as a conveyor of identity and memory. The essays in this cluster expose the reader not only to different reactions to Fidel Castro's revolution by Cuban Jews but also how Jews in, and from, Cuba, in Martinique, and in Mexico, dealt with dual identity, and how they transformed their cultural values and mores.

The last section, "Poeticizing, Painting, Writing the Pain," presents powerful testimonies of resistance to violence and antisemitism through the lens of memory. The poems by Marjorie Agosin, the paintings of Raquel Partnoy, and the memoirs of Alicia Partnoy convey these authors' experiences during the years of terror imposed by military regimes in Chile and Argentina. In all three cases, the memoirs and reflections—even the paintings—document vivid connections between the Holocaust and the diabolical viciousness of the Latin American military.

Raquel Partnoy is the mother of Alicia, who was abducted in the early years of the military junta in Argentina, and remained "disappeared" for four years until she was released. Both women comment on the reaction of Raquel's father, who suffered during the Holocaust in Europe, and remained silent about it for the rest of his life. His daughter and granddaughter opted to speak, the former via her paintings, the latter by way of her books and memoirs.

Alicia Partnoy, however, asserts that most of the literature and poetry produced in the South American concentration camps and jails does not respond to an initial impulse to testify "outwards." The poems rather

contribute to survival in the most basic and raw of its meanings.

These fragments of memory are a significant contribution to our understanding of Latin American Jewish life. In some of the essays memory is understood as evoking a world that is no more, with yearning and love. In others memory is painful, but transformed into lessons for the authors as well as for the readers, it could be a source of healing. Apropos of the latter, the words of historian Yosef Yerushalmi come to mind. "Ultimately Jewish memory cannot be 'healed' unless the group itself finds healing, unless its wholeness is restored or rejuvenated."

VICTOR A. MIRELMAN

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MATTHEW RESTALL, editor. *Beyond Black and Red: African-Native Relations in Colonial Latin America*. (Diálogos.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 303. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$22.95.

This newly published collection is a welcome addition to the University of New Mexico Press's Diálogos series, designed specifically for course-adoption books on Latin America. Essays included in the volume encompass the diverse regions of Latin America under European colonial rule.

In his introduction, editor Mathew Restall discusses the book's predominant theme of the "hostility-harmony dialectic," which is articulated in the three "arenas of identity, community, and cultural change" (pp. 4–5). Restall's introduction is followed by Ben Vinson III and Restall himself (chapter one), who maintain that in colonial Spanish America black and native soldiers fought together as comrades as well as against each other. Jane Landers (chapter two) observes similar black-native relations in the case of colonial Spanish Florida borderlands. Stuart B. Schwartz and Hal Langfur (chapter three) meticulously trace the extremely complicated history of native-black interactions in the case of Brazil, where "[b]eing 'Indian' is sometimes a way of not being black" (p. 107). In chapter four, Norma Angélica Castillo Palma and Susan Kellogg examine the important gender roles among Nahuas and Afro-Mexicans in the Central Mexican town of Cholula during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Both Renée Soulodre-La France (chapter five) and Chris Lane (chapter six) focus on the mines, where legally free natives and enslaved Africans worked side by side. According to Soulodre-La France, black-native relations in Nueva Granada (Colombia) were conflictive and antagonistic as both subordinate groups attempted to benefit from the colonial legal system. By contrast, Lane maintains that in the Spanish American gold and silver mine camps, African slaves and indigenous peoples widely cooperated, intermixed, and even intermarried, "to survive and to keep digging" (p. 180). Black-Mayan relations in colonial Guatemala and Yucatan is the topic of chapter seven by Christo-

pher Luz and Restall, who examine various intensified intragroup interactions in both urban and rural settings. The result was the breakdown of the original group boundaries, despite the Spaniards' attempts to keep blacks and Mayans apart from each other by fostering prejudice between them. Anthropologist Neil L. Whitehead contributes an outstanding essay (chapter eight) on ethnic transgression in the case of northern South America and the Caribbean, where "black" phenotypes in the indigenous populations have been read as "red." Patrick J. Carroll (chapter nine) also finds that in colonial Mexico the "natives" and "blacks" lived more in harmony than in constant conflict and antagonism. Carroll attributes the Spaniards' official reports of allegedly frequent black-native confrontations to their continuous efforts to keep power in their own hands.

All in all, this volume makes significant contributions to a wide range of scholarship in colonial Latin America and subaltern studies. The book's thematic focus indeed goes "beyond" the simplistically powerful/powerless dichotomy in order to examine relations among subordinate groups. By studying the peoples who were categorized as "black" and "red" respectively (and who might or might not identify as such), the contributors bring out numerous intriguing instances in which identity became more fluid, original group boundaries broke down to a varying degree, and new communities emerged. Of course, this was not usually the case in New World slave societies, as exemplified by Brazil, where the colonial economy was firmly established on the institution of African slavery in combination with the plantation complex. I must also point out that not only the "natives" but also the "blacks" in colonial Latin America were by no means homogeneous in terms of place of birth, legal status, ethnicity, or color. For instance, not all the people of African descent who arrived in colonial Spanish America were enslaved or African-born; some were actually free-born Iberian conquistadores, known as skilled horsemen, who later became *encomenderos* in New Spain and Peru. Accordingly, racial mixture also took place between such free-born black and mulatto colonists with their white wives and/or "Indian" mistresses, which contributed to the emergence of mixed raced *castas* located between Spaniards at the top of the racial order and the "Indians" at the bottom. Thus, as Castillo Palma and Kellogg discuss, gender played an important role in relation to race and ethnicity for the formation and development of colonial society, and Restall could have addressed this in his introduction.

Despite these minor reservations, this collection of essays, each based on substantial research, illustrates various ways by which a group of the powerless struggled to empower themselves by competing and/or cooperating with members of another subordinate group. The book also demonstrates how successfully or unsuccessfully the white elites could set "blacks" and "Indians" at odds with each other. Not only will this book appeal to specialists in New World history with an interest in race, ethnicity, and gender, but it could also be

adopted widely as a textbook for survey courses in colonial Latin America and advanced seminars in comparative slavery and race relations. Furthermore, this book provides the general readership with a good insight on race, ethnicity, and identity politics in the Americas from a comparative perspective.

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SUEANN CAULFIELD, SARAH C. CHAMBERS, and LARA PUTNAM, editors. *Honor, Status, and Law in Modern Latin America*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 331. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

An emerging trend among historians of Latin America is the acknowledgment that law matters—not only in the sense that it shapes people's daily lives in numerous ways, but also (less surprisingly) that legal and prescriptive documents (in the present collection of essays, mostly criminal and other court records and law codes) are indispensable in writing the social and cultural history of societies in which literacy was limited until recent times, and where humble individuals left a documentary trace only when they bumped up against the state. The fourteen essays in this interesting and sophisticated anthology, ranging temporally from the early decades of the nineteenth century to about 1950, and encompassing research on Puerto Rico, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, amply demonstrate this tendency and contribute materially to its consolidation. Although all the essays have something of interest, given the tilt toward cultural history in the field it may actually be the first five, which deal with early republican and liberal aspirations, constitution making, and law codes, that offer the most original work. Co-editors Sueann Caulfield, Sarah C. Chambers, and Lara Putnam neatly summarize the main themes of the book as the rise of liberal ideologies in the successor states to the Ibero-American empires, shifting ideas regarding the constitution and boundaries of the public and private spheres, the role of the state in defining and arbitrating individual reputations, and the enduring importance of patriarchy in apportioning honor and legal rights (p. 1). Beyond this, most of the essays deal either explicitly or implicitly with citizenship in the new nation-states, the nexus where honor, status, and law converged, a theme not mentioned by the editors but palpably central to most of the authors' concerns. More concretely still, the contributors write about how gender and class-based notions of honor traveled from traditional to modern societies, how honor was unlinked in large measure from ascriptive social status after the fall of the colonial regimes (the notion of "decency" replacing that of "caste" as the chief constituent element of personal reputation, for example, although racialized hierarchies remained largely in place), how female sexual propriety and male control over women nonetheless remained at the core of definitions of honor, how economic dependency became a mark of dishonor for men, and so forth. The essays depict quite

vividly, in sum, how new principles of social exclusion were molded to fit liberal ideologies and republican politics. Indians, for example, subordinated in the colonial period through the discourse of their putative inferiority, tended to be marginalized in the political nation in the new states more because they were dependent than because they were Indian as such (an interesting but not entirely convincing argument). On the whole, while the authors emphasize change between the colonial and republican eras, especially at the normative-prescriptive level, they amply demonstrate continuity in the honor-status system and the many inconsistencies between modernizing ideology and traditional practice.

Summarizing a few of these interesting essays will have to stand proxy for describing each of them individually. In the first, Chambers looks at crime, public order, honor, gender, and emerging legal norms in republican Peru, specifically at the city of Arequipa in the early decades of the nineteenth century, laying out some of the themes for subsequent essays. Chambers suggests that the codification of criminal law and behavioral norms in the republican period was due, not surprisingly, to the breakdown of the monarchical regime and the incipient development of Peruvian civil society. More interesting are her conclusions that, as in other Latin American societies, personal independence became an important desideratum of citizenship, citizens acquired the leverage to defend themselves in the courts, and a productivist social ethic began to define citizenship, although female honor still remained linked to sexual purity. Rossana Barragán's very nice essay on Bolivian citizenship during roughly the same period demonstrates the large contradiction between liberal assumptions of individual equality, as embodied in republican constitutions, and the preservation of old racialized and gendered hierarchies. Putnam's evocative essay on gender and verbal insults in a Costa Rican town between 1890 and 1910 skillfully interweaves colorful anecdote and sociologizing, when the former can easily be boiled off by the latter, or overwhelm it. The woman-on-woman insults she mentions sometimes bespeak the oddly innocent and awkward yet sly quality of a Monty Python routine, as when one woman replied to accusations of sexual impropriety by a neighbor in 1907, "Don't you break my ass this morning" (p. 159), and the two ended up in court over a series of traded insults. The chapters by Laura Gotkowitz and Brodwyn Fischer, respectively on Cochabamba, Bolivia (1870–1950) and Rio de Janeiro (first half of the twentieth century), deal fascinatingly with the same sort of evidence. Other essays raise interesting specific points, as in Eileen J. Findlay's examination of the medicalization of the legal arena in rape cases in late nineteenth-century Puerto Rico, Olivia Maria Gomes da Cunha's discussion of "forensic taxonomy" in Rio de Janeiro criminal records between 1900 and 1940, or Caulfield's welcome emphasis on the influence of exogenous cultural ideas (specifically, from the U.S.,

about "modern women") on female behavior in Brazil, 1920–1940.

One issue the authors of the essays do not address is the question of how a structure of at least provisional legitimacy was created for the new rules repackaging some fairly traditional and exclusionary social norms to comport with ideas of modernity, so that subaltern individuals did not take issue with the rules of honor and subordination as such but rather with how they were applied individually. Beyond this theoretical concern, there are some methodological and discursive problems peculiar to the sort of cultural history—for that is what I take this collection to represent—being written here. For one thing, many of the essays are notably self-paraphrastic (e.g. Findlay's otherwise fine chapter on Puerto Rico), as if the layering of repetitive language made the central point more convincing. For another, the chapters are rendered in a particularly elliptical style common to much such historical writing, in which terminology proliferates and conclusions remain elusive. There is also what can be called the "small-N" problem. With 450 cases over twenty years, Caulfield's study of Rio de Janeiro is relatively awash with data, but Findlay on Puerto Rico has some 200 cases spread over two decades, and Gotkowitz on Bolivia only about 225 cases over seventy-five years. Common to the essays, therefore, is a tendency to hyperminiaturize, which raises questions of the larger claims raised by the authors vis a vis the representativeness of their data. Still, a common virtue of the approach shared by these (mostly) younger scholars is their treatment of cultural history as an ironic project, in which the slippage between overt social norm, whether *de jure* or *de facto*, is treated not as an obstacle to historical understanding but rather as a window into social practice. This fine collection of essays will definitely be of interest not only to historians of modern Latin America but also to those scholars of the human sciences who work on cognate issues of gender, honor, law, and the social construction of citizenship in other areas of the world.

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B. W. HIGMAN. *Plantation Jamaica, 1750–1850: Capital and Control in a Colonial Economy*. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 386.

B. W. Higman's book is an excellent study and a fine example of economic history. The author focuses on one aspect of Caribbean history that has received little scholarly attention until now: that is, "the management of the plantation economy." The historical context for this study is colonial Jamaica, 1750–1850. Jamaica was Britain's largest producer of sugar and the most important example of absentee proprietorship and plantation or estate management through agents. The principal figure in Higman's study is the estate agent, usually an attorney, who represented a unique concept of the separation of ownership and management.

The author meticulously examines the character of the absentee planters and the role of the agents who managed their estates on their behalf. Higman traces the extent of absentee ownership in Jamaica, and with sophistication and ease he elevates to new heights the ongoing debate on the impact of absenteeism on plantation life and the plantation economy. His comprehensive and diligent analysis of data and sources compels readers to reevaluate old notions of plantation management and to address crucial questions related to this issue such as "who were these agents?" and "how did they manage the plantation before and after the abolition of slavery?"

Higman argues several key points. The management style and the decisions of slave owners and their attorney agents were instrumental to the plantation economy. Owners' and agents' decisions about crop selection, scale of production, and the type of management style to be implemented on the estate all contributed to the comparatively high levels of productivity extracted in Jamaica. The profit reflected the managerial success of the attorneys and suggested that the separation of capital and control, of ownership and management, was in many ways modern in its operational structure and efficiency. Higman further argues that management decisions were clearly linked to the manipulation of complex agro-industrial technology, an integrated trade network, and the brutal exploitation of slave labor. The absentee proprietors' decision to empower attorneys as estate agents and place them ahead of managers and supervisors to run the estates resulted in vast amounts of wealth for the proprietors. The system of attorneyship, in effect, made possible absenteeism, at least from the proprietor's perspective. Higman concludes his argument with a provocative debate, in which he questions whether the attorneys of Jamaica were good managers or not. He provides no clear answers to this moral dilemma and leaves us thinking about the issue. Nonetheless, Higman emphasizes that the unique management system that was created by both proprietors and attorneys enabled the estate agents to maximize profits from the system and the people they oppressed. Such a system, Higman concludes, was both modern and repugnant.

The book is extensively documented and relies on a remarkable array of primary and secondary sources to provide unique insights into the world of estate agents, including their range of activities and demographic characteristics. These sources include, attorneys' letters, plantation records, official publications, parliamentary papers, and slave registration records. In-depth case studies are used to compare the management styles of individual attorneys, such as Simon Taylor's management of Golden Grove Estate in the decade before the American Revolution and Isaac Jackson's control of Montpelier in the years following the abolition of slavery. This study provides new information on topics such as the postal service during this period, the history of accounting, plantation life, tech-

nology, investments and profits, as well as the role of the attorneys in the British West Indies.

Higman's narrative style is elegant and fluid, and the text is clearly organized and well presented. Particularly useful are the many detailed maps, charts, and beautiful illustrations dispersed throughout the text. The book is divided into two main parts. The author begins with some background information and overview of Jamaican productivity during the period, planters' management of resources, and the beginning of the distinction between planters and proprietors within the Jamaican and the British Caribbean context. This is followed by the first part of the text, which focuses on the owners of the plantations, their agents, and the complex structure of managerial hierarchy. The second part of the study analyzes the management choices of planters, merchants, and agents.

Higman has succeeded in conveying the role of estate agents in the Jamaican plantation economy between 1750 and 1850. Overall, this is a superb book that is rich in texture and information. More importantly, it makes valuable contributions to the fields of Caribbean history and slavery in the Americas. I strongly recommend this book for scholars and students at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.

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YEIDI M. RIVERO. *Tuning Out Blackness: Race and Nation in the History of Puerto Rican Television*. (Consoling Passions: Television and Cultural Power.) Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 264. Cloth \$74.95, paper \$21.95.

In a work whose theoretical sophistication and historical breadth is matched by its cultural sensitivity, Yeidi M. Rivero explains how and why blackface comedy and imagery continued to be constructed and consumed as a valid form of popular entertainment in Puerto Rico as late as the 1990s. Complementing and expanding on Rine Leal, Robin Moore, and Jill Lane's pioneering studies on Cuban blackface, Rivero shows that early uses of blackface structured white supremacist values into depictions of blackness while also articulating blackness as a quintessentially anticolonial, nationalist condition.

As in late nineteenth-century Cuba, "blackface and blackvoice [in post-1898 Puerto Rico] became protected political masquerades for criticizing U.S. colonialism, the Puerto Rican government, and the oppression of the working class" (p. 25). Particularly responsible for this was Ramón Rivero, an actor, writer, and producer whose characterization of the *negrito* in theater and radio from the 1930s through the early development of television in the 1950s transcended evolving media forms. In Ramón Rivero's hands, the black buffoon transformed into a trickster figure, symbolic of organic political wisdom, who rejected traditional elite representations of the poor and working class through the image of the white peasant, or *jíbaro*. Eventually,

Rivero's *negrito* became popular-class Puerto Ricans' hero and "the *jíbaro*'s nemesis," rejecting the triumphalist discourse of paternal politicians that glossed colonial collaboration and class injustice under the rubric of *la gran familia puertorriqueña*. Yet, as the author contends, the complex dimensions of sociopolitical critique embodied in Rivero's *negrito* were increasingly eliminated after his death in 1956, when transnational contact with radical ideologies of black liberation and transnational migration (first of anti-Castro Cubans in the 1960s and then of impoverished black Dominicans in the 1980s) rendered the cultural landscape of nationalist debates a veritable battleground. In many ways, public consensus on the meaning of blackface and blackness did not so much as expand in progressive directions as retract into reactionary patterns.

Officially, Puerto Rico's government has never recognized that racist ideologies or practices permeate society and institutions, let alone commercial television (p. 104). Consequently, televisual popular culture remains a central site for both confirming and contesting the white ideal and related myths of racial equality, especially because television, until the early 1990s, was a largely national affair. Using poignant examples of fan mail, personal testimonies, popular press, surveys, and anecdotes, Rivero illustrates how most islanders maintain that racism does not exist in Puerto Rico, that any discrimination is the outcome of individual moral failings, and that those who complain of racism are importing U.S.-derived sensibilities that have no place there. More often than not, Rivero argues, television and media professionals, journalists, and average citizens have justified the ridiculing of blacks through blackface as well as the celebration of white ideals of beauty and power with the argument that because racism does not exist in Puerto Rico, such actions and attitudes are entirely acceptable and possibly complimentary—even to black Puerto Ricans (pp. 75, 85–88, 95–96, 150). Moreover, particularly threatening images of U.S. black activism have been translated into forms that serve the purpose of culturally distancing Puerto Rico from its colonizer and making Puerto Ricans appear comparatively innocent of all race problems. Thus, a satirized version of Angela Davis appeared in a 1970s comedy show while a Puerto Rican black family posed as a "colorless" version of the Cosbys in the 1990s island sit-com, *Mi Familia* (pp. 114; 147–159).

From the late 1960s through the early 1970s, local efforts to challenge the validity of blackface, the normalization of whiteness as the basis of national identity, and racialized definitions of beauty culminated in one of two ways: either the activists themselves were systematically discredited or their critiques were subsumed into the parodic paradigm of what Rivero brilliantly calls "blackface blackness." For example, Rivero details the "televisual racial crisis" that Lucecita, a popular Puerto Rican singer who initially used wigs as a whitening device, inadvertently provoked when she decided to wear a natural Afro in 1970. Public outcry over Lucecita's Afro radicalized the singer, prompting her to

challenge racialized and gendered norms of femininity even further, a process that eventually led to severe marginalization and public rebuke (pp. 78–85). Even as Lucecita inspired other antidiscriminatory and black pride campaigns, such as that led by Sylvia del Villiard, the public selected “Chianita,” a character created by a white actress who played a blackface maid on a popular television soap opera, as its icon of choice. Similarly, Puerto Ricans reacted with surprise when a *mulata* compatriot won the Miss World beauty pageant in 1975, only reservedly celebrating her win and then in terms that re-racialized her as a sun-tanned white or stereotypically explained her victory as a result of her sexuality as a *mulata* rather than conceding the beauty of her blackness (pp. 108–111).

Indeed, one is left to wonder about the degree to which black and *mulato* Puerto Ricans, a self-identified minority of the population, identify with the ideals and myths Rivero so adroitly explores. The absence of personal interviews with the televising public is a minor flaw in this book, as are its somewhat unsatisfying discussions of Puerto Ricans’ evolving views of Cubans, before and after the 1959 Castro Revolution. The fact that Puerto Rican actors’ historical blackface performance involved their deployment of a Cuban accent provides a case in point. Did Puerto Ricans’ association of black pride with the legendary rebelliousness of Cuba’s slaves and revolutionaries serve a specific national purpose? Did the expression of black pride through Cubanized characters help repress the legitimacy of race consciousness in Puerto Rican popular culture through the deliberate creation of national distance from blackness? Or did such appropriations of Cubanness serve to neutralize radical calls for the transformation of the social order in general, much as later “translations” of Angela Davis or *Soul Train* did? Moreover, while Rivero charts Puerto Ricans’ visceral reaction to the self-construction of anti-Castro Cuban immigrants, her discussion of Puerto Ricans’ efforts to bond with exiles over mutual claims to whiteness bears further thought. How much do denials of racism and fidelity to the white ideal in Puerto Rico act to construct broader structural deficiencies and make nationalist discourses complicit with U.S. colonialism?

However hungry readers may be for more analysis from Rivero, this book is a triumph of striking research and stirring narration whose relevance is as much historical as it is contemporary.

LILLIAN GUERRA
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CONSUELO CRUZ. *Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua: World Making in the Tropics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xvii, 281. \$80.00.

This is a dense book of nearly three hundred pages that should be compared to significant contributions along these lines by Jeffery M. Paige, James Mahoney, Deborah J. Yashar, Kirk S. Bowman, Fabrice Edouard Le-

houcq, and Robert H. Holden, to mention some of the most notable and recognized names in the U.S. Despite their differences, what Consuelo Cruz and these authors have in common is a commitment to explaining Costa Rica’s exceptional twentieth-century political history of stability, democracy, and nonviolent electoral regime transitions in the historical context of a neighborhood of nation-states whose record in these and related processes illustrates little of what is positive in the Costa Rican case. One of the strengths of this book, for which it will be praised, then, is that it focuses on a targeted audience composed of a sophisticated if small community of scholars familiar with a spate of theorizing and dialogue about democracy, regime change, and electoral politics.

The chronological and conceptual reach of the argument is neatly presented in chapter one, “Theoretical Overview,” itself cogently projected in a learned introduction of eighteen pages. First, this book is “concerned solely with what political actors make discursively explicit” (p. 31). Thus, this book is grounded in the rhetoric of literate elites. Second, the focus is a comparison between Costa Rica and Nicaragua from their colonial periods until the 1990s. Third, special attention is placed on the relationship between colonial and post-colonial macrohistories and elite political cultures that diverged in both countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Finally, chronologically speaking, Cruz emphasizes “moments of danger” besides the colonial period: for Costa Rica the 1940s, for Nicaragua between 1857 and 1893. For Cruz, individual agencies and political events, and processes after these periods were structured through the legacies of political cultures established by elites in the previous periods.

More specifically, Cruz argues that her book “shows that political culture is . . . historically shaped, but also argues that political culture endogenously generates critical junctures. At these key points, political culture itself can change at a surprisingly rapid pace, sometimes ahead of institutional and even socioeconomic restructuring” (p. 21). How did this explain the differences between Costa Rican and Nicaraguan political evolution? Cruz uses a range of political science jargon that space does not allow me to explain. Herein I distill the argument as best as I can for an audience unfamiliar with the conceptual schemas and narrative rhetoric used by Cruz and her colleagues.

In the case of Costa Rica, the relationship between its colonial history and early independence from Spain, one of a number of “critical junctures” that Cruz analyzes, including the famous civil war of 1948, allowed for an elite-created political culture that she characterizes as a “system of Manichean normative scheming in which the foe was, in contradiction to the Nicaraguan system, foreign to the nation” (p. 112). In Costa Rica, soon after independence, elites thus deployed rhetoric of localized common ground that promoted and nurtured elite political competition and a sense of national identity prescriptive of those values. This allowed for a political culture shared by elites who did not see each

other as real or potential enemies requiring not only war but the continued destruction and restructuring of the polity.

In Nicaragua, by contrast, the opposite occurred, especially after the 1890s, and the end of almost thirty years of Conservative stability after war with the Liberals. During that postcolonial stability, Nicaraguan elites, defeated and conquerors alike, created a political culture and associated national identity, through what Cruz calls a "tailored communicative regulation," prescriptive of values of intolerance and disdainful of the kind of "gradualist reformism" that benefited Costa Ricans in the twentieth century. In Nicaragua, elites of whatever ideology and economic commitment socialized themselves, as well as their sons, daughters, and political institutions, into a political culture of winner-take-all and a fateful metaphysics of destruction of the polity itself in the search for equality.

This is a very important book that cuts against the grain of much new social and ethnohistorical scholarship that has sought to find and give voice to the subaltern. This is especially the case for Costa Rica. Race and gender are not categories that readers will find in the narrative or analysis presented here. However, the book's main weakness is not necessarily the conceptual and methodological focus on elite discourses; rather, its reading of the historiography seems to have been done in such a way that significant contributions on how subaltern rhetoric and discourses have shaped critical junctures and specific decisions in political history do not receive the attention they merit. Sadly, space does not allow me to substantiate this claim.

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STEPHEN G. RABE. *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story*. (The New Cold War History.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2005. Pp. 240. \$19.95.

The diplomatic history of the Cold War in Latin America is replete with tales of hypocrisy and misapplied power. Purporting to be an international sponsor of sovereignty and democratic self-determination, the United States habitually undercut those principles in the name of national security interests and a desire to circumvent Soviet expansion. The resulting tragedies in countries such as Guatemala, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic have been chronicled by two generations of historians.

Stephen G. Rabe's book reinforces these points as it shines a bright academic light on what has been a forgotten corner of Latin American and diplomatic history. British Guiana is a place that exemplifies the ongoing tragedy of colonialism compounded by American Cold War malfeasance. The deliberate campaign waged by U.S. policy makers against the government of Cheddi Jagan, and the consequences faced by Guyanese citizens to this very day, constitute one of the more shameful episodes in modern American history.

As a traditional history of Cold War diplomacy, Rabe's book excels. When he unspools the convergent paths taken by America and Great Britain after World War II, the author very effectively portrays the process of policy making as a clash of both perception and response. As Rabe makes clear, both sides kept on the blinders that defined their global outlook when they addressed British Guiana. Washington treated the colony almost wholly within the realm of the Communist threat. British officials, while clearly more open minded, still saw the events unfolding in their colony from the perspective of more than a century of imperial practice. One point Rabe very adeptly relates is that America and the United Kingdom did not approach the question of British Guiana as peers. The fate of its South American colony became yet another milestone marking the decline of British global power and its American replacement. The narrative relating this dawning realization, particularly for Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson, is one of the strongest parts of the book. Supporting this discussion is a formidable body of primary source research drawn from private collections, presidential libraries, and the national archives of both the United States and the United Kingdom.

Cumulatively, Rabe uses this montage of sources and perspectives to redefine the more traditional models used by diplomatic historians. Particularly effective is his relation of the interaction between the U.S. government and American labor unions. As this theme unfolds, the state as an actor in the process of diplomacy recedes as a singular entity, replaced by a plural accumulation of institutional interests, personal biases, and contextual influences that more realistically characterize international relations. In this manner, Rabe extends a paradigm created by pioneers of multicausal diplomatic history such as Akira Iriye into the Latin American arena.

When it attempts to explore areas further outside the traditional purview of diplomatic history, the book falls short of its goals. One of Rabe's earliest assertions regards the importance of race and gender in the study of international relations (p. 11). Rabe does periodically mention race in his discussion, particularly the evolving tensions between Indian and black constituencies in Guiana, but does not dwell on the topic in depth. This is unfortunate given the fact that race is clearly relevant to not only the internal dynamics of postcolonial development, but also U.S. treatment of the country as a whole. There are many apparent linkages between the interpretation of race and its influence on the Cold War, especially in the context of the history of American civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s. While these issues are discussed, they are not well integrated into the narrative. The extent to which race influenced the Kennedy or Johnson administrations in their decision making is unresolved in the book. Conversely, a fascinating related topic would have been attempts on the part of the Guyanese leadership, especially Forbes Burnham, to manipulate emerging American concerns about race.

Rabe's assertion that diplomatic history relies too heavily on U.S. and other Western sources is on point and reflects a longstanding problem in the field. Moreover, the fact that documents drawn from British Guiana are written in standard English offers a unique opportunity to any scholar focusing on Latin America. Unfortunately, aside from autobiographies published by Jagan and Burnham, there is little in the way of local primary documents that illuminate this side of the story.

Despite these shortcomings, the book under review is a highly instructive history of an important and tragic place in Cold War history. Rabe's introduction of newly released documents will no doubt spark other scholars' interest in expanding and exploring new facets of this story.

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ELIZABETH W. KIDDY. *Blacks of the Rosary: Memory and History in Minas Gerais, Brazil*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 287. \$55.00.

In 1642, the ambassador from Kongo entered Recife, Brazil, escorted by costumed dance troupes brandishing weapons to honor their homeland and hosts. Remarkably similar dances, performed by *congada* troupes from the Brotherhood of Our Lady of the Rosary of the Blacks, continue to be performed, according to Elizabeth W. Kiddy, the author of this impressive new study of lay religious organizations of Minas Gerais, Brazil. Kiddy's book is a thorough-going investigation of the meaning and function of devotional groups in the lives of enslaved and free Africans and their descendants in colonial and postcolonial Brazil.

In this book, the first major study of black brotherhoods in thirty years, Kiddy argues that the African slaves created "transnational and multiethnic communities" that "celebrated" spiritual powers of Catholic and African traditions, cultivated "unseen powers," and provided for a better afterlife through rituals and symbols during their activities in the rosary brotherhoods (p. 5). She explains that their religious life and ideas blossomed into a rich alternative tradition under the aegis of the church, adapting to historical conditions in Brazil. Rather than merely sketch the trajectory of beliefs or institutions, however, Kiddy weaves an intricate tapestry of the four centuries of the religious brotherhoods in Minas Gerais, drawing together information on the brotherhoods' institutional development, related political and economic circumstances, the history of race relations and social status, and the devotional practices of Luso-Brazilian Catholicism.

In her introduction, Kiddy draws on contemporary theories of racial identity and social memory formation to underscore the importance of the creation of the brotherhoods "of the blacks" in contradistinction to white and nonreligious organizations. Each subsequent chapter impressively documents the history of the central political, economic, and ecclesiastical factors that

shaped the religious and social lives of blacks in the rosary brotherhoods. While some readers unfamiliar with the convolutions of colonial developments may be overwhelmed by the details, these sections are valuable additions given that Brazilian history—especially concerning slavery and racial demographics—is so little known.

Kiddy begins, in chapters one and two, with the Old World antecedents to the rosary brotherhoods, in the saints' veneration and religious organizations of the medieval Roman Catholic Church and the vital cosmology of the Central and West Africans whose lives were devastated by slavery. In Africa and later in Brazil, Portuguese Christians utilized Marian devotion and the rosary to evangelize Africans, while converted slaves adapted the rituals to their own understandings of the relationships between the human and divine realms. In Brazil, the rosary brotherhoods were cultivated by whites and blacks alike, to both similar and divergent ends, perpetuating deep misunderstandings beneath the conjoining of popular Catholicism and African religious worldviews. There, while religion provided the slave holders with another means of controlling the underclass of slaves, Africans and their descendants created a community of resistance around their own myths of Mary's preferences for blacks, feast-day celebrations, and rituals for the dead.

Chapters three through six trace the progressive history of the rosary brotherhoods for blacks, beginning in the colonial gold boom of the 1690s, and continuing through the political and economic reorganizations of the nineteenth-century Brazilian Empire and twentieth-century republic. Begun as loosely organized groups dedicated to Our Lady of the Rosary, brotherhoods hired their own chaplains, arranged rituals, elected festival kings and queens, and even built their own chapels. Members gained autonomy through their community-shaped identity, strategically evading or delaying church or state control. Gradually brought under centralized authority, rosary brotherhoods in Minas Gerais revitalized their African heritage, blended with Catholic popular religion, and experienced a resurgence in the 1880s. In chapter seven, Kiddy's meticulous history is brought to life with the vivid interviews of festival kings, queens, and *congada* dancers, complemented by accounts of current celebrations and tantalizing hints of the secret ceremonies and symbols kept just out of the public view.

This project draws on regional and national archives and extensive fieldwork with the participants in contemporary festivals to create a rather compelling history, concluding with "the story of the past as lived by the *congadeiros* themselves" (p. 11). Although Kiddy usually leaves aside analysis of the meaning of and impetus for religious devotion among Africans and their descendants, her work nevertheless provides important insights into the creative preservation of African heritage woven into Brazilian Catholicism and the development of racial identity among blacks, without neglecting the interplay of the dominant hierarchy and

power structures of church and state within Minas Gerais. A challenging and rewarding read, the book offers scholars a valuable resource for the understanding of the development of social and religious organizations of "blacks" in the African diaspora.

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MATTHIAS RÖHRIG ASSUNÇÃO. *Capoeira: The History of an Afro-Brazilian Martial Art*. (Sport in the Global Society.) New York: Routledge. 2005. Pp. xiii, 267. \$24.99.

This is by a wide margin the best book yet published on the history of capoeira, in any language. Matthias Röhrig Assunção has done the archival digging that most previous authors have been unable or unwilling to undertake, and has avoided the essentialism and willful invention of tradition that pervade the most popular accounts. Instead, he makes the competing and overlapping accounts of capoeira's origins part of his subject, emerging with a rich account not only of the game itself but of the ways in which it has been understood and its place in larger debates on the meanings of Afro-Brazilian culture. He also incorporates and builds on exciting recent Brazilian scholarship on capoeira and nineteenth-century social history more generally, and he connects these inquiries to capoeira's globalization over the past two decades. The result, as they say in capoeira, is a compelling and authoritative *volta do mundo*—a trip around the capoeira ring that is at the same time a trip around the world.

Most capoeira academies cultivate the myth that capoeira has always been first and foremost a manifestation of Afro-Brazilian resistance, and they support this with an assortment of complementary myths: that it was invented by runaway slaves, that it arrived full-grown with the slave trade from Angola, that its movements derive from the struggles of shackled slaves, that its musical components were developed to disguise the preparation for battle. The mutual contradictions of these myths does not prevent their simultaneous deployment by self-proclaimed authorities. Assunção takes them apart with care and admirable restraint: regarding the tendency of several authors to see apparitions of African survivals, he writes, "There are sufficient facts to corroborate the Angolan origins of capoeira—we do not need to invent any" (p. 27).

Capoeira grew from a Central African matrix of combat games and competitive dance, responding and adapting to the rough demographic and cultural mix of Brazil's major port cities, maturing into a unique, multifaceted form, sometimes ludic and sometimes violent, often in between. As Assunção shows, that process of maturation was both more recent and more open to external influence—primarily from other martial arts and from broader intellectual interest in the championing of Afro-Brazilian culture as a source of national strength—than is generally believed. In the nineteenth century, it was practiced in different ways in Rio de Janeiro and in Bahia. In Rio, it was primarily the province

of street toughs, organized in territorial gangs, available for hire as bodyguards and wardheelers by corrupt politicians. (Assunção wisely leaves the reader to work out comparisons to Rio's current scene.) Only in the fuzziest of conceptions could this be classified as resistance, cultural or otherwise. As Assunção shows, the attempt to repress capoeira via police action in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not so much a reaction against Afro-Brazilian culture as an attempt to crack the power of the gangs and their political patrons.

In Bahia, capoeira was primarily a more ludic and self-contained pastime of dockworkers and porters, who played with varying intensity, acrobatics, and *malícia*, or trickery, depending on the circumstances; a Sunday display in a plaza full of churchgoers demanded a different approach from a dockside rumble. Assunção identifies these manifestations as "classic" capoeira, for they preceded the efforts to catalogue, contain, and uplift the game that gained traction in the 1930s. The two most important figures in this process were Mestre Bimba, known as the patriarch of the fast, combative "regional" style, and Mestre Pastinha, patriarch of the relatively slow, tricky "angola" style. In contrast to most writers and practitioners, Assunção presents a convincing account of these men as modernizers, rather than traditionalists. In two fascinating chapters, he explores both their actions—the foundation of competing academies, with parallel rituals of training and advancement—and their ideas, connecting them to Afro-Brazilian modernism more generally. He demonstrates that capoeira is best understood not as a colonial relic but as a product of black Atlantic modernization.

Assunção is slightly less surefooted when discussing capoeira's current manifestations. While he recognizes the importance of technology like the internet and DVDs to the game's internationalization, he makes several pat references to commodification and cooptation as if they represented a danger to capoeira instead of a mechanism for growth. It seems clear that the rise of capoeira as a marker of cool globalization in advertisements for cell phones and automobiles has been the best thing to happen to capoeira since Mestre Bimba quit his day job.

As a work of historical scholarship, this book is consistently topnotch. It is required reading for anyone who cares about capoeira, and strongly recommended for all those interested in modern Brazil and Latin American popular culture more generally.

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ANNE G. HANLEY. *Native Capital: Financial Institutions and Economic Development in São Paulo, Brazil, 1850–1920*. (Social Science History.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2005. Pp. xviii, 286. \$55.00.

This book by Anne G. Hanley is an important contribution to our understanding of the institutional mechanism that helped the state of São Paulo emerge as the

economic powerhouse of Brazil in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Hanley is the first scholar to examine closely the means through which the financial sector transferred agricultural wealth to the growing urban-industrial sector in the 1850–1920 period. She convincingly refutes the long-held view that the modernizing elements in late nineteenth-century Brazil were foreign owned or foreign controlled and shows that the dynamism of São Paulo's economy stemmed instead from domestic institutions. In the 1880s most banks serving the São Paulo economy were increasingly dominated by coffee planters, who had a substantial equity stake in them. Under their influence these banks shifted away from merchant-inspired banking practices to loans that were secured by collateral placed with the banks. Thus the “shift from discounting paper with two well-known signatures to lines of credit secured by collateral represented an important diversification away from formalized versions of traditional, personal arrangements” (p. 51). Hanley also notes increased investment by banking institutions in the shares of joint-stock companies after 1885 and that some banks, encouraged by the provincial government through profit guarantees, provided long-term credits to the rapidly expanding agricultural sector.

Among the book's important contributions is its analysis of the role played by sale of stocks in financing the growth of banks, railroads, urban transportation, and public utilities. In fact about sixty-five percent of public utility finance and seventy-seven percent of railroad finance came from domestic stock and bond holders. Hanley provides evidence that many of the wealthy families in São Paulo placed substantial portions of their portfolios into stocks. Regulatory reforms instituted right after the establishment of the republic gave a big incentive to the formation of new businesses, many financed by the issues of stocks. Especially revealing is the fact that railroads, which accounted for just a small handful of market listings in the 1890s and early 1900s, dominated the Bolsa.

Hanley's findings lead her to challenge the traditional view that foreign capital was dominant over domestic finance. In fact, her data show that the industrial and utility sectors “found their financial base in the domestic capital market” (p. 110). And the enormous size of the Canadian-owned São Paulo Tramway, Light and Power Company “has overshadowed the fact that its investments were limited to the greater São Paulo metropolitan area . . . The municipal utility companies for São Paulo's secondary and tertiary cities were financed through the domestic capital market” (pp. 110–111).

There is a chapter on the government's attempt to establish universal banks that would concentrate on development-oriented lending to both agriculture and urban enterprises. Only three such banks were established and they ultimately failed. Hanley attributes this lack of success to the prohibition on the banks using funds raised in one portfolio for application in another one. Although this prohibition was imposed to keep banks

from using short-term funds to make long-term loans, it eliminated the advantage universal banks were supposed to have: diversification of assets.

Another major chapter concerns the growth of commercial banking in the late 1890s. The reforms of January 1890, which eliminated the liability of investing in joint-stock companies, spurred the rapid appearance of new commercial banks, and most were domestically owned. Hanley also finds that the coffee boom of the 1890s generated a surplus for investment in non-agricultural activities, much of which found its way into the new banks. She also describes the links of the growing banking sector to non-bank companies through the sharing of board directors. This made a lot of sense in the context of the times as “Having bankers as board members meant companies might gain access to bank finance, while the bankers gained access to information” (p. 160).

In the boom of the 1890s many banks, especially the regional banks, made risky loans, and Hanley shows how these resulted in precarious liquidity ratios. The conservative policies of Minister Joaquim Murinho at the turn of the century resulted in the Bank Panic of 1900; this caused the disappearance of many domestic commercial banks, which in turn led to a dramatic reversal of the position of domestic and foreign banks. The latter, by virtue of survival, became the dominant financial institutions after the crisis was over. Hanley concludes that “reliance on local sources was both a triumph of the coffee economy and the Achilles' heel of the São Paulo banking system. That so many resources were available and put to productive use testifies to the great wealth generated by coffee and its attendant commerce. The fact that all these institutions were formed at unit banks, however, caught them short when the bank crisis of 1900 hit. The lack of access to a network's funds doomed most domestic banks to failure” (p. 186).

Hanley's well documented study is indeed an important contribution to our knowledge of the early diversification and industrial growth of Brazil's most dynamic state.

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JEFFREY M. SHUMWAY. *The Case of the Ugly Suitor and Other Histories of Love, Gender, and Nation in Buenos Aires, 1776–1870*. (Engendering Latin America.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2005. Pp. x, 200. \$29.95.

In 1776, as colonies on the North American seacoast declared independence from their British rulers, the reverse was taking place at the other end of the Atlantic basin: the Spanish crown established a new viceroyalty with Buenos Aires as its capital. That same year, the Spanish monarch issued a new law on marriage that was extended to the American colonies two years later. The legislation granted parents the right to prevent the mat-

rimony of their progeny to partners of inferior social status. It also entitled the offspring to challenge parental opposition in civil court. Jeffrey M. Shumway's book draws its title from one of these cases, in which a father objected to his daughter's suitor on the basis of—among other complaints—his physical appearance.

These court cases and others related to child custody provide the author with more than a catchy title. They offer him a rich, and suitable, source to examine prevailing attitudes regarding family, marriage, women, and status during a period that runs from the inception of the law, through its survival after Argentine independence, to its abrogation with the creation of a national civil code in 1870. Criminal cases deal with aberrations, with behavior that—in spite of its apparent ordinariness—is actually statistically rare (the reason criminologists find it so difficult to explain crime trends even today when data abound by comparison to the nineteenth century). Marriage, however, is—as an event—only less common than birth and death, and as experience arguably more common than any other social relation. It is true that not all Argentine parents objected to their children's choice of spouse, and fewer children challenged their parents' objection in court; Shumway does not tell us how common the practice was or the socioeconomic distribution of the individuals involved. But the cases he examines deal with prevalent ideals and quotidian realities and concerns, include people of diverse social backgrounds, and, because of the nature of litigation, necessarily highlight divergent opinions.

As have other studies of the transition from colony to nation in Latin America, this one detects both continuities and changes. Racism against people of indigenous or African ancestry obviously persisted after independence. But the number of parents objecting to the marriage of their children on the basis of race declined, as did their success rate in court. Parental prerogatives did not disappear. But the proportion of court cases won by parents (which had already been only about one-third during the colonial period) dropped drastically after independence, when judges ruled in favor of the children in eighty-six percent of the cases. Youthful romance gained further ground at the expense of paternal control after the national civil code of 1870 curtailed the basis of parents' objection to their children's marriages. Shumway rightly reminds us that patriarchy is not only about gender. It includes a critical dimension of generational relations and conflicts.

Postindependence trends in the gender component of patriarchy are less clear. Shumway discusses attitudes toward women in a judicious manner that balances apparent empowerment related to republican motherhood and education with persistent inequalities. But the lack of a systematic sociological and textual analysis of the material prevents him from identifying clear tendencies. We do not know if mothers and daughters became more, or less, likely to initiate and win court cases regarding marriage partners or child custody; or if the language in the legal arguments be-

came more, or less, egalitarian. This is particularly important to detect trends because the law itself did not change during the period the book covers. Nor does Shumway discuss the dramatic demographic transformation that immigration engendered and its implications. This is particularly surprising for a book that aims to reconstruct the ideals and experiences of the majority, since immigrants represented more than half of the city's inhabitants by 1870 and about three-quarters of its adult population. Mass migration also sharply altered the sex ratio of the city's population, a shift of clear relevance for the topics of the book.

Shumway does demonstrate, however, that patriarchy, whether colonial or national, was never absolute. Women and young people consistently contested patriarchal authority, often with success. Patriarchs, after all, lost more court cases than they won. The limits of patriarchy may be obvious to anyone who has ever observed the domestic politics of Latin American homes, even—or perhaps particularly—those described as “traditional.” However, Shumway expounds the historical depth of these limits. And he does so in a delightful way. The suitor of the title may have indeed been ugly—although he claimed he was not as ugly as his future father-in-law. But Shumway tells his and others' histories with grace, beauty, and insight.

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EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

CALLIE WILLIAMSON. *The Laws of the Roman People: Public Law in the Expansion and Decline of the Roman Republic*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2005. Pp. xxviii, 506. \$75.00.

In this very systematic attempt to unravel the contentious history of the Roman Republic beginning with its expansion in 350 and ending with its demise in 44 B.C.E., Callie Williamson examines how public and institutional law-making practices facilitated Roman expansion during the first two centuries and then, in the third century, became the mechanism of the republic's decline. Williamson lays out her argument in three parts (each divided into three chapters), three appendixes, and thirty-nine tables devoted to showing when, where, and why public law-making took place and who sponsored it. Accordingly, she presents Roman expansion as a Greek drama: successful expansion planted the seeds of its own destruction.

Williamson begins her survey in 350 B.C.E., thereby avoiding the even more contentious historical debate known as the struggle of the orders. However, she mentions the Licinian-Sextian laws (367 B.C.E.) because they prevented “the threatened dissolution of the Roman citizen body” (p. xi). She accepts without discussion similar traditional interpretations for a variety of measures, including the *lex Publilia* (471), the laws of Publius Philo (339), *lex Ovinia* (313), *lex Ogulnia* (300),

and *lex Hortensia* (287 B.C.E.). The last presumably ended the struggle by making plebiscites binding. However, when and how plebiscites became binding on the entire community remains debatable. Some sources, but particularly modern scholars, view the aforementioned measures as evidence of the struggle. Since Williamson argues that during times of crisis public law measures increased in number and were a particularly effective response to crises, thereby creating consensus, it is surprising that she does not deal with early plebeian victories in the struggle, which were mainly the product of public law making and therefore grist for her mill. Furthermore, *plebiscita* are commonly reported before 287 B.C.E., and Williamson's own statistics suggest they were very nearly the only legislative method thereafter. Later evidence does not reinforce the presumed early legislative competence of the *comitia centuriata*; apart from a few extraordinary examples, the centuries did not legislate. To my way of thinking, plebiscites were binding both before and after 287 B.C.E., but their date and significance must be established by historical analysis, not by arbitrary attribution. For example, what would Williamson make of nearly two dozen agrarian measures reported before 367 B.C.E.? The *lex Flaminia* (232 B.C.E.) is the only other example of an agrarian law until well into the second century, suggesting that colonial foundations were the primary mechanism for spreading Romans and *Romanitas*. Even if these early agrarian measures are unreliable, they were fabricated from later events and can be mined for information: for instance, about the importance of soldiers' demands for land versus settlements given to the poor. What does Williamson think about the *foedus Cassianum* and its impact (before 338 B.C.E.) on Rome's relations with its neighbors? This treaty, our most important evidence for the incorporation of peoples with Latin status into the Roman system, deserves pride of place in a work examining consensus among Italian *populi*.

Our sources highlight Rome's internal and external crises and its responses; consequently they give limited attention to procedure. The so-called Bacchanalian conspiracy illustrates both their selectivity and their failure to mention procedural rules governing law making. The account of this episode reports not only senatorial action and magisterial decisions but also a *contio* called by the consuls, who ascended the *rostra* to discuss possible action. No *comitia* or vote was mentioned. Livy (39.8–19) contrasted the illegal assemblies of the Bacchan worshippers with the legal assemblies of the Roman citizens. Williamson, unconcerned with *senatus consulta* or magisterial *edicta* in detail, assumes they covered many of the same matters as assemblies. On the contrary, measures reached the *comitia* only if tribunes opposed them. *Senatus consulta*, *edicta*, *leges*, and *plebiscita* at different times appear to deal with the same public concerns because our sources were not interested with procedure. Public law making in *comitia* was a consequence not of consensus but of opposition. Finally, Williamson vastly overstates the degree to which Rome's decline was due to "a substantial increase in the

number of clans whose involvement in law-making was manifest" (p. 18). More clans represented does not mean more mobility and less influence by "established" clans. Few measures were associated with true *novi homines*, and even men like Marius and Cicero rose to the top with the patronage of established *nobiles*.

Williamson's thesis is certainly defensible, however difficult to prove by means of the data base of laws presented. She considers 541 laws and proposals reliable but admits that our information is unreliable and inconsistent. The information exists for a multitude of reasons—personal, political, archival, and institutional—and not all of it can be shoehorned easily into fixed categories. It defies Williamson's effort to bring order to our understanding of how and why Romans engaged in public legislation. Shortcomings result from her highly selective use of earlier public laws and from her failure to move beyond our elliptical sources to discern procedural rules.

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KIM BOWES and MICHAEL KULIKOWSKI, editors. *Hispania in Late Antiquity: Current Perspectives*. Translated by KIM BOWES and MICHAEL KULIKOWSKI. (The Medieval and Early Modern Iberian World, number 24.) Boston: Brill. 2005. Pp. xii, 645. \$223.00.

Kim Bowes and Michael Kulikowski have done a great service to the field of late ancient studies with this edited and translated volume. The collection of essays is far beyond the standard for the genre. The editors, realizing the need to provide those late antique specialists not working specifically on late Roman Hispania with a convenient entry into the very best scholarship being done, commissioned and, when necessary, translated eleven scholarly contributions from highly respected historians, art historians, archaeologists, and numismatists. The task assigned was first to clarify current departures from traditional Spanish scholarship, much of it written under or before the Franco regime, which stressed Hispania's uniqueness and its peculiar Christian intensity. Next the authors were urged to set their own work in the context of the Roman Empire as a whole and the scholarly work being done on neighboring provinces in particular.

In addition to the editors, both of whom contributed stellar essays as well as very useful introductions to the volume and to each of its four sections, the authors are: Javier Arce, Pedro Castillo Maldonado, Alexandra Chavarría, Pablo C. Díaz, M. Victoria Escribano Paño, Carmen Fernández-Ochoa, Fernando López-Sánchez, Neil McLynn, Luis R. Menéndez-Bueyes, Ángel Morillo Cerdán, and Paul Reynolds. The essays are grouped in four categories: Spanish government and Spanish cities; Christianity and the church; Spain and its provincial neighbors; and trade and the economy. Each author has kept to task and produced an essay remarkable in its clarity and significance, and much of

this precision and insight flows from the challenges articulated by the editors. The editors and authors reveal the strength of interdisciplinary study and especially the recent cross-fertilization of history and archaeology. Almost no text is treated in isolation from contemporary artifacts, and visa versa. Although the editors' stated goal that all practitioners become conversant with both the study of texts and artifacts—history and archaeology—will surely remain beyond reach, this volume more than hints at just how very productive such marriages could be.

Kulikowski's essay, "Cities and Government in Late Antique Hispania," is the first in the volume and sets the tone for what follows. After rehearsing the tropes of traditional Spanish historiography, he gradually strips away, as did the historical circumstances themselves, the Diocletianic administrative and military structures and reaches the bedrock of Roman Hispania, the urban centers and their territorial governments. He suggests that the more or less autonomous cities remained central to much of Hispania throughout the fifth and sixth centuries and that this urban template remained formative even in Visigothic Spain of the seventh century. As with most of the essays that follow, Kulikowski finds that basic values survived although progressively adapted to local circumstances rather than to the needs of an overarching imperial system. Local replaced imperial patronage and Christian patronage, which remained suburban and peculiarly rural for a very long time in Hispania, augmented secular.

The decidedly rural character of much of fourth and fifth century Christianity is the subject of Bowes's essay "Une coterie espagnole pieuse": Christian Archaeology and Christian Communities in Fourth- and Fifth-Century Hispania." The evidentiary window provided by the Priscillianist controversy affords Bowes the entree to explore a variety of rural Christian buildings, notably mausolea/martyria and the evidence for villa churches. The rural Christian building projects, which aggregated around elite burial and the martyr cult, preceded comparable urban structures by up to half a century.

Space limitations force the selection of only three essays for elucidation here, but every one deserves praise and analysis. The longest and most detailed of the essays is that of P. Reynolds. "Hispania in the Late Roman Mediterranean: Ceramics and Trade." Each main type of ceramic vessel is catalogued and discussed as it relates to the period, and their regional and Mediterranean distributions are analyzed. This contribution shall surely become mandatory reading for all specialists in late Roman pottery. Díaz and L. R. Menéndez-Bueyes ("The Cantabrian Basin in the Fourth and Fifth Centuries: From Imperial Province to Periphery") explore the juncture of the chronicle of Hydatius, the core text for those holding to the "crisis and invasion" theory of late antique Hispania, and the administrative and military posture of the northwest in light of recent excavations. What stands out from all sources is, as Kulikowski and most others also pointed out, the gradual breakdown of imperial power and its replacement by

local authorities responding to local conditions. Here the presence of carefully articulated Roman cities was essentially lacking; instead Rome relied from the Augustan era onward upon *civitates*, administrative units ostensibly formed around pre-existing ethnic groups but more commonly simply assembled for Roman administrative convenience. The traditionally accepted existence of a *limes Hispanus* against some internal or external invader is thoroughly debunked, replaced by a concern in the early imperial centuries for the protection of mining activities and the road network leading from them to markets, and after the Diocletianic military reforms by the continued need to protect the roads, but primarily in order to guarantee the movement of the *annona militaris* to the troops on the Rhine and in Britain. The *annona*, first suggested as a prime factor in late antiquity by D. van Berchem in 1952, finds discussion in many essays in this volume. Díaz and Menéndez-Bueyes also provided the most rigorous discussion of the Sueves' central position both geographically and politically in late Hispania. Their contribution, combined with that of López-Sánchez ("Coinage, Iconography and the Changing Political Geography of Fifth-Century Hispania"), provides the best guide to the Sueves now available in English.

Every archaeologist realizes that bronze coinage basically ceased being struck in the West after Theodosius I, but why and how this played out on the ground is less clear. With the help of numerous charts and maps, López-Sánchez reveals that the distribution of Theodosian bronze (*maiorinae*, AE2) was concentrated in the southern and western regions of Iberia, and so too with gold *solidi* struck in Italy. The relatively dense distribution of villas is a prime suspect in explaining why this occurred in the south rather than in the much more militarized north. One result of the battle at the Frigidus River in 394 between Theodosius and the usurper Eugenius was the breakdown of the imperial monetary system supplying Hispania. The *annona* was replaced by large-scale use of gold to supply the army even before Frigidus and seems not to have been revived. The authors suggest that the final blow came as a result of the invasions and civil wars in Italy between 402 and 406, during which the imperial administration of the provinces and the entire *annona* system collapsed, one of the indicators marking the end of large scale logistics in the Western Empire. Their comparison of the iconography on Suevic and Vandalic coinage reveals just how much the former, particularly the Suevic King Rechiar, tried to integrate their territorial claims with the supra-jurisdiction of the imperial government, whereas the Vandals did not. Childeric, the Frank, and Rechiar are seen to have shared this goal.

The marvelous synthetic statements, honed by years of fieldwork and pouring over texts, will in themselves inspire every reader's admiration. This volume surpasses even the editors' goals. No specialist should let it sit unread.

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MARIBEL DIETZ. *Wandering Monks, Virgins, and Pilgrims: Ascetic Travel in the Mediterranean World, A.D. 300–800*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2005. Pp. ix, 270. \$50.00.

Defining one's terms is often a necessary exercise for the historian as for other scholars, but it has its hazards. Maribel Dietz has written an agreeable book, occasionally menaced by her preoccupation with the definition of "pilgrimage." Dietz prefers to regard the word as meaning "goal-centered travel for a religious purpose" and distinguishes this from "religious travel" as undertaken by monks and nuns in her chosen late antique period. It was as important for early monastic "pilgrims," she suggests, to visit holy persons and live the monastic life in settings remote from their familiar surroundings as it was to reach specific destinations and see holy places. Pilgrimage as we usually think of it by contrast typically consisted of a simple return journey, undertaken for the sake of either cure or penance, considerations largely unmentioned in the accounts that Dietz discusses. These individuals were vowed to religion, but (until the Benedictine rule at last won acceptance as the Western monastic standard) they could believe that *peregrinatio* was not merely compatible with their spiritual commitment but integral to it. Although women religious travelers encountered special opposition from the earliest times, there is during this period evidence for a female mobility that had not existed in the classical Mediterranean world and would be more restricted in later centuries. Dietz's chapter on monastic travelers from and in the Iberian peninsula will be particularly informative for many readers.

So far, so good. If it be agreed, however, that pilgrimage should be understood "not as a single relatively uniform entity, but rather as a series of different practices" (a suggestion quoted approvingly on p. 6 n.17), there seems little justification for insisting too strenuously than one such variant practice was "pilgrimage" while another form of "religious travel" was not. The all-purpose term is convenient, and Dietz does in fact occasionally call her travelers pilgrims and their journeys pilgrimages. The historic reality is correspondingly full of overlaps. Celtic and Anglo-Saxon monks developed and exported the notion that pilgrimage had penitential value. The Saxon Willibald recalled how it was believed, in the early eighth century, that to squeeze between a pillar and a wall in the church on the Mount of Olives relieved one of all one's sins. Six centuries and more later, the belief that detachment from home comforts for the Lord's sake was the essence of pilgrimage and a meritorious form of asceticism was still alive, and there were still individuals who spent their lives in pilgrimage (sometimes incurring the accusation of vagabondage).

The weakest part of this book is the epilogue, which could well have been omitted. Dietz's touch outside her preferred period is somewhat unsure and she seems here to be putting her toe rather unnecessarily into deep waters, raising issues—above all, about the rela-

tionship between monastic religious travel and later lay pilgrimage—that these pages are far too brief and second-hand to address. That pilgrimage to Santiago was by the tenth century the primary form of "site-specific long-distance pilgrimage within Europe" is stated as a fact (p. 214), and it is suggested that the popularity of Santiago pilgrimage from the tenth century "helped to inspire new travelers, primarily lay people, to journey to Jerusalem" (p. 216), although the footnote offers no evidence for this assertion. Evidence for tenth-century lay pilgrimage to Jerusalem, albeit scanty, suggests that the relationship (if any) may just as plausibly have been the other way about.

Dietz suggests that "Stricter adherence to the Benedictine ideal of *stabilitas*" not only "helped to end monastic travel" but "led to the promotion of lay pilgrimage" (p. 220). This begs rather a lot of questions about the sequential connection between these phenomena. Is it in fact possible to state when such pilgrimage began? Was it an outgrowth of the recourse to local shrines abundantly attested by writers from Augustine in Africa to Bede in England, or something entirely different? The forty-ninth canon of the Council of Châlons (813) indicates that dubious penitential pilgrimages (to Rome and Tours) by both clergy and laymen, rich and poor, were already regarded as a problem: it might be better for penitents to stay at home. If "wandering" was inimical to Christian perfection, monks clearly should not go on pilgrimage, but should the laity (and the nonmonastic, secular clergy) do so? Late medieval critics forcefully reaffirmed the very old view that pilgrimage was simply unnecessary to the Christian. Dietz helps to illuminate an irony. Early monks established pilgrimage as a Christian practice; later monks thought better of it, but some of them were prepared to recommend to others what was bad for themselves, like Peter Damian, who in the eleventh century advocated Jerusalem pilgrimages for lay sinners precisely because they were not vowed to cloistered perfection.

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PATRICIA PIRES BOULHOSA. *Icelanders and the Kings of Norway: Mediaeval Sagas and Legal Texts*. (The Northern World, number 17.) Boston: Brill. 2005. Pp. xv, 256. \$164.00.

In the course of the Viking age (ninth and tenth centuries A.D.), Scandinavians established a number of colonies in the North Atlantic. The medieval kingdoms of Scandinavia emerged at the same time, eventually raising questions about the constitutional relationships between the royal administrations in the old homelands and the colonies in the North Atlantic. Due to its geographical position, and possibly also because the majority of the colonists had originated there, it was the Kingdom of Norway that became most involved with the colonies. Although the idea of a kingdom of the whole of Norway was articulated, and possibly put briefly into practice, in the late ninth century, it was a

long time before a royal administration with effective control over the whole country was established. Not until the reign of King Hákon Sigurðsson (1217–1263) can a Norwegian king be said to have had a firm grip on the country. It was also in the reign of Hákon that the North Atlantic colonies were brought formally and decisively into the fold of the Norwegian kingdom. That process and its prelude, the two to three centuries of self-rule (or no rule) in the colonies, have long fascinated scholars. Icelandic historians in particular have been preoccupied with the period before submission to the Norwegian king around 1260, often labeled the “Free State” or “Commonwealth” period, viewing it as an expression of a separate Icelandic identity and nationhood. This was particularly pertinent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Icelanders were in the process of gaining independence from Denmark and much emphasis was placed on the separateness and uniqueness of Icelandic constitutional arrangements. Historians of medieval Iceland have been much less interested in these issues in the last few decades but a critical revision of earlier scholarship has not taken place, and many of its premises have remained unquestioned and have thus continued to shape and direct the modern debate.

Patricia Pires Boulhosa's book addresses this situation. It is primarily a work of source criticism, directed toward understanding the dating and significance of a number of important documents that have until now been considered securely provenanced. Boulhosa's basic point is that historical documents must first and foremost be considered in the context in which they were made; if they purport to be copies of earlier documents, this claim must be critically examined before an earlier date can actually be assigned to the text. Moreover, the copying constitutes a significant historical act with a meaning of its own that must be understood. In the same vein, Boulhosa is critical of scholarly assignments of authorship to particular texts. In the first chapter, which also serves as an introduction, Boulhosa challenges one such assignment, the long-held view that the thirteenth-century chieftain Snorri Sturluson was the author of *Heimskringla*, the greatest of several compilations on the lives of Norwegian kings from the ninth to the twelfth centuries. She shows convincingly that this view has little to recommend it, although its origins in the late sixteenth century are quite interesting in themselves. In the second chapter, Boulhosa discusses a late thirteenth-century text purporting to detail an early eleventh-century agreement between the Icelanders and the Norwegian king about the rights of one party in the country of the other, suggesting that this is better understood in the context of an evolving relationship between the two countries resulting in this late thirteenth-century manifestation.

The book's third chapter is the most revolutionary. Here Boulhosa points out that the text of the treaty supposedly made between the Icelanders and the Norwegian king in 1262 only exists in manuscripts from the fifteenth century or later. She argues that the treaty was

first committed to vellum in the fifteenth century and should be considered in the context of Iceland's political relationship with the kings of the Kalmar union, of which the Norwegian kingdom had become a part in 1379. The fourth chapter sits rather awkwardly with the rest of the book, containing an attempt to analyze the relationship between the Icelanders and the early kings of Norway based on a number of fourteenth-century sagas.

While Boulhosa's own attempts at analysis and explanation of historical processes are rather feeble, her critique is well founded and clears the way for fresh scholarship. Her revision is thus a breath of fresh air in this rather staid field.

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LOUIS B. PASCOE, *S. J. Church and Reform: Bishops, Theologians, and Canon Lawyers in the Thought of Pierre d'Ailly (1351–1420)*. (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions, number 105.) Boston: Brill. 2005. Pp. xii, 326. \$147.00.

Louis B. Pascoe's judicious and detailed examination of the reforming ideas of Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly is a welcome addition to the impressive body of recent work in English focusing on the advocacy and achievement of ecclesiastical reform in the context of the great general councils—Pisa (1409), Constance (1414–1418), and Basel (1431–1449)—assembled under the crisis conditions of a turbulent era. His own earlier *Jean Gerson: Principles of Church Reform* (1973), D. Catherine Brown's *Pastor and Laity in the Theology of Jean Gerson, 1414–1418* (1987), Phillip Stump's fine *Reforms of the Council of Constance* (1994), Christopher Bellitto's *Nicolas of Clamanges: Spirituality, Personal Reform, and Pastoral Renewal on the Eve of the Reformation* (2001)—the list is an impressive and growing, and buttressed by the convenient reprinting in Latin (with German translations) of a whole set of major reform tracts from the conciliar epoch (Jurgen Miethke and Lorenz Weinrich, eds., *Quellen zur Kirchenreform im Zeitalter der grossen Konzilien des 15. Jahrhunderts*, 2 vols. [1995–2002]). As such sources are made more readily available, and as the body of interpretative commentary mounts, historians will find it less easy to indulge the dismissive generalizations once customary when assessing either the advocacy or actual achievement of reform during the century leading up to the Reformation.

Pascoe's book is in many ways an obvious companion piece to his earlier work on the reform thinking of Gerson, d'Ailly's former pupil at Paris and his lifelong friend. Pascoe was able to take into account the whole sweep of Gerson's reformist ideology, including his views on the nature and importance of general councils and their destined role in the achievement of reform. But, as the subtitle of his current book signals, his ambition here is somewhat more limited. Because of “the extensiveness of d'Ailly's ecclesiological and reform thought” (p. ix), Pascoe restricts his analysis to just

three major dimensions: his views on bishops, on theologians, and on canon lawyers. In consequence the book does not reach out to comprehend d'Ailly's conciliar views or ecclesiology at large, and for that restriction a price is occasionally paid. It would have added a further dimension to Pascoe's lengthy and interesting discussion (pp. 165–205) of the relationship between bishops and theologians and their respective spheres of authority had he noted that in his *Disputatio de iure suffragii quibus competat* (1415), d'Ailly argues for the extension of the vote in general councils to doctors of theology and canon law on the grounds that their authority exceeded "that of a single, ignorant and merely titular bishop or abbot." And, so far as coherence goes, while Pascoe correctly emphasizes d'Ailly's apocalyptic inclinations (underestimated by some scholars in the past) and also the persistent degree to which he viewed "the reformation of the Church in terms of its return to its evangelical roots" (p. 47), neither characteristic can quite afford the commentator the coherent framework provided by Gerson's adamantly hierarchical vision of the church.

That said, it is important to say also that Pascoe's successive chapters on episcopal office and authority, on the pastoral and personal reform of bishops and their pursuit of the apostolic life, on the office, status, and authority of theologians, and, finally, on canon law and canonists all provide full, clear, and detailed analyses of their respective topics.

One puzzling thing, however, should be noted. There is a certain oddity about the way in which Pascoe, so careful a scholar, handles d'Ailly's *De reformatione ecclesiae*, a disquisition on reform delivered at the Council of Constance in November 1416. In one place (pp. 93–94) he correctly describes the work as "essentially a slightly revised version of the third part" of d'Ailly's *De materia concilii generalis*, dating the latter tract (again correctly) to 1402–1403. Elsewhere, however (p. 146 n. 26), he mistakenly dates the tract to 1411 and speaks of the *De reformatione* as having been "written at the time of the Council of Constance" (italics mine). Pascoe then slips, almost habitually, into referring to texts in the *De reformatione* without reference to the fact that d'Ailly had drawn nearly all of them word for word from the *De materia*, written some fourteen years earlier.

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JOHN W. COAKLEY. *Women, Men, and Spiritual Power: Female Saints and Their Male Collaborators*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2006. Pp. x, 354. \$45.00.

JODI BILINKOFF. *Related Lives: Confessors and Their Female Penitents, 1450–1750*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 181. \$45.00.

In recent years, medieval and early modern female spirituality has burgeoned as a field of scholarly interest. John W. Coakley and Jodi Bilinkoff provide welcome

additions to this lively critical conversation. Their books extend the discussion of a wide range of topics, including women's strategies for crafting religious authority, women's ascetic practices, forms of female mysticism, and conflicts between holy women and the ecclesiastical establishment. They also both address another set of important issues that has received comparatively little attention: the lives and perceptions of the male confessors so intimately involved in the careers of holy women, and the ways in which these male clerics' perspectives, self-conceptions, and desires shaped the forms of female holiness they created in their texts.

Coakley's book covers the period from 1100 to 1400, featuring nine pairs of men and women chosen because each "man wrote about the woman in such a way as to include himself extensively" (p. 3). Coakley sets out to provide neither a comprehensive study of female holiness, nor an overarching account of the relationships between holy women and their confessors. What he does give us is a sustained exploration of female and male modes of religious authority as well as of strategies of (self) representation. His methodology is to focus on holy women's own writings in dialogue with men's writings about them; in the process he devotes admirable attention to modes of collaboration and co-operation alongside investigations of tension and competition.

Coakley's first chapter sets the stage with a survey of the basic question that lies at the heart of all of his case studies—the nature of the relationship between holy women's powers and those of clerics. His first two case studies, set forth in chapters two and three, concern the twelfth-century monastic milieu. In chapter two he focuses on Ekbert and Elisabeth of Schönaue, arguing that Ekbert's greatest concern in shaping his appearance in his writings about Elisabeth is to demonstrate that he "has exercised proper authority in the matter of her visions" (p. 26). Ekbert casts himself as gatekeeper, a supervisor of "the interactions between the visionary and her audience" (p. 35). Unlike Ekbert, Guibert of Gembloux never had, nor did he claim to have, such supervisory authority over Hildegard of Bingen. In his exploration of this pair, Coakley emphasizes, as he does in his analysis of Ekbert's and Elisabeth's texts, competing representations in the writings of the cleric and the holy women, even as he takes seriously their collaborative textual activities. Guibert emphasizes the importance of Hildegard's monasticism, presenting her as a colleague. Hildegard, in contrast, does not present herself as either a subordinate or a colleague. Rather, her writings argue for a "precise distinction to be made" between her prophetic and his priestly role (p. 60).

In his fourth chapter, Coakley moves out of the monastic milieu to present the case of James of Vitry and Mary of Oignies. In their relationship, and the textual portrayals of it, a theme emerges that links the cases that Coakley treats in chapters five through eight: the distinctions between and interactions of holy women's "informal" powers and clerics' "institutional" powers.

Coakley's reading of James's *Vita* also introduces the issues of role reversal, of male indebtedness to and dependence on holy women, that crop up repeatedly in subsequent case studies. Peter of Dacia, in his writings about Christine of Stommeln (which Coakley treats in chapter five), emphasizes, as does James, the large gulf that separates the visionary's experience from his own, presenting himself as an inferior who benefits from the holy woman's experience of divine grace.

In chapter six, Coakley discusses Angela of Foligno and the anonymous Franciscan friar who composed her *Memorial*. Here we return to an emphasis on collaboration, on commonality rather than otherness; "[t]he friar finally stands with Angela in the text of the *Memorial*" (p. 111). A collaborative model also predominates Henry of Nördlingen's writings about Margaret Ebner, which Coakley considers in chapter eight; what is distinctive here is the opportunity to view the relationship between cleric and holy woman evolve through Henry's letters. Giunta Bevegnati's *Legenda Margaritae* concerning Margaret of Cortona, the focus of chapter seven, portrays the "familiar threesome" of holy woman, Christ, and cleric, but introduces innovation in presenting each of the three figures standing alone, modeling "that great desideratum, a balance of priestly and prophetic authority" (p. 141).

Another important issue introduced in Coakley's chapter on James and Mary and subsequently carried through other chapters concerns political motivations in hagiography. He argues that James's *Vita* is designed to "tame and sanctify the public image of Beguines" (p. 70). Similarly, he calls attention to Bevegnati's "pro-Franciscan" agenda in his writings on Margaret of Cortona and to Raymond of Capua's stance in favor of an Urbanist papacy and the Dominican order in his *Legenda maior* of St. Catherine of Siena (discussed in chapter nine).

Coakley observes that Raymond's *Legenda maior* "represents . . . a kind of summing-up of the themes and trends" found in the writings of male hagiographers of holy women over the preceding two centuries (p. 170). Furthermore, he returns to questions of perception and self-perception, noting that Raymond's portrayal of Catherine differs in some dramatic ways from her self-conception in her letters. Coakley also finds the emergence in the *Legenda* of a trend of hagiographical caution in the face of a "changing climate" (p. 192) for holy women, one in which suspicion and opposition were on the rise. This changing climate left its mark on John Marienwerder's writings about Dorothy of Montau, the topic of Coakley's tenth chapter. As he observes, "the question of the holy woman's genuineness" (p. 193) had new prominence.

Coakley notes that Raymond's *Legenda maior* was to become an important model for hagiographers of holy women in the coming centuries. Indeed, Bilinkoff takes up this case in her introductory chapter of her brief but lucid book as she examines the formation of what she terms "penitential culture" (p. 10) and the distinctive role of the spiritual director. Her overall focus, though

also on pairs of clerics and holy women, is somewhat different from Coakley's. She examines "the practice of confession in late-medieval and early modern Europe" (p. 1), exploring the ways in which "oral communication, intimacy, and exemplarity" (p. 2) feature in confessional processes and their expressions in texts written by and about female penitents. Like Coakley, she attends closely to collaborative forms of textual production. Her large range of sources come from the Iberian Peninsula, France, Spanish America, and French Canada.

After outlining the emergence of penitential culture, Bilinkoff in her second chapter takes up the very topic that concerns Coakley throughout his book—that is, what he calls "the acts of hagiographers" (p. 6). In chapter two, she examines motivations and methodologies of counter-reformation hagiographers, touching on their apostolic concerns (particularly in the age of print), their involvement with the Catholic cause, and their self-promotional aims. She notes, though, that the primary motivation for many confessors who became authors was "the formal recognition of their penitents as saints" (p. 38).

In her third chapter, Bilinkoff explores the complex generic nature of the texts under consideration. These texts—and she discusses a far-reaching, diverse set—reveal several forms of collaboration and blur the line between autobiography and biography; many generically "hybrid" texts exist. As did Coakley, she notes that even confessors and penitents who engage in close collaboration at times diverge in their representations of the holy women's lives.

In chapter four, Bilinkoff examines the "messages" that "readers derive[d]" from life writings about female penitents. She argues that the "vivid depictions of friendships shared by priests and penitents" were particularly compelling (p. 76). Again, she develops her arguments with copious, diverse examples. Chapter five, entitled "Reading Habits," continues the focus on reception and interpretation. Here Bilinkoff conducts a detailed study of textual production and distribution of printed *Lives*. Readership is more difficult to document than production, but Bilinkoff points out that one sort of readership is readily documentable; *Lives* of saintly women were read by other female penitents. A large section of this chapter comprises her exploration of holy women's uses of such texts. Readers often in turn became writers; Bilinkoff closes this chapter with the powerful argument that this "cycle of creativity and imitation . . . played a pivotal role in the preservation and perpetuation of Catholic culture" (p. 110).

Coakley's and Bilinkoff's volumes work, as do many of the sets of texts written by male clerics and holy women that these scholars examine, as complementary, dialogic texts. While each is a persuasive, fascinating book in its own right, they deserve to be read together by students and scholars of medieval and early modern religion, if for no other reason (but, of course, there are many other reasons) than Bilinkoff's book picks up so precisely where Coakley's leaves off chronologically

and thematically. Taken together, these books provide a remarkably comprehensive account of both continuity and change in the practices of, and textual representations of, female spirituality and the little-considered roles of male clerics in that spirituality.

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EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

JUDITH P. ZINSSER, editor. *Men, Women, and the Birthing of Modern Science*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 215. \$38.00.

Recent decades have witnessed a revised understanding of what we currently call natural science. That revised understanding has resulted from greater attention to the religious, social, political, institutional, and gender aspects of the investigation and understanding of nature as well as from recognition of differences between early modern natural philosophy and nineteenth-century natural science. This collection of essays, edited by Judith P. Zinsser, attempts to expand our understanding of early modern "science" further by reexamining disciplinary boundaries; emphasizing the participation of early modern women, particularly in a household setting; and suggesting that their opportunities and contributions became more constricted when household science was replaced, in the nineteenth century, by universities, which had become important centers of scientific activities, and by scientific societies that excluded women.

A substantial portion of the book is devoted to individual women who operated in a variety of institutional and household venues. The first essay, by Susanna Ackerman, examines the eccentric Queen Christina of Sweden, who, after her abdication from the Swedish throne, established an academy in Rome and explored alchemical topics hoping to transform her body from female to male. The second, by Hilda L. Smith, is devoted to the natural philosophy of Margaret Cavendish, duchess of Newcastle, and her rejection of the microscope and other scientific instruments. The Marquise du Chatelet's frequently published synthesis of René Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, and Isaac Newton is the subject of Zinsser's contribution. Stephen Clucas argues that Joanna Stephen's work with medications constituted experimental philosophy, emphasizing the appropriation of her findings by men who denigrated her work as "merely empirical." Monika Mommert describes the important astronomical observations of Maria Margaretha Winkelmann-Kirch and her daughter, who for many decades provided astronomical data to the Berlin Academy of Sciences. Their work was largely invisible because it was carried out in a household setting. Again we see male appropriation of women's scientific work. The collection also includes Grigory A. Tishkin's discussion of Princess Ekaterina Romanova Dashova's (1743–1810) role in

the academies she headed and her support of women's education.

Lynette Hunter suggests that men and women practiced science in the same place with roughly the same equipment until the mid-seventeenth century but did so for different purposes. As a result, women's contributions were unrecognized by the scientific community. Women experimenters associated with the founders of the Royal Society remained unrecognized because their work was tied to local communities and communicated in different rhetorical formats than those employed in the male scientific community. Two essays investigate efforts to incorporate women into the world of "science" via dialogic popularization. B. J. Shank argues that the woman participant in Bernard de Fontenelle's dialogue is presented as a highly intelligent person, capable of understanding the material presented. Franco Arato discusses the many editions of Francesco Algarotti's anti-Cartesian *Newton for the Ladies* (1737).

The majority of the essays focus on the neglected scientific work of individual women, underline the exclusion of women from the most common scientific venues, and stress the failure of historians to include women who operated in household settings. There is some overreaching. While no one would question that the observations of Winkelmann-Kirch and her daughter were contributions to astronomy, it is less clear that men or women involved in creating, recording, and distributing medicinal recipes are best placed under the scientific umbrella. One can question whether those who simply utilize or even slightly modify existing recipes ought to be labeled scientific experimenters.

The most provocative essay, that by Margaret J. Osler, challenges the conventional feminist views developed by Caroline Merchant that early modern natural sciences were hostile to women because of a defeminization of "nature" that resulted from a shift from an organic to a mechanistic view. Osler also shows the lack of a clear demarcation between organic and mechanical approaches to nature. She convincingly demonstrates that the Baconian approach to scientific investigation did not involve the misogynist torture or rape of a feminine "nature" by male investigators and exonerates Francis Bacon and his followers from having initiated scientific misogyny. In response to the current inclination to see Paracelsianism as more hospitable to women than Baconian investigations of nature, Osler points out the misogynistic aspects of Paracelsian concepts.

The current common practice of substituting the words "natural philosophy" for "science" or "natural science," typical of this collection as well as other recent studies, does little to illuminate the transition to the "natural science" of recent centuries. Much of the work of seventeenth century observers and experimenters described here would have been far more likely at the time to have been called "natural history" than "natural philosophy." Much remains to be done if we are to understand the transition from early modern "scientific" activity to that of later centuries.

While the collection demonstrates that there were

more women than we have been led to believe engaged in scientific activities, often within a household setting, it does not show that the early modern era was more receptive to the participation of women than the later period, when science was increasingly practiced within a university setting, a venue almost entirely closed to women since the inception of universities. (Paula Findlen has found a few notable exceptions in Italian universities.) More household science there may have been, but it does not appear to have been much noted by the seventeenth-century learned male community.

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SHMUEL FEINER. *The Jewish Enlightenment*. Translated by CHAYA NAOR. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2004. Pp. xiv, 440. \$45.00.

In recent decades, the Enlightenment has been extended beyond the *Siècle des Lumières* and *Aufklärung* to various national contexts. Further diversification would address the transnational diasporic minorities of Jews, Greeks, and Armenians. As demonstrated in Shmuel Feiner's excellent book *The Jewish Enlightenment* (translated from the Hebrew *Mahpekhat hane'orut*, *The Enlightenment Revolution*, 2002), such work should go beyond individual's contributions to general Enlightenment thought in order to consider Enlightenment-inspired movements for cultural and social change within the particular religious-ethnic communities. Self-styled vanguard intellectuals championed the Enlightenment as the means to break down parochial insularity and to make their cultures reasonable and modern, in accord with European and supposed universal values.

The Jewish Enlightenment movement Haskalah (from the Hebrew *sekhel*, intellect) flourished from the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries, first in Germany, then in Galicia and Russia. Its proponents the *maskilim* figure prominently in every modern Jewish history, appearing in some as heroes while in others as villains or dupes who betrayed the Jewish religion or the Jewish people from over-eagerness for assimilation. In this comprehensive and meticulously researched study, Feiner provides a spirited and sympathetic interpretation of the formative eighteenth-century Haskalah as a variant of pan-European Enlightenment and as the foundational ideology of secular, liberal modernity among Jews. His central claim is that the new elite of public intellectuals wrought an internal, secular revolution within Jewish society as they promoted a new tripartite identity of man, citizen, and Jew; yet, in animadversion to other circles, the *maskilim* plotted a measured path of change, for they sought to balance European Enlightenment and Hebrew-language Jewish culture. In Feiner's view, they abandoned neither religion nor the Jewish collectivity but remained committed to both, revitalized and modernized.

Feiner narrates and analyzes the maskilic republic of

letters, from its roots in the early eighteenth century, to its flowering in Königsberg, Berlin, and Breslau from the 1750s through 1780s, to its crisis in the 1790s. The book has four main sections—"A Passion for Knowledge," "Jewish *Kulturkampf*," "The Maskilic Republic," and "On Two Fronts"—as well as introductory and concluding essays "The Jews and the Enlightenment" and "Haskalah and Secularization." Inspired by Robert Darnton and Roy Porter, Feiner casts a wide net, synthesizing ideas, high and middlebrow texts, lives of intellectuals and activists, associations, schools, publishing ventures, networks, and controversies. He uses a wealth of new sources to present unknown figures and works as well as to reinterpret familiar episodes. Extensive quotation of maskilic rhetoric yields vivid and complex portrayals of individual *maskilim*. Feiner also clearly depicts their rabbinic opponents, who coalesced as embattled, self-conscious defenders of Orthodoxy. An important subject for further research remains rabbis who identified with Haskalah; especially intriguing is Saul Berlin, who used pseudonyms to hide his radical views.

Feiner, like David Sorkin (*The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840* [1987]), argues that Haskalah developed not only in response to external Enlightenment challenge, but also as immanent cultural critique within Jewish society. On this, they rightly counter Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Emancipation, 1770–1870* (1973). Indeed, ultimately both internal and external dimensions require attention. Feiner does note Gentile involvement in Jewish affairs and maskilic concern with Gentile reactions. Sorkin and Feiner use the term "early Haskalah" (as in *Frühauklärung*) for intellectuals who sought to broaden traditional Ashkenazic culture with science, philosophy, and literature in the early to mid-eighteenth century, but who did so without severing ties to the rabbinic elite or proposing wholesale programs of change. Feiner eschews the term "precursors," for he views "early Haskalah" as an autonomous and perduring option for Jews throughout the eighteenth century. Yet the term "early maskilim" is somewhat confusing, for some so designated (such as Moses Mendelssohn and Naphtali Herz [Hartwig] Wessely) became protagonists of Haskalah controversies proper, while others became critics of contemporary Haskalah. A nonchronological term such as "enlightened traditionalists" or "moderately enlightened" or "inward-looking" might work better.

Regrettably, this important book is ill-served by occasional errors in translation and editing. For example, Gentile *Aufklärer* should not be called "maskilim" (pp. 154, 198, 257); "literary" meaning of the scriptures should be "literal" or "simple" (p. 338); and authors' names such as Tissot, Meldola, Kramnick, Franklin Ford, and Hyman are misspelled. A convenient list of manuscript and archival sources is lacking since no bibliography supplements the notes.

Feiner has written the definitive work on the eighteenth-century Jewish Enlightenment, especially its

Hebrew-language oeuvre. His overall judgments are sound and discerning: the maskilic revolution promoted secular authority and a secular public sphere but was not necessarily antireligious; *maskilim* navigated a middle way between Orthodox and assimilationist extremes. Feiner's masterful book is an outstanding achievement in Jewish and Enlightenment historiographies: in elucidating maskilic struggles to negotiate religion, community, and modernity, it demonstrates the ongoing significance of modernist-traditionalist *Kulturkampf* in Jewish society and others.

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DAVID L. PIKE. *Subterranean Cities: The World beneath Paris and London, 1800–1945*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2005. Pp. xviii, 355. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

David L. Pike analyzes representations of the nineteenth and twentieth-century urban subterranean through readings of a variety of literary, architectural, pictorial, cartographic, and cinematic texts. He offers many examples of the integration of classical and Christian underground motifs with the utopic/dystopic element of technological projects pursued underground. While there is always an implicit or explicit pairing of the underground with the aboveground, the social imaginary is most revealing in an insular underground, where what happens underground stays underground. Particularly interesting is Pike's comparison of representations of the undergrounds of nineteenth-century London and Paris, presented as responses to the challenges of modernization. Pike sees this differentiation waning in the twentieth century as the underground lost its connection to the natural and the mythological to become the masculine-coded engineered space in which all engage in the everyday experiences of a suburban life. Pike does not limit himself to texts on the urban underground, exploring Kenneth Grahame's *The Wind in the Willows* (1908) and J. R. R. Tolkien's novels as well as representations of coal mines, World War I trenches, and World War II concentration camps. Nor does he restrict himself to England and France or to the pre-1945 period, moving in the final chapter to the appearance of often apocalyptic accounts of the underground in a variety of geographical settings.

While Pike nicely develops elements like the political resonances of the catacombes in nineteenth-century Paris and the social world of the late nineteenth-century London Underground, what can get lost in his reading is the historic specificity of events underground, including the endowment of meanings to their representations and the reception of these representations in particular historical contexts. Pike criticizes the related tendency "to lean far too heavily on theoretical pronouncements and not heavily enough on the relation of those pronouncements to the . . . spatial practices expressed within their texts" and contends that today "this incomplete reception remains an important issue of in-

terpretation" (p. 286). Pike is not immune to a variant of what he describes as this legacy of the interwar years. He places Andrzej Wajda's film about resisters in the sewers during the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, *Kanal* (1957), in a pan-European context of Dante's *Inferno*, Carol Reed's film *The Third Man* (1949), and existentialism (pp. 190, 288, 292–293) but neglects the historically situated political charge of Wajda's depiction of the underground. Viewers received Wajda's film differently in different contexts. Around 1960, Régis Debray tells us, French students got their "baptism of fire," crawling through the Warsaw sewers, while sitting in Paris theaters. Michel Foucault believed that "Warsaw will always have . . . its sewers populated with insurgents," but how they were kept there is quite revealing. In Wajda's Poland, as Mary Werden shows, the Warsaw Uprising was the subject of a polarizing debate. After the war, communist authorities suppressed the memory of the uprising, the Polish effort at self-liberation that had been pursued as Soviet troops assembled nearby. Polish nationalists celebrated the uprising, seeing the resisters in the sewers as emblematic of Poland's martyr nation status, suffering the abjection that would precede the nation's resurrection. In the liberalizing—but not too liberal—Poland of 1956, communist censors authorized release of *Kanal*. However, it was precisely the naturalistic qualities of the film that anticommunist Polish nationalists condemned. They believed that resisters against foreigners' brutal occupation of Poland should be presented as heroic martyrs whose memory would fuel liberation. For this reason, nationalists rejected Wajda's depiction of resisters in the sewers as a diverse group, some of whom were rendered aimless and mad. They feared that viewers could interpret this derangement as a fruit of resistance—the act that had driven partisans into the underground labyrinth of filth—against an occupying power, whether German or Soviet.

Pike situates his study in various phases of capitalism, but he does not examine the urban underground as a locus of the public sector that grew in tandem with and as a condition of the growth of capitalism. If his analysis is not always rooted in specific historical situations, this is, following his analysis, because he wrote it in what he considers the era of the rootless finance capitalism. However, this is also a source of its insights. Pike concludes his book with a wide-ranging examination of social phenomena and artifacts of mass culture in Europe and the United States. Although the particular conditions in which the underground nurtured dreams and fears in earlier eras have changed, Pike shows how the discourse developed during the nineteenth century is recycled, shorn of its utopian elements, to allow elites to bemoan the consequences, without assessing the causes, of the exploitative nature and the environmental degradation of globalization.

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VICTORIA KAHN. *Wayward Contracts: The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640–1674*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2004. Pp. xii, 370. \$49.50.

Thinking about contract and resistance flourished in seventeenth-century England, and so did a fully fledged discourse of passions and interests. Given the prevailing division of labor between historians and literary scholars, it may not surprise that the coincidence has garnered little attention, but practitioners of both disciplines should applaud Victoria Kahn for correcting the oversight. By throwing a sharp focus on a number of pivotal mid-century texts, she shows how debates over contract and meditations on the affections underpinned each other, with the affectivities of contract theory being matched by the contractualism of explorations of affect. The two discourses overlapped imaginatively since each worked through metaphor, and each required interpretation. Arguments about contracts as sources of rights and duties hinged, Kahn suggests, on acts of imagination that found in the passions motives for contracting, that conjured an order in which the contractors could be moved by words, and that related those qualities and actions “mimetically” for readers.

Brilliant chapters on Thomas Hobbes and John Milton, who encapsulate both the argumentative potential of affect and the interpretive and affective resonance of contract, form the heart of Kahn’s study. On the one hand, she points to Hobbes’s political motive, those unceasing appetites and desires and the creative fear they engendered, and sees in contract not just the foundational metaphor but also “the process of analogical reasoning that checks the errant activity of the imagination” (p. 149); and on the other hand she stresses the “irresistible” passion (p. 202) against which in Milton’s divorce tracts the marriage contract must be held up to scrutiny, and which in *Paradise Lost* (1667) surely warrants Adam in questioning the divine will. Passion and political action were for Hobbes and Milton, though to very different effect, inseparable; they were as well conjoined with interpretation. Silently reversing Marxian priorities, Kahn argues that through contract Hobbes underwrote “bourgeois diffidence” (p. 150). With regard to Milton her claims are larger: building on covenant theology’s tradition of interpreting the Old Testament figuratively and equitably through the New, Milton joined his Adam in equitably, or conscientiously, glossing contracts, whether divine, marital, or political. And in the workings of the conscience, Miltonic and Adamic alike, passions and the body play a vital part, just as they do in Hobbes’s account of the workings of the will. In finding such space for the body in political argument, Kahn adds an extremely important dimension to a much traveled landscape.

On her way to these conclusions, Kahn carefully charts the emergence of contractualism in common law, natural law, and covenant theology in the decades before the English Civil War. Here she draws significantly on the scholarship of others, but she has read widely

and is scrupulous in her accounting. More importantly, she has glossed many of the key sources herself, and her independence of judgment shows particularly in her stress on the significance of Ciceronian sociability in theories of the origins of the polity.

Yet for all its argumentative verve, Kahn’s work suffers from tunnel vision, at its worst when she assures us that regicide was the “logical conclusion of the new discourse of contract,” and that the ancient constitution was a “proto-republican theory” (pp. 3, 10; see also pp. 109, 118). It seems to be *a priori* argument, rather than the sharp insights of the central chapters, that drives her discussion of contract and obligation, sexual as well as political, in Margaret Cavendish’s romances. Focused on English partisanship, she learnedly demonstrates the royalist politics of the romance yet does not examine probably the most famous work in the genre, *Parthenissa* (1654), by the nonroyalist Lord Broghill; nor does she consider the implications of the genre’s popularity in France. Beguiled by the Restoration’s language of love, and apparently unaware of the long affective tradition exemplified in the parliamentary smokescreen the ageing Elizabeth blew around monopolies and in the way the crown disguised some of its arbitrary fiscal takings as “benevolences,” Kahn finds “extraordinary” (p. 237) one romance’s suggestion that mutual love between prince and people validates a state. Because she is concerned with the play of contract and passion and (rightly) understands interest as passion prolonged, she is inattentive to the other powerful meanings of interest in the period. And her use of evidence can be cavalier, in the nonroyalist sense: tellingly, the first citation of seventeenth-century material in her book is simply wrong; more egregiously, she opens her analysis of Hobbes with a scintillating discussion of *Behemoth* (1680) that presents to us an earl of Essex of her own imagining rather than Hobbes’s. Kahn’s case for the politics of the passions is impressive and her readings of Milton and Hobbes are dazzling, but her practices sometimes fall short of her interdisciplinary aspirations.

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HOLLY BREWER. *By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, and the Anglo-American Revolution in Authority*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va. 2005. Pp. 390. \$39.95.

According to Holly Brewer’s study in intellectual and legal history, children had considerable authority in late medieval and early modern England. Young kings such as Henry VI and noblemen like Christopher Monck, earl of Torrington (later duke of Marlborough), exercised their political power widely. Even children from the common ranks possessed sufficient authority to devise their estates or sign contracts of indenture. At surprisingly young ages the law held children responsible for their criminal acts, and judges saw that they were

punished like adults. Children's rights and obligations at all ranks were slowly abrogated over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the early nineteenth century they were deemed incapable of wielding power of any kind over others, and in most cases even over their own lives.

The change in attitude toward children's legal status derived from new ideas about the rights of individuals to consent and contract. Once John Locke, Algernon Sidney, and other seventeenth-century theorists had established that adults were under no moral obligation to follow hereditary rulers but instead possessed a natural right to choose who they wanted to wield authority over them, children of high status lost the ability to rule. The need to reason and consent in a representative system of government meant that minors could not participate in choosing leaders either, because they lacked sufficient understanding to do so properly. Lacking understanding, children could not be held responsible for contracts or crimes. Adults had to take responsibility for them.

There was considerable confusion about what ages were deemed appropriate for various degrees of independent action on the part of the young. Late medieval law recognized roughly three stages of development: the age of reason at about seven, the age of consent at twelve for girls and fourteen for boys, and the age of majority at twenty-one. As early modern lawmakers recognized the need to set new boundaries, they grappled with the problem of deciding when children should have the authority to sign contracts, marry, or be held accountable for their crimes. In separate chapters, Brewer outlines the changes jurists set in place in each of these areas of the law and explains why, often referring to arguments from the intellectual currents of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. She discusses ideas about the meaning of authority and consent in fully five chapters covering the intellectual history of religion, politics, and the common law. In fact, Brewer's wide ranging essays on consent make up more than half the book. This may disappoint legal scholars and teachers looking for a definitive analysis of the law on children's rights. The essays are sometimes painfully general and repetitive as well. If the book is to be used in the classroom, teachers may want to consider assigning only selected parts.

Brewer seems not to be quite sure that the shift in legal responsibility from children to adults was a positive development, because the abrogation of children's rights could be detrimental to their interests. Her perturbation may stem from what I perceive to be an important missing link in her study: the acknowledgment that children wielded power in late medieval and early modern England not only because power accompanied birthright, but also because corruption was rampant in the government and society generally. Adults gave young children power because doing so made it easier to exploit their vulnerability. Four-year-olds did not write wills. Adults wrote wills for them and then helped them to make their marks signifying consent. When

thirteen-year-olds were elected to parliament, it was because their relatives and friends intended to influence their votes on issues of importance. And when children became kings they remained mere figureheads, carefully denied the right to exercise meaningful authority over adults until they reached at least the age of consent. Certainly Henry VI did not, with his great-uncle Cardinal Henry Beaufort and uncle Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, vying shamelessly for influence at his boyhood court. And Edward VI, sick and dying, was so pitifully manipulated by his Protestant councilors that he sealed the grisly fate of his beloved cousin Jane by naming her his successor in place of his half-sister Mary, a Catholic.

With the dawn of the age of reason lawmakers came to realize that children had to be denied authority in order to help control the sinful behavior of adults who sought power in their names. In the West today, we agree that the development of democratic institutions was a good thing, even for children. This is not to say that the law on children's rights has always served them well. As Brewer reveals perceptively in her chapters on case law, the difference between a child and an adult was often exceedingly difficult to define. We continue to grapple with the issue today.

MARYLYNN SALMON
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D. BRUCE HINDMARSH. *The Evangelical Conversion Narrative: Spiritual Autobiography in Early Modern England*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 384. \$110.00.

This book is a study of the astonishingly large number of conversion narratives that proliferated in England during the early Evangelical Revival, a movement that began with the rise of Methodism in the mid-1730s and ended with the rise of the Clapham Sect in the mid-1780s. D. Bruce Hindmarsh's definition of conversion narratives is unusually capacious. It encompasses not only a discrete experience of spiritual awakening or rebirth, but a broader and more protracted process that was repeated throughout life, as the individual reached for greater and more meaningful conditions of spiritual insight. Thus, for example, Methodist narrations of sanctification or perfection are treated as a further conversion experience, so that the individual's conversion becomes "not a moment in one's life, but the key to interpreting the meaning of one's life from beginning to end" (p. 322). Hindmarsh is as curious about extended autobiographies and journals as he is about more limited accounts of the sinner's religious despair and rebirth, and this makes his work of great interest and significance to all students of the modern self, whether religious or secular. Indeed, his ultimate goal is to show "that the evangelical conversion narrative represents an alternative version of modern self-identity, one that overlaps in some ways with the modern autobiographical identity, but one that also qualifies the notion of self-fashioning" (p. 6).

Hindmarsh's book analyzes the conversion experiences of Wesleyan Methodists, Moravians, moderate Calvinists, Particular Baptists, and others. These are discussed according to a "provisional typology" of conversion that includes the categories of autobiography, narrative, identity, conversion, and gospel. Following an extended discussion of the traditions of Puritan and pietist autobiography and the evangelical awakening of the eighteenth century, Hindmarsh devotes three chapters to a discussion of Methodism, emphasizing the view from the top (the journals of John Wesley and George Whitefield), the view from the trenches (the journals and autobiographies of Methodist lay preachers), and the view from below (the letters and journals of Methodist laypeople). There are also chapters on Moravian narrative culture, the mass conversions at Cambuslang in Scotland, the narratives of William Cowper, John Newton, and Thomas Scott at Olney, and a final discussion of the evangelical conversion narrative and the Enlightenment concept of identity. Hindmarsh sees an overall development in these various examples, from a charismatic phase, when people "seemed to walk in a cloud of wonders" (p. 321), to a more settled phase, in which conversion narratives became, if not more routinized, then more generally familiar. He also draws attention to the differences in the existential condition of various groups; thus the Arminian narratives were agonistic (the will engaged in a painful quest for perfection) while the Moravian narratives were self-abasing, quietist, and contemplative and the Calvinist narratives were introspective, rational, and providential.

One of the great virtues of this perceptive and wide-ranging study is that Hindmarsh's reading of the texts is both analytically sophisticated and extraordinarily sympathetic. Indeed, his stated goal is to find a balance between a nonjudgmental, receptive reading and one that brings the reader's own theoretical apparatus to bear on the text. He is aware of the complexity of the process of self-fashioning within a social and religious framework, asking how much of the individual's narrative identity was shaped by the religious environment and how much was constructed privately. He observes that the conversion narrative "was not a matter of having a certain sort of experience and then 'writing it up'; it was more a matter of having an experience that was in principle narratable" (p. 325). He questions whether the conversion experience was voluntary or one experienced as an act of self-surrender. Most interestingly, he is sensitive to issues that are normally ignored in works by secular historians and literary critics, namely, the ethical content of the conversion narrative. Ultimately, Hindmarsh reads these texts as attempts to recover a "right relationship with God," and he wants the reader to consider them as alternatives to the "solipsistic" nature of the secular vision of the self. At the same time, he views the evangelical conversion narrative as fundamentally rooted in the conditions of modern society and in the individual's capacity for self-determination. "It was precisely in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the emerging modern identity

could cross paths with the fading Christian moral hegemony" (p. 340).

Hindmarsh's study is definitive in many respects, most notably in its breadth of vision, its analytical precision, and its evident compassion. Inevitably, this breadth forecloses the possibility of analyzing specific narratives more fully, for example, by juxtaposing manuscript accounts with edited publications, or analyzing the texts of Methodist women leaders in a more extended fashion. Nevertheless, both secular and religious scholars are lucky to have this magisterial study of conversion narratives as a guide to further reflection and research.

PHYLLIS MACK
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ROBIN PEARSON. *Insuring the Industrial Revolution: Fire Insurance in Great Britain, 1700–1850*. (Modern Economic and Social History Series.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2004. Pp. xi, 434. \$99.95.

Some historians may view fire insurance as a highly specialized, even marginal and technical topic, not one to buy—or even read—a book about. Indeed, standard economic histories of the industrial revolution do not make more than scant reference to fire insurance. Robin Pearson's book demonstrates the potential of this topic. His history of fire insurance combines internal and external perspectives. The external perspectives should attract the attention of social, cultural, and economic historians. But I will begin with the internal perspectives, as they are the foundation.

Pearson tells the story of this subsector of the economy. He has a good starting point, because he builds on the company histories of three leading fire insurance companies (Sun by P. G. M. Dickson, Royal Exchange Assurance [REA] by Barry Supple, and Phoenix by Clive Trebilcock). His study is a synthesis of these three books and a few other published works on insurance, complemented by his substantial original archival research in the records of various London and provincial companies.

Pearson uses both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to study his companies and the subsector as a whole. For the first, he relies mainly on minutes of boards of directors and of committees and correspondence with agents and other companies. These provide a vivid picture of strategic aims, business problems, and executive decision making. This is standard business history practice, but when performed for an entire subsector it allows a wider picture and new findings. For example, it reveals the two-decade-long (1786–1806) cooperation among market leaders Sun, REA, and Phoenix. In an age of supposedly free-market competition, these three companies not only collaborated over risk assessment, property surveys, and firefighting but actually fixed premiums, thus forming an effective and stable cartel.

The quantitative research presented in the book is truly impressive. Using company and stamp duty

records, Pearson has reconstructed a time series of sums insured and premium payments over the better part of a century and a half. He analyzes these aggregate figures, breaks them down by region and type of property, and correlates them with macroeconomic figures and indexes. The scope of his database and the econometric and statistical methods used are extremely impressive. A counterintuitive finding of this study is that fire insurance expanded quite slowly during the second half of the eighteenth century, which is traditionally considered the core of the industrial revolution.

The discussion of external perspective is where most historians will get their best value. From insurance records and insurance practices, one can learn about attitudes toward uncertainty and risk, about social networks and structures, about residential housing and industrial mills, about emergency services and the provision of public goods by private enterprises, about capital formation and economic growth, and much more. A major contribution of this book is Pearson's demonstration that the external perspective cannot be detached from the internal one. In other words, insurance records cannot be used properly by historians for their own ends, unless they first study the basics of fire insurance and its history. The best illustration of this point is the growing scholarship that uses insurance records in order to study the value of residential and industrial property and the rate of capital formation in the economy as a whole. This literature often assumes that for insurance purposes (unlike tax purposes), owners declare the full value of their assets. If they declare lower values, they pay less in premiums but end up not being fully compensated at replacement cost if their assets are destroyed in a fire. True reporting is thought to be the great advantage of this methodology. Pearson claims that the assumption is baseless. Insurance companies encouraged and even required underinsurance. The theoretical rationale for this is the problem of moral hazard. Fully insured individuals do not have sufficient incentive to invest in avoidance and care measures. Evidence from the period on the actual costs of rebuilding insured houses that were destroyed in fire suggests that insurance companies understood this; significant gaps existed between eventual replacement costs and initial insurance values.

Coinurance was another source of bias. Rather than one company having to pay a lot in the event of a large fire in a region it insured in full, it shared the risk of fire in this region, and in other regions, with other companies. The problem that coinurance creates for historians is that they cannot reconstruct the value of an asset based on the records of any single fire company. Selecting the best preserved and most conveniently accessed company records and merely sampling them is not sufficient. Pearson shows that reliable studies must match values from different companies for each specific asset. Such studies are exceptionally resource and time consuming.

The bottom line is that only by understanding the downward bias in the value of assets created by under-

insurance and coinsurance can one use insurance records to study the value of property and capital formation. More generally, historians need to read books like Pearson's in order to appreciate both the potential and the complexity of insurance records.

RON HARRIS
Tel Aviv University

DAVID PHILIP MILLER. *Discovering Water: James Watt, Henry Cavendish and the Nineteenth-Century "Water Controversy."* (Science, Technology and Culture, 1700–1945.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing. 2004. Pp. xii, 316. \$109.95.

From Greek antiquity through the early modern period, European chemists divided the world up into empirically obvious elements such as earth, air, fire, and water, but by the time the nineteenth century began, all of these entities were regarded as compound substances. The transition occurred during what many historians still call the "chemical revolution," whose most famous protagonist was Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier. Lavoisier's new chemistry placed the substance he called "oxygen"—Joseph Priestley's "dephlogisticated air"—in a central category, as a component of atmospheric air (proclaimed by Lavoisier to be a physical mixture of different gases) and also as a component of "earths" (now interpreted as oxides of metals). But the most important of all the compounds of oxygen was common water, discovered in the early 1780s to be nothing other than the product of combustion of that species of inflammable air that Lavoisier subsequently called "hydrogen" (the name, of course, means "water producer").

In the preceding sentence, the word "discovered" invokes the common idea of the recognition and announcement of an existential truth for the first time. Who "discovered" that water was a compound of hydrogen and oxygen? The history of this affair is complicated. Probably the most common subsequent judgment is that James Watt (inventor of the improved atmospheric steam engine) and the reclusive aristocrat Henry Cavendish share credit for the breakthrough, the former for a hypothesis and the latter for a convincing experimental demonstration, while Lavoisier was the first to embed the discovery in a new and highly successful theoretical system. But historians of science have long recognized that discoveries, like chemical substances, are dauntingly complex compounds of ideas, events, experiments, and public and private dialogue. Often it is not worth the historical effort to untangle the mess.

But sometimes it is. In this book, David Philip Miller places the "water controversy" at the center of a stimulating discussion of what it means to make a discovery, and how the subsequent attributions of discoveries are guided by diverse interests. In a compressed fashion (too compressed, I fear, to be easily followed by any but the most expert in this material) Miller recounts the events surrounding the discovery of the compound

character of water. But his real focus, as his book's title indicates, is not in the late eighteenth but rather in the nineteenth century. After a generation of relative quiescence, the priority controversy emerged anew when in 1834 François Arago made Watt the subject of one of his famous *éloges*. Arago was a tendentious biographer, and his choice of Watt was carefully calculated. He used Watt as a symbol of what he perceived as the best of industrializing Britain: middle-class self-determination, democratization, and the close connections between technology (represented by Watt's steam engineering) and science (Watt's revelation of water as hydrogen oxide). In short, Arago's biography of Watt provided a road map of his ambition for France. Several English scientists who saw the matter similarly (including James Watt, Jr.) adopted Arago's interpretation of the controversy and pursued similar wider rhetorical goals.

But Arago's interpretation was soon opposed by William Vernon Harcourt, in his presidential address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) in 1839. Harcourt championed Cavendish's claims, not only on the purported merits of the historical details of the case, but also as a part of a well-organized campaign of a self-selected group centered on the BAAS to shed the image of scientists as self-made amateurs and tinkerers, and to help promote the new model of the scientist as a university-trained professional, mathematically sophisticated and with elite qualifications. Harcourt and others saw Cavendish, who in fact was just as much an amateur as Watt (for neither made a living from science), but whose scientific work was highly methodical, cautious, and quantitative, as a far better fit for this newer type. Cavendish was seen as a paragon of the ideal of "pure science" in a way that Watt could never have been.

Miller's "water controversy," then, was a nineteenth-century battle between competing icons and ideologies, and his focus is on those wider sociological interests. His goal is to "take the reader behind the discovery accounts of the historical actors in the controversy in order to lay out the rhetorical character of those accounts and to indicate the grounding of rhetorical strategy in circumstance" (p. 280). The cast of characters is large. Miller appears to have gained complete mastery of both the primary and secondary literatures, and has fruitfully mined a truly impressive number of manuscript sources. It is an admirable performance.

Theoretically, Miller grounds his work in the Edinburgh school of the sociology of scientific knowledge. Although he balks at more extreme constructivist theories, constructivism appears to be at the heart of his endeavors. He wants no "resolution" of the facts of the discovery of the composition of water, seeking to be evenhanded and symmetrical to both winners and losers. Scientific "discoveries," in his view, are constructed post facto in the attributional dialectic, and in no way revealed from nature. A weakness here is the well-known problem of reflexivity. If evidence from nature plays a vanishingly small role in the construction of sci-

entific ideas, then one ought to be consistent and suggest that historical evidence plays a vanishingly small role in the construction of historical ideas; and we must seek out Miller's sociological interests in portraying the water controversy as driven by sociological interests. Indeed, Miller's vaunted evenhandedness and avoidance of judgments regarding his historical protagonists vanishes when he comes to treat other historians and their work.

This conundrum aside, Miller has produced a deeply researched, well-written study of an important episode in the construction of scientific ideologies in the nineteenth century, and the book deserves to be widely read.

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KEVIN MATTHEWS. *Fatal Influence: The Impact of Ireland on British Politics, 1920–1925*. Dublin: University College Dublin Press. 2004. Pp. xvi, 317. Cloth \$79.95, paper \$39.95.

In this detailed study of British politics in the early 1920s, Kevin Matthews argues that Ireland did not, as is often thought, disappear from the British political agenda as soon as Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State were established. He is certainly right. Whether the general consensus on this point has been quite as complete as he suggests is, however, perhaps less certain. After all, there has been no doubting the fact that, as H. A. L. Fisher put it in August 1924, "the old feeling" about Ireland remained "very intense" among Conservatives—the backwoodsmen especially. Their bitter sense of betrayal had already caused the decade's (maybe the century's) most famous political assassination, the fall of David Lloyd George, and blighted the careers of his high-flying Conservative allies Austen Chamberlain and Lord Birkenhead. The government's embarrassment over the implementation of the boundary provisions of the treaty, and over the Northern Ireland Parliament's unilateral dismantling of key provisions of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, is likewise familiar fare.

Matthews's sensible, careful, densely researched account of the first half of the 1920s presents a more nuanced and richly textured account of the British attempt to come to terms with the uncertain implications of the Anglo-Irish Treaty than has previously been available. He shows convincingly how awkward the treaty issue was for the Conservatives once the quasi-diehard Andrew Bonar Law was succeeded by Stanley Baldwin, who lacked the visceral empathy with Ulster Unionists that had led the party to the brink of the political precipice. Those who were convinced, like Edward Wood (later Lord Halifax), that "the British law-abiding temperament was more shocked than we always recognized" by the Ulster defiance did not immediately prevail. Baldwin, thoroughly English in seeing Ireland as a confounded nuisance rather than a challenge or a threat to the empire, had no real strategy for coping with the potential crisis of boundary revision; he got

through this awkward period mainly thanks to the intervention of Lord Salisbury, who persuaded the Conservative peers to agree to the Boundary Commission by tacking on a nonbinding proviso that its revisions would be minor.

But the crisis that threatened was within the Conservative Party, not the political system as a whole. Salisbury's argument, indeed, was that the average voter had "little interest in, and less understanding of, Irish affairs," and that to take the issue to the country would be reckless. The Labour prime minister in 1924, Ramsay MacDonald, told the king that "even a bill which raises such grave issues as the Irish bill does not seem to contain the germs of a domestic crisis." So while Matthews usefully corrects the idea, offered for instance by John Ramsden in *The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940* (1978), that there was little discord within Conservative ranks after the 1923 election debacle, his larger argument, that the Irish problem had a "fatal influence" on British politics, may seem overstated. His title phrase is a quotation from Austen Chamberlain, on whose career its influence was indeed fatal. The historic political readjustment of this period, however, the relegation of the Liberal party to marginal status, was not in the end (as this narrative makes clear) due to Irish issues. Matthews's resolutely high-political perspective effectively maximizes the scale of the Irish storm. It is, as he suggests, an interesting question what the outcome of the 1924 election might have been had Ireland been its key public issue. But it was not. (Leo Amery, showing how hazy politicians' grasp of public opinion was, said that "the country, sick of Ireland as it is, is just as likely to be cross with those who force an election" on the Irish issue.) The storm remained confined within the Westminster teacup.

One of the conclusions that emerges with special clarity from the mass of evidence on display in this book is the unanimity of the British political establishment—not just the negotiators of the treaty, or the senior civil servants—on the ultimate necessity for ending partition. The Council of Ireland provisions in the treaty were, contrary to the view of many Irish nationalists, far from mere window dressing. Nobody in the British political mainstream wanted Northern Ireland to exist at all, let alone to last for a century. This can, of course, only strengthen the neurotic suspicions of Ulster Unionists (should they read this book) about the outcome of the current "peace process."

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ALAIN HUGON. *Au service du roi catholique: Honorables ambassadeurs et Divins Espions; Représentation diplomatique et service secret dans les relations Hispano-Françaises de 1598 à 1635*. (Bibliothèque de la Casa de Velázquez, number 28.) Madrid: Casa de Velázquez. 2004. Pp. xii, 700. €40.00.

Spanish historians have done little research on the diplomatic history of their country. The result has been

that English-language scholars have done most of the pioneering work in the field, outstanding examples being Garrett Mattingly's *Renaissance Diplomacy* (1955), De Lamar Jensen's study of Bernardino de Mendoza (1964), and Charles H. Carter's superb *The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625* (1964), and *The Western European Powers 1500-1700* (1971). The enormous gap left by Spanish scholars was filled only very recently by Miguel Angel Ochoa Brun's six-volume *Historia de la diplomacia española* (1999), a truly impressive work. The relative neglect of Spain's diplomatic history means that we shall have to wait many years before we get an adequate picture of how the most important European nation in the early modern period carried out its diplomatic business. Alain Hugon's volume is a welcome addition to a very bare landscape.

The body of the book (just over two-thirds of the text) retains all the features of a graduate thesis, the remaining part of the text consisting of appendixes and bibliography. Hugon's research is based primarily on the Spanish state correspondence housed in the section Estado at the archive of Simancas. The period chosen for study, 1598 to 1635, was that rarest of all phenomena in the relations between France and Spain, a generation of "peace." Conflicts went on in various spheres, but there were no overtly military clashes between the two states. Diplomatic correspondence became for a change free of the pressure of war, and in principle that would make it more possible to examine how the ambassadorial network functioned when not under stress. Hugon concentrates his attention on two aspects of the links between France and Spain: the diplomatic personnel, their numbers and function; and the workings of unofficial ("secret") diplomacy. In the ten chapters he deals, respectively, with Spanish political priorities at the time, the state of relationships between France and Spain, the situation of the Spanish diplomatic service, the French ambassadors in Spain and what they did, the vexed question of diplomatic immunity, the crucial matter of salaries and what money was used for secret pensions, conspiracies, the network of secret diplomacy and spies, routes covered by agents and spies, and, finally, the manner of passing information.

The range of themes is extensive, but the author limits his coverage by sticking exclusively to his research sources, and almost every phrase is supported by reference to the Simancas documentation. This works excellently for a thesis, but obviously has drawbacks when the material is presented as a book for the general public, since information that lies beyond the scope of the manuscripts is not added in order to give a more rounded picture. That is probably the only fundamental criticism that one can make of this fine piece of research, conscientiously carried out and efficiently presented. It is, however, an important criticism, for some statements can occasionally mislead. Hugon suggests, for example, that Spanish xenophobia toward France indicated a closed-mindedness toward foreigners (p. 61). That is not quite true, for enough evidence exists of intimate and cordial links at this period with Italians,

English, and Austrians at a diplomatic level. Indeed, by leaving out of account work in German such as that by Friedrich Edelmayer, Hugon restricts his perspective unduly and offers only a part of a picture that was somewhat more complex than he shows.

Another example relates simply to social history. Hugon observes quite correctly that in the period he covers many French generals defected to Spain but no Spanish generals defected to France (p. 62). He feels that this reflects something of the political situation in each country. The reality is that there were few Spanish generals to speak of, since the nobles were no longer a military aristocracy, so no such defections could have taken place. At another point (p. 154) he refers to criticism by Philip IV that a "mere painter," Rubens, should be conducting diplomacy in the name of the king of Spain. Hugon omits to mention that Rubens was no mere painter but an aristocrat, and that he was not only highly valued by the king but used on very many diplomatic missions. It is the sort of detail that slips through the fingers of the author, who has produced a fine and useful study but one that needs to be filled out in very many respects in order to make it more satisfactory as a work of reference.

HENRY KAMEN
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ANDREW W. KEITT. *Inventing the Sacred: Imposture, Inquisition, and the Boundaries of the Supernatural in Golden Age Spain*. (The Medieval and Early Modern Iberian World.) Boston: Brill. 2005. Pp. viii, 229. \$142.

In Madrid during the 1630s and 1640s, the Inquisition prosecuted a number of men and women for pretending to be holy persons. Those who were prosecuted typically claimed to receive divine visions and to live ascetically. They led informal prayer groups and religious processions, and served as spiritual advisers to people around them. In this engaging and elegantly written book, Andrew W. Keitt examines the uncomfortable social, theological, and legal tensions that the Inquisition's prosecutions stirred up, tensions that were general to early modern Europe.

Behind the Inquisition's determination to prosecute feigned sanctity lay the events of the Protestant Reformation and the reforms instituted at the Council of Trent. Trent reaffirmed the importance of outward piety and ritual, of saints, and of the miraculous against Protestant skepticism. Because sacred ritual and the supernatural were deemed so essential to Catholic identity, the church became preoccupied with defining and regulating them. Holiness increasingly required official certification. In deciding who was a legitimate holy person and who was not, inquisitors were forced to address questions, often with deep roots in the Middle Ages, that took on particular urgency in the period of the Reformation and Counter Reformation. What, for example, was the relationship between outer manifestations of sanctity and inner piety? How could one tell if a vi-

sion was from God or from the devil, or if it was a hallucination caused by illness?

The royal court at Madrid grappled with some of these same issues. Since the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, monarchs had worked to define themselves not just as rulers but as Catholic rulers organically linked to the church and its goals. At the same time, however, the court became wealthier and court ritual more elaborate. The wealthier and more ceremonial the court became, the more people at all levels of society suspected it of being pious on the outside but corrupt and licentious on the inside. At least among intellectuals, European literature about court life was a source of anxiety; Baldassare Castiglione's work suggested that courtiers must construct a variety of surfaces or personas to please the ruler, while for Niccolò Machiavelli's prince, pious conduct was merely a means to cover the most violent and cruel actions. Indeed, Spanish theologians of the day argued that Machiavelli was inspired by Satan. The monarchs, like the church, valued ritual and outward piety, yet recognized that outward displays of virtue could conceal a false interior.

One of the refreshing aspects of Keitt's book is that while he presents the post-Reformation church and the increasingly powerful Spanish monarchy as working together to gain control of ritual, sanctity, and the supernatural, he does not see the Inquisition as a particularly effective tool for imposing social discipline of the sort Michel Foucault describes. The inquisitors he depicts were often overworked, inadequately briefed, and given to misplacing important records, closer to Monty Python's skit than to a well-oiled machine of oppression. They undoubtedly harmed some of the people Keitt studies but finally had no worked-out strategy for resolving their cases. The self-identified holy people Keitt describes were exactly what the Inquisition and, by extension, the monarchy were trying to eliminate: independent operators who claimed supernatural powers on the basis of their visions (several believed they could release souls from purgatory), led religious processions, and attracted crowds by falling into noisy states of rapture. One put on theatrical presentations in which he appeared in drag. To admit that their visions and raptures were legitimate was to invite ridicule of the church and to lessen centralized control of the sacred, particularly in the case of the women in the group, who often showed insufficient respect for their male confessors' authority. Defining the visions as demonic raised procedural problems, since Satan did not leave reliable trails of evidence. Therefore the expedient the inquisitors generally adopted was to dismiss signs of sanctity as medical conditions or fraud. Such an approach also had its dangers, however. If the church defined the supernatural too narrowly, reducing the charismatic abilities of holy people to pathology or fakery, it risked losing the miraculous powers of the saints, the very phenomena which separated it from Protestantism.

In addition to its careful analysis of the key court cases, this book also offers an intelligent study of chang-

ing early modern perspectives on nature and the supernatural, on the scope of medicine, and on the stability (or lack thereof) of the human personality. It will be of interest therefore not just to scholars of Spain but to anyone who studies the European early modern period.

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ROGER HAHN. *Pierre Simon Laplace 1749–1827: A Determined Scientist*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 310. \$35.00.

The gifted mathematician and renowned theorist of celestial mechanics and of probability calculus, Pierre-Simon Laplace, represented the public face of French science during the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. A previous study by Charles C. Gillispie (with the collaboration of Robert Fox and Ivor Grattan-Guinness) analyzed the mathematical and scientific content of his papers. This prodigiously researched yet modestly presented synthesis by Roger Hahn furnishes the biographical and cultural context for Laplace's science. Four previously unpublished manuscripts illuminate Laplace's hostility to organized religion.

The first paradox of Laplace's life is his youthful timidity and mature arrogance. Perhaps permanently scarred by the early loss of his mother and the aloofness of his father, Laplace was a cautious youth who prepared in the colleges of Caen for a career in the church. Before his move to Paris and presentation to the mathematician Jean Le Rond d'Alembert in 1769, he lost his religious faith and then pursued a secular career as teacher and examiner in military schools. The Academy of Sciences, which elected him in 1773, was virtually his only social circle. During the period of his greatest fame in the late revolutionary and Napoleonic period, Laplace became an imperious orchestrator of the mathematical agenda of the Academy. Hahn points out his inclination to help only those who advanced his own research program and his frequent neglect of appropriate citations.

The second paradox of his career is that despite the well-known symbiosis of science and government under the new regime, Laplace himself was not an early enthusiast for the French Revolution. In 1790, before Laplace assimilated revolutionary rhetoric—the mutually reinforcing strength of science and freedom—his letters show a preference for political calm elsewhere. He survived the Terror by strenuous efforts to remain apolitical and gained fame for helping the reconstruction of scientific institutions in the later phases of the revolution (particularly through the Bureau of Longitude, the National Institute of Sciences and Arts, and the metric system commission).

After the coup of 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte appointed him interior minister, but Laplace's administrative acumen proved less reliable than his mathematics. Subsequent designation to the increasingly servile

Senate assured Laplace substantial wealth. Yet after repeatedly praising the emperor, who treated him well until at least 1813, he accepted the title of marquis from the Bourbon monarchy in 1817 and, for all his earlier rhetoric, refused in 1826 to sign a petition of the Académie française for freedom of the press.

Laplace's major scientific accomplishment was the development of the mathematical calculus to allow Isaac Newton's force of attraction to explain all motions of an essentially stable solar system. He also offered a "nebular" hypothesis of planetary formation from rings breaking away from a gas cloud, apparently without knowledge of Immanuel Kant's similar views. The extension of Newton's laws to the physical world was less coherent. Laplace explored in skeptical, pre-positivist fashion the mathematical basis of fluid mechanics, including capillary action, and the "imponderable" fluids of heat, light, and electricity. Particularly fruitful was his collaboration from 1777 to 1784 with Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, from which resulted the ice calorimeter experiment helping to prove the equivalence of respiration and combustion. At his country house in the Napoleonic era, Laplace presided over an informal scientific salon, the Société d'Arcueil, where some of the most illustrious contemporary scientists could exchange ideas more effectively than in the formal atmosphere and with the ponderous publication timetable of the Academy.

Laplace's other great contribution was the application of probability theory to astronomical data and to many aspects of daily life. His early memoirs developed what later was called Bayesian statistical inference, the selection of the best mean value from observational data, a technique enriched by Carl Friedrich Gauss's normal distribution curve. Benefiting from the similar interests of the marquis de Condorcet, Laplace also assumed probability could contribute to rational choices for demographic data and election systems. Like his friend the Idéologue Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, Laplace became interested in mind-body relationships and was convinced that free will was an illusion.

Hahn's most impressive contribution is his discussion of Laplace's religious views. The apocryphal conversation with Napoleon questioning the need for God in the world system conveyed well Laplace's apparent atheism. The testimony of fellow dinner guests alleges that Laplace saw the Academy as a bulwark against the church. His private manuscripts questioned the veracity of the New Testament and outlined a Humean denigration of miracles, including transubstantiation and resurrection, as contravening natural law. He even speculated that Christ survived the crucifixion.

Hahn has provided a masterful study of Laplace's career that, together with earlier discussions of his science, will clarify his manifold achievements and promote reflection on the fate of a would-be apolitical man in a politically charged epoch.

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RACHEL HAMMERSLEY. *French Revolutionaries and English Republicans: The Cordeliers Club, 1790–1794*. (Royal Historical Society Studies in History, new series, number 43.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 192. \$80.00.

This work by Rachel Hammersley proposes that the Cordeliers Club of revolutionary Paris occupied a key transitional position between the classical republican tradition of early modern Europe and the politics of modern democratic agitation. Opening with a brief and cogent overview of historiography on republicanism's relevance to the intellectual history of the French Revolution and the extent of links between anglo and francophone thought in the eighteenth century, the text goes on to survey the early history of the Cordeliers from district to club. This chapter considers their track record as defenders of individual freedom against administrative tyranny, and their articulated beliefs in forms of democracy—"delegate and semi-direct" (p. 46)—that challenged the rights of representative bodies to act as if sovereignty was theirs, and not their constituents'. While noting the club's relatively low membership fees, Hammersley acknowledges that the core grouping was made up of educated men with the means to live an intellectual life, and this is demonstrated in the three chapters that follow, detailing the individual engagement of different figures with English republican writings of the previous century. The final substantive chapter deals with the most prominent of the Cordeliers' various wordsmiths, Camille Desmoulins, and in particular his attempts to rein in the excesses of the Terror through journalistic denunciation: attempts that were both futile and ultimately fatal.

Hammersley clearly succeeds in her central task, which is to demonstrate that these individual Cordeliers, who include the municipal activist Théophile Mandar and the established author and journalist Jean-Jacques Rutledge, were well read in the literature of figures such as Marchamont Nedham, Algernon Sidney, and above all James Harrington, author of the 1656 political utopia *Oceana*. Thus she connects these figures to an intellectual heritage running through the diverse currents of eighteenth-century radicalism and opposition, from English Restoration Whigs and later "commonwealthmen" to Huguenot exiles and the Chevalier d'Eon. The complexity of the heritage is shown in Desmoulins's debt to the French Protestant minister Pierre Daudé's translation of the Englishman Thomas Gordon's commentaries on Tacitus, which form a key component of Desmoulins's attack on the Terror in his *Le Vieux Cordelier* (1793–1794). Indeed, as Hammersley points out, when Desmoulins claims to be quoting Tacitus, the words are actually Gordon's via Daudé.

While this exploration of intellectual heritages is both interesting and clearly delineated, some of the limitations of the approach are also apparent. In chapter four, which considers texts produced in 1792 as debate began on a constitution for the newly declared republic, the central focus is on one such text, printed and dis-

tributed among other model constitutions submitted to the National Convention for consideration. As Hammersley herself notes, it "attracted little attention" (p. 116) and was only "rediscovered" in the first half of the twentieth century, by a scholar who noted its resemblance to *Oceana*. Throughout the chapter Hammersley analyzes this obscure text against a series of others of similar obscurity published anonymously around the same time, concerning which she admits "we cannot be certain who actually wrote" them (p. 133). Although her close reading methods show ably that Harringtonian ideas permeate the texts, and she ties them to other productions of the Cordelier school, what is lacking is any sense of direct political significance. Rutledge and his ilk were figures who failed entirely to achieve political leverage in the revolutionary politics of Paris, and the degree of intellectual sophistication they brought to their discourse increasingly fell out of favor even within the Club they had founded. Throughout the book, Hammersley is unable to show evidence that the discourse of these anglophile Cordeliers had any practical impact. Her claim that the ideas she documents are of "fundamental importance" (p. 165) simply does not hold water outside the rarefied realm of the history of ideas; when these ideas were put forward as a basis for action during the French Revolution, they were ignored.

As a text, this work also has weaknesses. Although it offers both accessibility and authenticity in giving translated and original versions of French passages, these turn out to be hostages to fortune on a number of occasions. "Il y a peu d'années" does not mean "For many years" but "a few years ago" (p. 41); "statuer sur les intérêts de tous" is not "to rule in the interests of all" but to lay down the law concerning those interests (p. 42); "retentir" is not to keep but to resound (p. 69); "lâcheté" in the context used here clearly means baseness, not "weakness" (p. 77); "trop peu" is not "so little" but "too little" (p. 79). It is particularly unclear why "prêter le serment civique" should be translated as "preach the civic sermon" when the correct phrase, "swear an oath," is used a few lines earlier (p. 112).

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JOHN MERRIMAN. *Police Stories: Building the French State, 1815–1851*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. viii, 254. \$55.00.

One imperative in the creation of the modern nation-state has been acquiring a monopoly over justice and the repression of domestic disorder. In France under the Old Regime, Paris alone had a well-developed police force, the rest of the country depending mostly on the *maréchaussée* (the army's mounted constabulary). Napoleon Bonaparte remedied this lack of centralization and rigor by imposing on the rest of the country prefects, mayors, and, to enforce their authority, *commissaires de police* (police captains). All the many subsequent French regimes reinforced this intention be-

cause, as an official in 1814 put it perfectly, "Without the ministry of the police, how would one know the movement of society, its needs, its deviations, the state of opinion, the errors and factions which agitate minds?" (p. 9).

Once a French town's population reached five thousand, it was required to have, and to pay the salary of, a *commissaire*, with additional *commissaires* and their subordinates, *agents* (constables), depending on the town's size, location, and importance. The duties were complex and difficult. As the chief instrument in the maintenance of public order, the *commissaire* answered both to the prefect—and thus to the ministry of the interior in Paris—and to the mayor, who often had conflicting agendas. As an officer of the *police judiciaire* (judicial police, criminal investigation bureau), the *commissaire* reported to the local public prosecutor. As the regime's man on the ground, the *commissaire* carried out missions of the *haute police* (political policing). The rewards for such strenuous and exacting work were only slight prestige and a miserable salary, although both rose as the century progressed. Not surprisingly, most of the *commissaires* were former noncommissioned officers from the military.

The *commissaires* were a peculiarly French institution, for nowhere else was there such an early national centralization of the police. The main elements of its history, the rationale, and the structure have long been analyzed. What remained to be told was the detail: the lives and careers of the *commissaires*, their struggles with competing authorities, and above all their policing of routine daily life, of social and political protest, of miscreants, vagrants, and troublemakers. This detail John Merriman now provides. Assiduously, Merriman has ferreted out the dossiers of *commissaires de police* at seventy-one departmental archives, as well as at the National Archives, the Archives of the Prefecture of Police, and the Archives of the Ministry of War. From this material he has compiled accounts illuminating four critical issues in the history of these *commissaires*: their career patterns, their efforts to professionalize the position, their day-to-day activities, and their impact in effecting the centralization of state control over local affairs.

Writing in 1850, one of Lyon's *commissaires*, a certain David, denounced "heavy-handed policing, done without intelligence," calling instead for having "an exact knowledge of the human heart" and grasping "practical morality" (pp. 48–49). Some few *commissaires* were capable of such nuances, but the dossiers demonstrate that most of them gained appointment not through talent and certainly not sophistication but through having the proper political affiliation during a time of shifting regimes. Once they were in office, their "zeal"—meaning more a willingness to follow the appropriate orders than a dedication to their work—determined whether they received promotions.

Yet despite the manifold worries by prefects about potential social and political disturbances, the *commissaires* spent most of their time dealing with the mun-

dane and trivial: disputes at the marketplace, smuggling past the toll gates, raucous behavior at cabarets, cafés, theaters and during charivaris, fights between rival *compagnonnages* (journeymen's associations), and the sorting out of men and women in *situations irrégulières* (of dubious legality): beggars, prostitutes, vagabonds, and outsiders of all variety. The comment of the *commissaire* for the town of Aubenas in the Ardèche was typical, "I have recognized four abuses that must be eliminated: the dirty condition of the streets, untimely discharges from windows, songs and noise at night, and the proper closing of public establishments" (p. 159).

A certain fascination attaches to this material: the intimacy of personal letters evokes the harsh realities of life more than a century and a half ago, and the tedium of reports makes clear what unending drudgery a *commissaire* endured. But this fascination is tempered by the approach Merriman takes to telling his "police stories." Most often, he simply recounts them, one after another, occasionally interjecting comments but rarely drawing any quantitative conclusions. His editors have permitted him to leave pungent French words and expressions without translation, to write some sentences only slightly acquainted with the rules of diction, and to adopt paragraphing at random intervals. A good story deserves a good telling.

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ANNICK OPINEL. *Le peintre et le mal (France, XIX^e siècle)*. (Science, histoire et société.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 2005. Pp. 363. €25.00.

Medicine changed a lot during the nineteenth century, and the demand for medical care increased tremendously. How were these changes reflected in paintings? This is the main question addressed by Annick Opinel. Illnesses, wounds, and treatment were represented in paintings before 1800, but the number of paintings devoted to these matters seems to have become much greater thereafter.

The book is organized in four parts, dealing respectively with the purpose of the paintings as didactical tools or as propaganda instruments, with the question of the scientific proselytizing or of the realism kindness ("complaisance misérabiliste"), with the specificity required to represent abnormal states, and finally with the problem of categorization. Opinel also considers the intentions of financial backers and the social role of these works. She does not adopt the angles used by medical doctors, neither using the image as a working tool nor offering medical critique of what is represented.

The hierarchy of painting categories inherited from the eighteenth century (history, portrait, genres) was modified by the representation of wounds and medical activities after the end of the ancien régime. But the pedagogical purpose of the paintings has never been clear. Theodore Géricault's *Les Aliénés* (1822–1823), a series of paintings of the insane, was very quickly dispersed and sold just for its aesthetic value. Other paint-

ings were ordered by medical institutions, which chose the theme to be represented. Tony Robert-Fleury's two paintings of Philippe Pinel breaking the chains of the insane were commissioned to decorate the Académie de Médecine and the Hôpital de la Salpêtrière. The purpose here was to celebrate a doctor's initiative and a symbolic place. In the images of hysteria cases commissioned by Jean-Martin Charcot, it is clear that the pedagogical function was assumed by photography and that the paintings did not focus on information about these women.

During the First and Second Empire and even under the July Monarchy, medical paintings were a propaganda tool. Depiction of the care given to wounded soldiers, or generals, on the Napoleonic battle fields magnified the generosity of Napoleon himself. The paintings kept at Val-de-Grâce, the military hospital in Paris, highlight the excellence of the army medical service, with important surgeons like Dominique Larrey represented. The ambulances systematized by Larrey were often painted until the Commune period (1870–1871). But an evolution is clear here: more and more often after midcentury, the suffering soldier is an anonymous one, chosen as an example of the suffering caused by battles. The same purpose of propaganda is evident in paintings of some members of the royal family visiting poor people contaminated by cholera in 1832 or in 1854.

Opinel studies the exhibitions of these paintings and the reaction of critics and of the public. If the pedagogical purpose of the paintings was not fulfilled, it is clear for her that the diffusion of scientific information regarding medical care did increase. Scientific progress was also illustrated by these paintings more effectively than by verbal discourses. After midcentury, the paintings were used by the medical profession to celebrate Edward Jenner, René Desgenettes, René Laënnec, Louis Pasteur, and well-known scientists such as Claude Bernard. The hospital, the place of the clinic lesson, was also celebrated.

At the end of her book Opinel emphasizes that the paintings she discusses were not part of any artistic movement; they stand apart as a minor category, and their critics expressed regrets about how they endangered the traditional painting of history. The medical profession refused to grant the paintings the role of pedagogical tools that drawings, engravings, anatomical wax, cut aways, and photography occupied. But the public was fond of these paintings, learning through them some characteristics of the new medicine and misery. Painters were clearly dependent on the institutions or persons who commissioned such works. They reflect the evolution of medical practice over the course of the nineteenth century from individualized to collective medical care. The hospital, for instance, was no longer the place where people died but, by the end of the century, a site with great scientific and social prestige.

This book allows us to have a more clear idea of nineteenth-century French paintings considered in their re-

lationship with medicine, medical professionals, institutions, and politics.

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REBECCA ROGERS. *From the Salon to the Schoolroom: Educating Bourgeois Girls in Nineteenth-Century France*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 335. \$65.00.

This is a well-written, well-researched, and well-argued work. Rather than a narrowly conceived institutional history of particular establishments, Rebecca Rogers has produced a far broader, more ambitious analysis of social and familial change during the course of the nineteenth century, as made manifest by changes in the schooling of bourgeois girls. She explains these developments with reference to the evolution of bourgeois concepts of the relationship between the public and private spheres, and is most persuasive in her account of the unexpected rise of a new form of secondary schooling in mid-nineteenth-century France, neither led by the church nor guided by the state. In Rogers's analysis, the Revolution of 1789 was primarily destructive, ending the small network of largely Parisian girls' schools that had developed in the eighteenth century. After the false start of 1795, new girls' schools were created in the late 1790s. By 1800 there were forty-five in Paris (p. 47). Some were created by female religious congregations, but the majority were run by secular heads. By 1855 there were twenty-two religious girls' secondary schools in Paris, and three hundred and twenty secular schools (p. 168). In the early nineteenth century their status was somewhat uncertain: as Rogers remarks, they were defined as "secondary" by virtue of their curriculum and clientele rather than their administrative position (p. 45). In December 1853 the Falloux law brutally ended such uncertainties by simply declaring that, for administrative purposes, all girls' schools would be counted as primary schools (p. 123).

Although the demand by bourgeois families for a more advanced form of education for their daughters was clearly an important factor in the rise of these schools, Rogers also presents an articulate case that these institutions had a wider social importance: they can be linked to the work of innovative publishers, new women authors, female educational entrepreneurs, and slowly professionalizing female teachers. Collectively they shaped the outlines of a new, female-oriented public sphere, stretching beyond the world of salons, balls, charities, and churches (p. 43). Indeed, at times one can hear echoes of Mary Wollstonecraft's or Adam Smith's faith in the free market as an instrument of progress in Rogers's evocations of the canny commercial operators who ran girls' schools, with one eye on contemporary debates concerning the nature of femininity and the other on the potential market for a product. In these sections (principally in chapters three and four), Rogers suggests a rethinking of the perhaps too starkly

drawn dichotomy between public and private. In this often-ignored female public sphere, ideas about the importance of the educated mother for the revival of post-revolutionary French society circulated.

At the end of chapter four, Rogers analyzes the records of some sixteen hundred headmistresses. While common contemporary clichés suggested that they were impoverished (and embittered?) spinsters from bourgeois families, Rogers finds that they were more likely to be ambitious lower-middle-class women, even educated working-class women, who—on average—were only thirty-two when they opened their institutions (p. 130). Fifty-nine percent were married (p. 131). On average, their schools stayed open for almost thirteen years.

Most important, Rogers gets beneath the public pronouncements concerning the ideal nature of girls' education. A prospectus might well promise parents that its school's "tender and obedient girls . . . will become virtuous wives and good mothers" (p. 174), but, asks Rogers, what was the girls' *real* experience? Certainly, the institutions were more than secluded: often boarding schools, they were rigidly separate from the outside world. Religious values structured daily life in both secular and religious establishments. Despite the pseudo-familial rhetoric used by the headmistresses, business considerations dominated their institutions. School life worked to prevent deep, lasting friendships growing up between particular girls. Rogers finds almost no trace of rebellion or dissidence in these schools: in other words, the rules and regulatory mechanisms seem to have worked well. Could this be an explanation for the relatively weak presence of feminism in French political culture (pp. 194–195)?

Rogers considers an extremely broad range of sources: as well as the archives of particular institutions and numerous secondary sources, she analyzes some of the prestigious works in the French literary tradition (for example, Gustave Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*), girls' fiction, autobiographies, diaries, prize day speeches, and prospectuses and advertisements issued by the schools. Some of these are extremely telling: for example, the illustration of the ideal religious boarding school shows girls engaged in perhaps eleven different activities, including sewing and praying, but does not include any depiction of a schoolroom or of organized teaching (p. 139).

In conclusion, this is a highly successful work, presenting a telling analysis of the nature of women's entry into public life in nineteenth-century France.

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RICHARD THOMSON. *The Troubled Republic: Visual Culture and Social Debate in France 1889–1900*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004. Pp. ix, 256. \$60.00.

Richard Thomson has written an unusual book. He is an art historian who has published a series of sparkling monographs on the Impressionists. This time around,

however, it is not the canonical greats who interest him but visual culture, the making of images across a whole range of media from painting and sculpture to more ephemeral forms like postcards and posters. Thomson's quarry is different, too. He wants to explore how image makers, working in 1890s France, handled hot-button issues of the day such as the body, religious belief, the crowd and *revanche*. Subject matter rather than style is Thomson's principal concern, and he adjusts his mode of analysis accordingly, taking an iconographical approach centered more on what is represented than how.

This is an uncommon set of strategies for an art historian, but it yields some interesting results. Students of the Third Republic will not be surprised to learn that there was an official, sanctioned mode of representation. Jules Dalou's monumental statue of the republic (1899), Alfred Roll's grand canvases of celebrating crowds, and Edouard Detaille's paintings of battle scenes and parades all illustrated core values of the regime: an exuberant but not bellicose patriotism, founded on a secular faith in the people and its democratic devotion. The sentiments are estimable, if conventional, and so is the execution, always realist in style (with, in the case of the statuary, the occasional allegorical element thrown in).

But the republic's was just one voice in a raucous and wide-ranging visual debate. For every serene goddess of liberty, there were images of more disruptive forms of sexuality that ran from the erotic to the prurient to the bizarre. The ideal of classical beauty came in for a drubbing in the fin de siècle. Edgar Degas's tub-women and Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec's prostitutes are but the most celebrated instances of what Thomson demonstrates to have been a much wider phenomenon. This was still a patriarchal world in which men did the looking, but what they saw was no longer the *beau idéal* but more complicated and disturbing forms of female physicality. The crowd too was a more complicated and disturbing presence. The 1890s were an era of strikes and street riots, and the image makers of the era did not shy away from such subjects. Think of Jules Adler's sympathetic depiction of marching strikers, red flags unfurled, at the Le Creusot mineworks (1899) or, better still, Jules Vallotton's woodcut of a demonstration, dispersing helter-skelter before a police charge that is not shown but evoked by the crowd's very flight (1893).

Thomson's discussion takes a yet more absorbing turn when he addresses the question of religion. Realists and Impressionists alike had shunted aside religious subjects in favor of more contemporary material—everyday life in a secularizing nineteenth century—but the eclipse of religious painting proved to be no more than momentary. In the nineties, Léon Lhermitte and Jacques-Émile Blanche, artists not otherwise known for their transcendental impulses, took to painting scenes of unmistakable Christian content. Yet, this was not quite standard-issue sacred art, for the scenes were often contemporary in setting. Take, for example, Lhermitte's *L'Ami des humbles* (1892) which depicts a peasant family at table. And there is Christ, seated

among them, breaking bread, as his fellow diners draw back in amazement. Or Blanche's *The Host* (1891–1892), whose theme is once again a family meal. This time, the gathering is bourgeois, disposed around the table in a Last Supper-like composition, and placed center canvas is a Christ figure facing outward with a fixed, otherworldly gaze and one hand raised in blessing. The holy spirit, the painters seemed to be saying, was not far removed from the here and now; God was not absent in the modern world, but a living presence among us. Artists like Maurice Denis took the challenge of renewing religious painting one step further, eschewing the realist style of a Blanche or Lhermitte in favor of something more modern. Denis treated religious themes but employed offbeat chromatic schemes and hieratic compositional forms to create a naïve, primitivizing effect that conveyed a sense of the mysterious. The divine was not represented in human form but evoked by artistic means.

As for *revanche*, Thomson's iconographic trawling yields an arresting conclusion. Léon Gambetta had advised his countrymen to think always of the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine but never to speak of them. It may be, Thomson acknowledges, that contemporaries heeded Gambetta's counsel when it came to public debate but not, he insists, when it came to imagery. The Franco-Prussian War, its material and territorial costs, haunted the imaginations of painters, engravers, and sculptors who in representational media of every kind—from grand commemorative monuments to images d'Épinal—kept alive the painful memories of what Germany had done to France.

France's official visual culture thus found itself beset on all sides in the 1890s: by a disturbing sexuality, by protesting crowds, by eruptions of the divine, by a simmering militarism. The rational, male citizen, so central a figure in the republic's understanding of itself, was indeed under siege. The challenge was all the greater when contestatory images came packaged in novel styles and greater still when a more or less explicit politics were involved. Herein lies the peculiar power of the work of a Vallotton or Denis, the one an anarchist fellow traveler, the other a man of the Catholic Right, but both modern artists handling themes that disturbed the good conscience of a republican status quo.

Thomson makes quite clear that he is after an understanding of the modern. It is a notoriously elusive term, but one that takes on flesh and blood in Thomson's accounting. France in the 1890s boasted a democratic public culture unparalleled in Europe. Yet that culture was contested on all sides, and not just by old regime holdovers but by currents—whether socialist or Nationalist—every bit as up-to-date as the republican mainstream. Thomson has rendered a signal service in laying out the visual record of these confrontations. This is modernity, he argues: the confrontation between democracy and its others, each side battling not just in words but in images, the challengers more often than

the incumbents resorting to the most novel representational means.

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SALLY DEBRA CHARNOW. *Theatre, Politics, and Markets in Fin-de-Siècle Paris: Staging Modernity*. (Palgrave Studies in Theatre and Performance History.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2005. Pp. xi, 268. \$69.95.

Sally Debra Charnow's book on French theater shifts the limelight from actors and plays to theater directors: specifically, to several avant-garde directors and their innovative projects in turn-of-the-century France. André Antoine, founder of the Théâtre Libre (1887), receives the most attention, both because he led the way and because his impact seems greatest. Charnow explains well Antoine's multiple innovations: the new kinds of stage lighting he used for both visual and emotional effects; the practice of turning off house lights during performances; the more natural style of acting and speaking; and the new playwrights and pathbreaking plays he introduced to Paris, especially works that brought out the complex and darker sides of human relationships. Antoine was also a pioneer on the business side of theater, resourcefully financing his private enterprise through subscriptions, advertising with new brilliant posters, commissioning collectable illustrated programs, and engaging in publicity-generating provocations, in many ways following the model of the Chat Noir and other Montmartre cabarets.

Charnow's other modernist directors are Paul Fort and François Lugné-Poë, who joined Antoine in the struggle to bring critical issues of modern life to the Parisian stage in the early 1890s. Their symbolist and naturalist productions on themes of poverty, crime, and prostitution alarmed political guardians of morality and the state censors. So in addition to their struggle to finance productions without state support and to win over audiences, the avant garde had to do regular battle over censorship for years, until the state gave up censoring theater in 1904. At the same time, they engaged in combat with conservative and nationalistic critics hostile to plays by such foreigners as the unsettling, non-Latin Henrik Ibsen. Charnow gives a wide-ranging account of these battles in a broad cultural and political context.

Taking a perspective long maintained by literary scholars, the author presents the modernists as "theater revolutionaries" (p. 205) boldly taking on entrenched conservatives: critics, bourgeois audiences, and state authorities. The exciting, tough-minded works of the modernists are set off against the conventional fare of "boulevard theater," classical theater, and such popular culture favorites as melodrama and café concerts. Yet the author also shows convincingly that this binary framework does not hold in some important ways. Antoine wanted to be a successful entrepreneur, not an insolvent artsy outsider. The avant garde that proudly rejected commercialism and scorned the philistine

bourgeois employed shrewd marketing practices and enjoyed the support of venturesome bourgeois theatergoers.

The book's introduction and conclusion suggest that the avant garde transformed theater and brought new life to "a moribund art form" (p. 110), but the detailed story does not have so neat an ending. The experimental theaters did not survive long in the marketplace. Antoine kept his going until 1894. Fort's theater lasted just a year. Lugné-Poë's theater depended on a state subsidy from 1903 on. Meanwhile, mainstream theater was not dying or faring so badly, thanks to fresh plays by the likes of Georges Feydeau, Georges Courteline, and Edmond Rostand.

Realizing how limited their audiences were, modernists searched for ways of reaching the common people from the early 1890s on. They wanted not only to strengthen popular support for the republic and to counter the illiberal passions raging over the Dreyfus Affair, but also to morally uplift the working people, rescuing them from crude, crass popular entertainment and alcoholic excess. The state lent support to one popular theater project in the 1890s and came close to going further in 1905–1906, but funding did not come through, and the high hopes went unrealized. Without receiving any state money, one remarkable People's Theater did open in a small town (Bussang) in Lorraine in 1895, and it thrived—with underwriting by director Maurice Pottecher's businessman father (it is still going today).

The problem that popular theater faced was not just a lack of state support, important though that has been in French cultural history. The theater reformers, even most leftists, distrusted the common people, disdained the popular, and sought to edify the masses, molding minds and tastes by exposing them to works of classical French culture. "The People's Theatre in Bussang," the author points out, "offered only a one-way flow of ideas and images—from patron/director to audience/worker" (p. 190). More than a half century later, state efforts in the early Fifth Republic, such as the *maisons de culture*, continued in the tradition of Charnow's protagonists, as Herman Lebovics shows in *Mona Lisa's Escort: André Malraux and the Reinvention of French Culture* (1999). The innovators in this book were eclectic in their approach to theater, the author emphasizes, but they did not cross many old boundaries set by taste and education. To see an eclecticism of that kind, France had to wait until the 1980s and Minister of Culture Jack Lang. Viewed in that perspective, the history of the fin-de-siècle modernists represents one particularly eventful act in a long French drama of episodic cultural reform: an act memorable for its lofty aspirations, creative experiments, and many disappointments.

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ROBERT A. DOUGHTY. *Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War*. Cambridge: Belknap

Press of Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 578. \$39.95.

Robert A. Doughty has filled a longstanding gap in the military history of World War I. Throughout that conflict, the Western Front was the principal theater, engaging the largest numbers of troops and weapons, and it was above all damage inflicted there that caused Germany's defeat. At least until spring 1917, French strategy largely shaped that of the Allies as a whole, and right down until the armistice the French fielded the largest Allied force committed to the Western Front and held much the longest section of it. Their contribution to the anti-German war effort was indispensable, and the price paid was commensurate: of 8.41 million French soldiers mobilized (more than one in five of the total population), 3.6 million were wounded and 1.38 million were killed. For all these reasons, Doughty's topic is of major importance.

None the less, until recently the French war effort has received less scholarly attention than have those of other powers. Excellent studies have now appeared of the home front, the war economy, and combatant morale. Even so—with the exception of Guy Pedroncini's rehabilitation of Philippe Pétain—French strategy has remained neglected, and many of the standard works on it were written over fifty years ago. Yet abundant information was disclosed in inter-war memoirs, and above all in the forty-volume official history, *Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre (AFGG)* (1922–1937), a remarkable compilation that published thousands of confidential documents. Doughty's references demonstrate that he knows the *AFGG* well, but he has supplemented it from French archival collections (notably the Service historique de l'armée de terre at Vincennes) as well as from British and American records. This is an admirably researched text, well versed in the relevant historiography, and the publishers deserve congratulation for providing sufficient space for Doughty to pursue his topic in depth.

The book focuses on the strategic decision making by the French government and high command in relation to the war on land. One of Doughty's few oversights is naval operations. He discusses combatant morale, war production, domestic politics, and inter-Allied relations in so far as is necessary to provide context. His book is organized as a series of extended narrative chapters, which incorporate judicious commentaries on the controversies that surround French strategy and its authors. He acknowledges the progress made by the French army between 1870 and 1914 while demonstrating its serious flaws. He awards the first commander in chief, Joseph Joffre, primary credit for halting the initial German offensive at the battle of the Marne, though he is much more scathing about Joffre's record in the subsequent 1914–1915 offensives (which caused appalling casualties, and which no other modern writer has examined so fully). He also criticizes Joffre for France's inadequate preparedness at Verdun and is still more critical of Joffre's ill-starred successor, Robert

Nivelle. By contrast, Doughty accepts much of Pedroncini's assessment of Pétain, stressing that the latter was not a purely passive and defensive commander, although he was exactly the leader needed to restore confidence after the 1917 mutinies. None the less, he generally vindicates Ferdinand Foch, the Allied supreme commander from spring 1918, over Pétain in the conflicts that scarred the two men's working relationship. In contrast to some recent Anglo-American historiographical trends, Doughty rightly stresses the French army's resilience and its crucial contribution in the final year, both in repelling General Erich von Ludendorff's offensives and in the subsequent Allied advance, even if by the end the French were very close to exhaustion.

Beyond these detailed observations Doughty presents two overarching contentions. The first is that the French consistently advocated a multifront effort that would squeeze their enemies from all sides (although the Salonika expedition was their only major and continuous overseas deployment). In the 1915 and 1916 Chantilly conferences they pursued a strategy of concerted Allied offensives, and in 1918 Foch actually implemented such an approach. The second, and more problematic contention, is that French strategy emerged after careful consideration of alternatives and from a pragmatic debate. Doughty certainly establishes that there was discussion within the military establishment, and that from 1915 onward French politicians too were involved in major decisions. However, he condemns Joffre's and Nivelle's commitment to the doctrine of the offensive as going well beyond what was justifiable. Yet he also documents the military and political imperatives that drove the French to return to the offensive again and again, and to this extent he helps explain what otherwise might seem incomprehensible.

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JANE F. FULCHER. *The Composer as Intellectual: Music and Ideology in France 1914–1940*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 473. \$74.00.

Although it seems to be the most apolitical of all arts, music has ever been an instrument of what Pierre Bourdieu calls "symbolic power." The ideological function of music was especially emphasized in France during the Third Republic. In the wake of growing competition with Germany, music was nationalized and came to represent national culture and identity. This process reached its peak during World War I, when music was assigned the patriotic task of unifying the national community. The musical canon itself was at stake: French music was to be promoted and the German influence in France, especially that of Richard Wagner, to be combated.

How did composers react to these ideological constraints? Far from retreating into an ivory tower, French composers responded by committing themselves as intellectuals. The material and symbolic benefits they could obtain by endorsing the public role the

state assigned them were important: promotion of French composers in programs, public commands, financial support for institutions. As Jane F. Fulcher puts it, "the dominance now being exercised by the state was powerful precisely because, in the interests of ideological hegemony, it played upon deeply rooted professional concerns" (p. 34). But, as she demonstrates in this very thorough and comprehensive inquiry, the response was never direct. Using concepts such as ideology, cultural hegemony, and symbolic domination as well as Bourdieu's theory of cultural fields, she shows that the political constraints were refracted or mediated through the specific issues and stakes of the French musical field. This relational (anti-essentialist) approach allows her to analyze the ideological struggles between the right and the left for appropriating the most legitimate references of the canon such as Ludwig van Beethoven, described either as revolutionary or as religious, while excluding contemporary composers like Wagner, Arnold Schoenberg, or Darius Milhaud as representative of German romanticism as opposed to French classicism, modern as opposed to classical style, foreign (Jewish) as opposed to French.

The book is divided in four chapters, covering four periods. Each chapter begins with a frame of the ideological issues, political constraints, and state cultural policy, turning then to analyze collective and individual reactions. These include not only the public discourse and interpretation of works in musical and cultural publications but also the way that ideological issues were translated in the musical works themselves.

The first chapter deals with wartime nationalism. During World War I, classicism, promoted by the extreme right, became the dominant style. The head of the Conservative Schola Cantorum, Vincent d'Indy, represented this trend, although contrary to other nationalists like Camille Saint-Saëns he refused to proscribe German music from the canon and thought Wagner had helped to "purify" French music from foreign influence, mainly Jewish. The republicans soon responded by appropriating the reference to classicism, while giving it a more humanist and universal meaning. Founded in 1916, the *Ligue nationale pour la Défense de la musique française* embodied the dominant ideology of "Union sacrée." Nevertheless, a few composers resisted this ideology: namely Claude Debussy, Maurice Ravel, and Erik Satie, who introduced some ironic distance in their works of this period, or references to jazz, which was proscribed.

The ideological function imposed on music favored the postwar development (chapter two) of a policy aiming at diffusing legitimate music to the whole French people. A reform made musical education compulsory in the *Écoles primaires supérieures*. In 1919 the *École normale de musique* was created to train music teachers and was open to foreigners, unlike the prestigious Conservatoire. A critic of the nationalist dominant order, Ravel refused the official award of the *Légion d'honneur*, explaining that it implied agreeing to be judged by the state. Unlike Debussy, he was a reference

for the young generation, the *Groupe des Six*—Georges Auric, Louis Durey, Arthur Honegger, Milhaud, François Poulenc, Germaine Tailleferre—whose works articulated the dilemmas between national and universal, tradition and modernity. Igor Stravinsky was also a prominent reference, harshly contested by the right as was André Gide in the literary field.

The Popular Front (chapter three) assigned to culture the task of fighting fascism and symbolizing democratic values. Art should no more be considered as a luxury but as something indispensable. Although it promoted the concept of *fêtes du peuple*, the cultural policy of the Popular Front consisted in diffusing “high” culture to the people—the radio providing a powerful instrument for this purpose—rather than promoting popular or amateur culture or developing a new revolutionary culture. The Fédération musicale populaire, a branch of the Maison de la Culture, embodied this policy: it created 140 musical groups in the summer of 1936 and launched the music firm *Le Chant du monde*. Linked to prominent leftist intellectuals such as Romain Rolland and the communist Paul Vaillant-Couturier, the Fédération promoted modern music against the fascist conception of the modern as “degenerate art.” Its head, Charles Koechlin, was close to members of the *Groupe des Six*, who got involved in cultural projects of the Popular Front and became official musicians of the regime. They contributed to great collective works like Rolland’s *Le 14 Juillet*.

But the fascist currents were reviving romanticism. As the Popular Front regime declined, there was a return to spirit (chapter four), promoted by a new generation (among which Olivier Messiaen) close to the nonconformist intellectuals who refused the choice between right and left. In this last period, the seeds of both collaborationist and resistance tendencies can already be identified—but Fulcher leaves the war period for future investigation.

This remarkable study illustrates the heuristic value of Bourdieu’s theory of fields, which has successfully been applied in recent research about literature in the same period (Anna Boschetti, *La poésie partout: Apollinaire, homme-époque* [2001], Hervé Serry, *Naissance de l’intellectuel Catholique* [2004]). Although emphasizing political issues and interpretations can induce a bias by according them a higher weight than they really had, it was necessary in order to dismiss the purely internal approach that prevails in the history of music. Without reducing musical practices to the simple reflect of external constraints, this research is exemplary in demonstrating that processes of hierarchization always involve ideological stakes.

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STEPHEN SCHLOESSER. *Jazz Age Catholicism: Mystic Modernism in Postwar Paris, 1919–1933*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 449. \$85.00.

The topic of Stephen Schloesser’s book is the *renouveau catholique*, or Catholic revival, of the 1920s in France, and more specifically the emergence of a Catholic avant garde in the spheres of art, literature, and culture—a development that would have appeared impossible in the nineteenth century, during which, for most observers, modern meant secular and Catholic meant reactionary. Schloesser begins with a prologue examining the roots of the postwar *renouveau* in the final decades of the nineteenth century, as Decadents, Symbolists, and others rebelled against the dominant secular positivist ideology of republican France and its artistic counterpart, the realist insistence on *vraisemblance* and exact, “scientific” depictions of reality.

The greater part of the book focuses on four figures of the *renouveau*: the philosopher Jacques Maritain, the painter Georges Rouault, the novelist Georges Bernanos, and the composer Charles Tournemire. The “Catholic modernism” theorized by Maritain in his 1922 book *L’Anti-moderne* and exemplified in the works of the other three artists is defined by Schloesser in terms of hylomorphism (or the dualism between inchoate matter and the form, or the internal force or principle which structures and defines matter) and paligenesis (rebirth, or the creation of new works of art from old materials, such as Scholastic philosophy, Gothic stained glass, or organ and plainchant music). These principles, which Maritain encountered through his study of the works of Thomas Aquinas, encouraged artists to break with a purely realist aesthetics and instead to seek to depict essential truths and realities beyond the reach of the senses. Maritain’s “antimodernism,” Schloesser argues, was itself a modern phenomenon, which defied traditional views of what Catholic art was supposed to look like. Refusing, in Schloesser’s terms, to “quarantine the sacred,” Catholic artists embraced ugliness and the grotesque, depicted the suffering of poor and marginal members of society, and experimented with novel techniques of composition and presentation of their work.

The *renouveau catholique* also implied a break with the philosophical optimism of the nineteenth century and a deepened sense of the tragic side of modernity. The unprecedented carnage of World War I played a major role in this development, and in this sense, Schloesser’s title is somewhat misleading; rather than the frivolity and improvisation that the “jazz age” suggests, Schloesser persuasively makes the case that, particularly for the French, the 1920s were a time of grief and mourning. In addition to the experience of suffering shared by all French men and women, it is striking how many of Schloesser’s protagonists also experienced personal tragedies; the deaths of spouses, partners, friends, or beloved mentors drove many artists to a crisis of belief. Even before the experience of total war, much of the French avant garde rejected realist modes of representation primarily for ethical and metaphysical reasons, despairing of a “disenchanted” world left without mystery, in which positivist science and the inexorable laws of heredity (as in Émile Zola’s *Rougon-*

Macquart series) were sufficient to explain the full range of human experience. The *renouveau catholique* was first and foremost a quest for timeless principles, meaning, and order in an apparently meaningless world, a rejection of both nihilism and determinism.

The "Catholicism" of the *renouveau catholique* was in many ways quite unorthodox. Few, if any, of Schloesser's protagonists came from anything that might be described as a traditionalist Catholic upbringing. On the contrary, Maritain and his childhood friend Ernest Psichari were the grandsons of republican icons Jules Favre and Ernest Renan, respectively; Maritain was raised in a liberal Protestant home. Rouault hailed from the radical egalitarian district of Belleville in Paris, and Tournemire came from a family of artisans of Bordeaux. Maritain's wife Raissa, who played a pivotal role in her husband's intellectual evolution, was a Russian Jewish refugee and, like him, a Catholic convert. Moreover, the artists of the 1920s *renouveau* and their *fin-de-siècle* predecessors took decidedly unconventional paths to Rome, whether through occultism (as was the case with Joris-Karl Huysmans and Josephin Peladan) or through the modern philosophy of Henri Bergson (as with Maritain and his fellow philosopher Gabriel Marcel). *Renouveau* artists also embraced modernity in ways that more traditionalist Catholics found disturbing: through breaking with traditional Catholic aesthetics, building friendships with secular, even scandalous modern artists like Jean Cocteau, and engaging in unusual forms of religious outreach, such as Leon Bloy's efforts to redeem prostitutes or Maritain's "mission" to homosexuals, whom he tried to win over to his ideal of celibacy within committed relationships. In a variety of ways, to paraphrase an advertising slogan, this was not their fathers' Catholicism.

Schloesser is to be commended for the wide range of interdisciplinary erudition he demonstrates in this work, as he successfully integrates substantive analysis in the fields of philosophy, art history, literary criticism, and musicology, discussing the artists he examines within the technical criteria of their arts as well as within the cultural environment that fostered them. This primarily aesthetic orientation, however, means that the political, and even religious, views that informed the work of these artists are relatively unexplored—we only rarely glimpse how Catholicism guided other facets of their lives. I would have liked for Schloesser to have gone into more depth with regard to the political implications of the *renouveau*, as the evidence he provides on this score is intriguing. Maritain, in particular, was far from a straightforward reactionary, as he defended the Vatican's condemnation of *Action Française* in 1926 and became an outspoken critic of antisemitism and an advocate for the Jews after Adolf Hitler's 1933 rise to power. The book also ends rather abruptly at the final chapter, without a conclusion, although Schloesser's introduction makes clear the points he wants his readers to take away from this study. These concerns aside, this is a well-written, erudite, and persuasive book, which should be of interest

to all scholars of religion, culture, and the arts in modern France.

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ETHAN KLEINBERG, *Generation Existential: Heidegger's Philosophy in France 1927–1961*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 294. \$39.95.

Ethan Kleinberg's history of the reception of Martin Heidegger's thought in France from 1927 to 1961 is a compelling account of the peaceful invasion of contemporary French theory by the German existentialist whose legacy remains tainted by his support for National Socialism. Kleinberg's account unfolds through individual portraits of the intriguing personalities—Emmanuel Lévinas, Alexandre Koyré, Alexandre Kojève, Raymond Aron, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Beaufret, and Maurice Blanchot—whose interrogation of subjectivity and alterity, ontology and historicity, and freedom and responsibility were powerfully influenced by Heidegger's thinking. Kleinberg's rigorous examination of the translation of Heidegger's concepts and questions into the French context explores how the "generation of 1933" became "generation existential."

Born between 1900 and 1910 but intellectually coming of age in the fateful year when Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany, this was a generation for whom a Whiggish view of history was bludgeoned in the trenches of World War I and trampled under the jackboots of fascists on the move. Neither the neo-Kantianism of the French academy, entrenched in science, reason, and the drive for objectivity that dominated intellectual life in the early Third Republic, nor its key rival in the *fin-de-siècle* subjectivism of Henri Bergson proved palatable to them. The contingencies and conflicts of a world on the precipice demanded a new vocabulary and perspective. Phenomenology from across the Rhine provided it.

The agents of philosophical translation were Eastern European Jews operating on the margins of French academia, many of them students of Edmund Husserl who were discovering Heidegger as an avenue of critique. The seminal role played by Lévinas frames Kleinberg's book, which then proceeds to demarcate three readings of Heidegger in this phase of his Gallic adventure. The first interpretation of Heidegger emerged out of the weekly seminar on Hegel at the École des Hautes Études led by Kojève from 1933 to 1939, which Vincent Descombes's *Le Même et l'autre: Quarante-cinq ans de philosophie française (1933–1978)* (1979), Michael Roth's *Knowing and History: Interpretations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France* (1988), and Judith Butler's *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (1999) have already established as a central crucible of twentieth-century French thought. "Kojève captivated students with his ability to make connections," Kleinberg writes, presenting "a reading of Hegel that drew from Einstein's physics, Bergson's

intuitionism, Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger's ontology, and Marx's politics" (p. 67). The participants in the seminar, especially Jean André Wahl, Jacques Lacan, Aron, and Merleau-Ponty, then disseminated the insights they garnered to a wider philosophical cadre, producing an anthropocentric, teleological, and humanist existentialism (p. 17), one that "conserved the Cartesian subject and thus presented a domesticated Heidegger" (p. 109) concerned with human agency in history (p. 281). Sartre's meteoric rise to popularity in the aftermath of World War II popularized this understanding of Heidegger in France and around the world.

The second reading emerged from Heidegger's response to his French readers in the form of his "Letter on Humanism" written to Beaufret in 1946, set against the background of the concurrently brewing scandal concerning his relationship to Nazism splayed out in the pages of *Les Temps modernes* in 1945–1946. For a new generation of captivated students, here was a Heidegger who had turned toward language and in so doing was more radical than Sartre in developing the anti-subjectivist tendencies of *Being and Time* by insisting on rethinking the philosophical tradition outside the *ego cogito* (pp. 184, 191). Moreover, "Heidegger's critique of technology and traditional metaphysics spoke to the young intellectuals" (p. 200) taught by Beaufret at the most prestigious preparatory schools in Paris, even as Beaufret echoed Heidegger's party line defense of his affiliation with Hitlerism. Beaufret's reading thus helped to whitewash the Heidegger who had acclaimed, "The Führer himself and he alone is the present and future German reality and its law."

A third interpretative constellation shaped the deconstructive philosophy of the generation rising to prominence after Lévinas's *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exertiority* (1961). They were inspired by Blanchot and Lévinas reading against the grain of Heidegger's critique of the Western philosophical tradition in order to forge an ethical response to the horrors of the twentieth century, especially the Holocaust, about which Heidegger would remain almost totally silent. An astute and lucid writer, Kleinberg works carefully through Blanchot's early texts, but this chapter remains hermetically sealed in Blanchot's dense and paradoxical formulations and uncanny literary works. Kleinberg also never satisfactorily explains the shift in Blanchot's oeuvre from the 1930s to the postwar period. In his conservative nationalist writings in the 1930s, for example, Blanchot claimed that Léon "[Blum] represents exactly what is contemptible to the nation . . . His is a backward ideology, an antiquated mentality, a foreign race" (p. 211). But his post-Shoah ruminations shared the Levinasian urgency to expose the deficiencies of the Western metaphysical tradition and open it to an ethical interrogation and encounter with the Other. Explaining this turn is pivotal because Blanchot's itinerary (similar to that of Paul de Man) continues to stain the history of deconstruction.

Regardless, Kleinberg's study helps to elucidate the leading lights of postwar French thought. But its weak

point is the failure to contextualize the philosophers he explores within the broader cultural and political field. We get a taste of the institutional history of these thinkers. But the oft-repeated claim that the generation of 1933 was concerned with literature and philosophy to the exclusion of politics until after World War II (pp. 57, 104, 129, 149, 209) is based on a failure to read reciprocally the politics of culture and the culture of politics. Indeed, the book would be richer if Kleinberg explained how responses to Heidegger's thought were coded within the social and political (rather than narrowly philosophical) issues that France faced, from the rise of fascism to the end of the colonial empire. Nonetheless, he offers a work that for historians is more fruitful than Tom Rockmore's *Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism, and Being* (1995) because his chronological rather than thematic organization and his insightful vignettes clarify why Heidegger had such a definitive impact on contemporary French thought.

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MARIA GREVER and BERTEKE WAALDIJK. *Transforming the Public Sphere: The Dutch National Exhibition of Women's Labor in 1898*. Translated by MISCHA F. C. HOYINCK and ROBERT E. CHESAL. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2004. Pp. xi, 305. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

Dutch feminist historians have long been aware of the importance of the 1898 National Exhibition of Women's Labor in the history of the Dutch women's movement, and they have used its extensive archive—kept in the invaluable International Information Center and Archives for the Women's Movement in Amsterdam—for a variety of projects. Yet until recently the National Exhibition of Women's Labor itself was never the topic of extensive research. On occasion of its centennial in 1998, historians Maria Grever and Berteke Waaldijk published a book-length study of the exhibition, which in 2004 appeared in a revised English edition.

Exhibitions, both on a national and an international scale, were a well-known and influential phenomenon in the Western world in the nineteenth century. Grever and Waaldijk show that especially the Woman's Building at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893 and the 1895 Danish national Women's Exhibition from Past to Present inspired Dutch feminists. Their reason for staging a women's exhibition in 1898 was that Wilhelmina, heiress to the Dutch throne, would turn eighteen and become the first female monarch of the Netherlands. This, feminists realized, was a perfect moment to show the nation what women could do, and to argue that all positions should be opened to them. The exhibition, held from July 9 to September 21, 1898, in the dunes between The Hague and the North Sea and attracting 90,000 visitors, by all accounts was a huge success. Objects and activities showed many aspects of Dutch women's labor. There was a reading room where

visitors could read books written by and about women. And there was an enormous conference hall, where twelve two-to-three-day conferences were held, on topics varying from domestic service (from the perspectives of both employers and servants) and the relation between socialism and feminism, to education and "Women's Labor in Our East Indies Territories." Throughout the summer of 1898, the national and local press reported about the events and debates taking place at and initiated by the National Exhibition.

Following an introduction by Antoinette Burton, which places the book in the wider historiography of imperial cultures, the authors present their theoretical framework in chapter one, with Nancy Fraser's work on the plurality of the public sphere and the creation of "counterpublics" as the main focus. The very readable and beautifully illustrated book then takes the reader through all stages and aspects of the exhibition, from the earliest planning phase to its impressive opening ceremony, the main exhibition sites (the Hall of Industry and the Social Work Exhibit), the popular Kampong Insulinde (a replica of a Dutch East Indies village), the major discussions at the conferences, and the exhibition's long-term effects.

The National Exhibition of Women's Labor was important for a number of reasons. Not only did it have a major impact on the lives of its 500 or so organizers, but it managed to change the public discourse in the Netherlands on "women's work." Even if its primary goal—women's economic independence—was (and still is) not realized, the importance of women's work for the country as a whole, and the need to open up all sorts of professions to middle-class women and to improve working-class women's conditions, were publicly debated and led to many concrete initiatives and changes. In addition, the desire to continue this form of national cooperation between women resulted in the creation of the Dutch National Council of Women, whereas the focus on women's work as a major dimension of the women's movement was continued in the influential National Bureau of Women's Labor, founded in 1901 with the proceeds of the exhibition. Finally, and emphasized by Grever and Waaldijk, the exhibition did enhance women's participation in and impact on the public sphere, making it "a dress rehearsal for twentieth-century citizenship" (p. 222).

Probably the book's most original and striking contribution is its analysis of class and ethnic differences between women—those organizing, exhibiting, and exhibited—and the way in which the National Exhibition questioned, highlighted, or reproduced these differences. I refer here in particular to the part about Dutch working-class women—including the possibly unique strike by a group of eight young carpet factory workers during the exhibition—and about Indonesian and Surinam women and men (in the chapter called "Colonialism on Display"). While I wish that the authors had gone further in comparing the Dutch with other imperial feminist experiences, this book is an important contribution to both Dutch feminist historiography and the

wider literature on the women's movement, imperialism, and women's work.

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KIMMO KATAJALA, editor. *Northern Revolts: Medieval and Early Modern Peasant Unrest in the Nordic Countries*. (Studia Fennica, Historica, number 8.) Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society. 2004. Pp. 299.

As compared with other European regions, Nordic countries—that is, essentially Scandinavia plus Finland—figure only faintly in syntheses and comparisons concerning European peasant struggles before the eighteenth century. Although Nordic historians themselves have long been aware both of the peasantry's great weight in national politics and of the frequency with which peasants threw that weight around, on the whole they have integrated peasant politics into regional and national histories rather than seeking sustained comparisons with the rest of Europe. Aware of that absence, editor Kimmo Katajala and his collaborators have invested a mighty effort in the first half of the necessary task: documentation of Nordic peasant struggles in terms that made them available for comparison with struggles elsewhere. But they stopped short of any serious attempt to identify similarities, differences, and connections between Nordic and non-Nordic forms of peasant politics.

Starting in 1998, a multinational team coordinated by Katajala produced papers dealing with general issues and particular streams of conflict stretching from about 1300 to 1800. (In pursuit of his quest, Katajala ended up writing five of the eleven published essays.) The team has created an invaluable sourcebook on Nordic history from the bottom up. Their book offers a dual benefit: vivid sketches of particular struggles and insight into the Nordic region's recurrent competition and coalition among kings, nobles, churchmen, peasants, and (much less frequently) merchants. After a brief introduction by Katajala, Harald Gustafsson provides an overview of Nordic institutions' distinctive features, Katajala places peasants in Nordic history from mythic origins to the Protestant Reformation; Kenneth Johansson looks closely at Sweden's sixteenth-century Dacke War; Magne Njåstad examines Norwegian conflicts (including four brief but informative case studies) from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries; Árni Daniél Júlíusson covers Iceland (where plenty of small-scale resistance but nothing like a "peasant revolt" ever occurred) from 1300 to 1800; Katajala takes up a variety of Finnish struggles, from food riots to open warfare, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; Karin Sennefelt catalogs the varied repertoire of peasant claim making in eighteenth century Sweden; Katajala offers a complementary analysis of how the eighteenth-century restoration of Swedish absolutism diminished the peasant autonomies that had facilitated the sorts of risings Sennefelt describes; Mia Korpiola shows how

Swedish law defined treason and argues persuasively (contrary to widespread claims among specialists) that treason legislation and jurisprudence did not develop in response to peasant unrest, even if the Swedish crown invoked treason statutes to repress unruly peasants.

Most chapters provide substantial references to primary sources and secondary works, which should prove precious to the next round of researchers. Nevertheless, the research team's monographic approach to its subject has its costs. With all the rich information on variations in political, economic, and social structure from one region to another, one might have thought the contributors would undertake a systematic investigation of how social contexts and their changes across the Nordic region affected the character of peasant politics. At the extreme, an Iceland that lacked cities, villages, and manors yet sustained a powerful (if constantly warring and shifting) set of overlords still produced substantial resistance to ecclesiastical and royal demands. We do not learn what causes these sorts of variations. Katajala closes the book with a dozen pages of conclusions. The conclusions repeat arguments Katajala offers throughout this rich book: that neither economic crisis nor religious zeal constituted sufficient conditions for Nordic peasant unrest; that instead of simply serving as tools for other classes, peasants pursued their own collective political agendas; that the seventeenth-century consolidation of monarchies pacified peasant society; that peasant communalism (the book as a whole cites Peter Blicke more frequently than any other historian) gave way to accommodation between peasants and the crown; and that Nordic political cultures deeply shaped all forms of peasant unrest. In the absence of independent descriptions for political cultures and some specification of how they produce their effects, the last point strikes me as a *petitio principii*. On the whole, however, the contributors and their stalwart editor avoid incautious claims and back the claims they make with ample, fresh historical documentation. Now we can only hope that they or someone else will integrate these well-documented accounts of little-known phenomena into the larger comparative history of European peasant struggles.

CHARLES TILLY
Columbia University

HANNU SALMI. *Wagner and Wagnerism in Nineteenth-Century Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic Provinces: Reception, Enthusiasm, Cult*. (Eastman Studies in Music, number 34.) Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press. 2005. Pp. x, 310. \$65.00.

Hannu Salmi set two goals for himself in his book: to provide a commentary on the reception of Richard Wagner in nineteenth-century Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire, and to address the question of "how the Baltic Sea created the opportunities for and limitations on cultural interaction" (p. 4). To achieve these goals, Salmi discusses Wagner's early employment in Königsberg (1836–1837)

and Riga (1837–1839); the dissemination of Wagner's music through the arrangements for home and orchestral use; the performance of Wagner's operas in urban centers such as Riga, Stockholm, Helsinki, and Tallinn; Wagner's self-promotional tour to Russia in 1863; the representation of Wagner and his music in the contemporary press and by early music historians; visitors to the Bayreuth Festivals from the regions under discussion; and the activities of local Wagner societies and Wagner aficionados. The book unearths a wealth of details about the performances of Wagner's operas in the theaters of the region, the press reaction to these events, the arrangements through which much of Wagner's music was disseminated, and the development of organized Wagnerism, drawn from a variety of sources including newspapers and periodicals, theater posters, music catalogues, membership lists of Wagner societies, and personal correspondence.

For the most part Salmi focuses on the presentation of his research findings—facts, dates, and names—and offers little more than a large quantity of information about the reception of Wagner and his ideas. In a brief introduction, Salmi evokes Fernand Braudel's *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (1949) and a possible analogy between the Baltic and the Mediterranean regions, where the Baltic Sea can be viewed as a "connective link" in the circulation of goods and ideas, but he drops the analogy as soon as he brings it up. The evocation of Braudel's work serves no other purpose than a mere juxtaposition of the two regions and has no impact on Salmi's analysis. His book displays few qualities called for by the *Annales* and is largely detached from the social, economic, political, and cultural developments of the region. Consequently, the question he poses at the beginning—how has the Baltic Sea created opportunities for and limitations on cultural interaction?—remains unanswered.

The geographical scope of the book is never explained. Salmi focuses on Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic provinces of Russia—Estonia, Livonia, and Courland—but refers to "the Baltic world" throughout the book as though its referent were a matter of course. The exclusion of Denmark, Prussia, Lithuania, and Russia from "the Baltic world"—never explained—makes the notion a misnomer, and the book's claim that "the Baltic Sea region was of central importance to Wagner" (p. 1) is unsubstantiated. While it may be legitimate to focus on a region encompassing several countries, rather than on individual countries, the argument the author brings to support such a focus—that "nationality is not a relevant basis for a study of musical life during the nineteenth century" (p. 2)—is untenable with respect to nineteenth-century Europe in general. If applied to the eastern Baltic provinces in the nineteenth century, it implies, incorrectly, that Russian domination prevented the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, or Lithuanians from developing their sense of national identity. The analysis of the nineteenth-century reception of Wagner's music in regions such as Estonia and Livonia can hardly ignore the ethnic composition of the

cultural public of these regions and the role of the German presence—an issue only marginally treated in the book.

The data pertaining to the reception of Wagner's music and ideas are not sufficiently grounded in specific social, economic, or political realities, which make many of Salmi's conclusions unsubstantiated. There is no information about the size of the population of the regions under discussion, their social stratification, ethnic groups, level of urbanization, economic conditions, education level of the audiences, cultural and educational institutions of the region, or political developments—information indispensable for the analysis of the dissemination of music. For example, the price of a concert ticket or a membership fee does not tell the reader much without information about the buying power of money and average salaries. Similarly, the number of people from the Baltic provinces who attended the Bayreuth Festivals must be placed against the size of the population they represented and the size of the audience of these festivals in any given year. And the reader must take Salmi's word for it that Riga was "extremely important" to Wagner because he had a chance to conduct "a large number of operas" (p. 25) there, while only about half-a-dozen operas Wagner conducted in Riga are mentioned.

JOLANTA T. PEKACZ
Dalhousie University

WILLIAM D. GODSEY, JR. *Nobles and Nation in Central Europe: Free Imperial Knights in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1850*. (New Studies in European History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. Pp. xi, 306. \$85.00.

William D. Godsey, Jr., has already established himself as a leading authority of the central European nobility during the revolutionary age. In this new study, he adds substantially to his reputation with an acute analysis of the divergent paths that German and Habsburg nobles took in redefining the "nation" with which they identified. For a vehicle he has selected a cross-section of the 350 families of imperial knights that played such a pivotal role in Franconian, Rhenish, and Swabian imperial circles during the prerevolutionary era. The resulting prosopographical analysis makes extensive use of manuscript collections from a score of archives scattered across Germany, Austria, and the Czech Republic as well as a plethora of published primary and secondary sources. The result is a detailed reconstruction of the cultural ambience of the *Reichsritterschaft*, several of whose families he features as examples of a cultural odyssey that spanned the course of the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

Certainly the period under examination witnessed a shift in definition and self-identification, at least within Prussia and the German states. Prior to 1789 nobles regarded themselves as exclusive members of a noble "nation" that transcended political borders but depended heavily on the pure pedigree of both male and

female forbears. In their insistence on a requisite number of (sixteen or thirty-two) quarterings of nobility, the imperial knights were no different from feudal elites elsewhere in central Europe or, for that matter, in Spain and France. They had a particularly strong corporate identity that was sustained by imperial law and institutions, as well as by its members' access to lucrative (principally Catholic) ecclesiastical appointments. Although mismanagement or profligacy had driven more than a few knightly families into debt, their corporations typically provided legal refuge from outside creditors and even corrective stewardship of their estates. Notwithstanding their privileged position within the empire, they operated within a much broader "geocultural landscape" that stretched from the Low Countries across France and the Habsburg lands to the great metropolises of Paris and Vienna.

This cosmopolitan noble *Weltanschauung* changed in the aftermath of France's conquest of the Rhineland. While the confiscation of property and secularization of benefices posed financial hardships for many *Reichsritter* families, the emergence of France as a hostile nation-state interposed formidable territorial and cultural barriers that compelled them to reassess their definition of nationhood. Like the rest of the German nobility, most came to see their noble selves as the flower of a broader community that now included all Germans. Membership in this inclusive but still distinctly German nation now depended less on quarterings of nobility undiluted by common ancestors than on the maintenance of a single, unbroken pedigree in the family's male line traceable through the centuries to an idyllic, medieval German past. Thus was born the heretofore unknown concept of *Uradel*, which Godsey attributes in part to the first scientific genealogy that Gottlieb Samuel Treuer (1683–1743) produced for the male line of the Münchhausens of Lower Saxony. Henceforth, the affirmation of paternal lineage to the medieval German nobility validated the presumption of virtue and honor that had always been the conceit of its members.

But not all of the *Reichsritter* became Germans. With the support of expatriates like Philipp Franz von Stadion and Clemens von Metternich, perhaps a third of the knights from west of the Rhine emigrated to the Habsburg monarchy, whose multiethnic feudal estate retained a supranational identity that placed a premium on the comprehensive purity of male and female ancestry. Godsey notes that even Baron vom Stein spent three years in Bohemia before repatriating to Nassau and entering Prussian service. Certainly Stein's Protestantism and earlier education at Göttingen made it easier for him to reacclimate to Germany and the emerging noble consciousness that placed the entire prerevolutionary *société des orders* within a greater German nation. Meanwhile, those who stayed in the newly created Austrian empire were spared the sacrifice inherent in a common German nationhood that "signified a slip down the social scale" (p. 13).

Readers will readily recognize the influence of Benedict Anderson in Godsey's explanation of a process by

which *Reichsritter* families retained or reconstructed membership in a noble community amid the harsh realities of the revolutionary wars. Some will have more difficulty deciphering the sometimes arcane Latin terms and other allusions that Godsey employs in presenting this excellent study.

CHARLES INGRAO
Purdue University

ROBERT M. CITINO. *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich*. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2005. Pp. xix, 428. \$34.95.

In this ambitious work, Robert M. Citino argues for operational continuity in the way Germans waged war for almost three centuries. Focusing on selected battles and campaigns, Citino establishes a framework for analyzing such continuity. A specialist in operational history, he is aware that the book's title invites criticism. He concedes that a "Prussian-German way of war" is the more historically accurate rendering but is willing to sacrifice accuracy for a less awkward textual construction.

Citino demonstrates that operational continuity stems from chronic security liabilities of geography, size, manpower, and limited resources. Surrounded by larger and wealthier neighbors, Friedrich Wilhelm I, the Great Elector, and those who succeeded him realized that their wars must be "short and lively." From this maxim evolved fighting that favored aggressiveness in attacking and destroying an enemy quickly. This offensive solution to defensive vulnerability, known as *Bewegungskrieg* or war of movement, reached its maturity in the wars of unification. Helmuth von Moltke's successors endeavored to continue it but were swamped by the strictures of a war of attrition in the Great War. Following the devastating defeat, and the eventual emergence of Adolf Hitler, command independence ultimately disappeared. Citino maintains that its demise eliminated the most vital ingredient for waging a war of movement.

Citino distinguishes military operations from tactics or strategy by placing them in a conceptual realm between the two. While tactics involve the command of small units, and strategy is the concern of the political-military leadership, the operational domain centers on the command and movement of large formations: armies, corps, and divisions. His survey of selected battles over time, some well known and others familiar only to specialists, demonstrates how the army excelled against enemies usually larger in size and resources. That excellence, he argues, stemmed from the initiatives of aggressive commanders who were expected to make independent decisions that in combination threatened opponents with annihilation through envelopment or dispersion.

Bewegungskrieg required flexibility in mission execution as well as speed and aggressiveness. Operational behavior apparent from the seventeenth century com-

bined these three elements, and Citino's impressive research in the professional literature indicates that generations of German officers understood, accepted, and elaborated upon them. Accepting the reality of short wars, however, was not tantamount to winning them. Citino offers some cogent explanations for success.

When success occurred, good troop training and effective use of technology share some of the credit. Yet, other factors frequently carried more weight. Wars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were fought over familiar terrain and the army possessed the advantage of interior lines. The army was fortunate in its opponents: the Austrians and French often proved inept, slow, and defensive oriented. And, as always in combat, luck and chance also contributed to victory. Citino emphasizes that what mattered most was command character and independence. Repeatedly, he notes that victory or avoidance of defeat was due to the actions of field commanders who made decisions on their own. Invariably, their decisions were to attack the enemy no matter the cost. How does one explain their independence and aggressiveness? The answer to their independence, he suggests, stems from the sociopolitical system of Prussia. The Prussian nobility (*Junkers*) served their king as officers and civil servants in return for absolute sovereignty over their land and peasants. Sovereign power on their estates equated militarily to command independence in battle.

What explains the aggressiveness? Citino infers that it stems from a sense of collective vulnerability. A defensive mentality provoked offensive action. Surely, there is some truth in this, yet it probably is not the complete answer. Another factor might be that the Prussian-German population historically confronted scarcity—too little space for too many people—so Germans habitually fought and scratched for survival. This may partially explain why the army's battles were so often vicious bloodlettings.

The study has several strengths. It is well written and impressively researched. In revealing army operational continuity, it adds yet another perspective to the ongoing debate over continuities in German history. Moreover, it is a scholarly analysis of operational history, a specialized field of inquiry much ignored of late. Hence, the book's focus is on actors and actions rather than thinkers and ideas. Furthermore, Citino provides balanced coverage to the twentieth century as well as those preceding it. The analysis of World War I operations on both fronts is especially well done.

Citino delineates what the army did well. He also reveals what was handled poorly. Logistics, intelligence, and counterintelligence were stepchildren to mobility, and the army had little talent or taste for coalition warfare. And, despite the army's efforts to harness technological innovations in firepower, communications, and mechanization to *Bewegungskrieg*, they ultimately combined to overwhelm the command independence essential for its practice. What technology began, Hitler

finished when he assumed operational command in 1941.

LARRY V. THOMPSON
U.S. Naval Academy

MARTIN KOHLRAUSCH. *Der Monarch im Skandal: Die Logik der Massenmedien und die Transformation der wilhelminischen Monarchie*. (Elitenwandel in der Moderne, number 7.) Berlin: Akademie. 2005. Pp. 536.

Using the four largest political scandals that rocked the Second Empire, Martin Kohlrausch seeks to analyze the interrelation of monarchy and media in Germany from 1890 through the Weimar Republic. This well-researched but massively over-footnoted study consulted 100 newspapers, 200 pamphlets, 200 journal articles, and the most important contemporary books devoted to the kaiser. Kohlrausch's argument builds on the work of two other scholars. The sociologist John B. Thompson, in *Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age* (2000), provides a taxonomy and phased time line for political scandals, while Bernd Weisbrod, in "Medien als symbolische Form der Massengesellschaft: Die medialen Bedingungen von Öffentlichkeit im 20. Jahrhundert" (*Historische Anthropologie* 9 [2001]: 270–283), argues that the performative and market-oriented aspects of modern mass media hold a democratic potential, even in un- or incompletely democratic political systems. Kohlrausch's study therefore contributes to the ongoing discussion of the Kaiserreich as a modern institution, rather than as the backward, peculiar entity described by the Sonderweg school.

Kohlrausch asks "how far the monarchy was subject to the logic of the mass media?" (p. 14). His answer is: very much. The Kaiserreich boasted 4,000 newspapers that increasingly reprinted each other's articles and responded to mass-market imperatives. This mass media was modern; it produced a discourse independent of political parties and powerful enough to fashion politics on its own. Beginning with the first "scandal" in 1890, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's fall, the public was treated to criticism of the monarchy that became successively stronger and more focused with each new cause célèbre: the Caligula Affair of 1894, the Eulenburg scandals of 1907–1908, and the Daily Telegraph Affair of 1908. Kohlrausch writes that "a medially mobilized society sought a [political] discourse that reduced complexity" (p. 452). They found it in the mass media, which "emotionalized, individualized, and personalized" politics by focusing on the monarch and his character, rather than on the "more complex and anonymous processes of bureaucracy or government" (p. 451). But he goes farther. Kohlrausch claims that there was a strong participatory aspect to the scandals, which he reads (not unplausibly) as demanding, successively, that the kaiser hear public opinion, heed it, and, finally, follow it. The press's success in actually removing intimate advisors from office made it seem that "public opinion" wielded actual power. Kohlrausch charts the rising standard of "accomplishment" [*Leistung*] that

public commentators more and more required of the kaiser. And he shows well that "accomplishment" hardened into a concept of leadership that Wilhelm II was unable to fulfill and that laid the foundation for the later Nazi concept of the führer. The development of the führer idea is important to understanding Weimar and Nazi Germany, but Kohlrausch hews closely to Elisabeth Fehrenbach's discoveries in *Wandlungen des deutschen Kaisergedankens (1871–1918)* (1969). Nor does he explore sufficiently the highly gendered masculinity component that helped make the führer concept so powerful.

Kohlrausch creatively reinterprets the long, pained discussion of the kaiser's abdication and flight to Holland in 1918 as yet another in the long line of Wilhelminian scandals, although it occurred during the Weimar Republic. It substituted for a genuine public discussion of the loss of the war, or the structural deficits of monarchy (and thus, the advantages of the republic). This point raises the question how far one might interpret scandals as a substitute discourse altogether. Because of Kohlrausch's emphasis on public participation and mass media as a modern, independent, and quasi-democratic force, he does not address this question. But his research shows that from the very beginning of Wilhelm's reign the press expressed only conditional allegiance to the monarch (pp. 87, 114). That is, Wilhelm had to fulfill certain expectations of success, or allegiance would be withdrawn. The new monarchy thus suffered a lack of legitimacy that had to be made good by charismatic means, as Max Weber, a Wilhelminian, described. The burden of charismatic success, together with the fact that monarchy is a personal type of government, surely must have encouraged the press's focus on the monarch. Both presumably set important limitations on public discourse. More than this, the peculiar constitution with its weak Reichstag further shaped where and how political discourse would develop. It is not an accident that scandalous criticism occurred mostly in the press and not in parliament, and that, given its weakness, the Reichstag could not provide the venue where public political opinion was formed. Kohlrausch's interesting study would have profited from a clear, extended discussion of these important structural parameters within which the discourse of the press developed. As to the values expressed by that discourse, Kohlrausch calls them "*bürgerlich*" (p. 461). That description raises the question how a modern mass media related to the previous inventors of public discourse, the (educated) bourgeoisie? This important question awaits further research.

ISABEL V. HULL
Cornell University

PETER JELAVICH. *Berlin Alexanderplatz: Radio, Film, and the Death of Weimar Culture*. (Weimar and Now: German Cultural Criticism, number 37.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California press. 2006. Pp. xvi, 300. \$39.95.

The theme of Peter Jelavich's latest book is the death of the experimental and leftist-leaning Weimar culture in 1931, two years before Adolf Hitler's coming to power. The date is important because this is "a cautionary tale about how fear of outspoken right-wing politicians can cause cultural production to be curbed and eventually eliminated as a critical counterforce to politics—all in the name of 'entertainment'" (p. xii). With these admonitory hints at the media and political landscape of America today, Jelavich seeks to show how censorship for commercial and political reasons can pave the way for a dictatorship rather than simply being a result of one. He organizes the book around Alfred Döblin, author of the most celebrated experimental novel of the Weimar period, *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (1929). An examination of the novel in the first chapter, another of the radio play, "The Story of Franz Biberkopf," based on the novel, and one of the 1931 film version in the last chapter anchor a lucid and illuminating discussion of the political, commercial, and aesthetic debates regarding censorship in the German radio and film industry during these years. Jelavich considers the film to represent a considerable falling off in both aesthetic merit and political engagement compared to the novel, and he ascribes this decline largely to the commercial and political anxieties provoked by the Nazi electoral breakthrough in the September 1930 Reichstag elections.

Döblin's novel certainly embodies many of the characteristics one associates with Weimar culture in its heyday: urban, aesthetically adventurous, acerbic, leftist. Berlin is as much a character in the novel as the protagonist, Franz Biberkopf, who is depicted more as a product of the various discourses, including political slogans and advertising jingles, that pervade the big city than as an autonomous moral agent. Jelavich points out how the aesthetic theory behind the novel anticipates notions of the "death of the author" and the antihumanism of postmodernism. Because it was his most critically acclaimed and commercially successful work, but also because he was interested in the challenges posed by the new media, Döblin was eager to adopt the novel for both radio and film. The first project was to create a *Hörspiel* for the radio. One of the most interesting chapters in the book explores the development of the state-owned radio networks in Weimar Germany and the inevitable controversies over programming and censorship. The debate over whether politics should be scrupulously avoided or whether one should strive for "polyvocality," the expression of multiple viewpoints, will remind the reader of similar debates over public radio today. Jelavich traces the development from an elitist programming of classical music and lectures, aimed at the *Bildungsbürgertum*, to a more popular but also more aesthetically and politically adventurous programming in the late 1920s, a shift that owed much to the political cover provided by the Social Democratic leadership in Prussia. Döblin welcomed this shift and understood that to write for the radio posed an entirely new set of challenges. Thus he adapted his novel for the

radio by forgoing much of the montage technique and concentrating on the figure of Biberkopf. He was also forced to eliminate much of the political subtext due to the increased fear of political controversy. In any case "The Story of Franz Biberkopf," scheduled to be broadcast on September 30, 1930, was cancelled abruptly, a result of the September 14 Reichstag elections.

Jelavich then turns his attention to the film *Berlin Alexanderplatz*, which was actually screened in 1931. The successful Nazi campaign against the American production of *All Quiet on the Western Front* created such a chilly climate that the film industry was no longer willing to risk producing overtly political films. Against this background it is rather surprising that *Berlin Alexanderplatz* was made at all, but it was shorn of nearly all of the novel's controversy (its implicit and explicit discussion of homosexuality, for example). Despite its excellent director and cast, headlined by the formidable Heinrich George in the title role, the film largely eschewed experimentation; many critics compared it to a run of the mill gangster film. For Jelavich the aesthetic and political failure of the film rang down the curtain on Weimar culture. As with the radio play, however, it is unclear how much of the failure of the film can be attributed to preemptive political censorship and how much was due to the difficulty of translating the novel into a quite different medium. In this context one would have liked to know what Jelavich thinks of Rainer Maria Fassbinder's epic version of *Berlin Alexanderplatz*. Nevertheless, this thoughtful book reminds us of how fragile cultural expression really is, menaced not only by right-wing media and politicians but also by mob violence, as the recent controversy over Danish cartoons demonstrates.

LAIRD M. EASTON
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LAIRD MCLEOD EASTON. *The Red Count: The Life and Times of Harry Kessler*. (Weimar and Now: German Cultural Criticism, number 30.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2002. Pp. xv, 497. \$35.00.

Harry Count Kessler, born 1868 in Paris, the son of an ennobled German banker and an Irish mother, was educated in France, England, and at the universities of Bonn and Leipzig. After satisfying his military service obligation in a Guards regiment, he became a junior legal official, expecting an eventual appointment to the diplomatic service and in the meantime immersing himself in the commotion of Berlin's emerging modernism. The variety of his interests matched the diversity of his background and upbringing. His wealth enabled him to collect art and to support artists such as Aristide Maillol and Edward Munch. He helped to edit and contributed to the modernist journal *Pan*, which led to a long, difficult friendship, including collaborations, with Hugo von Hofmannsthal, who dedicated the libretto of *Der Rosenkavalier* to him. A trip to North America resulted in Kessler's first book, *Notizen über Mexiko* (1898). De-

spite his obvious ability and social connections he did not receive the hoped-for diplomatic appointment, evidently being considered too much of an individualist. Between 1902 and 1906 Kessler was head of the art museum in Weimar. He engineered the appointment of Henry van de Velde as director of a new arts and crafts school, and planned to expand the Nietzsche Archive, which he already supported financially, with the goal of turning Weimar into a national force for modernism and cultural regeneration. Intrigues at the grand-ducal court led to his forced resignation, the "indecent" of an exhibition of Pierre Rodin's watercolors serving as the ostensible reason.

In 1903 Kessler helped found a national association of modernist artists, the *Deutsche Künstlerbund*, which kept him near the center of the conflict over modernism in Germany. Shortly before World War I he started an important bibliophile press. During the war Kessler served on the eastern and western fronts until he was asked to organize German cultural propaganda in Switzerland, make contact with French pacifists, and explore the possibilities of a negotiated peace. As Germany's military situation became desperate, Kessler at last received a diplomatic appointment as ambassador to the newly independent Poland. After the war he became a strong advocate of the League of Nations and of pacifism, was occasionally used as a "half-official special envoy," and continued to write and speak on politics and on art. His most important book, a biography of Walther Rathenau, the foreign minister of the early Weimar Republic, appeared in 1928. A committed liberal, Kessler left Germany in 1933. He lived in Mallorca and in France, where, by now impoverished, he died in 1937.

Laird McLeod Easton seeks to assess what Kessler himself called an unusually fragmented existence, and finds the key in "the great axis of [Kessler's] life . . . the agonistic relation between *Macht* and *Geist*, between power and spirit" (p. 410). This is probably best exemplified by Kessler's attempt to turn Weimar—a small provincial town, albeit with a glorious past—into a new Athens, a fantastical scheme even if the grand-duchy had not been governed by disagreeable nonentities. Easton's axis may be less applicable to other parts of Kessler's life in which the two concepts of power and spirit seem to define not interaction but the coexistence of Kessler's interest in politics, which encompassed more than cultural politics, and his interest in literature and the fine arts, which went far beyond their didactic and socially regenerative powers.

Kessler wrote memoirs and kept copious diaries, segments of which have been published while others remained undiscovered for decades and are only now appearing, a valuable record of the restless life of a cultural entrepreneur and sophisticated observer who seemed to know everybody from German chancellors to the great neo-Impressionists. Easton has made extensive use of these writings, and perhaps inevitably his biography has a touch of the picaresque novel about it, a twentieth-century *Simplicius Simplicissimus*. His nar-

rative gains depth from analyses of the political and cultural context, which are sometimes so copious as to obscure the more mundane facts and dates of Kessler's career. But they include excellent discussions of such varied matters as Kessler's bibliophile productions, his politics in the 1920s, and his writings. Although there is more to be learned about such episodes as Kessler's missions to Switzerland and Poland, there seems to be far-reaching agreement about his life and its historical significance in general, and Easton does not suggest major reinterpretations. What matters most to today's reader, in any case, is Kessler's witness to his times, as expressed in his diaries and memoirs, which, much like Karl Scheffler's *Die fetten und die mageren Jahre* will continue to influence our understanding of the Wilhelmine and Weimar periods in German history. Easton has written a comprehensive, informed guide, sympathetic but not uncritical, to Kessler's life and writings. His book answers many questions, and, like all good biographies, lays the basis for raising new ones.

PETER PARET

Institute for Advanced Study

DOUGLAS G. MORRIS. *Justice Imperiled: The Anti-Nazi Lawyer Max Hirschberg in Weimar Germany*. (Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 443. \$35.00.

In this methodical monograph, Douglas G. Morris explores law, politics, and society during the Weimar Republic and ranges much farther than the modest title of the volume suggests. No mere biography, the study uses the career of Max Hirschberg as a trial lawyer in Bavaria to examine larger issues of the power and durability of the liberal rule of law as a compelling and convincing bulwark for pluralist values in times of cultural, economic, and political upheaval and of social struggle.

Morris, an historian and lawyer who is a federal public defender, focuses on the career and cases of Hirschberg, a Bavarian Jew born in Munich in 1883. Reared in a comfortable *bildungsbürgerlich* family in the post-emancipation and post-unification era, Hirschberg attended gymnasium, studied law at Munich, Berlin, and Leipzig, and entered private practice in 1911. He quickly emerged as a skilled criminal defense counsel and gained a positive reputation in the Munich bar. Mobilized in 1914, he served with valor on the western front and earned two decorations, the Iron Cross Second Class and First Class.

After the transformative experience of war, Hirschberg returned to revolutionary Munich in mid-December 1918 attracted to social democratic political ideals and embarked upon an important series of legal cases. Morris divides Hirschberg's career into three phases: political cases that arose before the stable middle years of the Weimar Republic and contested the historical and political meaning of World War I (pp. 67–189); nonpolitical cases that involved miscarriages of criminal justice during the stable middle years (pp. 193–239);

and criminal and civil cases arising from Nazi violence and rhetoric in the final years before 1933 (pp. 243–94).

The political cases consisted of a libel action, a criminal trial for treason, and a second libel action that involved a Social Democrat named Felix Fechenbach, who had been an aide to Kurt Eisner, and a conservative journalist named Paul Cossmann. Morris treats these together as a classic example of political justice, not only in the sense that the treason accusation against Fechenbach could only have resulted from political motivations, but also in the sense that in turbulent times of great political controversy, no high-profile litigation can avoid assuming political meaning. In some ways, the cast of characters in these cases behaved very much according to the script described first by Emil Julius Gumbel in *Vier Jahre politischer Mord* (1922) and elaborated upon later by Heinrich Hannover, Elisabeth Hannover-Drück, and Ingo Müller. Judges Albert Frank (who heard two of the trials) and the aptly named Karl Hass certainly played their roles as hypernationalist, biased jurists determined to protect the “honor” of Germany from betrayal. As an experienced litigator himself, Morris ably analyzes Hirschberg’s litigation strategy as he learned the limits of the possible in the Weimar courts of Munich and ultimately prevailed in the final of the three cases.

But Hirschberg’s political commitment extended beyond high-profile criminal cases to philosophical and psychological theories about the criminal mind and the fallibility of criminal procedure. Three nonpolitical criminal cases, involving murder, love triangles, and other sordid untidinesses of life, illustrate how Hirschberg pursued in practice theories, influenced by his reading of Sigmund Freud, that he later expounded upon in a 1960 book on miscarriages of justice (*Das Fehlurteil im Strafprozess: Zur Pathologie der Rechtsprechung* [1960]). Again, Morris inserts his own acute observations, including how liberal reforms that made trials public and oral shifted witness testimony to the fore and introduced its dangers, such as perjury, false accounts by children, and simple inaccuracies (p. 214).

As right-wing violence escalated in Bavaria from 1926 onward, Hirschberg accepted briefs to defend working-class leftists against criminal charges arising from clashes with National Socialist storm troopers. He worked with skill and zeal, but in conservative Bavaria most frequently to no avail, as the courts convicted leftists and let culpable Nazis walk free. In 1929, Hirschberg even tangled with Adolf Hitler himself, cross-examining him in a libel action that Hitler had brought over claims that he had betrayed Germanism in the South Tyrol. Although Hirschberg succeeded in confounding Hitler at several turns, unsurprisingly Hitler succeeded in his goal of using any public forum, including the courts, to undermine the public standing of the policies and principles of democracy in the Weimar Republic. Hirschberg emigrated in 1934, first to Italy and then to the United States, where he died in 1964.

Besides his gift of clear explication and analysis of arcane points of criminal law and procedure, Morris of-

fers valuable observations that transcend legal history. His vignettes about the ethical and professional principles of historians Friedrich Thimme and Hans Delbrück in their testimony about war guilt reveal both their critical honesty in the face of the instrumentalization of history by advocates and judges and the fragility of intellectual principles in the arena of the courtroom. At times, Morris verges on rhapsodizing the autonomy of the rule of law as a bulwark of justice, replicating arguments by legal scholars such as Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde that fundamentally distinguish between that concept and the German *Rechtsstaat*. But in the end, Morris concludes that “the rule of law in a liberal democracy cannot avoid political justice” in the sense that it cannot avoid cases that carry political overtones; but too steady a diet of political cases threatens “liberal democratic justice, for rationality all too often yields to power” (pp. 331–32). The ultimate contribution of Morris’s fine book, then, is not only its enrichment of the historian’s understanding of German legal history in the tumultuous Weimar Republic but a cautionary tale about too-great a reliance on the rule of law in eras of heightened political conflict.

KENNETH F. LEDFORD

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JOSIE McLELLAN. *Antifascism and Memory in East Germany: Remembering the International Brigades 1945–1989*. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. xii, 228. \$99.00.

To even a casual visitor to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the centrality of German International Brigade veterans to the officially endorsed national mythology of antifascism was obvious. In the names of streets and parks, in museums and monuments, and on the shelves of bookstores, the heroic resistance of the *Spanienkämpfer* seemed omnipresent. Moreover, the corridors of power too were strolled by a number of individuals who could point to a stint in Spain on their curriculum vitae, not the least of them the notorious Stasi boss Erich Mielke. The great strength of this study by Josie McLellan, however, is to show how ambivalent the legacy of Spain really was for the veterans themselves and indeed for the entire GDR.

That ambivalence is at first surprising, since the grounds for the inclusion of the experience of the Spanish Civil War in the “myth of antifascism” were obvious enough. Like the communist resistance against Adolf Hitler in Germany, Spain connoted the struggle against the universal evil of fascism. Occurring as it did in far-flung Spain, and before World War II, the Spanish Civil War offered German antifascist mythology extra dimensions of selflessness and longevity. Following that logic, International Brigade veterans who chose to live in the Soviet Zone of Occupation and then the GDR had every expectation of claiming positions of moral and political authority in the postwar order.

Alas, in Stalinist times the Spanish legacy proved a

vexatious one. Joseph Stalin was deeply suspicious of those who had spent the years of the Third Reich in the West, where, he feared, they were exposed to heterodoxy, if not downright heretical, political ideas. That would apply to those who had made their way to Spain, and from there perhaps to France, England, or Mexico. The GDR did not experience the open bloodletting of Czechoslovakia's 1952 Slansky trial, yet for many Spanish Civil War veterans the reality of a communist Germany fell far short of their expectations.

The climate changed after Stalin's demise, and yet at no point did the veterans as a whole assume the role of moral or political vanguard they had envisaged. The 1953 dissolution of the umbrella organization that represented their interests and those of other victims of fascism—the VVN (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, or Association of the Nazi Regime's Persecuted)—underlined the marginalization of many who had suffered directly from fascist excesses, whether on German soil or elsewhere. The successor organization, the KdAW (Komitee der antifaschistischen Widerstandskämpfer, or Committee of Antifascist Resistance Fighters), was small and willing to comply with the official line. True, there was a rehabilitation of sorts of the veterans who had fallen under suspicion in Stalin's time, but it was a rehabilitation that never extended far beyond the symbolic. Tensions between veterans and the "official" interpreters of the Spanish Civil War's legacy remained.

McLellan's study does a great job in identifying the sources and also the sites of those tensions. The case studies she discusses are insightful. One, for example, is that of Hans Beimler, in truth a KPD functionary killed on the Madrid front in December 1936, but converted in official GDR memory to a mythical soldier-hero and KPD Central Committee member. Many of the veterans knew better. Another example is the Spanish Civil War monument in Berlin Friedrichshain, in which the state's need for an image of triumphant resistance prevailed over the veterans' own preference for a tragic and despairing figure more faithful to the reality of defeat.

If the story thus far appears to be one of the state's appropriation of memory, McLellan is able to add an intriguing twist. Her argument is that a new generation of East Germans was able to rescue the veterans from this appropriation. Rather than viewing them as personifications of the antifascist values endorsed by the state, a new generation read the veterans' stories in new ways, even to the point of seeing the veterans as individuals motivated throughout their lives by a resistance to conformity. Their relevance for the present was clear. The controversial song writer Wolf Biermann and others took the reinterpretation a step further, evincing a sympathy with those who had not toed the Stalinist line in Spain but found merit in the revolutionary ideals of anarchists or Trotskyites.

To achieve this more subtle reading of the GDR's Spanish legacy, McLellan has not confined her research to the state's and the Socialist Unity Party's own

records—meticulously though indeed she has performed this part of her task. Even more impressive is the tapping into the neglected sources of unofficial memory, in written and in spoken form, and the sensitivity to the ways in which cultural meanings were not simply imposed from above.

Confined though it is to the remembering of the Spanish Civil War, this is a valuable contribution to a much broader understanding of the GDR, of how it sought to establish a sense of history and legitimacy for itself, but also of why it was that it ultimately failed.

PETER MONTEATH
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ALESSANDRO GUERRA. *Il vile satellite del trono: Lorenzo Ignazio Thjulen; Un gesuita svedese per la controrivoluzione*. (Politica e storia; Collana del Dipartimento di studi politici—Università di Roma "La Sapienza," number 4.) Milan: FrancoAngeli. 2004. Pp. 361. €25.00.

Alessandro Guerra has published a solid work on Lorenzo Ignazio Thjulen (1746–1833), an important representative of the Italian counterrevolutionary movement who staunchly opposed the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Thjulen was born in Sweden (Göteborg) and converted from Lutheranism to Catholicism. He moved to Italy and joined the Jesuits in 1770, a time of deep crisis for that organization. In Italy he lived in Bologna, Venice, and Rome.

Thjulen was a prolific writer, producing five different autobiographies (1770, 1778, 1831, and two largely identical versions in 1833) and numerous antirevolutionary books, essays, and letters. Guerra analyzes his writings within the context of the major events and transformations in Europe, most notably the revolutionary years. The author bases his study on a meticulous research of Thjulen's writings and those of other contemporary authors, located in archives and libraries in Florence, Venice, Modena, Bologna, and Rome. The book also includes brief appendixes of three of Thjulen's works.

In 1794–1796 Thjulen published a monthly journal, *L'Almanacco storico politico militare scientifico*, about events in France. As Guerra shows, Thjulen viewed the revolution as a catastrophic event, using virulent language to describe its leaders and reforms. The revolution was "criminal," "absurd," and "folly." He lamented that the revolution destroyed ethics and morality, labeling its leaders "fanatics." Thjulen condemned the anti-ecclesiastical policies, insisting, for example, that the Supreme Being celebration was a political crime. He watched the Napoleonic invasion of Italy with dismay and described the French armies as "hordes of barbarians, not soldiers but cannibals, not men but wild and brutal animals."

Thjulen's most famous work is a two-volume dictionary, *Nuovo vocabolario filosofico-democratico*, published in 1799 in Venice, in which he examined from an extremely conservative point of view the meaning of the revolutionary language. Thjulen organized the terms

not according to alphabetical but ideological order. He divided the words by categories such as "new vocabulary" (words like social pact, sansculottes), "vocabulary that changed meaning," by far the largest category (liberty, equality, democracy, revolution), and "old words that were eliminated by the democratic vocabulary" (God, humility, continence). As Guerra shows, this extreme antirevolutionary work aimed at demonstrating the "corrupting" impact of the revolutionary language on society. Guerra correctly points out that the dictionary constituted part of a broad discussion on the impact of French revolutionary language in Italy in which revolutionaries like Vincenzo Cuoco, Eleonora Fonseca Pimentel, and Giuseppe Compagnoni participated. Italian Jacobins believed that the revolutionary language was a necessary tool to educate the masses and render the revolution successful.

Thjulen insisted that by changing the meanings of words, the French Revolution upset the original order of God, producing chaos and "pernicious confusion of languages." It destroyed the linguistic homogeneity that held knowledge together and disrupted communication among people, creating social disunity. People were "deceived by false vocabulary" and were following ideas that enslaved them. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thjulen stressed, initiated the new linguistic "Babel" by coining the "absurd" term "social pact (contract)" that amounted to "a real chimera damaging to human nature, and contemptible of reason." He fiercely assaulted the notion of democracy, arguing that democratic language hid a reality of oppression. An active democratic person signified an atheist, assassin, and scoundrel in government. Passive people included those who subjected themselves to democratic abuses. A democracy, actually, meant "demonocracy," a government of demons. To democratize meant to get rid of legitimate government and impose a government of scoundrels. At the same time, Thjulen never justified the popular uprisings that toppled the Italian "Sister Republics," believing that such a campaign belonged to the rulers who were invested by God. He believed that the revolution could be defeated through an alliance of the throne and the altar.

The Napoleonic occupation of northern Italy in 1800 was a major blow to Thjulen. It silenced him as it did other counterrevolutionaries. Not surprisingly, he celebrated the restoration of papal power and the end of the hated Napoleonic regime in 1814. He vehemently criticized Napoleon for what he believed was an unprecedented persecution of the clergy, for the humiliation he inflicted on the pope, and for destroying the papal state. Thjulen accused Napoleon of trying to discredit the clergy and of aiming to eliminate the spirit of faith from people's hearts and minds. Only with the fall of that tyrannical regime, he concluded, would people be able to recover the lost happiness and find again the sense of universal citizenship.

It is impossible to mention in a short review the many other writings discussed in Guerra's volume. Guerra's work undoubtedly will be of much interest to scholars

of revolutionary and Napoleonic Italy and of the European counterrevolution during that period.

ALEXANDER GRAB
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ALESSANDRA FERRARESI. *Stato, scienza, amministrazione, saperi: La formazione degli ingegneri in Piemonte dall'antico regime all'Unità d'Italia*. (Monografie, numero 40.) Bologna: Il Mulino. 2004. Pp. 411. €27.00.

A North American in a French university will be struck not only by the rigid regimen of professional formation but also by the prevailing belief that the purpose of this training is to provide a fairly homogenous experience that will render graduates eligible for government employment. The prevailing ethos is quite at odds with the more laissez-faire outlook governing U.S. institutions. Alessandra Ferraresi examines how Piedmont similarly directed the training of engineers from the early eighteenth century to the period of Italian national unification in 1860. The Savoyard monarchy took a fairly precocious active role in forming elites to serve the state competently in a variety of professional capacities where technical expertise was required. It became increasingly conscious of the "civilian" dimension of the government engineer, whose function until then had been military. While the crown could always legitimate a gifted individual who acquired technical skills on the fly, it developed coherent selection strategies. King Victor Amadeus II erected the new "state" university in Turin (in 1726) with an eye to shaping the professional outlook of the corps. Progressively, new military institutions like the Arsenal (1751) and the Artillery School (1752) offered courses on metallurgy, chemistry, mechanics, and hydraulics to officer candidates and selected them via examination. Graduates interacted with the new scientific Academy of Sciences in Turin. Piedmontese intendants (like their French counterparts) drew upon the expertise of these military technicians to equip the kingdom with modern roads, bridges, dikes, and canals. Engineers acquired prestige not just from their social utility but from the inherent honorability of service to the crown.

The Napoleonic occupation allowed the Piedmontese to measure their science and their training against the French model. Civil engineers made their indelible mark on the state with the Restoration after 1814. Engineers in state service extended considerably the reach of macadamized highways, and complemented them with a web of local roads and bridges. They built an important network of irrigation canals, and provided clean water and modern hygiene to Turin. State-employed engineers inspected mines and private foundries. The reconstituted University of Turin played the lead role in setting standards and delivering certification to relatively small numbers of engineers, architects, and surveyors, whose specific formation it was always trying to improve and update, as scientific discoveries pushed previously unified knowledge into ever-greater specialization.

The book's most suggestive chapters describe the heady years after 1840 when economic expansion called for the technical expertise of specialists in agriculture, in industry, in communications. New industries, like gas lighting, made their first appearance. Investments in railways exploded in order to connect the Piedmontese economy with the maritime gateway of Genoa, and the state-run railway proved to be a nursery of skilled mechanical engineers. Liberal economic doctrines made the Piedmontese ever more aware of European competition, and to keep up with it officials called upon foreign technological expertise, from France, Britain, and Belgium. The 1850s saw the rapid creation and development of a telegraph network, and the new state cadastre required surveyors as never before. Public Works (now an autonomous ministry) became synonymous with good government, and so civil engineers, the modern knights of progress and modernity, acquired social prestige equal to aristocratic military engineers.

The book's principal emphasis is on the projects and debates around the professional training of engineers, and to a lesser extent, the programs designed for architects and surveyors. The detail Ferraresi deploys in recounting these debates is often overwhelming. Government officials conceded even more resources to the applied sciences, such as courses in mechanics for architecture students. French applied technology schools like the *École des Mines* or the *École Polytechnique* continued to be the dominant models. Bureaucrats sought just the right mix of mathematics and physics, theory and application. In their projects, we see the contrasting models of France, where professional training and certification was paramount, and Germany, where science developed as a more autonomous, research-intensive discipline. The 1850s witnessed the advent of popular science (the government inaugurated lectures open to the general public), at the same time that new industries cried out for technical expertise. The Piedmontese state never ceased to prefer the more familiar French model and so sought to prevent an overabundance of certified engineers, without considering how private industry might soak up the surplus. Reforms culminating in the Casati Law of 1859 guaranteed a steadily increasing number of well-qualified technical experts, and the training schools that produced them became the model for all of Italy.

GREGORY HANLON
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MAURA HAMETZ. *Making Trieste Italian, 1918–1954*. (Royal Historical Society Studies in History, new series.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 204.

With Yugoslavia's dissolution, the history of Italy's eastern border in the twentieth century has sparked renewed scholarly and political interest. Maura Hametz's study offers a solid contribution to the growing body of literature exploring the intertwined histories of cosmopolitanism and nationalism in the port city of Trieste.

A thriving commercial entrepôt for the Habsburg Adriatic as a result of Emperor Charles IV's declaration of the city a free port in 1719, Trieste's economic fortunes declined in the twentieth century with the city's inclusion in Italy (first in 1918 and again in 1954). Hametz traces the sociocultural, political, and economic processes that rendered the once vital imperial port the periphery of an Italian state that accorded the city symbolic, if not material, importance. In doing this, Hametz aims to complicate histories that focus on Italian/Slavic confrontations in twentieth-century Trieste to the neglect of the complex cosmopolitan realities of Triestine experience and identity. More broadly, Hametz takes the Triestine case as a means for exploring "larger questions facing Europe after the First World War: the local effects of the transformation of European empires to nation states and the shaping of inhabitants of European societies into national citizens" (p. 7).

Hametz makes the case for the need to reframe the national (and nationalist) perspectives through which Trieste's recent history has been frequently viewed. Challenging a "binary view of Italian and Slavic culture [that] does not fit the reality of Triestine experience" (p. 8), Hametz emphasizes the city's enduring Germanic and Central European (particularly Jewish) heritage. In offering a multifaceted portrait of the "cosmopolitan" Triestine space, however, Hametz might have fruitfully dedicated more attention to the city's other diasporic communities, including Armenians, Greeks, and Serbs. In analyzing how Triestines "became" Italian subjects and citizens, Hametz herself focuses considerable attention on the other key term of the binary: Slavs (i.e. Slovenes and Croats).

Even as she acknowledges the brutality of the Fascist Italianization campaigns in the province of Venezia Giulia, Hametz points to more complex processes by which Slavs (as well as Jews) accommodated and assimilated to their new "Italian" reality. Early on in the book, she asserts, "After 1918 Rome's policies induced members of minority populations to accept the trappings of locally defined allegiance to Italy and Italianness. The majority of Triestines, including many ethnic Slavs, collaborated in the formation of ties to Rome and the promotion of a local version of Italianness" (p. 6). As an example, Hametz cites the approximately 1,000 persons who voluntarily Italianized their names between 1918 and 1922. This contrasted with the forcible Italianization of surnames and toponyms by the subsequent fascist regime. Hametz might state more clearly the limits of such "voluntary" Italianization; in her efforts to complicate a leftist and Slavic historiography that stresses the suppression of Italy's Slavic populations under fascism, Hametz risks making too much of the ways in which some Slavic Triestines colluded in their Italianization. At the same time, Hametz might more effectively tease out the dual issues of consent and coercion at work in Fascist Venezia Giulia. Doing this would bring into focus the particularities of the Trieste case, where the reconstitution of imperial subjects as

national citizens took place in a context in which national citizens also became fascist citizens.

Hametz does not fully succeed in her goal of using the Trieste case to illuminate larger European processes, with the result that her book may not have obvious appeal to those scholars who do not work on Trieste or the surrounding region. In her discussions of cosmopolitanism in Trieste, for example, Hametz does not flesh out what cosmopolitanism entailed in Trieste at the levels of rhetoric/identity discourse and practice. Nor does she make much more than a nod to the expanding interdisciplinary theoretical and empirical literature on cosmopolitanism(s), thereby missing the opportunity to make her analysis speak to these larger debates. One of Hametz's most interesting contributions to specific studies of Triestine cosmopolitanism lies in her fascinating discussion of how Italian nationalists and fascists paradoxically emphasized the city's "cosmopolitan" maritime past as a means for demonstrating the city's historic links with Italy. The fascist regime did this, for example, by sponsoring "marine festivals" and exhibits that "grew into major events as part of Fascist efforts to mobilise and nationalise the population" (p. 162).

Hametz's sources comprise a wide range of archival materials, including little-mined materials on trade fairs, city festivals, and tourist associations, together with artifacts of local or regional culture such as cookbooks. As with the topic of cosmopolitanism, however, Hametz misses the chance to make her rich and varied materials speak more compellingly to wider debates. In the analysis of trade fairs and various cultural "spectacles," for instance, Hametz could have built upon the sophisticated literature on the cultural politics of Fascist Italy that has transformed scholarly understanding of that experience. From another angle, she could have looked to the burgeoning literature on world fairs, museums, and the architectonics of power in order to probe more deeply the politics of culture at work in making Trieste Italian between 1918 and 1954. That Hametz does not do this may reflect her use of William Morris's rather conventional definition of culture as "the totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought characteristic of a community or population" (p. 10, n. 28).

Understanding culture as processual and attending to how it works and what it does (in terms of contestation and power struggles) would enable Hametz to probe further the complexities of Triestine identity and experience that she usefully signals in her study. Her book points to productive avenues for future research on Trieste's rich and tangled cultural histories.

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MURIEL BLAIVE. *Une déstalinisation manquée: Tchécoslovaquie 1956*. Foreword by KRZYSZTOF POMIAN. (Histoires du temps présent.) Paris and Brussels: Editions Complexe, 2005. Pp. 281. €28.90.

In 1956, when Polish workers protested by the thousands and Hungarians fought Soviet troops in the streets of Budapest, Czechoslovakia remained quiescent, seemingly impervious to the tremors unleashed by Nikita Krushchev's momentous "Secret Speech." Unlike his counterparts in Hungary and Poland, Czechoslovak party leader Antonín Novotný stayed in power and remained there for another dozen years. It is this remarkable stability that preoccupies Muriel Blaive. Why, she asks, did the Czechoslovak communist regime survive 1956 without challenge? To answer this deceptively straightforward question, she adopts a comparative approach that places Czechoslovakia in the context of its neighbors to the north and south. The result is a remarkably original and highly persuasive study that challenges central beliefs of Czech historiography.

The book opens with a brief outline of 1956, starting with events in Moscow and then fanning out to consider the impact of Krushchev's speech on Poland and Hungary. Blaive examines the concomitant reaction in Czechoslovakia and demonstrates that public passivity cannot be attributed to a lack of knowledge. Students did discuss the revelations and did press demands for de-Sovietization and greater openness, but these short-lived protests were merely, in the words of one former participant, a "pajama revolution," confined to the dormitories. Intellectuals did not appeal to the public nor was the public, in particular the workers, prepared to listen at that time.

Traditionally, Czechoslovak historiography has attributed the lack of protest to a particularly severe Stalinism, itself the alleged result of Moscow's desire to erase the country's democratic legacy. Blaive takes on this common thesis and demonstrates that it is neither logical nor supported by evidence. If the Czechoslovak Communist Party was torn between its Stalinist present and its democratic past, then it shared that dilemma with sister parties throughout Europe. Moreover, Blaive argues, Bolsheviks won out in the party long before the onset of communist rule, rendering the issue moot by 1956. Most iconoclastically, the book demonstrates that historians' focus on show trials has led them to lose the forest for the trees. Despite the terror associated with the prosecution of former General Secretary Rudolf Slánský, Czechoslovak Stalinism appears relatively mild in comparison with the repression carried out in neighboring countries: from 1948 to 1952, the Czechoslovak state officially executed seventy-eight convicts; including those who perished in prison or while trying to escape the country, the total number of victims comes to 1,367 persons. This is a disturbing number, certainly, but one that pales in comparison to the victims of Stalinism in Hungary, not to mention Romania or Bulgaria.

If Czechoslovakia's people did not remain calm because of the harshness of Stalinism, then why did they not follow the lead of the Poles and Hungarians? According to Blaive, the country's favorable economic situation in 1956 played a critical role. And it hardly hurt that Czechoslovakia was not treated as a vanquished

foe at the end of the war: it did not experience the worst crimes of the Red Army, did not suffer mass NKVD arrests and deportations, and, perhaps most importantly, did not chafe under direct Soviet military occupation (until 1968). As a result, there was not the popular groundswell of nationalist, anti-Soviet sentiment that fueled unrest in Hungary and Poland. Nor was communism in Czechoslovakia a fringe movement. By the end of 1948, one-third of the country's adult population and nearly one-half of all adult Czechs were members of the Communist Party—the highest percentage in the world. If the Czechs were unprepared in 1956 to challenge the ruling system, perhaps it was because so many were complicit in it.

Most interestingly, Blaive's research in secret police archives demonstrates that in 1956 Czechs and Slovaks did not feel solidarity with Poles and Hungarians as fellow subjects of the Soviet empire. To the contrary, secret police reports indicate that Czechs, and especially Slovaks, feared that the violence in Hungary could spread to their country's own Hungarian minority and even lead to irredentist demands to revise borders. Unlike in 1989, when Czechs and Slovaks watched and sought to emulate events in Hungary, in 1956 many apparently viewed the violence in Budapest with horror. It was, after all, little more than a decade since the demise of Miklós Horthy's Hungary and the reversal of its wartime gains.

Ultimately, Blaive's book does more than address a fascinating turning point at which Czechoslovakia did not turn. Scholarship on postwar Eastern Europe has overwhelmingly focused on dramatic purges and protests. Historians of Czechoslovakia, in particular, have primarily studied the 1950s in terms of the show trials' legacy or in a search for the earliest roots of the Prague Spring. By contrast, Blaive challenges us to consider not only the brief moments of crisis that punctuated Eastern European history but also the long periods when the region's peoples accommodated themselves to communist rule.

BENJAMIN FROMMER
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MARTIN MEVIUS. *Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism 1941–1953*. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 296. \$99.00.

In this book, Martin Mevius shows that under utilitarian-minded Soviet instructions the Hungarian Communist Party presented itself as a national movement.

Marxists judged nationalism by political necessity, Lenin by its place in development toward socialism. Russian history and culture became the focus of Soviet patriotism to make socialism palatable to the Russians. Similarly, Hungarian Bolsheviks constructed Socialist patriotism based on Hungarian national feeling. This entailed the reinterpretation of Hungarian historical

(and literary) canons to suit the Hungarian Communist Party's (HCP) political needs.

Nationalism served the Soviet Union and socialism. The HCP forged alliances and used them in propaganda, but the link with Moscow impeded patriotic appeals. Alliances concealed communist dominance. Socialism was not abandoned; the "gradual approach was mainly tactical." Harsh Soviet occupation policies conflicted with the nationalist, democratic propaganda and the seeming restraint of the HCP. Hungary was governed with little regard for party propaganda, and the behavior of the Red Army alienated the population even further. Mevius leaves this contradiction unexplained.

The communists had a hard time selling the gradualist line within party ranks, where excesses damaged their reputation. Exploiting national symbols, heroes, and personalities, the HCP presented itself as the heir to Hungary's struggle for liberation. Mevius discusses the role of antisemitism in communist policies but omits the fact that they recruited former Arrow Cross members. This underlines Mátyás Rákosi's claim that the HCP was known as both a Jewish and an antisemitic party. Although communist heroes came from the national past to represent Hungary's struggle for independence, more to the point they were selected because of their radicalism: István Széchenyi was not part of the communist pantheon. Radical strains in history were stressed to show the inevitability of communist victory. Red politics was more radical than Mevius shows.

Nationalist appeal was hindered by the communists' ambiguous public stance on border revision and the Hungarian national minorities. With Soviet backing, the Czechoslovak communists persecuted ethnic Hungarians, and the Romanians rebuked territorial revision. The HCP found itself limited by Soviet policy: "the Soviet link determined the success or failure" of its national line. Mevius shows how Soviet foreign policy contributed to the exacerbation of national tension in East Central Europe. Klement Gottwald supported the collective expulsion of Hungarians and the HCP leadership that of the Germans because both were on the Soviet agenda.

The party offset this setback by equating the nation's long struggle for freedom with communist aspirations and sacrifice, sneaking the introduction of communist celebrations under national guise. 1848 was initially used to present the party's national image, to show the continuity with 1945; later it was exploited to demonstrate the need to eliminate domestic enemies. After 1948, party propaganda was Stalinized. Mevius argues that the Stalinist turn was caused by the Marshall Plan, resulting in the abandonment of the notion of a peaceful road to communism "in vogue since 1946." But Rákosi had put the "liberation of the proletariat" on the agenda in May 1946, irrespective of domestic and international conditions. After the 1945 electoral defeat he claimed that the HCP had "other means" than elections to seize power. Equally untenable is the claim that Moscow's hold on Eastern Europe was not firm in 1947,

which by then was Soviet military and economic space. Soviet troops were not expected to leave Hungary after the peace treaty; Moscow manipulated the political scene at will.

Eventually communist nationalism was distorted into socialist patriotism, "loyalty to the USSR, the worship of Stalin" and hatred of the West. The content of liberation day was not nationalist as Mevius claims but legitimized Soviet occupation, which deprived Hungary of Westphalian sovereignty.

Mevius makes some errors. The USSR did get decisive influence under the percentage deal; in 1945 Hungary signed an armistice, not a ceasefire agreement; Romania had no allied status and paid reparations; there is no proof for a planned long transition to socialism or a "Polish tradeoff"; Social Democrats were ousted from the government in the summer of 1945; Soviet looting was systematic; German property was awarded to the Soviets not in 1947 but in 1945, as a result of which they established their economic empire. The Marshall Plan offered aid, not cheap credit; the HCP did want participation, and Hungary rejected it not in June but in July. István Werbőczy was rejected not because of his feudal past but because his Holy Crown theory signified the community of ancient Hungarian lands; hence his rejection unmasked the sham nature of communist "nationalism." There is a difference between the twentieth-century "idea of St. Stephen" and the sixteenth-century theory of the Holy Crown. The USSR seldom "reigned in" the communists but often prescribed more radical policies; the communists dealt with most of their right-wing enemies not after but before the Marshall Plan. The domestic component of the national line is missing: appeasement of the influential populist intelligentsia.

Nevertheless Mevius's discussion of communist nationalism deepens our understanding of Soviet aims and communist tactics after 1945.

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JEAN ANCEL. *Preludiu la asasinat: Pogromul de la Iași, 29 iunie 1941* [The Pogrom in Iași, June 29, 1941]. Translated by CAROL BINES. Foreword by YEHUDA BAUER. (Historia.) Bucharest: Editura Polirom. 2005. Pp. 491. \$29.50.

One week after the German and Romanian armies attacked the Soviet Union, on June 29–30, 1941, the Jewish community in Iași (Jassy), in Romanian Moldavia, was shattered by a large-scale pogrom, initiated and supervised by the Romanian army and the local police, with the support of German soldiers on their way to the eastern front. Jews who were arrested and survived the first day's killings perished in the subhuman conditions of the subsequent deportation on the "death trains."

Very few chapters of Holocaust history were so willfully distorted in the aftermath of the event and in the decades that followed. The official statement issued two

days after the massacre—"In Iași 500 Judeo-communists have been executed"—was only the beginning of the official mystification that continued unaffected by the changes in the political regimes, due to a common desire to obfuscate a massacre that preceded the larger mass killings carried out by the Einsatzgruppen. The official version used by the subsequent communist regime was to reduce the crime to the proportion of mere violent incidents provoked by former members of the Fascist Iron Guard (which had been dismantled by the military dictator Ion Antonescu in January 1941 following a rebellion of his former allies), incited and supported by the German military. The "death trains," in which thousands of Jews perished after several days of being sealed in boxcars without air and water, were presented as an effort made by the Romanian police to save the victims from the Germans. The culmination of the lies and self-delusion was Antonescu's declaration at his trial in 1946: "In my all life I didn't order the extermination against any person. In my home never a chicken was slaughtered. It's not me who ordered but the General Headquarters" (p. 293).

Jean Ancel's rigorous account and interpretation—a masterpiece of historical investigation—discloses both rudimentary and sophisticated fabrications used by Romanian military authorities, politicians, and, later, even conformist historians, in order to deflect Romanian responsibility in preparing and executing the massacre. Frightened by possible consequences and by the fact that the events had escaped their control, the military and civil authorities immediately took up a systematic attempt to destroy or falsify official acts and reports in order to hide the real dimension of the crime, and to present it as a justifiable retaliation for an alleged attack by Judeo-Bolsheviks against Romanian or Wehrmacht troops stationed in the city.

Antonescu, like his subordinates, disclaimed any responsibility for the massacre. Contrary evidence was discovered by Ancel only in 1996, when the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. acquired microfilm records of the judicial proceedings, most of them after the war, but also during the war, in which the Romanian leadership hastened to limit damage to the prestige of the Romanian army. Antonescu's explicit order, on the eve of the pogrom, referred to a planned total evacuation of the Jewish population of the city (45,000 at that time), and the immediate execution of any Jew "who will attack the army" (p. 23). The contradictory and ambiguous orders issued by the General Staff of the Army, the Gendarmerie, and the Special Service of Information ("a kind of Romanian Gestapo," as it was called by a leader of the local Jewish community; p. 26) sent a clear message: all Jews are dangerous agents, thus the army, the police, and even the civil population had a free hand in killing them. Moreover, special teams of the secret police prepared and organized provocations to create the impression that local civilian Jews had started a revolt. Blank bullets fired toward the columns of Romanian and German soldiers had the expected effect: the population of

the town and the military were convinced that pro-Soviet Jews were attacking. A huge mobilization of civilian "volunteers" joined the police and the army in killing and arresting Jews and robbing their property. This carefully prepared "event" ran out of control, and even the civil and military authorities became alarmed by the chaos provoked in a zone so near the front.

Ancel has succeeded in disentangling the network of outright lies, falsehood, and fabrication and clarifying the mechanism through which the directives of Ion Antonescu and his deputy prime minister, Mihai Antonescu, were received and subsequently applied by the military and civil authorities. He looks at the role of corruption, the sadistic local initiatives, and finally, the real, albeit secondary, German involvement in carrying out the massacre. The author's assessment is unequivocal: "The Iași Pogrom was a Romanian production with German support—the assistance of a great ally to a smaller partner to help him to fulfill his antisemitic fantasies. The initiative and schedule were exclusively Romanian" (p. 11).

Preparation for the massacre also included the psychological atmosphere among the Christian population of the town. In the days preceding the attack, the houses of Christian inhabitants were marked by a cross to facilitate the hunt for victims. Posters inciting the population against the Jews and rumors of "Judeo-Bolshevik" acts of sabotage and espionage were spread. A special chapter of the book is dedicated to the mobilization of the local press in preparing an atmosphere of panic and anti-Jewish hatred.

"Any human being who didn't endure such moments of horror can imagine the struggle for life who started in each wagon of that mortuary train," testified a survivor in September 1944 (p. 173). It may be that the shocking impression gained when reading many testimonies from survivors of the "death trains" explains the excessive pathos of some of the author's comments when his otherwise calm account of the facts is broken by accounts of the cruelty and sadism. Based on official statistics and the demographic reports of the Jewish community (to whom it was officially forbidden, however, to establish the number of victims or any list of victims' names), Ancel assesses the total number of victims as nearly 15,000, including 7,000 Jews who perished on the "death trains." He documents that the Iași "event" was a general rehearsal for the huge massacres that followed in the summer and fall of the same year, leading to the near-total destruction of Bessarabian and Bukovinian Jewry and to the mass killings in Odessa, Kishinev, Bogdanovka, and other Transnistrian camps. Some of the army or gendarmerie officers involved in the Iași pogrom quite soon became famous in those areas as well for their cruelty and pathological sadism.

The title of the book, translated from Hebrew, is misleading; the obvious intent of the author is to present the Iași massacre as a prelude to the genocide against the Jewish population that followed immediately in the eastern provinces re-annexed to Romania at the beginning of the war. Ancel is in a position to establish this

correlation, having spent many years researching the Romanian chapter of the Holocaust, and having edited twelve volumes of *Documents Concerning the Fate of Romanian Jewry during the Holocaust* (1986) and published a two-volume synthesis, *History of the Holocaust: Romania* (2002), as well as other volumes of documents and studies on the massacres and deportations in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria.

The general image of the event is completed by an analysis of the behavior of the local leaders of the Jewish community, overwhelmed by the amplitude of the disaster. Ancel also points to reactions to the pogrom by Western diplomats in Bucharest or, as is the case of the American State Department, the lack of a reaction, despite a well-informed report received from the chief of the American Legation in Bucharest (p. 422).

The impressive achievement of Ancel's book is not only the thorough reconstruction of all the stages of the massacre, including the preparatory phase in Bucharest, but also a documented demonstration of the relation between the Iași pogrom and the "Great Plan," as Mihai Antonescu named it, of "cleansing the land" of any trace of Jewish presence, and the attempt to adapt the Romanian plan and local initiative with the more systematic Nazi "Final Solution."

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STEPHAN SCHOLZ. *Der deutsche Katholizismus und Polen (1830–1849): Identitätsbildung zwischen konfessioneller Solidarität und antirevolutionärer Abgrenzung.* (Einzelveröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts Warschau, number 13.) Osnabrück: Fibre. 2005. Pp. 430. €35.00.

Throughout much of the nineteenth century, liberal German Protestants employed a caricature of Poland to reinforce their preferred understanding of German identity. Reduced to a bundle of negative stereotypes (eg. Catholic, inefficient, backward), the Polish character served as a counter-image of the German ideal. Did German Catholics perpetuate a similar discourse, or did the confessional bonds they shared with most Poles generate a sense of solidarity? These questions form the basis of Stephan Scholz's engaging new book.

Scholz identifies 1830–1849 as a critical period that formed German attitudes toward Poland for the rest of the century. In these years the stance of liberal Protestants evolved from one of general sympathy in 1830, when Poland was recognized as a symbol of the legitimate desire for political liberalization, toward a deepening hostility by 1849, when Poland had come to be viewed as a hostile stumbling block to the German national destiny. Methodologically Scholz relies on Michel Foucault's concepts of genealogy and discourse and the extensive theoretical literature on the dynamics of identity formation and stereotyping. He reconstructs the underlying structures and development of German Catholic discourse on Poland, drawing evidence pri-

marily from newspapers and journals that served German Catholic audiences.

Scholz's argument is sensitive to context and to divisions among German Catholics. In the early 1830s, German Catholics were polarized into enlightened and ultramontane factions, and this divide influenced interpretations of the November uprising (1830–1831). Majorities within both factions condemned the uprising, but they did so in ways that reconfirmed the core values of each. Enlightened Catholics dismissed it as an ultramontane-Jesuit conspiracy, while ultramontane Catholics attributed it to the anti-Catholic rationalism prevalent among Polish elites.

By the late 1830s, the ultramontane orientation came to dominate the public life and discourse of German Catholics, but this did not result in a unified reading of Poland. Attitudes remained in flux, vacillating between the negative stereotype of the Pole as revolutionary and the positive stereotype of the Pole as faithful Catholic. One or the other stereotype rose to prominence in relation to current events. As ultramontane Germans generally viewed the liberal drive for greater political freedoms as hostile to their religious values, reports concerning Polish conspiratorial activity reinforced the unsavory stereotype of the Pole as revolutionary. This was especially true of the failed uprising of 1846, which unfolded primarily in Austria. German Catholics cherished Austria as a symbol of Germany's Catholic past and as a guardian of present Catholic interests. In the German Catholic press, the Polish rebellion against Austria was described in terms antithetical to core German Catholic values.

At the same time, the era provided cause for identification with Poland. In light of the history of inter-confessional conflict in Central Europe, German Catholics were highly sensitive to instances of discrimination against Catholics by non-Catholic governments. Thus, as the Russian and Prussian governments pressured Poles to assimilate into the Russian and Prussian mainstream in the 1830s and 1840s, German Catholics readily sympathized with the Poles. In this context, the stereotype of the Pole as stalwart Catholic, standing firm in the face of persecution, resurfaced. This image reinforced the ultramontane values of faithfulness to the church and resistance to antireligious change.

German Catholic discourse vacillated between these two stereotypes throughout much of the nineteenth century. In this respect it did not replicate liberal German Protestant discourse, which followed a more linear trajectory of initial enthusiasm for Poland (1830–1831) followed by a mounting ambivalence (1840s) that set the tone for the rest of the century. In another respect, however, Catholics and liberal Protestants spoke the same language. For both groups, Poland served primarily as a set of ideas around and against which they affirmed their identities and values.

Scholz's work would have been well served by a greater sensitivity to regional variations in German Catholic opinion. He draws much of his evidence from periodicals based in the German west and south, paying

relatively little attention to German Catholics in the east who lived in direct contact with Poles. The discourse of German Catholics in the majority-Polish Grand Duchy of Poznań, for instance, differed substantially from the account Scholz provides. Scholz also can be faulted for promising more in his title than his methodology is able to deliver. The issue of identity formation demands more attention to the full range of collective discourse that German Catholics participated within, as well as an examination of the interplay between collective and personal discourse. Nevertheless, Scholz's work constitutes an important scholarly contribution. German Catholic attitudes toward Poland in the nineteenth century have never been explored in the kind of detail Scholz offers. Scholz's attentiveness to the international network of ideas that ultramontane Germans gradually came to inhabit also merits praise. This book is essential reading for scholars of modern German Catholicism and a valuable resource for German historians in general.

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ROBERT BLOBAUM, editor. *Antisemitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 348. Cloth \$57.50, paper \$24.95.

This volume consists of essays by fourteen scholars from Polish and U. S. universities, most of them originally presented at a three-day conference at the University of West Virginia in June 2002. The gathering sought to explore how "European hostility toward Jews and their place in the modern world" assumed "different meanings, content, forms of expression, and social range" in the "multiple and shifting contexts" that have defined "modern Poland . . . from the mid-nineteenth century to the present" (p. vii). "Lively electronic exchanges" among the participants following the conference brought the papers to present form (p. ix).

The essays are almost all of high quality, based upon concentrated reading in Polish primary sources, many of them hitherto untapped in studies of Polish-Jewish relations. The volume's empirical contribution is thus substantial, and for this reason it is essential reading for anyone engaged in serious study of its subject. The work suffers, however, from a fundamental conceptual difficulty, albeit not entirely one of its own making. The difficulty lies in the assignment of a single designation to two sets of phenomena that might better be kept analytically distinct: on one hand things (mostly hostile, the volume suggests, but sometimes admiring or friendly) that Poles said about Jews during the decades in question; on the other hand things (mostly injurious, sometimes helpful) that Poles did to or for Jews during the same interval. Hostile words and injurious deeds are grouped together under the rubric "antisemitism," admiring words and helpful deeds as "opposition to antisemitism." To be sure, current usage in English and other languages supports such lumping; Bożena Szynok's citation of the definition of "antisemitism" from

Nowa Encyklopedia Powszechna—"an attitude of aversion or animosity toward Jews . . . resulting from various sorts of prejudice; the persecution of or discrimination against Jews as a religious, ethnic, or racial group, as well as views that justify such actions" (p. 266)—demonstrates the common assumption that, where Jews are the objects, there is a clear, direct connection between malevolent feelings and deleterious acts. However, the four essays that focus primarily on deeds instead of words—Keely Stauter-Halsted's study of damage to Jewish homes and businesses inflicted by laborers, artisans, and peasants in rural Galicia in 1898, William W. Hagen's analysis of the November 1918 pogrom in Lwów, Szymon Rudnicki's catalog of interwar Polish discriminatory legislation against Jews, and Dariusz Stola's examination of the anti-Zionist campaign of 1968—render the connection far from obvious. Indeed, as represented in these papers, none of the principal perpetrators of these acts seems to have thought or felt much about Jews as such in launching them; what concerned them most were how Jews affected their ability to enhance food supplies, secure contested territory, administer complex legal regulations, or gain partisan advantage, not how to harm those they hated *a priori*. Moreover, whatever thoughts or feelings about Jews they did harbor do not appear to have been informed to any significant extent by the invidious images and ideas detailed and evaluated in the essays by editor Robert Blobaum on the construction of the Jew as criminal, Brian Porter on the relation between theological and biological motifs in discussions of Jews in the Catholic press, Antony Polonsky on opposition to the alleged Judaization of Polish literature as represented by the prominence of the poet Julian Tuwim during the interwar years, or Katherine Jolluck on perceptions of Jews among Polish women exiled in the Soviet Union during World War II. Some of the instigators did employ certain stock hostile stereotypes to mobilize broader support for their actions, but the degree to which they did so varied greatly, as did the particular stereotypes chosen. It is thus not at all clear how knowing, for example, that the newspaper *Przegląd Katolicki* railed against Jews as disseminators of pornography in 1913 makes it any easier to understand why the Polish National Democratic Party promoted a boycott of Jewish businesses during the same year, let alone why the boycott was honored in some quarters but not in others. Yet as long as both sets of incidents are analyzed from the single perspective of "antisemitism," the crucial problem of unraveling the nexus between antagonistic discourse and bellicose behavior tends invariably to be swept aside.

Indeed, although several essays reveal just how problematic that nexus has often been in the case of Polish-Jewish relations, the profound methodological implications of those revelations are nowhere noted. Porter and Dariusz Libionka both mention the well-known case of Zofia Kossak, a vocal Catholic intellectual reviler of the abhorrent "Jewish psyche" who nevertheless helped catalyze the founding of the underground Coun-

cil for Aid to Jews in 1942. Konrad Sadowski's piece on Catholic priests, Jews, and Orthodox Christians in the Lublin region between the world wars shows that the blame often placed by Bishop Maryan Fulman and his subordinate clergy on Jews for the ills of modern society was rooted primarily in "the progressive erosion of Church and clerical power in society and the clergy's consequent attempt to define a Catholic Polish nation to counter this trend" (p. 184). In this context, anyone not amenable to defining Poland as a Catholic state led by the church hierarchy represented a nefarious social influence. As a result, although the images they invoked differed, church statements about Ukrainian Uniates were hardly less aggressive than were those about Jews. Jews may have been seen as "a far greater threat . . . to . . . Catholicizing society," but only because, as non-Christians, they were presumed more difficult to convert (p. 187).

What is gained and what is lost by linking the discursive and active aspects of such examples via the undifferentiated "hostility toward Jews" suggested by the term "antisemitism"? That question requires serious, sustained reflection. It is unfortunate that the project that gave rise to the fine studies in this volume did not press participants to undertake it.

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SUSAN P. McCaffray and MICHAEL MELANCON, editors.
Russia in the European Context 1789–1914: A Member of the Family. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2005. Pp. x, 238. \$65.00.

Susan P. McCaffray and Michael Melancon, the editors of this collection of essays, state that their purpose is to "reconsider a common generalization about modern Russia: that it was utterly unique, that it deviated fatally from European pathways, and that, implicitly, its twentieth-century problems stemmed from this fatal, permanent exceptionalism" (p. 8). Educated Russians in the nineteenth century emphasized distinctiveness and judged their country by the degree to which it lived up to European ideals rather than to European practices, and historians by and large have followed their lead. Given the scholarly criticism of the explanatory value of "exceptionalism" in a variety of disciplines and fields, a volume that emphasizes a comparativist framework for nineteenth-century Russia is welcome. Even though several of the contributions provide evidence of continuing, and important, differences, as well as a time lag in development (the "backwardness" that the editors suggest abandoning as an explanatory model), the volume successfully demonstrates that Russia was fundamentally similar to Europe in its common experiences and in its response to those experiences.

The first part of the book is titled "Envisioning an Economy." Lee Farrow's opening article is geared less toward "envisioning" an economy than toward actual laws and practices. In "The Ties that Bind: The Role of the Russian Clan in Inheritance and Property Law,"

Farrow notes that Russia fit the Western pattern in the importance of landownership for noble status. Here the similarity ended, however, for in laws, customs and attitudes, the nobility and the Russian state showed "considerable difference from the situation in Western Europe" (p. 15). While most Western European countries had laws to prevent the fragmentation of estates, Russia practiced partible inheritance. Likewise, the practice of redemption, "unique in early modern Europe" (p. 26), allowed extended family members to repurchase sold or mortgaged land for forty years. Moreover, such laws and practices had consequences. For example, according to Farrow, the clan had a "choke-hold on the development of truly individual property ownership" (p. 28). This article presents the strongest case for Russian particularism in the volume. It is also the article that goes farthest back in time, suggesting that becoming "a member of the family" was a work in progress.

McCaffray's contribution, "Capital, Industriousness, and Private Banks in the Economic Imagination of a Nineteenth-century Statesman," compares the views on banking of N. S. Mordvinov and David Ricardo in order to demonstrate how political economists perceived European-wide problems. Since most countries developed "home-grown and idiosyncratic" banking practices, the "history of Russian banking resembles that of other continental countries" (p. 34). Like his counterparts in Europe, Mordvinov envisioned ways to encourage capital formation, the direction of money toward useful and productive activity, private property, and industriousness. In "Toward a Comprehensive Law: Tsarist Factory Labor Legislation in European Context, 1830–1914," Boris B. Gorshkov argues that the Russian "envisioning" of factory legislation in the second half of the nineteenth century was similar to that of Europe. Gorshkov also paints a positive picture of the relative effectiveness of the factory inspectorate. For example, although a common complaint was that factory legislation was difficult to enforce in Russia, the author notes that the rest of Europe also had enforcement problems.

Frank Wcislo, in "Rereading Old Texts: Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia," looks at Witte's early career. According to Wcislo, Theodore Von Laue's study of Witte posited Russian exceptionalism in the great degree of state intervention in industrial development. However, an examination of Witte's writings on the railroad suggests an "envisioning" of economic development more similar to that planned by railroad developers in Europe. Boris V. Anan'ich ("Religious and Nationalist Aspects of Entrepreneurialism in Russia") states that a full understanding of Russia's business history requires a closer investigation of Jewish and Old Believer entrepreneurship (although Alexander Gerschenkron long ago suggested the contours of the latter; see *Europe in the Russian Mirror* [1970]). Because of its diverse religious and ethnic cultures, Anan'ich concludes, Russia differed from Europe in that it did not develop a "unified bourgeoisie." However, this familiar judgment of Russian development is

predicated on the questionable assumption that a unified bourgeoisie developed in any of the major European countries, let alone across Europe as a whole. Sarah Maza (*The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie: An Essay on the social Imaginary* [2003]) is only the most recent historian to question the existence of a French bourgeoisie, let alone the existence of a strong and united one.

The second part of the book is entitled "Envisioning a Society." In "The Role of 'Europe' in Russian Nationalism: Reinterpreting the Relationship between Russia and the West in Slavophile Thought," Susanna Rabow-Edling questions the view of an inexorably antagonistic Russian nationalism. According to the author, Russian essentialism, whose origins are commonly sought in Byzantine Christianity, the Mongol invasion, or Russian patrimonialism, "forms the basis for many Western assessments of Russian nationalism" (p. 97). Such anti-Western nationalism has perpetuated the dichotomy between Russia and the West. But the Slavophiles paid Europe the ultimate compliment of imitation. In order to be part of Europe in the nineteenth century, as Rabow-Edling nicely puts it, Russian intellectuals had to be Russian. "The Slavophile project was not to isolate or separate Russia from the West, but to make her a worthy member of Europe" (p. 100). Even the Slavophiles' anti-Western view, the author reminds us, was part of a European critique of Europe common in French Restoration thought and in German romanticism.

In "Statistics, Social Science, and Social Justice: The Zemstvo Statisticians of Pre-Revolutionary Russia," one of the most substantial contributions to the volume, Esther Kingston-Mann puts the Russian statistical movement in the context of similar movements at the time in Europe. Like the English and the Germans, Russian statisticians pursued scientific knowledge to serve the cause of social justice. Also like their European counterparts, Russian government officials, as well as many in the scientific community, were suspicious of statistical investigations and feared that uncontrolled efforts to apply scientific knowledge to society threatened to become politicized. In their activist view of the role of statistics, Russian zemstvo statisticians most closely resembled German statisticians. But in their opposition to the state, they were unlike their German counterparts. It is not clear from this article whether the Russian government was singular in its repression of local statistical research and publication. Kingston-Mann does note that in some of their empirical data gathering and methodological strategies, Russian statisticians were not behind but ahead of Europe. In "'The Temple of Idleness': Associations and the Public Sphere in Provincial Russia: A Case Study of Saratov, 1800–1917," Lutz Häfner claims that the Russian government's suspicion of corporate structures and social organizations set it apart from Europe. Häfner rightly notes that associations did provide a space for individual initiative even though the need to get permission for their existence from the authorities hin-

dered their spread. However, since permission for incorporation was also required in France and Germany, Russia was more "a member of the family" than the author allows. Häfner concludes that Russia acquired some of the same practices as Europe, only later and to a lesser degree.

Jonathan Daly's "Russian Punishments in the European Mirror" makes some eye-opening comparisons with Europe. Not only was Russia in step with European countries in its penal policy; in the number of executions, hard labor, exile, and prison sentences per capita, Russia was often the *least* repressive European country. Even many government officials were opposed to the death penalty, and a variety of crimes that in Europe were capital crimes were in Russia crimes punishable by hard labor. (Indeed, if any country in Daly's tables comparing rates of various punishments deserves the distinction of "exceptionalism," it is the United States, not Russia.) To explain the prevalence of punitive exile in Russia after this punishment had been abandoned in Britain, Daly points to backwardness as well as to the comparative leniency of Russia's penal system. By this, Daly means the difficulty of governance, law enforcement, as well as the inefficiency of Russia's criminal justice system. (This certainly gives a new meaning to the concept of the "advantages of backwardness.") Indeed, Daly argues, perceptions of backwardness impelled government officials and public activists to follow progressive European and American penological models.

Alice K. Pate ("St. Petersburg Workers and Implementation of the Social Insurance Law of 1912") argues that the reform movement for improving the lives of Russian workers was comparable to movements in Europe. Such participation created the framework for the development of a civic consciousness among workers and gave evidence of cooperation, collaboration, and conciliation, not just of class conflict. Similarly, Melancon, ("Russia's Outlooks on the Present and Future, 1910–1914: What the Press Tells Us") documents a consensus on the need for a combination of "private initiative and state intervention" on a broad range of issues. This, Melancon believes, places Russia squarely within the European norm, and judging by the press from 1910 to 1914, Russian society viewed itself on a path of development "in alignment" with European models (p. 222).

Although this reviewer is predisposed to be sympathetic to the editors' agenda, not everyone will agree with the claim that the commonalities evidenced in Russian "envisioning" of Europe override the multifarious Russian "peculiarities" in practice, peculiarities that the contributors do not hide. Nevertheless, by challenging Russian exceptionalism, this collection should stimulate further thinking not only about the relationship between Russia and the West but also about the state of Russian society on the eve of World War I. Especially noteworthy is Melancon's challenge to the view that Russian society was hopelessly fragmented and polarized into irreconcilably hostile camps. The attitude

toward economic development, labor, politics, and human rights as represented in the press reveals a greater degree of civic consciousness and commonality than one would expect. Political differences certainly existed in vigorous and sharp form, as they did elsewhere in Europe. But, Melancon concludes, "Political conflicts and normal polemics summoned by these differences did not represent social fragmentation" (p. 222). Joining Melancon, Gorshkov suggests that Russian labor and welfare laws had the potential to ease the plight of workers. And Pate sees more cooperation than conflict among government officials, the business community, and worker activists. Although in the historiography a great amount of attention has been given to the formation of class consciousness, workers were also developing a civic consciousness on the eve of World War I. Finally, Melancon suggests revisiting one of the most venerable but long neglected explanations for the Russian Revolution: that is, the argument that had it not been for World War I, Russia could well have avoided catastrophic social and political strife.

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RICHARD STITES. *Serfdom, Society, and the Arts in Imperial Russia: The Pleasure and the Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 586. \$60.00.

Richard Stites can look back on a long and productive career as perhaps the premier American student of the interaction between culture and society in modern Russia. Much of his past work has focused on the period following the Great Reforms of the 1860s–1870s, whose central problem is the origin and legacy of the 1917 Revolution. In his newest book, he moves backward in time to examine the emergence of a Russian secular high culture in the century before serfdom—along with much of Russia's *ancien régime*—was dismantled by the Great Reforms.

Western scholarship on imperial Russia traditionally privileges the eighteenth century, when fusing Russia with Europe was still the utopian project of a narrow aristocratic elite, and the post-reform era, when that fusion had already been largely achieved and the aristocracy's hold on the country was eroding. What happened in between—how European influences blended with native traditions to create the late imperial synthesis—has been examined off and on over the last thirty years by Richard Wortman, Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, the late W. Bruce Lincoln, and others, but it remains nonetheless one of the great lacunae in our knowledge of imperial Russian history. In his new book, Stites contributes substantially toward filling in that historiographical gap.

At one level, the book is a history of music, painting, and theater in Russia, and readers learn much about the evolution of acting techniques, painting styles, and other aspects of the arts at the same time as they are introduced to a broad range of colorful personalities who populated the art world of the time. However,

Stites's deeper interest concerns the tensions inherent in cultivating the arts in a social order dominated by serfdom. He explores these tensions by studying the nexus among authors, performers, art schools, patrons, impresarios, critics, and audiences, for which he draws on a massive array of narrative and quantitative materials from both published and archival sources.

Stites argues that the complexity of these issues has long been obscured by simplistic clichés: an uncritical admiration for high culture regardless of its social cost, an opposite yet similarly onesided treatment of serf artists as mere victims of exploitation, and a contemptuous view of noble dilettantes and provincial serf artists as uniformly lacking in artistic merit. According to Stites, nobles both engaged in the arts themselves and employed serfs as actors, musicians, and painters, thereby—as his subtitle suggests—using their social power to obtain pleasure. In some ways, he argues, this was harmful to the artists as well as to their art, for the identification of public performance with lowly status kept talented nobles off the public stage, the prevalence of private domestic performance by serfs and noble dilettantes impeded the growth of a professionalized public art world, and a sometimes unbearable tension existed between serf performers' artistic dignity on stage and their utter disenfranchisement off stage. However, the arts could also create a common space shared by diverse classes, affording individual serfs an entrée into elite culture and, occasionally, individual emancipation, while inspiring in the elite a novel respect for, and solidarity with, artists of lower-class background.

While exploring the serf system's implications for the arts, Stites tracks the art world's transformation along four principal vectors. One is the geographic spread of the Europeanized high culture from the capital cities (St. Petersburg and Moscow) to "the provinces," where noble landowners and their serf artists played pioneering roles in disseminating the new culture. The second is the shift from an art world concentrated in private upper-class homes, where noble dilettantes and their serfs performed for invitation-only, upper-class audiences, to public venues sponsored by the state or private entrepreneurs and open to a socially diverse audience of paying spectators. The third is the rising status and growing professionalization of the artists themselves, associated with such developments as the establishment of specialized schools for training painters, actors, and musicians; the growth of theatrical touring companies; and the cult of the virtuoso in music and acting. The fourth, finally, is the art world's increasing interest in themes and styles drawn from contemporary, non-noble Russian society.

The result is a richly documented and highly readable book. Stites effectively bridges the historiographical gap between the age of enlightened absolutism, when an interest in European high culture first appeared among aristocratic Russian serf owners, and the dynamic, increasingly professionalized, socially heteroge-

neous, and recognizably "Russian" high culture of the post-reform era.

ALEXANDER M. MARTIN
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NICHOLAS B. BREYFOGLE. *Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia's Empire in the South Caucasus*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2005. Pp. xvii, 347. \$49.95.

The decomposition of the multinational polity of the Soviet Union in the 1990s gave a noticeable boost into historians' interest in the imperial legacy of tsarist Russia and its borderlands. Nicholas B. Breyfogle aims to examine the Russian Empire's interactions with the extra-European world through the lens of sectarian Russian colonists. He points out that, despite the prevalent view of the Russian Empire as distinct from Western European imperialism, there were similarities in the ways in which colony and metropole "coproduced each other." His book thus intends to explore the conceptions of Russianness, of "nation" and "empire," and of faith and religious affiliation in the course of imperial encounters. The focus is on the communities of Russian peasants who dissented from the established church to Dukhobor, Subbotniki, and Molokan sects and had a choice between being resettled to the frontier in the South Caucasus or returning to the Orthodox faith.

Breyfogle is interested less in the intricacies of religious beliefs and practices or reasons for conversion than in the intersections of religious nonconformity and imperial practice. The decision of the state to resettle sectarian peasants in the region of the South Caucasus signified a degree of negotiation that was possible within the imperial categorization of population that allowed for deviations from the Orthodoxy in the periphery. Despite their status as a persecuted religious minority, the sectarians served (unintentionally and indirectly) the interests of the Russian Empire, actively changing the environment and exploring the new possibilities offered by the borderland. As a result of their economic success and services to the imperial state, the attitude of the officials to sectarians shifted: the status of the "model Russian colonist" was often preferred to that of the "pernicious heretic." The frontier also helped to shape the sectarian's new identity: it strengthened their unity as a religious community and allowed them to carve a niche for themselves by overcoming the constraints of imperial classifications.

The arrival of Russian settlers destabilized the existing systems of landownership and usage. Conflicts over the ownership of land, robbery, and rape were not rare. Facing the failure of the state to protect them, the sectarians often resorted to violence incongruent with their religious beliefs, transforming them from pacifists into "pacifiers." But the relationship between colonizers and the colonized population also had mutual economic benefits: it involved an exchange of economic techniques, technology, and cultural practices. The critical phase of the Russian state's relations with the sectarians began in the 1890s when, following internal con-

flict, a section of the Dukhobor community shifted toward religious radicalism and protested against military conscription by making bonfires of loaded weapons. The state retaliated against the arms-burning Dukhobors, sending Cossack forces who did not hesitate to use violence and sexual assault. The protest of the sectarians against the cultural norms imposed by the metropole shattered the image of the "model Russian colonist" in the eyes of officialdom and led to the explosive situation in the region. Tensions between sectarians and the state over the issue of pacifism brought Dukhoborism to an impasse, leading to mass emigration to Canada.

This book shows that despite their problematic status within imperial definitions of loyalty, the Russian sectarian colonists cannot be underestimated as active builders of the empire. The study contributes to the understanding of the dynamic relationship between the center and periphery: if in the beginning Transcaucasia was a separate part of the empire where a degree of freedom for religious dissenters was possible, toward the late nineteenth century the lands of the South Caucasus came to be seen as more integral to the imperial whole and the state began to intervene more directly into the life of sectarian communities. But the book also provides a case study of centrifugal tendencies in the modernizing state when local peripheral processes "intersected with Empire-wide transformations" (p. 259). Breyfogle demonstrates that despite strong nationalizing tendencies and pragmatism of Imperial statesmen, religion never completely gave way to other, more secular forces and eventually "blocked the process of state or nation-building" and threatened the survival of the tsarist state.

This thoroughly researched and cogent study builds on the vision of the Russian Empire as a complex and multilevel system marked by social and administrative diversity, as described in the works of Alfred J. Rieber and others. It is a very important book that should appeal to students of religion, nationalism, and empire in both Russian and European contexts.

IRINA PAERT
Tallinn University

ROSHANNA P. SYLVESTER. *Tales of Old Odessa: Crime and Civility in a City of Thieves*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 244. \$38.00.

In popular and literary imagination, Odessa was a city of rogues and gangsters. As in Prohibition-era Chicago, crime became central to its identity. Zionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky echoed the view of many: Odesans were a unique urban type, "as clear as if hewn from marble" (p. 3). Concentrating on the immediate pre-World War I years, Roshanna P. Sylvester brings Odessa's characters and the neighborhoods in which they lived to life. In this freewheeling port city, Jews dominated trade, industry, and the professions, and defined themselves in secular terms. In fact, she argues, "a sec-

ularized Jewish culture in a very real sense became the dominant culture" of the city (p. 5).

Sylvester draws heavily from two newspapers: the moderately progressive and high-brow *Odesskii listok*, and the more lurid and sensationalistic "boulevard" publication *Odesskaia pochta*. The city's various neighborhoods took on distinct personalities, often defined by local journalists. The port and the outlying factory districts of Peresyp and Slobodka-Romanovka, cut off from the more affluent upland central city, were depicted as bleak, sinister, and dangerous. Press reports of crime in these neighborhoods were intended to reinforce the idea "that crime and immorality were closely connected with industrial workers." The words "worker" and "criminal" frequently appeared together in reports of violent incidents, implying "a straight line between workers' alleged criminality and their penchant for revolution" (p. 45). Squalid Moldavanka, the "quintessential Jewish quarter" filled with tradesmen, porters, child beggars, and thieves, "symbolized urban adventure, masculine possibility, and the allure of danger" (p. 80). Associated with moral degeneracy and crime, lurid stories from its bowels reinforced negative stereotypes of Jewish businessmen.

Sylvester's cast of characters includes the ubiquitous *dvorniki* (building guards and watchmen), who served as a network of informants, especially in Moldavanka, and "the queen of stylish hairdos," an "independent" entrepreneurial woman who challenged the standards of acceptable female conduct. Newspaper columnists and reporters helped define those standards, she observes, for they brought scandal and sensation to the attention of the public, casting their various characters as villains or heroes. The best of her characters appear in chapter six ("The Little Family"), where we meet the fictional Perel'muters from the pages of Odessa's weekly humor magazine *Krokodil*. This Jewish family battles over a rebellious daughter who prefers art school to finding a suitable husband. Negotiations with a matchmaker lampoon "the notion that potential fiancés could be stacked up in a status hierarchy based on their professions" (p. 134), and the entire episode targets the lower-middle-class Jewish obsession with status and quest for upward mobility. In the book's final chapter, a firing squad executes an unhappy and belligerent circus elephant. Attempting to find meaning in this act, local journalists produced a frenzy of soul-searching post mortems. Said one: this unfortunate beast, like so many of Odessa's residents, "was destined to die on the street, another victim of a city that made promises to many but only delivered to a few" (p. 188).

Sylvester makes very few references to other imperial Russian cities, which leaves us wondering whether her cast of characters and settings was really distinctive to Odessa? To be sure, Odesans spoke a peculiar Yiddish-Russian "language salad," but "language salads" of various mixes were spoken throughout the towns of Belarus and Ukraine. All cities had their oddities such as Odessa's hugely fat wrestler, and urban journalists everywhere warned of the dangers of seedy bazaars, not

to mention the perilous streets of outlying working-class settlements. In complaining about the introduction of electric streetcars and resisting other manifestations of modernity, Odessans were hardly unique. In fact, support for such innovations, particularly when they added new revenue streams to city coffers, sharply distinguished the burgeoning municipal progressive movement from its conservative opponents from Moscow to Kharkiv and beyond. And if police violated the privacy and security of Jewish Moldavankans, bursting into homes where they expected to find shady characters, Kiev was even more notorious for its periodic *oblavys* (round-ups). Indeed, the absence of comparisons with Kiev is surprising, given the importance of Jews in the shaping of the culture of both cities.

In sum, this book is a colorful read that contributes richly to the literature on Jewish culture in late imperial Russia. It makes excellent use of newspaper sources and underscores the role of local journalists in the shaping of urban culture. But it leaves a central question unanswered: to what extent was the culture of this vibrant port city distinctive? To what extent did it reflect late imperial urban culture as a whole?

MICHAEL F. HAMM
Centre College

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB. *Before Homosexuality in the Arab-Islamic World, 1500–1800*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pp. x, 210. \$32.50.

Islamic attitudes about homosexuality have been much discussed in Western writing for more than a hundred years, particularly by writers such as Richard Burton who were hostile to Western prudery. They were delightfully surprised to find that pederasty was much celebrated in Islamic literature dating from the medieval period onward, even though Islamic law itself has been hostile to anal intercourse. It is this contradiction with which the book under review is concerned. Khaled El-Rouayheb is especially qualified to bring light to the topic since he is knowledgeable about current Western research into homosexuality and is also an expert on Islamic law. He briefly discusses the constructionist approach of Michel Foucault and others who argue that the concept of homosexuality developed in the nineteenth century, and that of the essentialists who insist that although the term homosexual might be a nineteenth-century invention, the concept was not. Somewhat inclined to be critical of the constructionists, he holds that it is necessary to look at what was meant by the Islamic scholars who used a variety of terms to describe conduct that in the West is now categorized as homosexual. This cautionary approach distinguishes his book from other treatments of the subject.

Islamic law is complicated. There are basically four schools of law, each of which discusses *liwāt* (anal intercourse) somewhat differently. There is no term for homosexuality as it is now understood, and the Islamic

discussion is primarily concerned with penetration. The Hanafi school was the official school of the Ottoman Empire, and it considered anal intercourse between men the same as illicit vaginal intercourse between a man and a woman. The other schools—Shāfiʿī, Hanbalī, and the Māliki—considered it as different but still punishable, while another school unrecognized by the Ottoman Empire, the Imāmī Shīʿī, punished it most severely.

Yet there are widespread references to what Westerners have called homosexual conduct in Islamic literature. One reason for this is that though the Sunni schools of law specifically prohibited anal intercourse, behaviors such as kissing persons of the same sex, caressing them, or intercrural intercourse were similarly forbidden. In fact, homoerotic acts that did not involve penetration were not even considered major sins. Moreover, falling in love with a boy was regarded as an involuntary act and outside the scope of religious concern. Composing pederastic or heterosexual love poetry was actually permitted by most jurists in Islamic history, although it was usually stipulated that the name of the lover was not to be mentioned.

Quite clearly, Islam was hostile to anal intercourse, and if this is regarded as the distinguishing characteristic of being homosexual, it was anti-homosexual. Islam was not as antagonistic to activities that many would now call homoerotic, and this toleration was expressed in the pederastic poems of love and affection. Women, because they cannot penetrate, were not considered capable of being homosexual.

The whole issue, obviously, is a complicated one. El-Rouayheb's book is well footnoted (thirty-seven pages of notes in English and Arabic) and has a six-page bibliography of Arabic references as well as a six-page bibliography of secondary literature, mainly in English. I highly recommend the book for helping us to understand better the complexity of homosexuality.

VERN L. BULLOUGH
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RUDI MATTHEE. *The Pursuit of Pleasure: Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History, 1500–1900*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 346. \$39.50.

It was once a commonplace of European travel literature to comment on the pastimes and habits of non-European peoples; and European merchants working for the British and Dutch East India trading companies were similarly assiduous in documenting trade, including the exchange of commodities of indulgence such as wine, tobacco, coffee, tea, and opium. Thus raw material for a history of drugs and stimulants in Iran abounds, particularly for a scholar like Rudi Matthee for whom Dutch is a mother tongue. Add to this the Iranian Revolution and the attendant roiling of Iranian society on moral issues and you have a golden moment for writing such a book. Happily, Matthee's survey of four centuries of social and economic history lives up to the opportunity.

After an admirably balanced and succinct summary of Safavid and post-Safavid history, Matthee devotes two chapters to Safavid wine consumption and one each to opium, tobacco, and coffee. The discussion of wine details the paradoxical situation of gargantuan consumption by the shahs and their retinues, in the face of strong clerical disapproval, and periodic crackdowns on popular consumption of the beverage by Muslims. (Alcohol has always been permitted to Christians and Jews.) Matthee links the imperial drunkenness to a deeply entrenched pre-Islamic tradition of fighting and feasting. The Safavid rulers thus appear doomed by their rank to alcoholic overindulgence, and the guardians of Muslim morality were hard put to do anything about it.

Opium had similar roots in the pre-Islamic past, but it was used more as a medicine than as a hallucinatory agent in the Safavid period. Eating four or five opium pills a day was a common practice, with full-blown addiction relatively uncommon. Although smoking opium was unknown, the smoking of tobacco became widespread at all levels of society. Poorer smokers used clay or wooden pipes, but the more sophisticated smoker preferred the waterpipe, which involved elaborate social ritual. Matthee explores the problem of when tobacco first arrived in Iran and whether the waterpipe was already in use, possibly for hashish, which is briefly discussed. As in the Ottoman Empire, with coffee, mostly imported from Yemen, came the (potentially subversive) coffeehouse, a natural locale for enjoying a leisurely waterpipe.

The second half of the book deals with the post-Safavid period and is similarly divided into separate discussions of wine, opium, tobacco, coffee, and tea. Surprisingly, the Qajar rulers, who came to power in the late eighteenth century, shunned the wine that their Safavid predecessors were so fond of. Whether this was because they had a different concept of kingship, as Matthee proposes, or because of changes in the role of Islamic moralism is difficult to say. With respect to the other indulgences, tobacco use continued unabated, and the practice of smoking opium emerged in the nineteenth century. Another nineteenth century change was a turning away from coffee in favor of tea as the common beverage of all classes. Coffeehouses, so-called, still featured waterpipes, but the beverage they served was tea.

Matthee also provides a good deal of information about domestic Iranian production of tea, opium, and tobacco in the nineteenth century, and about the involvement of these products in Iranian export trade. In the 1870s, for example, the export of opium became so lucrative that in some locales grain output for domestic consumption was seriously affected.

As a work of social and economic history, this book sets a high standard. Matthee's canvas of Persian sources, including poetry, is as thorough as his review of European travel and trade literature. He pays close attention to issues of class, gender, and regional difference. And his discussion of the Islamic prohibition

on alcohol, and other moral issues, is both extensive and nuanced. Judging from his extensive citation of literature dealing with these indulgences in other lands, both Muslim and non-Muslim, he undoubtedly could have set the Iranian story more explicitly within the broader framework of world history, but he has left that for other hands to accomplish. As it is, most readers will be more than satisfied by this lucid, precise, and information-packed volume.

Those who take an interest in the tug-of-war between conservatism and liberalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran will find much to support the view that Iran has never been either the paradise of Islamic rectitude that the most demanding followers of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini are determined to create, or the sink of perdition and vice that they warn will result from overindulgence in Western culture. Rather, it has been a land of great diversity where tolerance and personal enjoyment repeatedly reemerge after episodes of puritanical control.

RICHARD W. BULLIET
Columbia University

AFSANEH NAJMABADI. *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 363. \$24.95.

An amazing book, this product of years of research and thinking takes analysis of gender, nation, and modernity to new levels. Afsaneh Najmabadi courageously incorporates examination of sexuality, sexual preferences, and concepts of sexual attractiveness into her textual study of the project of Iranian modernization through heteronormalization. She follows the transformation through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of male eroticism and concepts of sexual attractiveness that did not differentiate between the sexes to the binarization of male and female required by modernity and the modern state. Concepts of nation, seen as a brotherhood of males, and of homeland, seen as a female in need of protection whose sexual purity signified the inability of outsiders to penetrate her, depended on gender binarization, the author argues. Earlier nineteenth-century Iran had room for various concepts of male, such as *amrad*, "a young beardless male" whose beauty could be idealized and who could engage in homoerotic practices, without being seen as effeminate, during this period of his life (p. 307). Sufi mysticism and poetry emphasized homoerotic love and friendship as an ideal. European contact and influences, however, and the desire to build a modern nation, turned the un-selfconscious touting of young male beauty and homoerotic love into shame over "backward" practices and the seclusion of women—which came to be seen as the cause of such "perversion." As a solution, males and females should be brought together for the purpose of heterosocialization but separated conceptually and sexually into binary categories, with no variation approved. Opportunities for women

opened up as a result of the effort to modernize. In order to develop a modern nation, mothers had to be able to raise children, not in ignorance but from an educated perspective. For the nation to prosper, both halves of the population needed to contribute.

With erudite and comprehensive scholarship, Najmabadi examines the interconnections among art, literature, poetry, politics, and culture to trace Iranian gender and sexual transformations during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. She looks at paintings, changes in the sun and lion symbols, 'Ashura banners, art objects, cartoons, logos, playing cards, medallions, coins, official state emblems, and novels as well as more typical historical sources. "Notions of beauty were largely undifferentiated by gender in early Qajar Iran (1785–1925)," Najmabadi writes (p. 11). Similar words and phrases were used to describe beauty for males and females, and the sexes were portrayed with similar features and shapes in paintings. The Sufi practice of gazing was directed at an adolescent male. To be an object of desire for men was not seen as improper for the *amrad*, the adolescent male, who was seen as attractive and desirable with the first downy growth over his mouth. When he could grow a full beard, however, he was expected to transform from the desired into the one who desires. Otherwise, he could be called a *amradnuma* or "an adult man who made himself look like a young beardless man" (p. 307), wishing to continue to be the object of desire of other men.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, Iranian ideas of beauty became gender differentiated. In conjunction, the sun symbol behind the Iranian lion changed from "(fe)male" (p. 63), which could be either a male or a female, to feminized beauty or "lady sun" (p. 79). At the same time, the homoerotic poetry of Hafez was reinterpreted as heteroerotic (p. 114). The beloved became female, and the same words were used to refer to the female body and the territory of Iran. Men looked at Iran as the beloved, and also as mother, sharing as brothers in the responsibility to protect and defend her "skirt of chastity" (p. 115) from foreigners.

With more interaction with Europeans, elite Iranians became familiar with European attitudes toward homoeroticism. Najmabadi discusses how women's veiling was seen as a sign of the backwardness of homosociality, and also suggestive of homoeroticism. Reformists differed in their attitudes toward veiling, but they all agreed about women's education. Women should receive education in order to be manager of the home, enlightened mother, and supporter of her citizen husband. To be modern, one should look modern: that is, European. But how could men shave their faces like Europeans without looking like *amradnuma*? Those who took on the appearance of Westerners received criticism for excess, superficiality, and threatened masculinity.

One cannot adequately convey the complexity, nuance, detail, and stretch of this comprehensive study of the historiography of nation, gender, sexuality, and modernity in a few pages. Mind-expanding not only for the

Iranologist or Middle East scholar, the book is a must read for students of modern history, culture, historiography, political science, modernization, and sex and gender in general.

As someone who has worked in a rural area of Iran, this reviewer cannot help but ask how all of this played out in villages, or among the lower or middle classes in urban areas. Najmabadi's creativity has yielded data for her analyses of sexuality and gender among elites, but with few preserved records about rural or lower-class people, we may be left wondering about them. The heated struggle over modernization and Western influence continues in Iran. Although resisted, ruling clerics continue to favor the symbolism of beard or at least shadow, and going without a tie, for men. However, as Najmabadi points out, "historical amnesia" has screened the *amrad* and fear of looking like an *amrad* from current memory (p. 233).

MARY ELAINE HEGLAND
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FRANÇOIS GEORGEON. *Abdülhamid II, Le sultan calife (1876–1909)*. Paris: Fayard. 2003. Pp. 528. €25.00.

Written by a leading historian of the Ottoman Empire, this study of the last decisive Ottoman sultan is a major achievement in scholarship. Richly documented and cogently argued, François Georgeon's book steers between the pitfalls of demonization and adulation to reassess a ruler who left a contradictory but significant legacy. Abdülhamid II no doubt wished to be known precisely as a sovereign, not as a person; and Georgeon has written a history of a reign more than of a man (pp. 15–16). The result constitutes one of the most important recent contributions to Ottoman studies, a work that non-Ottomanists interested in the period will also need to read.

The book consists of a prologue, four parts with multiple chapters in each, and an epilogue. Part one examines 1876–1878, the critical years of Abdülhamid's accession, his struggle with the constitutionalists, and the international crises of the Russo-Turkish war, Treaty of Berlin, and state bankruptcy. Part two examines the Hamidian regime: his palace, his methods of autocratic control, his provincial administration, and his Islamic policy. Part three examines the crises of the 1880s and 1890s. Part four, on the last years of his reign, examines the period from the relative highpoint of 1897–1900 to the 1908 revolution and his deposition in 1909. Notes, maps, a genealogical table, glossary, bibliography, and chronology complete this meticulously prepared work.

Expert and non-expert alike will find new insights in this book. Indications of Abdülhamid's cultural modernism emerge throughout, from his European tour (1867), to the architectural taste exhibited at Yıldız Palace and elsewhere, the Hijaz railway project (1900–1908), his Western musical taste and partially bourgeois domestic life (p. 142). No longer did the palace set the style for Ottoman society. Although founded

on inherited prerogatives that had never been diminished in principle, but only allowed to lapse in practice by some of his predecessors, his autocracy was also modern in its way. Indefatigable in his work habits and rational about business and finance, he used modern means to extend his range of control: the efficiently run palace treasury and crown estates, modern censuses and other statistics, the modern provincial administration created since the 1840s, photography, the telegraph, the railroad, press censorship (tighter after 1890), his unprecedented secret police network, and special commissions that he presided over at the palace for his highest policy priorities (such as resettling refugees and building the Hijaz railway). He also expanded the use of the sultan's historical rights and entitlements: patronage, charitable endowment, and Islamic legitimacy claims, especially the caliphate, which he used to increase his authority at the expense of Ottoman religious scholars and to extend his influence beyond Ottoman frontiers. Abdülhamid II was one of the most prolific public builders among Ottoman sultans; and his many public clocktowers had their clocks set to European—not Turkish—time (p. 352). For him, Ottoman survival depended on Islam, the Ottoman dynasty, Istanbul as capital, and the Two Holy Cities (p. 203). Europeans overestimated his pan-Islamist ambitions, however, missing the point that he had to protect the Ottoman Empire first in order to pursue such ambitions even guardedly.

Without lapsing into the commonplace diplomatic historians' Eurocentrism, Georgeon's analysis of the ongoing "Eastern Question" crises examines Europeans' increasing aggressiveness in the search for bridgeheads within the empire and the resulting intensification of Ottoman reliance on Germany. In Abdülhamid's last decades, the Armenian crises of 1894–1896 and then the endless Macedonian crises show ample reason for his bloody image among some of his subjects. His struggle to repress the Young Turk opposition reinforced that image. At the same time, however, his expansion of the state schools, refugee resettlement, internal colonization, and patronage of notables and religious leaders show why his reign was remembered positively among the Muslim proto-bourgeoisie, which he was solicitous to foster. For that matter, outside eastern Anatolia the empire's non-Muslims enjoyed high levels of communal autonomy and development until their respective end-of-empire crises (p. 321).

Critical readers will all no doubt take exception at some point. The most obvious target will be the lack of archival research in the extensive Yıldız Palace papers, now in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul, or other manuscript sources for the period. Georgeon's bibliography is, however, very extensive, and his analysis very sophisticated. This is a major work that can be expected to stand the test of time.

CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY
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TUVIA FRILING. *Arrows in the Dark: David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust*. Translated by ORA CUMMINGS. In two volumes. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2005. Pp. x, 387, 297. \$75.00.

This edited English translation of Tuvia Friling's extensive study of the response of the political leadership of the Jewish community in Palestine (the Yishuv) to the Holocaust appeared originally in Hebrew three years ago. It is the product of over twenty years' research, and the issues it raises are not only of relevance to Holocaust scholarship but go to the heart of the Zionist paradigm: if Jewish Palestine was to be a refuge for endangered Jewry, what did or could it contribute to rescuing the Jews of Europe in their darkest hour? As the political affiliation of the leadership of post independence Israel (until 1977) was the same as the leadership of the Yishuv during World War II, the debate on the success or failings of Yishuv policies of rescue and relief during the Holocaust became part of Israeli political discourse in the generations that followed. Not surprisingly, the subject that Friling chose to research has already attracted an extensive scholarly literature and wide public interest in Israel. Throughout the 1940s (and later) the leadership of Jewish Palestine was dominated by one personality, that of David Ben-Gurion, and Ben-Gurion's response to the Holocaust has been subject to microscopic attention. What does Friling bring to this debate that is new?

It is a uniquely Israeli debate, premised on the conviction that had they chosen to act, the leaders of the Zionist movement might have moved mountains by the force of their own willpower. In fact, the Jewish community in the 1939–1945 period was a minority under British control in the Palestine Mandate, a minority whose nationalist ambitions had just received a very severe setback with the publication of the British White Paper on Palestine in May 1939. Henceforth, British policy was directed to blocking the Jewish drive to statehood and toward creating a binational state in Palestine with a large Arab majority. Any expressions of Jewish nationalist aspirations were now seen as hostile to British interests—and that at a time when Britain was the leading opponent of Nazi expansion. The 1939 White Paper set out to divorce the Palestine issue from the fate of European Jewry, and attempts by the Zionists to reach out to Jews under the Nazis were seen as inimical to British interests. The Yishuv was torn between its interest in the success of British war efforts and the reality of active British opposition to any and every Yishuv-based attempt at relief and rescue. Although Israeli historiography acknowledges these historical circumstances, there is an almost universal assumption that had the leadership of the Yishuv wished to overcome such obstacles they would have been able to do so. And even if Ben-Gurion and the other prominent leaders of the Yishuv were not able to come up with realistic rescue plans, at least they should have given public voice to the primacy of rescue planning in all

their many and exhaustive public or official statements (speech making being a well-established ritual in the Zionist movement). But Ben-Gurion was dismissive of rescue opportunities as unrealistic in face of the devilishness of Nazi policy and the active opposition of British policy. From his public statements it was possible to conclude that he, and the Zionist organization he headed, preferred to focus on postwar planning and the thrust for Jewish statehood.

It is the apparent callousness of public statements as much as the failure to develop an effective policy of action that has exercised the Israeli debate over the Yishuv's response to the Holocaust, and prominent Israeli historians have lined up for and against Ben-Gurion and the Labor Zionist movement he headed.

Friling's account surveys the whole gamut of issues that were debated during the war years: illegal immigration to Palestine, plans to rescue children, various ransom plans, plans to save Hungarian Jewry, financing relief measures, transferring funds and organizing resistance, pressuring the Allies to act. Although each has already been studied extensively, Friling has scoured archival resources that have become available more recently (including Allied and Jewish organizational materials) and fills many minor lacunae in existing accounts. Indeed, the breadth of his research lends an aura of "official history" (although Friling makes no such claim) to this work. Given the keen interest in the topic under discussion, this alone might have justified the publication of the reduced (by one third) English translation. But Friling also deserves attention because he recasts the historiographical debate in a manner that offers a new interpretation of Ben-Gurion's seeming inaction and the apparent inappropriateness of his public statements concerning the Holocaust during the war years. These were, Friling argues, a facade for highly secret and (under British wartime regulations, highly illegal) efforts to test every ransom possibility and mobilize resources for possible rescue activities. The Yishuv leadership came to the conclusion by early 1943 that the possibilities of rescue were so unrealistic that all efforts were like "arrows in the dark" (the quote is from Eliezer Kaplan, treasurer of the Jewish Agency and one of Ben-Gurion's closest confidantes). Nevertheless, they had to be pursued regardless of the political or material costs. Public displays to the contrary were an intentional camouflage. Normally, the discrepancy between appearance and reality would have become clear with the opening of the most secret records of the Zionist leadership; however, these records were sparse when they related to relief and rescue activities. The Yishuv leadership could not risk the exposure of any involvement with European Jewry that might be seen as disloyal to the Allies and were aware that the British supporters of the 1939 White Paper would have seized on such evidence to destroy Zionist ambitions. So the written record was fragmentary, obscured by code, and dispersed. The previous polemic on the Zionist leadership's failure to respond adequately to the challenges of the Holocaust has been based on available

records: protocols of official meetings, speeches at party conferences, and the like. But, Friling argues, it is a basic methodological mistake to take these records seriously, given that they were also available to British eyes. Instead, the researcher must read between the lines of Ben-Gurion's most confidential records, look closely at the activities of the Yishuv's rescue office in Istanbul, and examine newly released Allied intelligence records together with a rereading of sources that have been known for a while in order to come to a nuanced understanding of the engagement of the Yishuv's leadership in possible rescue and relief efforts.

Friling argues, convincingly to this reviewer, that the ultimate lack of success of the Yishuv to save European Jewry or any large part of it was not a failure of will, or a political choice. It was the result of the powerlessness of the Yishuv in the face of forces far stronger than itself.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

CATHERINE COQUERY-VIDROVITCH. *The History of African Cities South of the Sahara: From the Origins to Colonization*. Translated by MARY BAKER. Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener. 2005. Pp. xviii, 421. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$28.95.

Historians have previously largely ignored early African urban history, creating the misconception that cities did not exist prior to the European colonization of the continent in the nineteenth century, and that precolonial or ancient Africa was exclusively a rural, agricultural region of scattered villages. Urban centers in precolonial Africa were relatively rare and small in population, but their importance in politics, economics, and culture vastly outweighed those limitations. This book by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch is an English translation of a work originally published in French in 1993 that synthesizes a considerable amount of material, cutting across time and space restrictions. It provides a valuable overview of the major urban centers in ancient Africa as well as addressing some of the major issues in urban history generally and African urban history specifically, and posing important questions for further research.

Taking a general chronological approach, the book examines the major urban centers in all regions of precolonial Africa, including, among others, Meroe, the cities of the Western Sudanic empires, the Swahili city-states, Great Zimbabwe, and the ports of the transatlantic slave trade. Several common themes emerge from this disparate and dynamic group. African urban centers were demonstrably indigenous creations, although contact with Muslim Arab and later European traders contributed to the growth and transformation of cities. Metropolises emerged for military and security purposes, and as trade entrepôts, indigenous markets, specialized craft production centers, and political and

religious capitals. Rural economies supported the urban centers; the cities thus had to dominate the countryside for continued survival. Another commonality involves the dynamic response of cities to changing political, economic and religious influences, both internal and external which transformed, rather than created or disrupted these urban centers. Ultimately, urbanization was a long-term process, not a final product or result.

Several sections are particularly noteworthy. Chapter four deals with Islam and African cities, especially in the Western Sudan and the Swahili city-states on the Indian Ocean. Muslim Arab traders, crossing the Sahara Desert or sailing down the East African coast, encountered already existing population centers based on politics, economics, and cultural dynamics. In addition to contributing to the growth and centralization of these sites, Muslim traders and travelers made some of them seats of Islamic concentration and learning. Chapter five, focusing on Atlantic ports from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, is divided into the early rise of the slave trade and the eighteenth century, the trade's height. The confluence of African and European influences resulted in the development of a Creole culture, providing these cities with a distinctive character and organization. Given the recent spate of studies on the Atlantic slave trade and its impacts on Africa, this chapter offers a new perspective on the most visible remnants of African urban involvement in the trade, especially on their architecture.

Chapter six, the lengthiest and most detailed section, deals with the early and mid-nineteenth century, which the author considers a revolutionary period for African urban development. Centers already had their distinct features prior to European colonization, which most previous historians have pointed to as the defining moment in African urbanization. Coquery-Vidrovitch convincingly argues that the industrial revolution's impacts, especially increased contact and trade in many sorts of goods with Europeans, decisively fashioned these ports, although the dynamics differed radically between Western and Eastern Africa. In West Africa, urbanization took on a markedly mercantile and protocapitalist form. In East Africa, the continued Indian Ocean slave trade and the resultant local violence reinforced the military and political aspects of the ports. With the advent of colonialism, most of these cities were already shaped, and Europeans adapted to and expanded the existing natures, structures, and networks.

The author demonstrates the antiquity, dynamism, diversity, and complexity of African urban civilization prior to colonization. Rather than the traditional focus on late nineteenth-century European colonization, historians should turn their attention to the revolutionary period for African cities, before approximately the 1880s. Likewise, scholars should not assume cities in Africa are a recent development in the continent's history, or an import from the Arab, European, Asian, or Atlantic worlds; they have constituted an essential, if

largely overlooked, component of African history since antiquity. An understanding of the intensive and accelerating urbanization of Africa today necessitates an understanding of its long-term development.

The book contains an excellent and extensive bibliography, primarily of works published before 1994. It would serve well as a general or introductory text in undergraduate and graduate courses in urbanization, whether in African or global history.

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JAN VANSINA. *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom*. (Africa and the Diaspora: History, Politics, Culture.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2004. Pp. xiii, 354. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

This important work by one of the foremost historians of Central Africa is Jan Vansina's own translation of *Le Rwanda Ancien: Le royaume nyiginya* (2001), an original interpretation of Rwandese history from the beginning of the kingdom to the advent of the colonial era. It seeks to dislodge "false propositions" about Rwandese history from popular and scholarly consciousness.

The book's chapters follow a chronological progression from the "Central Rwanda on the Eve of the Emergence of the Kingdom," to "The Rwanda of Ndori," "Toward the Centralization of Power," "Government in the Eighteenth Century," "Social Transformations in the Nineteenth Century," "The Triumph of the Great Families and Its Consequences," "Nightmares: The Age of Rwabugiri (1867–1897)," and a conclusion on "History and the Present."

The book is informed by a rich archive of oral sources—referenced as *Ibiteekerezo* (1958–1962)—that documents the work of a dozen researchers, including Vansina, during the transition to Rwandan independence. The same sources now illuminate new questions raised by fifty years of postcolonial history, especially those of the post-genocide era after 1994. What were Rwanda's beginnings? Were they exceptional? What is the nature of the origin of the oppositional categories Hutu and Tutsi? What is the reason for violence in Rwanda? Is there a precedent? These questions would appear to be the stuff of historical reflection everywhere. How does one differentiate mythic sources from more factual sources? What accounts for the effective organization of a central government? What places do economic, social, military and ritual agents play in the maintenance of a state? How do memories of precolonial African states and institutions shape postcolonial events? In seeking an answer to these questions about the "antecedents of modern Rwanda," Vansina shows that the precolonial past does inform the postcolonial present, though it is not an inevitable slave to it.

Vansina's analysis of the sources stresses that Rwanda as a kingdom dates only from the seventeenth century, consolidated into a centralized state by Ndori. There were many *rwandas*, a term that used to mean the

principality of a ruler, or a region. Vansina rejects as "predynastic fairy tales" (Appendix 2) the versions of Rwandan history—principally those of the court, as assembled by Alexis Kagame—that trace Rwandese dynasties back a thousand years. In many ways Ndori's kingdom was similar to those of the Great Lakes region of the time. Distinctive to Ndori's *rwanda*, however, were the creation of a standing army, and all that this required by way of organization and provisions, and what it entailed in terms of the power structure in society.

Herd of cattle were created to feed the permanent armies, and this gave rise to royally favored herders and special concessions of grasslands. In effect, these herds were owned by the king and the grasslands were appropriated by the king. The association of cattle with wealth, power, and privilege gave rise to the Tutsi aristocracy. Those whose lands were expropriated, who became marginalized and were required to work for the herders, the armies, and the king, evolved into the Hutu class. The Tutsi-Hutu cleavage in Rwandan society is thus a function of the militarized late eighteenth and nineteenth-century kingdom. It is in no way, as many Rwandese and some in the Western media and popular press believe, a question of separate races or tribes.

The increasingly sharply drawn contrast of wealth and power to poverty, landlessness, and servility bred fierce competition among noble families in the court, as well as conquests for more land and pasture. Vansina details the escalating violence that ensued under King Rwabugiri (1867–1897), who settled many scores with assassination, and the killing of whole groups of the kin or local inhabitants of those who crossed him.

In his conclusion, Vansina raises the relationship of "History and the Present." Clearly these themes of the amassing of extreme power and control by an elite, and the exercise of violence and vengeance, presage the methods of the postcolonial era. Vansina would have Rwandese and others alike ponder this connection that is apparent, although not inevitable. His volume is carefully crafted around detailed evidence; it is convincing to this Africanist anthropologist. The organization and narrative of the book are straightforward; it may be recommended as a textbook for either college history classes or graduate seminars.

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DOROTHY L. HODGSON. *The Church of Women: Gendered Encounters Between Maasai and Missionaries*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2005. Pp. xvii, 307. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

KARI MIETTINEN. *On the Way to Whiteness: Christianization, Conflict and Change in Colonial Ovamboland, 1910–1965*. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura. Bibliotheca Historica, 92. 2005. Pp. 370. €29.00.

Although Dorothy L. Hodgson and Kari Miettinen both have produced books about missionary proselytizing

and Christian conversion in Africa, their books are strikingly different. Focusing on the Maasai of Tanzania, Hodgson investigates the work of American Spiritan (Catholic) missionaries in three communities, from the 1950s to the present. Miettinen, in contrast, focuses on the work of Finnish Lutheran missionaries among the Ovambo in Namibia from 1910 to 1965.

Even more significant than these ethnic, geographic, religious, and temporal differences is the dissimilarity in approach. Both authors make extensive use of government and missionary archives. Hodgson, however, complements these sources with interviews with American missionaries, Tanzanian catechists, and 175 ordinary Maasai women and men. Living among the Maasai converts she studied, her primary method of research was participant-observation. Miettinen, in contrast, conducted only a few interviews with elderly Ovambo pastors and teachers, but none with ordinary Ovambo congregants. These divergent research methods dramatically affected the authors' findings.

Hodgson's clearly focused, tightly written study approaches the question of conversion from the inside out, privileging Maasai over missionary perspectives. Her aim is to get to the bottom of a central paradox. Although Spiritan missionaries have concentrated on converting men, far more Maasai women than men have been attracted to Catholicism. Despite the best efforts of male missionaries to teach and baptize men, the Catholic Church has become a "Church of women." How and why, Hodgson asks, could this situation come to pass?

Investigating the internal dynamics of Maasai culture, Hodgson notes that historically, Maasai women have had significant powers in the religious/spiritual domain. They are believed to be more spiritual than men, which is manifest in their constant prayers. They have a special relationship with Eng'ai, the most important Maasai deity, who, like Maasai women, is responsible for creating and supporting life. Through their relationship with Eng'ai, women protect and ensure the prosperity of their families and herds and serve as the primary guardians of the Maasai moral order.

During the colonial period, the spiritual and secular realms, once united, were separated. While women were marginalized economically and politically, they grew more powerful in the spiritual domain. When the Spiritan missionaries arrived in the 1950s, with the hope of converting Maasai men, the men were indifferent—even hostile—to the new religion. Catholic teachings undermined what it meant to be "Maasai men" but reinforced, and even enhanced, women's preexisting spiritual roles. As the men turned their attention to the increasingly masculinized economic and political realms, women were drawn to the new spiritual one. They flocked to the Catholic Church despite official discouragement.

Thus, Catholic missionaries, who came to form male leaders among the Maasai, developed female leaders instead. In their attempt to reinforce the power of male elders, they actually subverted it, providing a means for

women to escape men's control. In fact, Maasai women used the new platform of Christianity to critique men, their alleged moral inferiority, and their material corruption. They used Catholicism to defend their view of a moral order in which the sacred and secular are one and where women and men respectfully complement one another.

Unlike many other scholars of African conversion, Hodgson argues that political and economic subordination alone do not account for women's attraction to Christianity. Although that religion has provided women with an alternative source of empowerment as their political and economic roles have been eroded, their spiritual power is deeply rooted in indigenous belief systems. It is not merely a function of their waning political and economic power. While other works on gender and power have tended to concentrate on the material world to the detriment of the moral order, Hodgson shifts the focus to the domain that is most important to Maasai women's identity. Similarly, most works on Christian conversion have tended to focus on men's experiences, wrongly generalizing them to society as a whole. By listening to the voices of Maasai women, Hodgson has presented us with a unique perspective that results in a wholly different understanding of conversion and its impact, one that clearly exposes the fallacy of earlier approaches.

In contrast to Hodgson's concise, cogently argued account, Miettinen's work, nearly 400 pages in length, has an unwieldy, dissertation-like quality. Where Hodgson's book gives preeminence to Maasai values and insights, Miettinen's work is based almost exclusively on archival sources. Ovambo perspectives, where they occur at all, generally are filtered through missionaries' eyes. While Hodgson poses questions from the inside out, Miettinen approaches Ovambo society from the outside. Although readers are provided with a clear view of missionary perspectives of the indigenous population, we learn little of Ovambo attitudes toward missionaries and their new religion. Although the author conducted a handful of interviews with elderly Ovambo pastors and teachers, these were privileged elites rather than average parishioners. In the absence of broadly based oral sources, we cannot begin to understand the innermost thoughts or spiritual motivations of the ordinary convert population.

In seeking to understand Ovambo conversion, Miettinen poses the following questions: what made Ovambos convert to Lutheran Christianity? How did missionaries alter Ovambo society? What sorts of social conflicts resulted between Christians and non-Christians in Ovambo society? Although these questions are important, the book would be even more valuable if it also considered the ways in which Ovambo spirituality and practices might have affected Lutheran Christianity—despite the missionaries' best intentions.

Miettinen claims that most Ovambo converted to Christianity for material and practical considerations and for reasons of social prestige. However, these claims are based almost exclusively on outsiders' ac-

counts, supplemented by the author's speculation, hunches, and instinct. The author acknowledges that some of his Ovambo informants may have believed that he worked for the Finnish Missionary Society. Acknowledging that the misunderstanding may have rendered his findings problematic—his informants' opinions were strikingly similar to those of the missionaries—Miettinen suggests that his book be read in tandem with Meredith McKittrick's 2002 book on Finnish missionary work among the Ovambo, which makes extensive use of oral data. While Miettinen focuses on external (missionary) factors to explain Christianity's appeal, McKittrick concentrates on internal Ovambo social dynamics. Unfortunately, the story cannot be broken into neat halves of a perfect whole. The absence of Ovambo perspectives in Miettinen's book does not leave half the story untold; it presents a distorted view. Missionary perspectives must be corrected, not simply complemented, by Ovambo insights.

Hodgson and Miettinen both have written about twentieth-century African conversion to Christianity. Hodgson's book is concise, accessible, and attempts to explain the phenomenon from Maasai women's perspective. Miettinen's book, in contrast, would have benefited from revision, distillation, and most importantly, the incorporation of Ovambo points of view. Despite these weaknesses, Miettinen's book, like Hodgson's, is an important contribution to the literature. Both should be of interest to scholars and academic libraries, while Hodgson's will be appealing to students as well.

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HENNING MELBER, editor. *Genozid und Gedenken: Namibisch-deutsche Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Frankfurt, Germany: Brandes and Apsel Verlag, 2005. Pp. 208. €16.90.

In 1904, the first genocide of the twentieth century was perpetrated by German colonial troops against the indigenous populations of German Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia). This collection of essays is one of the newest contributions to a growing, significant, and necessary field of study. However, as the current volume demonstrates, our understanding of the phenomenon is far from complete, and debates over its meaning and significance continue.

In this particular book, the authors recognize that they are examining this historical phenomenon from a contemporary European perspective. But, it is precisely through this lens that they desire "to process the past in the present of the future" (p. 10). According to editor Henning Melber, such an undertaking will enable them "to come to grips with a topic that still 100 years after the historical events has more to do with us than we were aware of" (p. 10).

In their informative and interesting contributions to the discussion, the various authors grapple with this contested terrain by focusing both on the event itself and on its significance for the present. Thus, the as-

sembled essays not only clarify and discuss what happened in the first decade of the twentieth century, but they also explore the implications of the past for the present and future, in particular with regard to nation building, civil society, collective memory, and identity construction in both postcolonial Namibia and a united Germany. The essays by Melber and Jürgen Zimmerer focus on explaining the genocide and its place within the histories of Germany and genocide. Christoph Marx goes a step further by critically assessing the current historiography and the controversies surrounding it.

This is particularly important, because there are real, tangible repercussions for today in placing this event within these two histories. Janntje Böhlke-Itzen examines the relationship between how the event is interpreted in Germany and the question of that country's responsibility for the past, specifically with regard to the payment of reparations. Malte Jaguttis also addresses the topic of reparations when he looks at the events of 1904 through the lens of international law. He argues that, according to the law of nations, the Herero are entitled to claim reparations. However, he notes that by ignoring or denying the genocide, Europeans continue to see the peoples of Africa as still "requiring civilization" (p. 139).

The true strength of the book lies in those essays that focus on how the genocide is remembered today and how that past is utilized. For example, Reinhart Kößler argues that how different groups view the past, most notably the Herero and the German-speakers, is a reflection of how they see their unequal positions in Namibian society today. Similarly, Jan-Bart Gewald and Melber examine how the Herero and SWAPO have each used the genocide to construct their own sense of identity, and how these identities are deployed in independent Namibia. The book concludes with an essay by Joachim Zeller that documents various activities surrounding the hundredth anniversary of the genocide, including the most important conferences, films, exhibits, committees, and events of 2004 in both Namibia and Germany.

The most original and noteworthy contribution of this collection is made by those essays dealing with historical memory. Previous works have dealt primarily with explaining the event and contextualizing it within broader historiographies. However, scholarly understanding of this event and its place in German and genocidal history is by no means complete. This is especially true in light of the recent publication of Isabel V. Hull's *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (2005). These essays place the genocide within the larger context not only of German history but also of European and world history as well as the history of genocide. Further, they raise an essential question: namely, what responsibility do we carry for the past, both individually and collectively? The collection will undoubtedly encourage further re-

search and debate and, consequently, expand the scope of those engaged in the conversation.

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GARY KYNOCH. *We Are Fighting the World: A History of the Marashea Gangs in South Africa, 1947-1999*. (New African Histories Series.) Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 200. Cloth \$44.95, paper \$22.95.

As this review is being written, urban South Africa is rocked daily by violent and horrific crimes, especially against women. What are the roots of this disregard for human life? Gary Kynoch's well-researched, provocative book provides one answer.

In this study of the Marashea, an ethnically based urban gang in South Africa, Kynoch pleads for the liberation of southern African social history from the limiting frame of African resistance against the colonial and apartheid states. He argues that the complexities of the lives of black South Africans call for much wider studies of their historical options and daily choices. Thus, for example, the violence described in this book did not emanate from the death squads of the apartheid state, but from an urban gang. This violence was tolerated by the state, true, but it developed and flourished, according to Kynoch, within a completely different register than that of social protest and resistance. By implication, African urban activities cannot all be automatically conceptualized as heroic.

The Marashea are ideal iconoclasts for Kynoch. Building on the well-known work of historian Philip Bonner, and of other social historians, Kynoch probes deeply for the first time into the social history of this mutual-aid-cum-criminal-society for migrant workers from Lesotho living in urban South Africa. Anywhere in South Africa, the term Marashea evokes images of bands of fighting men brandishing fighting sticks, clad colorfully in toga-like blankets (winters are very cold in mountainous Lesotho; blankets are sensible attire and have become markers of Basotho identity). The first male Basotho migrants worked in the gold mines around Johannesburg, but all forms of urban labor in South Africa have seen Basotho workers. Significantly, the stream of migrant workers included large numbers of women from the earliest days. The Marashea, or Russians, began after World War II. The first groups took the name because of the excellent fighting reputation of the Russian people gained during the war. Similarly, for a while, other Basotho dubbed themselves Majapane, the Japanese. The basic group structure remained relatively stable over time. Any male Basotho migrant was welcome to join; if he did so it meant a lifetime commitment to supporting Marashea activities through regular monetary contributions and his own participation as a fighter whenever called upon by the gang's elected leadership.

Marashea groups primarily defended communities of migrant Basotho workers by providing physical protection and "a haven of familiarity" (p. 69) in the harsh

cities. In sympathetic but unsentimental language, Kynoch traces the frequent internecine confrontations between various Marashea gangs, and their relations with other ethnic migrant worker groups (antagonistic); with settled township residents (predatory); with the South African police (corrupt), the state (generally mutually nonconfrontational), and the legal establishment (expensive); and with home communities back in Lesotho (ambiguous).

A large component of Marashea activity over the decades has been peacefully focused on providing financial aid from group funds for members' medical, legal, burial and funeral costs, and promoting Basotho cultural activities. These functions will be familiar to scholars and students of migrant labor throughout southern Africa. However, the Marashea can be differentiated from other groups by their notorious proclivity for violence. Kynoch does not prevaricate: the Russians fought brutally with each other and with the men of other ethnically organized gangs; preyed relentlessly on township residents through robberies and protection rackets; and fought with political groups such as the often more middle-class-like African National Congress (ANC). Being willing to fight designated enemies was a requirement of Marashea membership; battles (occasionally involving hundreds of fighters) were common. Thoroughly beating opponents with *melamu* (fighting clubs or sticks) gave way to outright and ubiq-

uitous killing as access to firearms became easier from the 1960s onwards.

But the Marashea had another purpose, which Kynoch describes superbly: the sustenance of a male identity through the control/ownership of women; crucially, "violence has been a key element in acquiring and maintaining that control" (p. 43). Basotho women seeking protection could join a gang voluntarily; others were forced into a life with a Marashea gang. In either case, allocation of women as sexual partners to male members and the collection of the proceeds of women's economic activities such as beer brewing and prostitution were fundamental to the ability of the Russians to maintain themselves. As one informant replied when asked how men contributed to Marashea, "Their role is to kill, commit robberies, and kidnap women" (p. 47). Here Kynoch's refusal to portray the Russians heroically is rewarded, as the often horrific violence meted out to non-performing, rebellious, or desirable women can be understood as integral to the gangs' *raison d'être*. In this way, gender-based violence is shown to be intrinsic to one aspect of the social experience of urban South Africa.

This thought-provoking book will reward close study by social historians of southern Africa and of urban cultures elsewhere.

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Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

CHRISTOPHER LESLIE BROWN and PHILIP D. MORGAN, editors. *Arming Slaves: From Classical Times to the Modern Age*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2006. Pp. xvi, 368. \$35.00.

PETER HUNT, Arming Slaves and Helots in Classical Greece. REUVEN AMITAI, The Mamlūk Institution, or One Thousand Years of Military Slavery in the Islamic World. JOHN THORNTON, Armed Slaves and Political Authority in Africa in the Era of the Slave Trade, 1450–1800. ALLEN ISAACMAN and DEREK PETERSON, Making the Chikunda: Military Slavery and Ethnicity in Southern Africa, 1750–1900. JANE LANDERS, Transforming Bondsmen into Vassals: Arming Slaves in Colonial Spanish America. HENDRIK KRAAY, Arming Slaves in Brazil from the Seventeenth Century to the Nineteenth Century. PHILIP D. MORGAN and ANDREW JACKSON O'SHAUGHNESSY, Arming Slaves in the American Revolution. DAVID GEGGUS, The Arming of Slaves in the Haitian Revolution. LAURENT DUBOIS, Citizen Soldiers: Emancipation and Military Service in the Revolutionary French Caribbean. PETER BLANCHARD, The Slave Soldiers of Spanish South America: From Independence to Abolition. JOSEPH P. REIDY, Armed Slaves and the Struggles for Republican Liberty in the U.S. Civil War. ADA FERRER, Armed Slaves and Anticolonial Insurgency in Late Nineteenth-Century Cuba. CHRISTOPHER LESLIE BROWN, The Arming of Slaves in Comparative Perspective.

ANN CURTHOYS and MARILYN LAKE, editors. *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective*. Canberra, Australia: Australian National University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 278. AU\$25.00.

TONY BALLANTYNE, Putting the Nation in Its Place? World History and C. A. Bayly's *The Birth of the Modern World*. MICHAEL A. McDONNELL, Paths Not Yet Taken, Voices Not Yet Heard: Rethinking Atlantic History. ANGELA WOOLLACOTT, Postcolonial Histories and Catherine Hall's *Civilising Subjects*. EMMA CHRISTOPHER, Steal a Handkerchief, See the World: The Trans-Oceanic Voyaging of Thomas Limpus. JOHN FITZGERALD, Revolution and Respectability: Chinese Masons in Australian History. MARGARET ALLEN, "Innocents Abroad" and "Prohibited Immigrants": Australians in India and Indians in

Australia 1890–1910. A. JAMES HAMMERTON, Postwar British Emigrants and the "Transnational Moment": Exemplars of a "Mobility Of Modernity"? DESLEY DEACON, "Films as Foreign Offices": Transnationalism at Paramount in the Twenties and Early Thirties. JILL JULIUS MATTHEWS, Modern Nomads and National Film History: The Multi-Continental Career of J. D. Williams. HSU-MING TEO, The Americanisation of Romantic Love in Australia. JOHN MAYNARD, Transcultural/Transnational Interaction and Influences on Aboriginal Australia. MARILYN LAKE, From Mississippi to Melbourne via Natal: The Invention of the Literacy Test as a Technology of Racial Exclusion. PATRICK WOLFE, Islam, Europe and Indian Nationalism: Towards a Postcolonial Transnationalism.

OCEANIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

TONY BALLANTYNE and BRIAN MOLOUGHNEY, editors. *Disputed Histories: Imagining New Zealand's Pasts*. New Zealand: Otago University Press. 2006. Pp. 283. \$49.95.

TONY BALLANTYNE and BRIAN MOLOUGHNEY, Angles of Vision. ATHOLL ANDERSON, Retrievable Time: Prehistoric Colonisation of South Polynesia from the Outside in and the Inside out. MICHAEL P. J. REILLY, Leadership in Ancient Polynesia. TONY BALLANTYNE and BRIAN MOLOUGHNEY, Asia in Murihiku: Towards a Transnational History of Colonial Culture. JUDITH BINNEY, "In-Between" Lives: Studies from within a Colonial Society. DAVID THOMSON, Marriage and the Family on the Colonial Frontier. MILES FAIRBURN, Is there a Good Case for New Zealand Exceptionalism? BRONWYN DALLEY, Chance Residues: Photographs and Social History. BARBARA L. BROOKES, A Germaine Moment: Style, Language and Audience. ERIK OLSEN, The Shaping of a Field.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

ROBERT M. S. McDONALD, editor. *Thomas Jefferson's Military Academy: Founding West Point*. (Jeffersonian America.) Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2004. Pp. xix, 233. \$35.00.

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Other Books Received

The following books were recently received in the AHR office. Books listed here do not include works scheduled for review.

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- BOURNE, RUSSELL. *Cradle of Violence: How Boston's Waterfront Mobs Ignited the American Revolution.* Hoboken, N. J.: Wiley. 2006. Pp. xiii, 272. \$24.95.
- BRAY, KINGSLEY M. *Crazy Horse: A Lakota Life.* (The Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 254.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2006. Pp. xviii, 486. \$34.95.
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- COBB, JAMES C. *The Brown Decision, Jim Crow, and Southern Identity.* (Mercer University Lamar Memorial Lectures, number 48.) Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2005. Pp. x, 93. \$22.95.
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ARTICLES

TO THE EDITORS:

An omission occurred in my article "Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of Commodity Exchange in the United States, 1875–1905" (*AHR*, April 2006, 333), which I caught after the article was in print, and for which I am responsible. Footnote 105 should read as follows:

William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (Boston, 1907), 113. In *Pragmatism and Political Economy*, 158–224, James Livingston first demonstrated that the original pragmatists grasped the epistemological possibilities residing in the radical contingency of the credit economy—"the future tense of money"—created by corporate capitalism. The foundational work of scholarship linking the thought of James and Holmes is still Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism* (New York, 1949), which argues that the two shared a "revolt against formalism." See also Morton J. Horwitz, *The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy* (New York, 1994), 454–463, and Menand, *Metaphysical Club*, 409–433. Others have commented on the triumph of probability and its ideological consequences in this period. See Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*, which focuses on another American pragmatist, Charles Peirce; and Jackson Lears, *Some-*

thing for Nothing: Luck in America (New York, 2003), 187–227, which posits an incomplete victory for a culture of corporate control over a William Jamesian culture of chance.

JON LEVY

REVIEWS

TO THE EDITORS:

Michael A. Genovese, reviewing Robert Mason's book on Richard Nixon (*AHR*, February 2006, 234), says that the difficulties of LBJ led to this: "Republicans, for the first time in thirty years, entertained the possibility they might become the majority party in America." After the Republicans won both the House and Senate in 1946, they expected to win the presidency in 1948. Most political commentators agreed. Harry S Truman eliminated that hope, but the possibility existed less than thirty years before the period discussed.

BERNARD SINSHEIMER
Boulogne, France

Michael A. Genovese does not wish to respond.

TO THE EDITORS:

A reviewer is expected to present the main theme(s) and argument of the book being reviewed, and introduce the author. In reviewing my *Identity and the Urban Experience: Fin-de-Siècle Budapest* (*AHR*, June 2006, 926), Steven Beller failed to do this. He nonetheless informs the reader that the author "does not succeed very well at achieving . . . [his] goals."

While the book does, as Beller indicates, examine "such topics as Budapest's parks, cafés, bridges, department stores, and panoramas," those were the sites of inquiry, not the point of the work, which examined various ways of perceiving and using public places and institutions in the metropolis.

Beller complains that the book relies on Hungarian

scholarship and that other "Central European perspectives that would have been of great interest are largely missing." Alas, one wishes that more such works had been published in the 1990s and thus were available to me. Yet he also admits that "Gyáni does cite many international authors." What is the problem? Too few? The wrong ones?

Of the books he mentions, apart from Lukacs's essay (not very scholarly), Congdon's and Gluck's are neither urban nor social history. Alice Freifeld produced her monograph after the Hungarian edition of mine was published—and she even cited it.

He claims that three "international" (!) authors are "especially" cited. In fact, there were eighty-seven, including many British, American (Beller also included), and several French, German, Swedish, and Austrian scholars. That is when someone concentrates "on works in one's own language." Why is Pierre Bourdieu not cited? Why, other than his current popularity, should he be? Other theorists seem more pertinent to the questions being asked. Beller says that the book gives "much less than it ought" because "Where there is interesting empirical thesis, theory is shortchanged; where there is an interesting thesis, the evidence is kept from us." The only example mentioned concerns "the peculiarities of Budapest's language(s)." Beller regrets that "when Gyáni's study [on that point] gets quite interesting theoretically . . . , he cuts off his discussion without giving much in the way of example." The only thing that is not indicated here is that "The examples mentioned cannot be reproduced here for these are untranslatable idioms" (*Identity*, 195).

That Beller's own work has dealt extensively with Central European Jews, particularly in Vienna, probably accounts for his extensive discussion of my very limited treatment of Jews. But why are interconfessional marriage and divorce law liberalization "dubious evidence" of assimilation? International social science specialists take such indicators seriously. Beller seems most upset by my argument about the significance of non-Jewish contributions to Budapest modernism, doubtless because it undercuts his own thesis that the "Central European modern culture was predominantly a product of the educated elite of the region's Jewish bourgeoisie, and dependent on the cultural and historical experience of the group" (*Austrian History Yearbook*, 1992, 77). Not exclusively Lajos Fülep, the alienated aesthete, but a major part of the Budapest poets, novelists, painters, composers, and other creative artists who had a prominent role in cultural modernism of the day were to represent the non-Jewish middle classes. And, contrary to Beller's suggestion, this was also discussed in the book through several notable examples (Endre Ady, Dezső Kosztolányi, Mihály Babits, Béla Bartók, Zoltán Kodály, and the painters of the Eight). All of them had the decisive experience of perceiving social impermanence as a fact of life, which was closely bound up with a severe identity crisis. This, however, was not the sole privilege of "a very particular group of 'Central Europeans,' the Jewish bourgeoisie,"

who thus must be given "a central place in that explanation" (*Austrian History Yearbook*, 1992, 77 and 79).

Beller says that my book is "sketchy" and "cannot . . . be trusted much in its conclusions." I suggest, however, that it is Beller's careless and sketchy review that ought not to be trusted.

GÁBOR GYÁNI

STEVEN BELLER RESPONDS:

Professor Gyáni claims that I do not tell the reader what the book is about. In the first paragraph of my review, I lay out the book's main themes—the international context, the public and private sides of Budapestian urban experience—and also indicate how Gyáni wants to tie this in to Budapest's cultural modernism. I think this an accurate summary.

Especially relevant is Gyáni's intent to derive explanations and characterizations of Budapest's cultural modernism from the social historical context constructed by him. That is why I find Gyáni's dismissal of Congdon and Gluck's work as "neither urban nor social history" perplexing, for surely any claims about the nature of Budapest's cultural modernism would also need to refer to the cultural and intellectual history treated by Congdon and Gluck? I also find the offhand dismissal of Bourdieu odd considering the topic, but that would not matter if Gyáni's argument were more compelling.

I happily accept Gyáni's claim that he cited eighty-seven "international authors" in his book. Yet I see no reason to alter my view that Gyáni's view of Budapest remains remarkably "Hungarian," typically wishing to see Budapest in a Western perspective rather than a Central European one. The "Central European perspectives" I found lacking referred to the large international literature that had, by the 1990s, accumulated about other Central European cities at the turn of the century, most notably Vienna 1900. Had Gyáni devoted more time to that literature, he might have had a more nuanced sense of the *shared* Central European modern culture of the turn of the century, and more understanding of the central, "predominant" (but neither "sole" nor exclusive) role that Jews played in that *shared* inter-urban culture.

There clearly is disagreement between us on the Jewish aspect to Budapest 1900. On Gyáni's characterization of the effects of changes to the marriage laws in the 1890s, for example, it is not the evidence that I find "dubious" but rather his treatment of that evidence. Gyáni's conclusion concerning the relatively high divorce rates among Jews after this liberalization is that "For the Jews it meant that at long last they could break out of the religious-ethnic ghetto and via a mixed marriage take a giant step toward complete absorption and assimilation" (170). It is this assertion that I characterized as "reductive social history," for it ascribes to individuals one holistic motive when many (individual) motives were possible, and then extrapolates from a

small set of cases to implicate the whole group of "the Jews" of Budapest. I do not dispute that assimilation was a goal of many and acculturation a fact, but I cannot see why divorce and remarriage was anything more for many Jewish individuals than an exercising of their new-found freedom to marry whom they wished.

Nor would I dispute that many non-Jews were involved in Hungarian cultural modernism, as indeed were many non-Jews in the cultural modernism of Vienna and other Central European cities. Yet beside Gyáni's impressive list of non-Jewish Magyar cultural modernists, I would offer another list of Hungarian Jewish contributors to Central European modern culture, which would include Lukács, Molnár, the Polanyis, Hatvany, Mannheim, Hauser, Jaszi, Fenyő, Ferenczi, Herzl, Nordau, et al. I would like to see addressed the ethnic patterns and developments behind such lists, especially which groups provided the crucial financial and social support for the culture. Gyáni sees

Budapest's ethnic multiplicity concerning mass culture, but this multiethnic perspective fades away when we consider Budapest's specific contribution to cultural modernism in favor of a general "identity crisis." One needs to go to another Hungarian social historian, Victor Karady (not cited by Gyáni), to find out that roughly 70 percent of *Hungary's* educated class around 1900 was not Magyar by descent, and that Jews were 25 percent of the *national* educated class, with presumably a much higher concentration in Budapest, where Jews were a quarter of the population. The detailed history of Budapest Jewry's contribution to Hungarian and Central European modern culture still needs to be written. Using Lajos Fülep rhetorically to prove that "modernism" was not exclusively Jewish simply serves to obscure and distract from the, indeed, central cultural role of Jews in Budapest 1900.

STEVEN BELLER
Washington, D.C.

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
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
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
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



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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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

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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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


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
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

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

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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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

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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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